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Abstract 
This thesis asks why some ethnic insurgencies in Myanmar have de-escalated since 2011, 
while others re-escalated concurrently. It investigates this puzzle by zooming into the 
country’s most important ethnic armies: the Karen National Union (KNU) and the Kachin 
Independence Organisation (KIO). 
Findings from nine months of ethnographically-informed field research in the Kachin and 
Karen borderlands reveal that internal contestations within both movements have driven 
their respective conflict and negotiation strategies with the state. These intramural conflicts 
were sparked in the context of changing political economies in the country’s borderlands 
that enabled the enrichment of individual rebel leaders but eroded their authority within 
their movements.  
The original contribution of this thesis is two-fold:  
Theoretically, the thesis contributes to the emerging literature on the internal dimensions 
of rebel groups by moving away from the prevalent focus on rebel elites and rational-
decision making. Instead, it conceptualises insurgency as a social process between 
differently situated elite and non-elite actors, grounding itself within relational sociology. 
This appreciates how social dynamics - including figurational interdependencies, 
reciprocal power relations, and embodied practices - develop a momentum of their own 
in driving political violence. In doing so, it is suggested that the emergence and erosion of 
leadership authority in rebel groups depends on whether elites address their grassroots’ 
claim to recognition, enabling the latter to develop and maintain self-perceived positive 
social identities through affiliation to the insurgent collective. 
Empirically, the thesis contributes to a better understanding of one of the world’s longest 
ongoing but least researched civil wars by presenting original findings on its most 
important rebel groups, particularly with regards to the often uneasy relations between 
rebel elites and their grassroots and the ways in which internal contestation drives their 
strategies. Its findings also have implications for policy in so far as they highlight the 
pitfalls of counterinsurgency and peacebuilding approaches that aim at fragmenting rebel 
movements and/or privilege the material interests of elites over issues surrounding 
recognition and identity that – as this thesis shows – are underpinning ethnonational 
insurgencies. 
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CHAPTER I – 
INTRODUCTION  
 
1 Introduction  
Civil Wars are often fought by multiple insurgency movements simultaneously. Why 
would one rebel group decide to engage in negotiations with the incumbent state at 
the same time that another movement leaves the negotiation table and returns to the 
battlefield? This thesis will argue that in order to explain such seemingly paradoxical 
conduct it is necessary to explore the intramural relations within insurgency 
movements, specifically the vertical relations between rebel leaders and their 
grassroots. The argument presented in this thesis is that the strategic choice of 
insurgency movements to engage in negotiations or return to the battlefield is the 
outcome of a social process between differently situated and interdependent elite and 
non-elite actors. In particular, this choice is driven by the internal struggle of rival rebel 
leaders over authority within their own movement. Rebel leaders capture authority if 
they satisfy the claims to recognition among their grassroots, their authority erodes if 
they do not. This argument stands in contrast to conventional analyses of civil wars 
that view rebel groups as unitary actors, whose strategic conduct can be explained as 
a function of their external utility expectations. It rather contributes to an emerging 
body of literature that looks to the internal politics of non-state armed groups in order 
to understand wider dynamics of conflict.  
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Myanmar is an informative case to study the often contradicting ways in which 
insurgencies fight or negotiate with the state. The country has been tormented by 
decades of civil war between its central state and multiple ethnic insurgencies, striving 
for greater autonomy in its restive borderlands. In January 2012, leaders of the Karen 
National Union (KNU), the Myanmar’s longest running insurgency movement, 
signed a historic ceasefire with the government of a country, which has been emerging 
from decades of military dictatorship after the administration of President U Thein 
Sein started to embrace a wide-ranging reform agenda with its advent to power in 
March 2011. At the same time, violence erupted between the Kachin Independence 
Organisation (KIO) and Myanmar’s army after the collapse of a 17 years-long ceasefire 
the year before. Since then conflict between government troops and various ethnic 
armies at the Myanmar-Chinese border has escalated to extents unseen since the late 
1980s. This has not only resulted in a humanitarian catastrophe, it has also presented 
one of the most pressing obstacles to peace and wider transition in Myanmar (cf. 
Burma News International 2015).  
 By investigating the divergent strategies of the Kachin and Karen insurgencies 
in comparison, the thesis’s goal is twofold. On an empirical level, the thesis seeks to 
explain why the Kachin insurgency has returned to the trenches at a time when the 
Karen insurgency chose to engage on the negotiation table. These shifting conflict 
dynamics have puzzled political observers and scholars alike, who lack adequate 
explanations for the contradicting strategies of both movements. On a theoretical level, 
the aim is to improve our theoretical understanding of a phenomenon that we know 
little about: the ways in which dynamics internal to armed groups drive the strategic 
choices of their leaders. The case selection makes a significant contribution to our 
empirical and theoretical knowledge feasible. On the one hand, the Karen and Kachin 
insurgencies are crucial stakeholders in Myanmar’s civil war. Gaining a better 
understanding of their politics is pivotal for understanding wider dynamics of conflict 
in the country. On the other hand, they feature important similarities to ethnonational 
insurgency movements elsewhere in the world. The theoretical arguments presented 
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in this thesis can, therefore, be brought into a meaningful conversation with other 
cases.   
To introduce the thesis, the following chapter will first present its empirical 
puzzle, surrounding the divergent strategies of the Karen and Kachin insurgencies, 
which remains unexplained by the available literature on Myanmar. In light of this, 
the chapter will then briefly review an emerging corpus of literature that looks to the 
internal politics of non-state armed groups upon which this thesis will build for 
developing an analytical framework that can address the empirical puzzle. Based on 
this, the chapter will elaborate on the thesis’s primary and subsidiary research 
questions. In a next step, the chapter will explain the comparative research design to 
demonstrate the wider significance of this study for other cases before it will end with 
a brief outline of the following chapters.  
2 Myanmar’s Insurgent Borderlands 
Myanmar’s borderlands have historically given birth to a dazzling array of non-
state armed groups. The most important of these are ethno-national movements that 
emerged as a result of militarised and violent identity formation processes during the 
colonial period and the Second World War. These movements started to fight the post-
independence state after the latter failed to guarantee autonomy rights for ethnic 
minorities located in the country’s border regions (South 2008, 1–22). Besides 
operating guerrilla armies, many of the ethnic armed groups in question developed 
political wings and administrative capacities with which they maintain extensive 
parallel governance systems, generating revenues and public goods, in their “liberated 
territories” (Smith 2007, 16). In addition, several smaller militias operate in 
Myanmar’s border areas. Many of them fight for the government or just act as armed 
criminal gangs. This complex situation is manifested by the fact that the exact number 
of Myanmar’s non-state armed groups let alone combatants, is unclear and remains in 
Chapter I – Introduction 
12 | P a g e  
 
constant flux. The following non-exhaustive map of the various areas where non-state 
armed groups operate in Myanmar illustrates this situation (cf. map 1).1 
                                                        
1 In early 2016, the local information platform Myanmar Peace Monitor counted 18 ethnic armed 
groups, 13 of which had bilateral ceasefire agreements with the government. Their military 
strength, territorial control, and political weight varies from groups commanding less than 100 
soldiers and possess no territorial foothold to groups with several thousand men strong armies that 
govern relatively sophisticated insurgent states. In addition, the platform recorded 58 pro-
government militias, including 23 Border Guard Force (BGF) militias, with more than 326 soldiers 
each, and 35 People’s Militia Groups (PMG) and other anti-insurgency militias, with up to 100 
soldiers each and less-formalised command structures (Burma News International 2015). 
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Map 1: Non-state armed groups in Myanmar’s borderlands. Ethnic armed insurgency groups are 
shown in colour while pro-government militias are shown in grey. The KNU is denoted in blue and 
the KIO in red. The map is not exhaustive (Source: Burma News International 2014, 45). 
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This thesis concentrates on the two most important non-state armed groups in the 
country, the ethno-national Karen and Kachin insurgencies, with the aim to explain 
their opposite strategic moves. The following maps illustrate this divergence and 
puzzle well. Map 2 shows the areas of active fighting in 2010. At the eve of Myanmar’s 
transition, most ethnic armed groups located on the Chinese border, not least the KIO, 
had working bilateral ceasefire agreements with Myanmar’s government, most of 
which were agreed in the early and mid-1990s. At this point in time, fighting was 
mostly confined to Myanmar’s eastern and western borderlands, with the heaviest 
battles raging between Myanmar’s armed forces, known as the Tatmadaw, and the 
Karen insurgents of the KNU at the Thai border. Map 3 shows how these dynamics 
have reversed in 2011 and 2012. On the one hand, a new wave of ceasefires has 
stabilised the situation on the Thai (and also Indian) border. The most important of 
these agreements was the KNU ceasefire of 2012, which brought unprecedented 
stability to Myanmar’s south-eastern Karen State, a region that had long been the most 
heated battleground of the country.2 On the other hand, the breakdown of the Kachin 
ceasefire in 2011, which had been central to stability in the Myanmar-Chinese 
borderlands for 17 years, concurrently plunged northern Myanmar back into fully-
fledged military hostilities between several ethnic armed groups and the Tatmadaw (cf. 
Farrelly 2012).  
                                                        
2 While the Arakan Liberation Party (ALP) has also signed ceasefire with the government, the 
situation on the Bangladeshi border has deteriorated rather than improved as sectarian violence 
between Buddhist and Muslim communities has since engulfed this border area (Burma News 
International 2015).  
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Map 2: Conflict area in 2010 & Map 3: Conflict area in 2013: The left map shows the area of ongoing 
armed conflict with various ethnic armed groups in 2010 before the new ceasefire wave. It does not 
show the ceasefire areas before 2010, as some of them overlap with the conflict zones due to different 
armed groups operating in the same areas. The right map shows how in relation to armed fighting 
by ethnic armed groups the landscape of escalation and de-escalation has shifted by 2013. The 
abbreviations BGF (Border Guard Force) and PMF (Paramilitary Force) denote areas held by 
government controlled militias (Source: Burma News International 2013a, 2,4). 
Scholars and political analysts have struggled to explain why some of the 
country’s ethnic insurgencies returned to the trenches at the time others chose to 
negotiate. On the one hand, the rapprochement between the government and various 
ethnic armed groups seemed to fit with wider political transition in Myanmar 
(International Crisis Group 2011). In particular, the ceasefire with the KNU, long 
regarded as the country’s least compromising rebel group, seemed to testify to the 
significance of these transformations (Burke, December 02, 2012; Mydans, December 
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02, 2012). On the other hand, the escalation of conflict on the Chinese border could 
not easily be brushed away as an anomaly. The ferocity with which the KIO and other 
insurgencies, including Palaung, Kokang and Shan forces, took up arms again, seemed 
particularly bewildering because these northern borderlands long appeared 
comparatively stable with regional ceasefires providing economic benefits to elites of 
all sides since the early 1990s (International Crisis Group 2012). In the absence of 
satisfactory explanations for the divergent trajectories of the two most important ethnic 
armed groups in Myanmar, this thesis has been driven by the following empirical 
puzzle: Why did the Karen insurgency sign a ceasefire in 2012 and why did the Kachin ceasefire 
collapse in 2011? 
 No academic study has yet addressed this question. That said, an edited volume 
on the Kachin ceasefire was published at the very time that this thesis was submitted 
(Sadan 2016b). Edited by cultural historian Mandy Sadan, it deals with several aspects 
of the Kachin ceasefire years between 1994 and 2011, including the personal 
experiences of Kachin students (Sadan 2016), the development of culture and arts 
(Hedström 2016), as well as the political economy of the ceasefire (Jones 2016; Woods 
2016). The historic contextualisation of the Kachin ceasefire demonstrates that cycles 
of conflict escalation and de-escalation have long been characteristic of Myanmar’s 
decades-long ethnic conflict (Anderson and Sadan 2016; Smith 2016). Importantly, its 
contributors highlight the dire experience among local Kachin communities during the 
ceasefire, which did not deliver on its initial promise of peace and development (Ibid.). 
The contributors, hence, provide an important corrective to the narrative of some 
political observers and policy-makers. Many of the latter have grown increasingly 
upset with the renewed Kachin resistance at a time of wider transition. As Sadan 
pointedly comments, to many Western policy-makers and journalists it seemed ‘that 
“the Kachin” were spoiling the party for everyone else’ (Sadan 2016a, 12). The volume 
also includes two brief accounts on the Karen ceasefire (Gravers 2016; Walton 2016). 
Both of the latter argue that the KNU is highly fragmented (as is Karen society) and 
that its ceasefire seems unstable because of its lacking code of conduct, without which 
violations of the agreement seem likely (Ibid.). Much of the following thesis agrees 
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with these forthcoming essays. Yet, their analyses alone do not provide a satisfactory 
explanation for why the KIO chose to take up arms again in 2011, nor do they explain 
why the KNU started to engage in negotiations at about the same time.  
In fact, the divergent strategies of both movements reveal the shortcomings of 
frameworks that understand the strategic choices of Myanmar’s ethnic armed groups 
with regards to their ceasefire politics as a function of their political and economic 
incentive structures. This logic is common in scholarly and policy analyses of 
Myanmar’s armed conflict. Many scholars have identified political grievances, 
surrounding ethnic discrimination and marginalisation, as the root cause of 
Myanmar’s civil war that motivates insurgency movements, including the KIO and 
the KNU, to struggle for autonomy against an authoritarian and ethnocratic state 
(Martin J. Smith 1999; South 2008; Sadan 2013; Walton 2013). Unsurprisingly then, 
policy analysts have highlighted the country’s changed political context since the end 
of military dictatorship in 2011 for explaining why several ethnic armed groups, 
including the KNU, agreed to new ceasefires (International Crisis Group 2011; Peace 
Donor Support Group 2013). In a forthcoming chapter Matthew Walton also pointed 
out that 
‘Myanmar President Thein Sein had prioritized ceasefires with 
ethnic revolutionary groups when he assumed office in March 
2011 and the agreement with the Karen seemed to be an 
indication of the seriousness with which he planned to pursue this 
goal.’ (Walton 2016, 250) 
While it indeed appears as if the KNU signed the 2012 ceasefire because Myanmar’s 
reforms finally opened a window of opportunity to engage on the negotiation table, 
the concurrent breakdown of the Kachin ceasefire demonstrates that we cannot simply 
infer the strategies of ethnic armed groups from their changing political landscape. In 
fact, armed conflict has re-escalated and spread along the Chinese border ever since 
Myanmar embarked on its political transition. At the time of writing, an alliance of 
Kachin, Palaung, Kokang and Shan forces remain locked in battle with the Tatmadaw.  
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The fierceness of the renewed fighting in Kachin State does not only stand in 
contrast with Myanmar’s overall political transition and move towards peace. It seems 
particularly puzzling because the Kachin ceasefire lasted for nearly two decades. In 
explaining its long-term stability scholars and political analysts have pointed to the 
economic incentives that the ceasefire agreement yielded to key elites of all sides 
(Smith 1999, 441; Sherman 2003; International Crisis Group 2003; Woods 2011, 
2016). Incoming Chinese investments, a lucrative natural resource base, and a 
counterinsurgency approach that sought to turn rebel leaders into business partners 
had indeed served to establish close working relations between former enemies. 
Moreover, the revolutionary ambitions, military capacities, and local support 
networks of the KIO have withered away while their leaders profited from the spoils 
of lucrative economies in collaboration with Myanmar’s establishment (Ibid.). Yet, 
since the reescalation of conflict in northern Myanmar the KIO, under the leadership 
of Gen. Sumlut Gun Maw, has surprised with uncompromising political demands, 
military strength, and organizational discipline. Moreover, the insurgency again seems 
to enjoy vast popular support among the wider Kachin society (Farrelly 2012; Sadan 
2016a).  
The shifting strategic choices of the KNU and the KIO can, therefore, not be 
deduced from the changing political and economic incentive structures in Myanmar’s 
borderlands, i.e. political transition and ceasefire economies. While political and 
economic incentives might well have played a role for KNU leaders for deciding to 
sign a ceasefire in 2012, they cannot explain why the KIO ceasefire broke down the 
year before. For explaining the inversely shifting strategies of the Karen and Kachin 
movements, it seems necessary to zoom into the politics of both insurgency 
movements themselves. While this might seem like a banal starting point, the 
memories of Aung Naing Oo, a peace negotiator of the Myanmar government, 
illustrates how little knowledge about the intrinsic dynamics of these movements 
actually exists, even among local experts. Aung Naing Oo’s reflections on negotiations 
with several Karen armed groups in 2014 highlight that these are pivotal for 
understanding the strategies of ethnic armed groups:  
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'For two days and two nights, we listened to various officials from 
rival groups, local authorities and local commanders of the 
Myanmar armed forces. By the second night of listening to these 
various accusations, counter-accusations, local situations and 
history of these local conflicts, my notebook was almost full. But 
most importantly, I could no longer take notes. So I just wrote one 
word “Tha-book-oo,” which is the name of a fruit. It has a labyrinth 
of fabric inside so intricate that no one knows the beginning, the 
middle or the end. Put differently, I thought I knew the protagonists 
and conflict situation in Karen State since I once worked with the 
Karen National Union. But my trip proved that I was wrong. Even 
within groups that broke away from the mainstream Karen armed 
movement, there were many layers of relationships, feuds, history 
of conflicts, friendships and camaraderie. […] How about all of 
these groups with their localized situations, with their own layers of 
allegiances, kinships, alliances, tribal divides, broken social fabric, 
grievances, war economy, territorial interests and political and 
negotiation cultures?’ (Aung Naing Oo, June 5, July 2014) 
 To be sure, the small community of scholars who have conducted extensive 
field research on Myanmar’s ethnic armed groups highlight their multifaceted 
character. Smith’s encyclopaedic history of Myanmar’s ethnic conflict is still one of 
the most authoritative resources on the topic (Smith 1999). Based on multiple years of 
research during the 1980s, Smith sheds light on the intricate backgrounds of 
Myanmar’s ethnic insurgencies including the interaction of political ideologies and 
ethnic identities, the idiosyncrasies of rebel leaders, the shifting alliances and 
antagonisms between and among different groups, their reliance on localised 
transborder economies, and the oft-occurring infighting between rival leaders. Ashley 
South has also conducted extensive first-hand research on Myanmar’s ethnic armed 
groups, most importantly on Karen and Mon armed groups at the Thai border (South 
2008, 2013). His work highlights the complex relations between ethnic armed groups 
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and local communities, including the often overlapping local governance 
arrangements of various armed groups in eastern Myanmar in the 1990s and early 
2000s. Sadan’s detailed history of the Kachin conflict is also based on years of field 
research in Myanmar’s northern borderlands (Sadan 2013). It demonstrates how 
international, national and local politics have interacted in creating Kachin ethnic 
identity and the ethno-national ideology of the KIO. Her account stresses not only the 
need to understand the hidden non-state histories of Myanmar’s borderlands for 
understanding Myanmar’s ethnic conflict, but also the particular importance of 
cultural politics. 
This thesis builds on the invaluable historical insights of these authors and 
combines it with own original empirical findings from nine months of field research in 
the Thai-Myanmar and Chinese-Myanmar borderlands in order to find explanations 
for the changing strategies of the KNU and KIO in 2011/12. This endeavour should 
also add to our wider, theoretical understanding of non-state armed groups and the 
ways by which their conduct is driven by local dynamics of violence. In doing so, it 
this thesis contributes to an emerging strand of enquiry within Conflict and Peace 
Studies. 
3 Authority and Armed Groups 
The difficulties in explaining the diverging conduct of Myanmar’s ethnic armed groups 
on the basis of the country’s changing political landscape do not only reflect our 
limited knowledge of one of the world’s longest ongoing civil wars. They also point to 
a more general, theoretical shortcoming within Conflict and Peace Studies: non-state 
armed groups are often conceptualised as monolithic actors. As per Charles Tilly, 
‘coherent, durable, self-propelling social units—monads—occupy a great deal of 
political theory but none of political reality’ (Tilly 2008b, 69).  
Stathis Kalyvas has also pointed out that political scientists and students of 
International Relations ‘often conceptualize non-state political factions involved in 
civil wars as monolithic actors akin to states writ small’ (Kalyvas 2010, xii). By so 
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doing, it is assumed that rebel movements act according to a unified strategic rationale 
aimed at maximising their perceived utility vis-à-vis the state. This conceptualisation 
has become particularly common in aggregate large-n studies on conflict causes and 
dynamics as it enables scholars to model collective behaviour of armed groups in 
theoretically parsimonious ways on the basis of quantitative data (cf. Collier and 
Hoeffler 1998; D. E. Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009). The same 
understanding, however, also underpins some of the most prominent arguments in the 
field of Conflict Resolution as, for instance Zartman’s Mutually Hurting Stalemate, 
which defines a situation as “ripe” for mediation at the point that all warring factions 
perceive the continuation of violence detrimental to their own unified interests (cf. 
Zartman 1989; cf. also Stedman 1997, for a good critique see Pearlman 2009). While 
such models make sense on paper, they often struggle to account for the empirically 
observable conduct of rebel groups. Many non-state armed groups, indeed, behave in 
ways that seem suboptimal when measured against their assumed strategic objectives 
with regards to their external environments (Pearlman 2009; Bakke, Cunningham, and 
Seymour 2012). 
Writing in the 1970s, James Scott long ago criticised the simplification of 
multidimensional social movements into presumably coherent entities by questioning 
the then-prevalent categorisations of revolutionary movements as “communists” or 
“nationalists”. To him, such broad-brush labelling presented a form of ‘instant 
analysis’ that centres on the decisions of a few elites but ignores ‘a large stratum of 
revolutionary actors’ (Scott 1979, 98). For gaining a better understanding of violent 
insurrections, he suggested to study the internal politics of insurgency with a particular 
focus on a movement’s grassroots and their often uneasy relations with their own 
leaders:  
 ‘A study of the values of “rank-and-file” rebels can teach us a great 
deal about the many occasions when rebellions escape the tenuous 
control of their would-be leaders and launch out for objectives of 
their own. Like the society from which it issues, the stratification of 
rebels embodies its own tensions and contradictions which provide 
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a dynamic and often tragic basis for the internal politics of the 
movement.’ (Scott 1979, 98) 
Since then, the study of civil wars has expanded significantly. Scholars from various 
disciplines have pondered over their causes, dynamics, and potential solutions. Instead 
of disaggregating insurgency movements and investigating elite-grassroots relations, 
however, most analyses have continued to operate on a macro-level, conceptualising 
rebel groups as unitary actors. Only recently, have conflict scholars returned to micro-
level approaches, rejecting the notion that civil wars are ‘binary conflicts’ that are 
organised around a ‘master cleavage’ (Kalyvas 2003, 475–76, Chenoweth and 
Lawrence 2010; Justino, Brück, and Verwimp 2013). 
This thesis grounds itself within this emerging strand of literature in Conflict 
and Peace Studies that looks beyond the conventional birds-eye perspective on conflict 
and highlights the importance of dynamics internal to non-state armed groups for 
explaining their strategies (Pearlman 2009; Cunningham, Bakke, and Seymour 2012; 
Berti 2013; Staniland 2014). The core finding of this literature is that non-state armed 
groups are heterogeneous movements that are often internally fragmented, typically 
into rival factions. Individual rebel leaders hence do not only contest the incumbent 
state, but they also struggle against each other for leadership of their respective 
movements (Pearlman 2009; Cunningham, Bakke, and Seymour 2012, 69). Internal 
contestation and fragmentation can undermine a group’s capacity for collective action, 
redirect violence away from outside adversaries to inside competitors, and eventually 
lead to attrition and organisational demise (Staniland 2014; Bakke, Cunningham, and 
Seymour 2012). It can also drive the strategies of armed groups in ways that are not 
consistent with the interests of the collective as a whole, but benefit particular interests 
within the movement (Pearlman 2009; Cunningham, Bakke, and Seymour 2012, 69). 
Wendy Pearlman’s work on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, for instance, shows 
that from a collective bargaining perspective, the divergent strategies pursued by Fatah 
and Hamas - the former favouring negotiations and the latter spoiling negotiations - 
were suboptimal for the Palestinian cause vis-à-vis Israel. Yet, both factions’ 
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leaderships behaved in line with their own particular interests with regards to their 
rivalry for Palestinian leadership. While Fatah aimed at developing and mobilising 
new sources of legitimacy and power as Israel’s negotiation partner in Oslo, Hamas 
sought the same goal, albeit by boycotting the talks (Pearlman 2009). Benedetta Berti 
has put forward a similar argument in order to explain the outbreak of violence 
between Hamas and Israel in 2014. In her view, competition between the political and 
military wings of Hamas as well as between Hamas and semi-independent local Salafi-
jihadi factions drove Hamas to escalate the armed conflict with Israel despite almost 
certain military defeat (Berti 2014). Her comparative work on Hamas, the Lebanese 
Hezbollah and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland shows that 
organisational fragmentation often occurs along particular fault lines, the most 
common of which might be the one between the military and political wings of 
insurgency movements (Berti 2013). Another potential cleavage from which intra-
organisational feuds commonly emerge concerns inter-generational differences. The 
violence that embroiled Northern Ireland in the 1970s was, for instance, partly 
escalated by the newly established northern command of the IRA. Led by a young 
generation, the northern command stepped up violence against England and Pro-
English loyalists not least in order to side-line the movement’s old guard that was 
located in southern Ireland (Berti 2013, 137–38).  
To develop an explanation for internal fragmentation and contestation, some 
authors have turned to organisational analysis. Kristin Bakke et al. argue that group 
fragmentation can occur in various ways, depending on the degree of organisational 
institutionalisation and the distribution of power among different organisational cores 
within armed groups (Bakke, Cunningham, and Seymour 2012). Following Staniland, 
armed group fragmentation happens along two dimensions: horizontal ties between 
different rebel elites, affecting information flows, trust, contestation and cooperation 
among the group’s leadership; and vertical ties between elites and grassroots of 
insurgency. The latter are crucial for building and maintaining stable support networks 
among local communities (Staniland 2014, 1–24). Horizontal fragmentation makes 
the leadership of armed groups prone to factional infighting and coups. Vertical 
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fragmentation makes it difficult to sustain asymmetric warfare against a militarily 
superior enemy because it erodes a movement’s support network. Groups that 
fragment along both of these dimensions are susceptible to quick decay and defeat 
(Staniland 2014, 1–24). Counterinsurgency planners, therefore, attempt to break both 
of these organisational ties by trying to erode the insurgents’ local support base and by 
promoting the factionalisation of its leadership. Not surprisingly, rebel leaders, on the 
other hand, are foremost preoccupied with building and stabilising both horizontal and 
vertical links. 
Rather than aiming to explain the strategy and behaviour of an insurgency 
movement as flowing from a coherent vision that is pursued by an omnipotent and 
undisputed leader figure, the central point of an approach that looks to internal 
contestation and fragmentation is that the strategies of armed groups may also be seen 
as the result of a complex social interaction process between differently situated actors 
within the insurgency, whose interests do not necessarily align. Pearlman, therefore, 
advocates that researchers focus their analysis of conflict dynamics on the differently 
situated insurgent actors and their social relations because 'if we fail to take account of 
the interaction of those who constitute a movement, we are liable to misunderstand 
why and how violence takes place' (Pearlman 2010, 217). While this emerging 
scholarship on the internal dynamics of armed groups has advanced our knowledge 
especially with regards to the horizontal relations between or among rival rebel 
leaders, little research has been undertaken on the vertical relations between rebel elites 
and their grassroots and how these may drive infighting within armed groups as well 
as their external collective behaviour.  
In contrast, elite-grassroots relations were central to Scott’s enquiry into the 
internal upheavals within Asian revolutionary movements during the Cold War. 
Highlighting the contestation within these movements in terms of a ‘revolution within 
the revolution’, Scott argues that significant tensions often existed in this period 
between elites and the peasantry. As he put it at the time, ‘it is by no means clear that 
all or even most of the participants in vast popular movements share the ideas which 
motivate their erstwhile leaders’ (Scott 1979, 97). While such tensions between leaders 
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and mass-level actors might not be important within non-state armed groups with 
purely criminal agendas, such as many urban gangs, mafia, or armed business 
networks, as well as private security companies. Yet, they seem pivotal for analysing 
traditional insurgency movements that are established upon overarching political 
motives aimed against the state, such as secession or defeating the incumbent regime. 
These groups are oftentimes in control of pockets of state territory, within which some 
of them will have established at least rudimentary, state-like structures through which 
they can govern local communities. The crucial point, however, is that successful 
insurgency movements to a certain degree tend to rely on mass mobilisation and 
popular support in order to sustain guerrilla warfare against what is usually the 
militarily superior state.3  
While the literature on the internal politics of armed groups has yet to focus on 
elite-grassroots relations, the importance of vertical support networks has also been 
highlighted by another emerging field of scholarship, namely that on rebel governance 
(Wickham-Crowley 1987; Mampilly 2011; Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly 2015). A 
consistent finding of this literature is that rebel groups provide public goods in their 
“liberated” areas in order to build stable support networks among local communities. 
Linking this insight with the discussion of internal contestation among rival rebel 
factions suggests that rival rebel leaders also need to draw on strong support networks 
in order to compete against internal rivals. The fundamental challenge that arises for 
                                                        
3 This thesis uses the terms (non-state) armed groups, rebel groups, and insurgency movements 
interchangeably. That said, it does of course appreciate that insurgency movements are non-state 
armed groups of a particular kind. In the absence of an authoritative definition of non-state armed 
groups and insurgency movements, the thesis defines insurgency movements based on Keith 
Krause and Jennifer Milken’s categorisation of non-state armed groups. With regards to traditional 
insurgency movements they write: ‘While the category of insurgent does not carry binding force in 
international law, both practitioners and researchers working on armed groups still mainly focus 
on groups having effective control over some part of a state’s territory, and possessing the 
organizational means to carry out sustained attacks against state forces. This traditional concept of 
armed groups is also associated with notions of armed groups as ‘proto-states’ or ‘states-in-
formation’: these groups seek to defeat the regime against which they are fighting, or through 
secession in a national liberation movement. It also covers armed groups which may not be seeking 
state takeover or secession, but which are engaged in an ‘internal war’, or a violent mass 
confrontation with a certain continuity and participation of the forces of a state on one side’ 
(Krause and Milliken 2009, 204).  
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leaders of insurgencies then is how to ensure either active support for or at least passive 
compliance with their own particular faction as they struggle against the incumbent 
state as well as other rebel leaders. 
The literature on rebel governance is however only partly helpful to explore the 
key question with which this dissertation is concerned as the relevant works have as 
their primary concern the vertical relations between rebel groups and local 
communities. In contrast, this thesis seeks to explain how internal contestations drive 
the strategic decisions of insurgency movements with regards to negotiations and 
conflict vis-à-vis the state. For doing so it aims to understand the significance and 
impact of vertical relations within insurgency movement themselves, i.e. between 
differently situated leaders, the rank-and-file and affiliated support networks, in the 
social process of insurgency between differently situated elite and non-elite actors. This 
notwithstanding, the central insight of the scholarship on rebel governance makes for 
a good starting point for my inquiry: ‘fear alone does not suffice to sustain rule in the 
long term,’ not even in the case of violent groups (Kalyvas 2006, 115). While this 
contemplation might seem contradictory to contemporary orthodoxies that associate 
rebel groups foremost with notions of “greed” and predation,4 it is in line with one of 
the common denominators in Political and Social Thought. Students of the latter have 
argued over generations that “naked power” does not create sustainable systems of 
compliance, obedience and support (cf. Zelditch 2001 for a good overview). Rather 
than wielding power within their movements on the basis of pure violence it seems as 
if rebel leaders need to establish some degree of legitimate authority among their 
grassroots. 
The importance of legitimate authority for understanding dynamics of political 
violence is highlighted by a small group of scholars who approach the issue of non-
state armed groups from a Political Sociology perspective (Apter 1997; Schlichte 
2009a; Bakonyi and Bliesemann de Guevara 2014b). Klaus Schlichte indeed writes 
that the ‘pursuit of legitimacy is the key to understanding their action’ (Schlichte 2012, 
                                                        
4 Cf. Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Kaldor 1999. 
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723). This is because political violence needs to be justified, even more so as violence 
in itself can have a delegitimising effect on political action. Together with Ulrich 
Schneckener, Schlichte argues that rebel leaders, therefore, seek legitimacy from local 
communities as well as from national and international audiences. They do so by 
drawing on legitimising discourses - most often surrounding the claim to guardianship 
for a particular community – as well as by behaving in certain ways, ranging from 
public service provision to charismatic performances of rebel leaders (Schlichte and 
Schneckener 2015, 415-418). This suggests that rebel leaders also need to legitimise 
their strategic choices among the rank-and-file within their own movements, for 
instance when entering negotiations with the government or when returning to armed 
struggle.  
Exploring these politics of legitimacy questions the rationalist orthodoxies in 
the study of civil war more generally. Instead of explaining the motivation behind 
political violence on the basis of material incentives,5 it highlights the social sources by 
which political violence is legitimated, surrounding social belief systems and identity. 
This dovetails with the memoirs of Aung Naing Oo, the Myanmar peace negotiator 
quoted above, who highlighted the importance of the ‘many layers of relationships, 
feuds, history of conflicts, friendships and camaraderie’ as well as ‘the allegiances, 
kinships, alliances, tribal divides [and] broken social fabric’ for understanding the 
moves of his negotiation partners, Karen armed groups in eastern Myanmar (Aung 
Naing Oo, June 5, July 2014). From this perspective, social relations rather than the 
interests of presumably self-propelled and asocial rebel leaders become the cornerstone 
of enquiry into the strategic choices of armed groups. This does not only run counter 
to the ontological underpinning of conventional unitary actor models, but also departs 
from methodological individualism within which much of the emerging literature on 
the internal politics of armed groups remains to operate. While shifting onto a lower 
level of analysis has contributed much to our understanding of fragmentation and 
                                                        
5 For examples of orthodox perspectives that explain the motivations to take up arms with material 
incentives see Collier and Hoeffler 2004 and Weinstein 2006. 
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internal contestation, the literature’s prevailing focus on strategising rival rebel elites 
maintains a largely technical, ahistorical, and uncontextual perspective that highlights 
rational decision-making but ignores the social undercurrents of organised political 
violence.6  
In contrast, focusing on the social foundations of organised political violence 
highlights that rebel groups are ontologically embedded in a certain socio-temporal 
space within which they should be analysed (Schlichte 2009a; Beck 2009; Reno 2009). 
Rather than understanding the conduct of rebel groups as the sum of self-propelled 
insurgent leaders, this approach focuses on the social interaction process that drives 
wider collective trajectories. Schlichte writes that we, therefore, need to place 
‘the relationships within armed groups at the center of attention 
instead of disaggregating them into unconnected individuals’ 
actions. To understand why and how relations within armed groups 
and with their social surroundings change is, in this perspective, the 
central task […].’ (Schlichte 2012, 723) 
This thesis will build on this relational understanding of insurgency and the politics of 
legitimacy, to develop an analytical framework that can explain the divergent 
strategies of both the Karen and Kachin movements. In doing so it will also contribute 
to our knowledge of the internal politics of armed groups more generally by elucidating 
the role of legitimate authority relations in the contestation between rival rebel elites 
and the way in which these internal struggles drive the conflict and negotiation 
strategies of insurgency movements.  
                                                        
6 In this sense, the new scholarly field dovetails with a related strand of investigation that has been 
forwarded by counterinsurgency strategists within U.S. military and intelligence communities. In 
order to understand and defeat insurgency organisations in Iraq and Afghanistan these “warrior-
scholars” drew heavily on social network analysis (Millen and Metz 2004; Muckian 2006). One of 
the outputs of this endeavour, a U.S. Army Field Manual, summed this up by noting that 
‘[n]etworked insurgencies are not monolithic, and decisions are made by different elements within 
the insurgency. Some parts of the insurgency may be willing to negotiate, while other parts may 
decide to keep fighting’ (U.S. Army 2014, 18). 
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4 Research Questions 
Based on the above reviewed literature, this thesis looks to dynamics of 
contestation and leadership authority within the KNU and the KIO in order to answer 
the empirical puzzle behind this thesis: Why did the Karen insurgency sign a ceasefire in 
2012 and why did the Kachin ceasefire collapse in 2011? 
Considering the importance of fragmentation, contestation and leadership 
authority, two subsidiary empirical questions arise. If internal contestation drives the 
strategic choices of rebel groups, and authority relations are central for understanding 
these intramural contestations, dynamics of rebel authority become the central 
mechanism that need be accounted for when explaining the shifting strategies of 
Myanmar’s rebel groups. The thesis therefore asks: How has the struggle over leadership 
authority within both movements driven their strategic choices with regards to negotiation and 
conflict vis-à-vis with the state? 
While recent scholarship highlights dynamics internal to rebel movements for 
explaining their collective strategy, it also points to the complex interactions between 
the wider environment of rebel movements and their internal politics. Indeed, several 
authors have stressed that the internal composition of rebel movements is inherently 
shaped by their wider socio-political and economic environment (Reno 2009; 
Schlichte 2009b; Staniland 2014; Mampilly 2011). In face of rapid political and 
economic change that insurgents in Myanmar’s borderlands are facing, it is, thus, 
necessary to ask: How has the changing politico-economic environment in Myanmar’s 
borderlands impacted on the internal authority relations of both movements under comparison?   
In order to answer both of these questions the thesis’s foremost theoretical task 
is to understand the constitution of authority relations within insurgency movements. 
In other words, it is necessary to explain how legitimate authority relations between 
differently situated rebel leaders and their movement’s grassroots are built and 
maintained, as well as the ways by which they erode. The thesis’s underlying 
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theoretical research question, therefore, is: How do rival rebel leaders capture and lose 
authority among the grassroots of their movements?   
5 Significance 
This thesis intended contributions to knowledge are two-fold: a) it aims to forward the 
literature on Myanmar’s ethnic conflict and b) it intends to advance the scholarship on 
insurgency and civil war more generally. Its findings should be significant because they 
are based on extensive field research in Myanmar’s borderlands, including rebel-held 
territories.  
A comparative study on the Karen and Kachin insurgencies appears to be 
particularly important for gaining a better understanding of Myanmar’s ethnic armed 
conflict at a crucial time of wider transition in the country. Both movements are the 
most important rebel groups in a civil war, which despite being one of the world’s 
longest running armed conflicts remains one of its least researched. A comparative 
study of both insurgencies seems particularly meaningful as they exhibit divergent 
strategies despite facing similar challenges in their immediate environment. Not only 
have they emerged in opposition to the same political order in Myanmar and are faced 
with the same political transitions since 2011. The politico-economic environments in 
Myanmar’s borderlands to China and Thailand have also changed in comparable ways 
since the end of the Cold War, exerting similar external pressures on both movements. 
Comparing both cases with the intention to explain their divergent strategies, 
therefore, makes for a most-similar research design, which seems particularly suited for 
this thesis’s exploratory empirical enquiry as it allows to identify factors that have led 
to different outcomes in similar circumstances (Gerring 2007, 131–34).7 
                                                        
7 A most-similar case design compares ‘cases that differ on the outcome of theoretical interest but 
are similar on various factors that might have contributed to that outcome [in the hope] that 
intensive study of these cases will reveal one – or at most several – factors that differ across these 
cases.’ (Gerring 2007, 131). 
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Methodologically, the thesis has chosen an ethnographically-informed 
qualitative approach. This entailed elite interviews as well as extensive field research, 
during which I lived and travelled with differently situated elite and non-elite actors 
involved in or affiliated with the Karen and Kachin insurgencies for about nine 
months. Much of the following analysis is, therefore, based on informal conversations 
rather than structured interviews. This ethnographic bend was essential to gather a 
wealth of original empirical data, most importantly to gain an insider’s perspective 
into both movements without which it would be impossible to develop an appreciation 
of the ways in which dynamics internal to both insurgent movements have driven their 
opposing strategies. While this thesis does not aim to develop a generalizable theory 
of authority relations in rebel movements, it follows Scott by intending to establish a 
‘plausible account’ that should be ‘judged by the standards of its logic, its economy, 
and its consistency with other social facts’ (Scott 1985, 46–47). In doing so, I do not 
only aim to advance our knowledge of Myanmar’s ethnic conflict but also want to 
contribute to the emerging literature on non-state armed groups in a meaningful way.  
My findings from field research should be able to inform the study of non-state 
armed groups in significant ways because the biggest challenge for scholarly enquiry 
in this field remains the lack of empirical data. While it has become clear that aggregate 
macro-models of conflict are of limited value for explaining civil war, local dynamics 
of violence are difficult to analyse precisely because they lie buried within the 'messy 
evidence' on the ground (Kalyvas 2003, 480). Close-range empirical research on 
conflict-affected communities is difficult with regards to feasibility, safety, and ethics 
(Goodhand 2000; Wood 2006; Mazurana, Gale, and Jacobsen 2013). This is even 
more so in situations of ongoing armed conflict rather than in post-conflict 
environments, which is why the latter has attracted the bulk of academic research in 
Conflict and Peace Studies. Some scholars have, however, shown that conducting field 
research in “hot” conflict settings is not only feasible but also essential for improving 
our understanding of societies in conflict (Wood 2003; Goodhand 2005; Keen 2005). 
This seems particularly important because societies are not static but develop during 
the course of civil wars (Menkhaus 2007; Wood 2008; Reno 2009). In protracted 
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conflicts that span over decades, as is the case in Myanmar, conflicts and societies 
have, however, often ‘virtually ‘dropped off the “research map”’ (Goodhand 2000, 8).  
Enquiring into dynamics internal to non-state armed groups, i.e. clandestine 
organisations, accentuates some of the research challenges that researchers in conflict 
settings face. Much scholarship in this emerging field has, therefore, relies on the 
analyses of secondary literature, such as journalistic accounts, and occasional elite 
interviews (Kalyvas 2003; Pearlman 2009; Cunningham, Bakke, and Seymour 2012; 
Berti 2013). Some scholars have, however, also demonstrated the value of doing field 
research for understanding the politics of non-state armed groups (Schlichte 2009a; 
Mampilly 2011; Staniland 2014). Their studies suggest that many misconceptions on 
insurgency are indeed based on a lack of empirical data. One persisting discourse, 
which emerged from macro-perspectives on conflict, for instance, associates non-state 
armed groups mostly with coercion and criminal interests (cf. Kaldor 1999; Duffield 
2002; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). At first glance, it might thus appear that legitimate 
authority relations might not be of relevance in most other insurgencies world-wide, 
even if they were found to be important in driving the strategies of both cases studied 
in this thesis. In other words, the Myanmar’s ethnic insurgents could simply be outliers 
and not representative of others.  
While William Reno argued that studying deviant cases of insurgency makes 
them ‘disproportionately important’ (Reno 2009, 357), a closer look reveals that the 
cases studied here are not so deviant after all. It seems as if scholars might have simply 
underestimated the importance of legitimate authority relations between rebel leaders 
and their grassroots on conflict dynamics, including the ways in which they drive the 
strategies of rebel groups, because we lack empirical data. The emerging scholarship 
on rebel governance and sociological approaches indeed point to the fact that 
legitimate authority has long been a concern to insurgencies world-wide, past and 
present (Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly 2015; Schlichte and Schneckener 2015). By 
studying the modalities of leadership authority within rebel groups in Myanmar and 
the ways in which internal struggles over authority drives their strategies, this thesis 
can, thus, inform our understanding of insurgency movements in other cases as well. 
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This is not least because the KIO and KNU feature important similarities to other 
ethno-national insurgencies in Myanmar and internationally with regards to their 
ideology and organisational structures.  
Ideologically, both are ethno-national movements that demand greater 
autonomy from the central state under a federal constitution. They emerged as a result 
of militarised and violent identity formation during the colonial period and the Second 
World War. Both started to fight against a post-independence state, which - dominated 
by the country’s ethnic majority - failed to guarantee autonomy rights for ethnic 
minorities. Decades of armed conflict have entrenched ethnic divides and grievances 
since (South 2008, 1–22). While ethnicity is an inherently fuzzy and contested concept, 
it has been a salient feature of many civil wars world-wide (Horowitz 1985; Chandra 
2006). Following Tilly, this is because it re-organises multifaceted social relations 
‘around a single us–them boundary’, a precondition for political violence (Tilly 2003, 
21). In the case of ethnonational conflicts, elites engage in drawing boundaries by 
employing discourses that aim at homogenising an ethnic community across, for 
instance, tribal, religious and regional divides, while maximising the differences 
towards other ethnic groups (Goodhand 2008, 226–27). Ethnonationalism has 
featured as a driving ideology of civil wars worldwide (Connor 1994). South and 
Southeast Asia are home to some of most protracted ethnonational insurgencies. 
Besides the various ethnonational insurgencies in Myanmar, these include, among 
others, the Naga insurgency in north-eastern India (Baruah 2003), the Tamil conflict 
in Sri Lanka (Goodhand 2008, 226–27), Malay Muslim separatism in Southern 
Thailand (McCargo 2008), and the Moro secessionist movements in the Southern 
Philippines (San Juan 2006). Prominent past and present ethnonational conflicts in 
other parts of the world include the Yugoslav wars in Europe, the Kurdish insurgency 
in the Middle East, and South Sudan’s struggle for independence (Wimmer 1997). 
 In terms of organisational structure, the Kachin and Karen insurgencies are 
both reliant on popular support from local communities, their claimed ethnic 
constituencies. Despite rejecting Maoist ideology and siding with the capitalist camp 
during the Cold War instead, their organisational structures and relationships to local, 
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rural communities have been heavily influenced by Maoist ideas of guerrilla warfare 
and mass mobilisation (Smith 2007, 16). Similar to the writings of other successful left-
wing guerrilla strategists of the 20th century, such as Ernesto “Che” Guevara and Ho 
Chi Min, Mao’s reflections ‘On Guerrilla Warfare’ stress the need to embed rural 
revolutionary movements within the local peasantry and build state-like governance 
structures that garner legitimacy and support from local communities (Mao 1961; 
Guevara 2002). Their manuals remain widely-read among insurgents of different 
backgrounds, disregarding their political outlooks (Mampilly 2011, 11–13). Besides 
operating rebel armies, the Karen and Kachin insurgencies have, indeed, developed 
pronounced political wings and administrative capacities to operate extensive parallel 
governance systems, generating revenues and public goods, in their “liberated 
territories” (Smith 2007, 16). While such quasi-state-like structures are particularly 
pronounced in parts of Myanmar’s borderlands, other past and present insurgency 
movements have organised in similar ways (Wickham-Crowley 1987; Mampilly 2011; 
Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly 2015). These include left-wing guerrillas such as the 
Colombian Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), as well as 
ethnonational movement such as the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) in 
Southern Sudan, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelan (LTTE) in Sri Lanka (Ibid.). 
The similarities between both cases studied here and other ethnonational insurgencies 
world-wide, therefore, makes a meaningful dialogue between this thesis’s findings and 
the wider literature on civil wars possible.8  
6 Structure 
To explain the puzzling and inverted strategies of the KNU and the KIO the thesis 
develops a conceptual framework, reflects on its methodological approach, discusses 
the historic background, and analyses both cases. The following chapters are 
structured as follows: 
                                                        
8 The cases are ‘representative of a broader set of cases [exemplifying] what is considered to be a 
typical set of values, given some general understanding of a phenomenon’ (Gerring 2007, 97). 
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 Chapter Two develops a conceptual understanding of insurgency that explains 
how shifting authority relations interact with dynamics of internal contestation in 
driving the wider trajectories of insurgency movements, including their collective 
conflict and negotiation conduct. To do so it engages with the literature on the internal 
politics of non-state armed groups and rebel governance through the lens of the 
relational sociologies of Norbert Elias and Pierre Bourdieu, drawing on a co-
constructed and interdependent triad of core concepts: figuration/field, power, and 
habitus. Building on this it identifies reciprocal exchange relations, social 
identification and the struggle for recognition as the core drivers behind the building 
and erosion of leadership authority within rebel movements.  
 Chapter Three explains the thesis’s ethnographically informed methodological 
approach by discussing its advantages and challenges. In line with the epistemological 
demand for reflexivity inherent in this approach, the chapter will discuss issues of 
power, access, and positionality that I encountered during my field research in order 
to help the reader assess the plausibility of the subsequent account. 
 Chapter Four discusses the history of Myanmar’s rebellious borderlands. This 
serves to understand the roots and development of the country’s protracted ethnic 
conflict and simultaneously provides an introduction to the Kachin and Karen 
insurgencies as well as to their social context within which they will subsequently be 
analysed. To do so, the chapter will trace the emergence of both ethnonational projects 
within larger geopolitical conflicts and a wider, transnational borderworld between 
India, China, and Thailand. It will then discuss how geopolitical shifts since the end 
of the Cold War have worked hand in hand with a changed counterinsurgency strategy 
to increase commercialisation and state consolidation in Myanmar’s restive border 
areas. Taking this long view helps to contextualises the structural changes in the 
politico-economic environments of both insurgencies in order to assess their impacts 
on internal authority relations. 
 Chapter Five will analyse the case of the Karen National Union (KNU). It asks 
why Myanmar’s oldest insurgency movement, which has historically been least willing 
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to compromise with the state, signed a ceasefire in 2012 and championed the country’s 
nationwide peace process since. It will show that this resulted from military and 
geopolitical pressures on the Thai-Myanmar border that drove group fragmentation 
and internal contestation within the Karen movement. The chapter also demonstrates 
how shifting authority relations between rival leaders and the movement’s grassroots 
have driven and accentuated these dynamics as well as how they furthered internal 
contestation since the ceasefire. What emerges from this chapter is that what looks like 
a stable settlement from the outside is indeed highly contested within the movement. 
 Chapter Six will analyse the case of the Kachin Independence Organisation 
(KIO). Its driving questions are why the movement’s 17 years long ceasefire with 
Myanmar’s government broke down in 2011 and how the KIO’s willingness and 
ability to wage war increased so dramatically, despite its faltering capacities and 
waning revolutionary agendas during the ceasefire years. The analysis reveals that 
driving the movement’s puzzling trajectory were eroding authority relations between 
rebel leaders and the movement’s grassroots, which were precipitated by the very 
modalities of the ceasefire. This gave rise to increased group fragmentation and 
ultimately a rival faction that managed to rebuild authority relations to their 
grassroots, recruit a new generation of rebels, and take over leadership, which has 
ultimately changed the organisation’s strategy from collaboration to confrontation.  
 Chapter Seven will conclude the thesis by recapturing its main empirical 
findings and theoretical arguments, drawing out its key contributions to the 
scholarship on Myanmar and the field of Conflict and Peace Studies, and elaborating 
on the implications of my findings for engaging with insurgency movements in 
Myanmar and elsewhere.   
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CHAPTER II – 
CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORK 
 
1 Introduction 
 This chapter conceptualises insurgency as a social process between differently 
situated but interdependent elite and non-elite actors, whose interactions drive the 
strategies of armed groups. It starts with explaining the thesis’s relational approach to 
studying the process of insurgency as ontologically embedded within its social 
environment by drawing on a co-constructed triad of core concepts: figuration, power, 
and habitus. This chapter will introduce the study’s conceptual framework. It starts 
out by charting the malleable landscape of interdependent insurgent actors, focusing 
on their mutual interactions and ties with their social surroundings. It introduces 
fragmentation and factional contestation as an important driving forces behind the 
collective conduct of armed groups. The chapter will then proceed to identify the 
fundamental challenge for rebel leaders as being the creation of stable support 
networks for or at least willing compliance with their insurgent social order as a 
counter-project to the incumbent state and other rebel leaders among the grassroots of 
their movement. It will argue that the key to understanding these internal contestations 
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within armed group therefore is the existence or lack of legitimate authority relations 
between differently situated rebel elites and the grassroots of a movement. Building on 
this, it proposes that two interlaced processes are at play in the building or erosion of 
legitimate authority between differently situated rebel leaders among their grassroots: 
(1) Reciprocal exchange relations that can be conceived of as an implicit social contract 
between rebel rulers and local communities, entailing obligations for both sides. (2) 
Respectful and dignifying interactions of elites with non-elites that satisfy the latter’s 
demand for recognition, allowing them to derive a positive self-perceived social 
identity from affiliation to the insurgency. 
2 A Relational Approach 
‘Society does not consist of individuals, but expresses the sum of 
interrelations, the relations within which these individuals stand.’  
- Karl Marx9 
Rebel groups do not emerge out of the blue but are embedded in a certain socio-
temporal space within which they should be analysed. In William Reno’s words, 
'social context matters a lot, perhaps more than individual motives in shaping the uses 
to which violence is put' (Reno 2009, 371). Chris Cramer has noted that this is precisely 
why methodological individualism seems ill suited to explain armed group behaviour 
(Cramer 2002, 1855). Rather than dislocating actors from their surroundings, this 
thesis attempts to analyse the social process between differently situated but 
interdependent elite and non-elite actors of insurgency. Taking account of social 
structures and processes neither leads to structural determinism nor precludes the 
analysis of agency. In his engagement with the political economy of conflict, Cramer 
states that 'agency is involved in the origins of conflict, choices are made, and economic 
incentives do matter, as do individuals. But they are influenced by and operate very 
                                                        
9 Cited as in Marx, Engels, and Tucker 1978, 247. 
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much within specific conditions and social and historical features of change' (Cramer 
2002, 1857).  
Relationalism, i.e. the analytical focus on relations between social entities, 
provides for an ontological handle for reconciling both, structure and agency. Charles 
Tilly summarises this approach as 'the doctrine that transactions, interactions, social 
ties, and conversations constitute the central stuff of social life' (Tilly 2008b, 7). It 
stands opposed to Substantialism, which infers motivations and behaviour from the 
properties of social entities, including individual or collective actors as well as social 
structures. Methodological individualism, for instance, views self-contained 
individuals to act independently of their environment upon their own powers, whether 
they are motivated by rational gains as presumed by rational-choice models or follow 
internalised norms as proposed by more sociological-inspired theories. In a similar 
vein, structural theories locate the source of action within self-subsistent and coherent 
social structures, including organisation, class, or nation. From the perspective of a 
relational approach, individual motivations, including the motivation to take up arms, 
are not located within a set preference structures of self-propelled individuals. Indeed, 
they do not even stem from within social actors themselves but emerge from the 
interactions between them (Emirbayer 1997).  
Relationalism has hitherto had limited impact on the study of the internal 
politics in armed groups, much of which remains grounded in methodological 
individualism. Political Sociology scholars in International Relations have however 
already demonstrated its usefulness for the study of political violence and armed 
groups (Schlichte 2009a; Bakonyi and Bliesemann de Guevara 2014b). The thesis 
follows in their footsteps by looking to the sociologies of Norbert Elias and Pierre 
Bourdieu. The ontological embeddedness of actors in their transactional environment 
is central to the thinking of both Elias and Bourdieu, whose work can be regarded as 
having contributed to a single heuristic device that focuses its inquiry on the dialectic 
nature of social structures and individuals (Paulle, van Heerikhuizen, and Emirbayer 
2012). This is because their frameworks are made up of a similar understanding and 
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deployment of a co-constructed and interdependent triad of core concepts: figuration,10 
power, and habitus (Paulle, van Heerikhuizen, and Emirbayer 2012, 70).  
Figuration 
Following Elias, societies are made up of intertwined structures and processes 
of interdependent and interacting actors whose identity, cognition, and behaviour are 
mutually contingent (Elias 1978, 103). These interdependencies stem from ‘everyone’s 
fundamental directedness to other people’ (Elias 1978, 136). They tend to stabilise 
social orders from family to nation-state despite suboptimal outcomes for some or even 
most of its members. Reciprocity, however, does not preclude change. From this 
perspective, the change of one actor’s position entails changes in other parts of a 
figuration along chains of interdependencies, which ultimately changes the whole 
figuration (Elias 1978, 133–44). Hence, social interaction enfold a multiplicity of 
simultaneous but interlaced processes without clear casual primacies, which create a 
momentum of their own in driving social processes. As Elias points out, this explains 
the frequently observable disconnect between human intentions and the trajectories of 
society: 
‘From the interweaving of countless individual interests and 
intentions – whether tending in the same direction or in divergent and 
hostile directions - something comes into being that was planned and 
intended by none of these individuals, yet has emerged nevertheless 
from their intentions and actions. And really this is the whole secret 
of social figurations, their compelling dynamics, their structural 
regularities, their process character and their development; this is the 
secret of sociogenesis and of relational dynamics.’ (Elias 1994, 389) 
From a relational perspective, self-contained non-social actors whose interests emerge 
from within themselves - as Substantialism would have it - do not even exist. Instead, 
                                                        
10 Figuration is the term for social space used by Elias. Speaking about ‘fields’ Bourdieu was 
researching in a very similar vein (Paulle, van Heerikhuizen, and Emirbayer 2012).  
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Elias posits that because ‘people are more or less dependent on each other first by 
nature and then through social learning, through education, socialization, and socially 
generated reciprocal needs, they exist, one might venture to say only as pluralities, 
only in figurations’ (Elias 1994, 213–14). For elite and non-elite actors of insurgency 
their embeddedness in different positions of the wider social environment, thus, 
becomes constitutive to their identities, interests, and behaviour.  
Power 
Importantly, societal figurations are characterised by uneven but constantly 
shifting power relations between actors. Elias notes that dynamic power balances are, 
indeed, ‘at the very hub of the figuration process’ (Elias 1978, 131). Using the term 
field instead of figuration to depict the social space under investigation, Bordieu also 
highlights that significantly they contain ‘people who dominate and people who are 
dominated. […] It is this power that defines their position in the field and, as a result, 
their strategies’ (Bourdieu as cited in Thomson, 74). Power is, therefore, the property 
of a relationship, which is located in neither of two or more actors but in the 
interactions between them. This relational understanding of power enables to shed 
light on the reciprocity of power, despite processes of domination.  
While power balances are skewed in most societal figurations, power does not 
only flow from above to below. In fact, all parts within a figuration exert influence 
upon each other, also the least powerful on the most powerful. Elias illustrates this is 
in his exploration of rule and authority within the court of Louis XIV in France, 
showing that even where power differentials are at their greatest, the ruled fulfil 
particular needs and functions for the rulers, which exerts figurational pressures on the 
latter that even strips the Sun King of his almightiness (Elias 1983). Authority, hence, 
becomes an inherently relational concept. The behaviour of any social actor, hence, is 
not the result of self-propelled agents acting on their transcendental individual interests 
and powers. It is the outcome of figurational pressures that result from fluctuating 
power constellations within a particular social figuration (Paulle, van Heerikhuizen, 
and Emirbayer 2012, 75–78). This reciprocity becomes important when analysing 
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interactions within insurgency movements. Despite strict military hierarchies and 
degrees of obedience, non-elite actors possess their own motivations and agency, 
which can make for an uneasy relationship with elites and enact figurational pressures 
on the collective.   
Habitus 
From a relational perspective, identity, interests, and behaviour all flow from 
one’s internalisation of the social. Elias and Bourdieu have conceptualised this 
phenomenon as habitus: evolving systems of dispositions that structure one’s ways of 
perceiving, feeling, thinking, and acting. This understanding conceptualises human 
behaviour not as the outcome of calculated response to one’s externalities but as the 
routinised practices of what one considers to be appropriate within one’s relational 
context. One’s habitus is structured by past and present conditions - i.e. one’s past or 
present position within a certain social figuration - that order one’s perception and 
actions in systematic patterns (Bourdieu 1990, 53). History, hence, produces ‘the 
structures of the habitus, which in their turn are the basis of the perception and 
appreciation of all subsequent experiences’ (Bourdieu 1990, 54). Social actors 
essentially become the ‘product of history’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 136).  
Despite these structural qualities, habitus is not a deterministic concept. 
Frequently utilising analogies to games and sports, Bourdieu also calls habitus ‘the feel 
for the game’ (Maton 2014, 54), stressing the inventive and active side of practices. 
Actors indeed do strategise in order to improve their own position within the power 
balance that lies at the core of every relational figuration (Maton 2014, 54). This turns 
figurations into sites of ongoing renegotiation and contestation between differently 
situated and empowered actors. In contrast to rational-choice theory, however, actors 
are limited by their embodied current position in the figuration. This provides them 
only with a particular set of abilities and only opens up certain paths to manoeuvre. 
As habitus, is also the basis of the actors’ perception of themselves and their situation, 
not all of these options might be visible or seem to be feasible (Maton 2014, 52). 
Choices made will in turn impact on future perceptions about their interests and 
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options as the habitus evolves. This leads to the emergence of strategic schemes or 
repertoires which actors resort to in their everyday practices.11 The outlined relational 
approach surrounding the concepts figuration, power, and habitus will help to 
reconceptualise insurgency from a rational unitary actor to a dynamic social process 
in the next step. 
3 Insurgency as a Social Process 
Conceptualising insurgency as a social process does not view insurgency as an 
actor category to be analysed separate from society, but understands insurgency as 
ontologically embedded within its social environment. Working within a similar 
figurational understanding, Schlichte highlighted that:  
‘Another reason to perceive armed groups in this way [as 
figurations] is the fuzziness of their boundaries. It is almost always 
impossible to draw a clear line between members and non-members 
of insurgencies as forms of participation differ appreciably. Contrary 
to terms like organization or group, the concept of figuration does 
not presuppose such clear boundaries, rendering the concept more 
appropriate than any other for the study of armed groups.’ 
(Schlichte 2009a, 19) 
The following section builds on the relational understanding above to develop 
a conceptual framework that conceives of insurgency as a social network whose in- 
and outgroup boundaries are indeterminate or blurry at best. Stressing the potential 
gaps in ideas and motivations between differently situated actors of this network, this 
study of armed group politics turns essentially into an inquiry about dynamic and 
                                                        
11  Charles Tilly has utilised a very similar notion of collective repertoires in the context of 
contentious politics, which are historically developed patterns of public claim-making by collective 
social actors, such as protests, strikes or the taking up of arms: ‘Repertoires vary from place to 
place, time to time, and pair to pair. But on the whole, when people make collective claims, they 
innovate within limits set by the repertoire already established for their place, time, and pair.’ (Tilly 
2008a, 14–15) 
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reciprocal power relations between differently situated actors within this social 
figuration. The fundamental challenge that insurgent leaders need to overcome for 
building a cohesive and capable political and military counter-project to the incumbent 
state is to ensure compliance and support with their insurgent social order among local 
communities as well as the grassroots of a movement. In other words, rebel elites need 
to build and maintain authority among mass-level actors by being perceived as 
legitimate by the latter. When rebel leaders do not only struggle against the state but 
also against rival factions within their own movement, similar processes of legitimacy 
are at stake. For understanding the social process of insurgency the key question, 
hence, becomes how differently situated elites come to be viewed as more or less 
legitimate by their movement’s grassroots in relation to one another. By combining 
literature on rebel governance with social identity theory, this framework proposes two 
interlaced processes behind the creation and erosion of legitimacy within insurgent 
movements: (1) the insurgent social contract, which is an exchange relationship between 
the elites and grassroots of a movement and (2) the insurgent social identity, which is 
conveyed through elite behaviour to non-elites.  
3.1 Insurgent Social Networks 
Students of armed conflict have only recently started to question the oft 
underlying assumption that insurgency movements are unitary actors whose 
behaviour is the result of purposive strategies in reaction to their external environment 
(Pearlman 2009; Cunningham, Bakke, and Seymour 2012; Staniland 2014). This 
questioning was mainly because conventional theories of civil war have struggled to 
account for the empirically observed behaviour of non-state armed groups, which often 
seem to employ violence in a suboptimal way when measured against their presumed 
strategic objectives vis-à-vis the state they are fighting against. 
 The focus of this new research agenda has hitherto rested on exploring the 
causes, dynamics and effects of group fragmentation and factional contestation within 
insurgency. Wendy Pearlman's work, for instance, shows that these processes can lead 
to negotiation or spoiling strategies that—while suboptimal from an external utility 
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perspective—can be rational for forwarding internal power interests (Pearlman 2009). 
Cunningham et al. agree that individual rebel factions struggle for leadership against 
each other. Yet, they stress that this happens simultaneously to their contest with the 
state. While insurgents engage in the first competition of this ‘dual contest’ to increase 
their own faction's political power and material gains, they contend in the latter to gain 
benefits for the movement as a whole (Cunningham, Bakke, and Seymour 2012, 69). 
Their findings support the argument that although the conflict behaviour of individual 
rebel factions might often seem to be at odds with their preferences in the wider 
struggle with the state, it can be perfectly consistent with their internal struggle for 
power.  
This thesis builds on this young body of literature. It understands rebel groups 
as heterogeneous movements, where differently situated actors form malleable 
alliances, fragment into factions along various fault lines and wield different sources 
of authority corresponding to their location within a fluid network of power embedded 
in wider society. These internal cleavages entail contestation for leadership between 
rival factions, which, in turn, develops a momentum of its own in driving armed group 
behaviour. For understanding these dynamics, the interactions between both elite and 
non-elite actors are important. Rather than being the outcome of elite strategizing, 
armed group behaviour is driven by a multifaceted social process between differently 
situated actors. In Pearlman’s words a ‘movement’s conflict behavior takes shape less 
as a choice on the part of a coherent entity than as an evolving social process in which 
these differently situated actors launch and sustain their participation for different 
reasons’ (Pearlman 2010, 202). Despite these preliminary insights that have shed light 
on important dynamics of insurgency, the bulk of recent analysis has remained to focus 
on strategic decision-making at the level of factional elites. 
Notwithstanding the importance of factional elite politics, successful popular 
insurgency - as opposed to other forms of non-state political violence such as small-
cell urban terrorism - is primarily sustained by mass participation (Staniland 2014, 1–
24). This is because leaders of popular insurgency rely on the grassroots of a movement 
for intelligence, recruits, food, taxes and shelter for challenging a militarily superior 
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state army (Staniland 2014, 1–24). Yet, pure coercion does not create stable support 
networks and the building of an alternative political order. Popular insurgency, 
therefore, depends on legitimate authority relations between elites and non-elites in its 
struggle against the state (Wickham-Crowley 1987; Mampilly 2011; Staniland 2014). 
The same seems true for rival rebel elites in their internal factional contestation against 
each other. This said, there is a frequently observed gap between the motivating ideas 
at the elite and non-elite level of mass movements, which can often make their 
relationship an uneasy one. James Scott, therefore, remarked in his studies on 
communist and nationalist insurrections that ‘doing justice to radical movements 
requires not only the analysis of the ideas and activities of radical elites but also the 
recovery of the popular aspirations which made them possible’ (Scott 1979, 98). For 
studying the social process of insurgency, this framework will, therefore, focus on the 
relations between both, elite and non-elite, actors of insurgency.  
To do so, it builds on Pearlman’s categorisation of rebel actors into rebel leaders, 
aspirants and mass-level actors (Pearlman 2010). While this is a first helpful guide for 
conceptualising the different situatedness of insurgent actors, this thesis proposes an 
important difference to it: conceptualising insurgency as a social process moves away 
from understanding rebel groups as collective actors with determinate boundaries. On 
the contrary, following the relational approach outlined above, it shows that the social 
phenomenon of insurgency cannot be separated analytically from its social 
environment. The line between the in- and outside of insurgency is often very fuzzy 
for several reasons:  
First, fluid overlaps between combatants and civilians are a defining criterion 
of most non-state armed groups, which provides an essential advantage in fighting 
asymmetric warfare against a militarily superior state (Schlichte 2012, 722). Second, 
integrating the structures of insurgency within wider social institutions of local 
communities through parallel governance structures and the provision of services is a 
key mechanism for rebel groups to mobilise and build legitimacy as will be seen below 
(Mampilly 2011, 12). This support needs not only be conscious and proactive. 
Teachers and students in rebel-operated schools, for instance, do not necessarily work 
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and study there because of their conscious conviction and outright support of the 
insurgents’ political cause but because they might simply lack alternatives. Still their 
participation and support shapes their views and values as well as strengthens and 
legitimises the insurgent organisation. Third, popular insurgency is often embedded 
within the everyday mesh of society through kinship and other social ties between 
civilians and insurgents (Shah 2013, 494). This can generate strong networks of 
support and loyalty from families of fighters (Kalyvas 2006, 125). Fourth, active 
membership and passive support of insurgency are difficult to distinguish. Civilians 
might support the insurgent cause by providing intelligence or food to rebel soldiers or 
simply not giving them away to state agents rather than joining their ranks on the 
frontline. Both, membership and support are also not fixed but fluctuate over time as 
people join and leave the insurgency or decide to support rebellion at one time but not 
the other (Wood 2003). Fifth, in places of protracted social conflict the ‘network of 
insurgent organizations’ (Wood 2003, 190) can be particularly wide-spread across 
society, comprising civil society actors, such as agricultural cooperatives, churches, 
student associations, social activist groups and other community-based organisations 
and institutions (Wood 2003, 190).  
Bearing this embeddedness in mind and building on Pearlman’s above 
mentioned categorisation (Pearlman 2010), this thesis conceives of insurgent social 
networks to comprise of incumbent leaders, aspirant elites, and a movement’s grassroots. 
The most obvious elite actors of insurgency include incumbent leaders, who wield the 
most power and have the greatest say in decision-making. These are mostly the official 
political and military leaders of rebel groups. While they might be fighting against the 
state, they are also interested in maintaining the status-quo within their movement. 
Aspirants are also elite actors. Yet, their aims or preferred means to achieve shared aims 
differ from incumbents leaders within the same group. Despite their political skills and 
ambition they lack institutional resources within their groups to lead the way. They, 
hence, strive to overcome this constraint in their struggle for leadership. Incumbent 
and aspiring leaders are, therefore, pitched against each other in significant ways that 
can be the very cause of group fragmentation and power struggles. Understanding 
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insurgency as a network that spans across different nodes within wider society, 
however, also reveals that rebel leaders stand in a complex relationship to other social 
elites, e.g. community leaders or businessmen. While these are not part of the 
“rebellion proper” they often have close working relations with rebel leaders and 
sometimes fulfil crucial functions for the insurgency, including mobilisation, funding, 
intelligence, and legitimisation. Depending on their interactions with incumbent and 
aspiring elites they could support either of them and become an integral part of the 
insurgent landscape to the extent that they as well are incumbent or aspirant rebel 
elites.  
Besides elites, insurgency consists of various mass-level actors, whose 
distinction into “rebels proper” and civilians is even more difficult. These grassroots 
can, for instance, be the foot soldiers of guerrilla armies or administrators of a 
rebellion’s political wing. They can also comprise of supporters from local 
communities, which despite not being officially part of the rebel movement are 
inclined to the insurgent cause. They have their own motivations for supporting the 
rebellion as well as an opinion regarding the insurgency and its elites. Their popular 
support is crucial to form and sustain armed rebellion by way of recruits, intelligence, 
and shelter. While the grassroots of a movement do not consciously direct or intend 
to direct the conduct of the collective, their importance for sustaining popular 
insurgency implies mutual dependencies between them and rebel elites. The 
fundamental challenge that arises for rebel leaders within this interdependent 
figuration is how to ensure active support for or at least passive compliance with their 
insurgent social order as a counter-project to the incumbent state and to rival insurgent 
elites among the grassroots of their movement.  
3.2 Authority within Insurgency 
Understanding insurgency as a social network embedded within wider society 
implies that contrary to contemporary orthodoxies that associate insurgency foremost 
with terrorism, “warlordism”, and the predation upon civilians, most insurgents are 
inherently political actors with complex relationships to local communities. Their 
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main aim is to seize and consolidate power vis-à-vis the state (Wickham-Crowley 
1987; Schlichte 2009a). Militarily, rebels depend on local communities for intelligence, 
recruits, food, taxes and shelter for challenging a militarily superior state army 
(Staniland 2014, 1–24). Politically, insurgents face similar challenges as other 
authorities in their attempt to build a “counter-state”, particularly how to turn physical 
violence and coercion into legitimate authority and voluntary obedience (Hagmann 
and Péclard 2010, 543; Schlichte 2012).  
In their military and political struggle against the state, leaders of popular 
insurgents, therefore, depend on stable support from the grassroots of their movement 
(Mampilly 2011; Staniland 2014). Yet, as agreed upon by generations of political 
theorists – from Machiavelli to Max Weber – pure coercion is unstable and ultimately 
impotent for creating sustainable systems of compliance, obedience and support 
(Zelditch 2001). To achieve this, elites need to turn “naked power” into authority, 
which in Weber’s words, is ‘ein Sonderfall von Macht’ (Weber 1980, 541), meaning a 
‘special kind of power’ (Uphoff 1989, 295). In contrast to other forms of power 
authority rests on ‘a certain minimum of voluntary submission; thus an interest […] in 
obedience’ (Weber 1947, 324) on the part of the person subject to authority. Coercion 
is transformed into authority by processes of legitimation (Weber 1947, 324; Zelditch 
2001). This turns legitimacy quite literally into ‘the key to politics’ (Jost and Major 
2001, 4).  
While this conceptual link between power, legitimacy and authority is well 
established in theories about state-society relations, it is uncommon to ponder over the 
legitimacy of violent non-state actors. On the one hand, this is because normative 
theories about legitimacy, i.e. what ought to be legitimate rule, and descriptive theories 
about legitimacy, i.e. when is a political order accepted as legitimate by the ruled, are 
often conflated. On the other hand, rebel groups by definition pose a threat to the 
established international system made up of sovereign nation-states. As pointed out by 
Zacharia Mampilly, many political scientists in general and students of International 
Relations in particular have, therefore, come to understand rebel groups foremost as 
warlords who ‘are ahistorical, economically minded actors, with no compelling raison 
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d’être for their presence in the Westphalian state system’ (Mampilly 2011, 28). 
Empirical investigation has shown, however, that state legitimacy is highly contingent 
on the behaviour of state authorities and, therefore, inherently contestable by other 
political actors, including non-state armed groups (Kalyvas 2006, 101–3). At the onset 
of civil wars, for instance, civilian support is rarely decided and mostly depends on the 
behaviour of warring factions (Kalyvas 2006, 101–3). For analysing empirically how 
authority of rebel elites arises and erodes - i.e. when the grassroots of a movement 
accept or reject different insurgent social orders as legitimate - it is necessary to adopt 
a subjective definition of legitimacy, which stresses the perception of actors 
themselves. 12  For this purpose, this thesis defines something as legitimate as per 
sociologist Morris Zelditch, ‘if it is in accord with the norms, values, beliefs, practices, 
and procedures accepted by a group’ (Zelditch 2001, 33). 
The importance of building legitimate authority relations with local 
communities have featured heavily in the thoughts of left-wing insurgent leaders, as 
evidenced in the manifests written by Mao Zedong, Ernesto Che Guevara, and Ho 
Chi Min (Mampilly 2011, 11–13). Despite this, questions of insurgent legitimacy and 
authority have attracted little attention from the scholarly community. A notable 
exception is Schlichte’s scholarship on non-state armed groups and the scholarship on 
rebel governance (Schlichte 2012; Schlichte and Schneckener 2015; Wickham-
Crowley 1987; Mampilly 2011; Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly 2015). This following 
section will build on the scholarship on rebel governance about how rebel groups build 
legitimacy among local communities in their struggle against the state. In contrast to 
these authors, the thesis’s conceptualisation of insurgency as a social process draws 
particular attention to processes of legitimacy within the insurgent social network, i.e. 
between differently situated elite actors of insurgency and the grassroots of a 
movement. This allows for analysing processes of legitimacy in both of the dual 
struggles rebel elites are engaged, the struggle against the incumbent state as well as 
the internal contestation against rival factions. To do so this framework proposes the 
                                                        
12 This stands in contrast to normative theories of legitimacy, i.e. what legitimate authority ought 
to look like which is common in Political Thought. 
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following two interlaced processes that seem central to the building or erosion of 
legitimate authority between differently situated rebel elites and their movement’s 
grassroots: (1) Reciprocal exchange relations between the elites and grassroots of a 
movement and (2) experiences of recognition that enable to derive a positive self-
perceived social identity from affiliation to the insurgency.  
3.2.1 Reciprocal Exchange Relations 
Leaders of popular insurgency seem to be aware of the need to build and 
maintain legitimacy among local communities for waging effective guerrilla war and 
engage in building it in a strategic way (Mampilly 2011). In fact, historic leaders of 
successful peasant revolutions attributed their success first and foremost to the building 
of legitimate authority by way of successful mass mobilisation that integrated local 
communities into the structures of insurgency through the establishment of parallel 
governance systems (Mampilly 2011, 11–13). In his handbook on Guerilla Warfare, 
Guevara stressed that the establishment of administrative arrangements that are 
viewed as legitimate by local communities is directly linked to success:  
‘In view of the importance of relations with the peasants, it is 
necessary to create organizations that make regulations for them, 
organizations that exist not only within the liberated area, but also 
have connections in the adjacent areas. Precisely through these 
connections it is possible to penetrate a zone for a future enlargement 
of the guerrilla front. The peasants will sow the seed with oral and 
written propaganda, with accounts of life in the other zone, of the laws 
that have already been issued for the protection of the small peasant, 
of the spirit of sacrifice of the rebel army; in a word, they are creating 
the necessary atmosphere for helping the rebel troops.’ (Guevara cited 
as in Mampilly 2011, 13) 
While one could attribute such campaigns to the left-wing political ideologies 
of Cold War revolutionaries, these organisational ideas have long been studied by rebel 
leaders around the world, irrespective of their political agendas (Mampilly 2011, 11). 
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This is also true for the Karen and Kachin insurgencies in Myanmar (Smith 1999, 93–
94). Scholars studying rebel governance, moreover, agree that establishing 
administrative capacities and providing services can be an important way for 
insurgents to build legitimacy and gain support among civilians through reciprocal 
relationships that entail obligations on both sides (Wickham-Crowley 1987; Mampilly 
2011).  
In his research on authority relations between rebel groups and local 
communities across Latin America, Timothy Wickham-Crowley has built on 
Barrington Moore’s understanding of peasant-landlord relations as an ‘implicit social 
contract’ that entails contractual obligations for both sides, such as taxation for 
protection (Wickham-Crowley 1987, 477; Moore 1978, 17–31). In a parallel fashion, 
Wickham-Crowley conceptualises the governance relationship between rebels and 
local communities living in their controlled territories as an implicit social contract as 
well. On the one hand, civilians in rebel territories are to support insurgent rule or at 
least not resist it. Rebels, on the other hand, are expected to defend the local populace 
from external enemies, maintain internal order, and improve the population’s welfare, 
for instance with providing basic health and education services. While rebel 
governance can legitimise insurgency and its leaders, the failure to fulfil these 
“contractual” obligations can erode legitimacy (Wickham-Crowley 1987). In 
Wickham-Crowley’s words, ‘[w]here guerrilla authority arose, it could also decline. 
When guerrillas do become the legitimate regional authorities in the areas they 
control, they must assume the obligations thereof’ (Wickham-Crowley 1987, 492).  
The present framework builds on this idea of an implicit social contract 
between rebel leaders and a movement’s grassroots by stressing the reciprocal and non-
coercive nature of authority relations within insurgency. By doing so I do, however, 
not intend implying that differently situated rebel actors necessarily “sign” such 
contracts consciously. While this notion of strategic contractualism – i.e. the idea that 
local communities strategically sell their allegiance to the highest bidder among local 
authorities - has been forwarded in the study of strongmen authority elsewhere (Barth 
1959), its underlying methodological individualism has been criticised for blinking out 
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other constraining and motivating factors, such as power relations (Asad 1972). Going 
back to Weber, it seems more likely that a variety of different motivations are at work 
simultaneously in the creation of rebel authority. Speaking about the person subjected 
to authority, Weber points out that his or her ‘motives of obedience […] can rest on 
considerations varying over a wide range from case to case, all the way from simple 
habituation to the most purely rational calculation of advantage’ (Weber 1947, 324).  
Issues other than strategic calculations over distributional outcomes seem 
particularly important to explain everyday motivations to support popular insurgency 
movements among their grassroots. This is because non-elite insurgents mostly receive 
little or no short-term payoffs for their participation or support. In addition, partaking 
in an armed insurrection against a militarily superior enemy often has very limited 
chances of success but involves the ultimate risk of being killed (Wood 2003). In fact, 
supporting insurgency might sometimes have little to do with conscious deliberations 
at all, as pointed out by Kalyvas in situations of prolonged armed conflict, where 
‘joining an armed group appears as the natural course of action for many’ (Kalyvas 
2006, 125). Kevin Toolis describes this in the case of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) 
in Northern Ireland’s small town of Coalisland in the 1970s, reflecting on his 
encounters with a family of IRA supporters:  
‘At the kitchen table, I sat asking the same question over and over 
again – why had Tony joined the IRA? The logic of the question 
was unintelligible to the Doris family. In their minds the mere 
description of life in Coalisland was sufficient to explain why Tony 
had joined the IRA. My naïve question shook this natural 
assumption. They searched for ways to explain something that was 
so obvious it was inexplicable.’ (Toolis cited as in Kalyvas 2006, 
125)  
From a relational perspective, this is because the motivations to support 
insurgency might often evolve around routinised practices, which are the result of 
embodied social environments that structure one’s ways of perceiving, feeling, 
thinking, and acting. This habitus mostly plays a stabilising role for social orders by 
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acting as ‘an automatic, blindly functioning apparatus of self-control’ (Elias 1994, 
446). Following Bourdieu, this is exactly because the habitus produces an ‘ongoing 
dialectic of subjective hopes and objective chances’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 
130). In most cases this results in a fit between the expectations of people and the 
opportunities granted to them by their position within a figurational setting. In normal 
circumstances habitus and figurational interdependencies, hence, work hand in hand 
in stabilising social orders. From this perspective, social orders are perceived as 
legitimate not if they deliver fair pay-offs but if they are naturalised and their 
underlying injustices, including structural violence engrained within an insurgency’s 
social foundation, remain unquestioned.  
It, hence, appears that rebel leaders might take painstaking efforts to craft 
legitimate authority relations with local communities whom they court for support, 
but the grassroots of a movement might not make similarly conscious deliberations on 
whether or not to pledge their loyalty to one leader or the other simply in return for 
public goods, including social services or protection. For understanding authority in 
armed groups, the next section will, therefore, propose the struggle for recognition as 
an alternative driver of human motivation that is better suited to explain authority 
within insurgency. It will be argued that elite behaviour and its repercussions on 
processes of social identification are key for understanding who and what is perceived 
as legitimate by insurgent grassroots. 
3.2.2 Recognition and Social Identity  
In his comparative historical analysis of feudal authority relations between 
landlords and peasants Moore notes that the peasantry often relied on services by the 
landed class but rose against the latter in case of non-delivery. Yet, he also stressed 
that these uprisings were not only the result of undelivered material promises but often 
emerged from experiences of injustice that abrogated the perceived moral obligation 
to obey traditional rulers (Moore 1978). This observation has been used by Axel 
Honneth to substantiate his formulation of recognition theory (Honneth 1996, 167). 
Honneth promulgates that the struggle for recognition as a morally responsible person 
by the wider society is a core motivational driver behind human behaviour, anchored 
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in each individual (Haacke 2005, 189). This struggle for recognition is motivated by 
subjective experiences of injustice and resulting moral claims (Haacke 2005, 194). If 
these experiences and claims are shared with others, the struggle for recognition can 
emerge as the motivational foundation for collective action, including insurgency.  
According to Honneth, three spheres of recognition exist on different levels. On 
a personal level, recognition is conveyed through intimate relationships based on 
emotional support, i.e. love, which builds self-confidence. On a more societal level, 
formal or informal rights that result in the allowance to take part in public will 
formation effectuates cognitive self-respect. Moreover, positive societal feedback by 
way of following social norms improves one’s self-esteem, as for instance expressed in 
feelings of honour or prestige (Honneth 1996, 92–130).  ‘Taken together,’ Honneth 
writes:  
‘the three forms of recognition - love, rights, and esteem - constitute 
the social conditions under which human subjects can develop a 
positive attitude towards themselves. For it is only due to the 
cumulative acquisition of basic self-confidence, of self-respect, and 
of self-esteem - provided, one after another, by the experience of 
those three forms of recognition - that a person can come to see 
himself or herself, unconditionally, as both an autonomous and an 
individuated being and to identify with his or her goals and desires.’ 
(Honneth 1996, 169).   
On the flip side, abuse, social exclusion, and perceptions of insult contravene 
these feelings of recognition. Such feelings of disrespect can form the ‘moral context 
for societal conflict’ (Honneth 1996, 162) and ‘become the motivational basis for 
collective resistance […] if subjects are able to articulate them within an intersubjective 
framework of interpretation that they can show to be typical for an entire group’ 
(Honneth 1996, 163). This conception posits that social conflicts contain a “moral 
grammar”. They are driven by the desire to overcome perceived sources of injustice, 
hence, ‘motivated by a demand for due or proper recognition’ (Smith 2012, 5). Jurgen 
Haacke points out that recognition, social conflict, and legitimacy, are, therefore, 
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inherently intertwined as the claim to recognition essentially becomes a ‘normative 
judgement about the legitimacy of social arrangements’ (Haacke 2005, 187). When 
this claim is satisfied, social orders are stable. When it is not, collective resistance can 
come about from within.  
The struggle for recognition as a motivating dynamic seems particularly 
obvious in the context of ethnonational insurgency, where claims to recognition of 
minority identities and rights are explicitly made in light of perceived and manifest 
cultural and socio-economic discrimination and feelings of being looked down upon. 
This is arguably true for conflicts with non-ethnic components as well. Indeed, Edward 
Azar’s promulgation of protracted social conflicts rests on a very similar premise, 
locating the main reason why social groups take up arms against others in the ‘denial 
of separate identity of parties involved in the political process’ (Azar 1986, 30). Wood‘s 
work on the peasant insurrection against a feudal social order in El Salvador shows 
how this plays out. Following her account, the support for insurgency and justification 
of violence among the peasantry in El Salvador was mainly motivated by feelings of 
pride derived from partaking in a collective political project that was attributed with 
moral principles, the defiance of discrimination and violence perpetuated by the state, 
and the pleasure in experiencing agency by way of changing entrenched unjust societal 
structures (Wood 2003, 231–40). Such motivations are also common for other kinds 
of social protest movements, whose members build communal identities of protest 
upon feelings of purpose and companionship in a similar fashion. In extreme cases of 
experienced violence and injustice, motivations surrounding participation, defiance, 
and agency, i.e. the struggle for recognition, can even serve to reassert a basic ‘claim 
to dignity and personhood’ (Wood 2003, 233). Wood describes this as the workings of 
an “insurgent identity”:  
 ‘An insurgent might act out of pride in acting as an insurgent, thereby 
expressing his insurgent identity and membership in the insurgent 
community. He might act on moral principles, to build a more just world 
or to express outrage, but also to experience pride in having the courage 
to have done so. He might act to assert his political efficacy, even his 
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capacity to make history, capacities long denied by landlords or state 
authorities.’ (Wood 2003, 237) 
Notwithstanding the extent to which agency is involved in the decision to 
support or join insurgency, members or affiliates of the insurgent community, 
therefore, derive their “insurgent identity” from the association to the insurgent 
collective. Following the basic tenets of social identity theory, identity is in parts 
derived from group membership, including identity groups such as ethnicity, gender 
but also one’s organisational affiliations, such as sports team, universities, youth gangs 
or revolutionary movements. Social identity, therefore, is ‘that part of an individual’s 
selfconcept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or 
groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that 
membership‘ (Tajfel 1978, 63). The basic argument is that self-perceived positive social 
identity is derived from feeling recognised as a respected member of a group that is 
associated with high societal standing and moral principles. A self-perceived positive 
social identity is important as it leads to feelings of self-esteem and self-worth (Turner 
1999, 6–8). Positive social identification can be threatened when the status and 
morality of the group is questioned from outgroup or ingroup sources. Social identity 
threat can also occur when one’s acceptance as a group member is questioned or 
refused, i.e. misrecognised. These threats can undermine positive social identification 
and lead to feelings of being disrespected (Branscombe et al. 1999, 46–55).13 Expressed 
in recognition theoretical terms, group membership, therefore, constitutes part of the 
social conditions that convey social recognition or misrecognition.   
In the case of popular insurgency, the moral principles of the collective are 
normally formulated as ‘charismatic ideas’ - including the aims of revolutionary 
struggle against social injustices or the protection of a particular community (Schlichte 
2009a, 99–106). In prolonged armed conflict this can, moreover, give rise to an 
                                                        
13 In addition to the threats to group value and the acceptance to this group, social psychology 
speaks of the threat of being categorised against one’s will to a certain social group and the threat 
to a group’s distinctiveness (Branscombe et al. 1999, 37).  
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alternative political culture14 with particular belief, norms and practices of its own, 
which resemble around the collective defiance of the incumbent political order. Wood 
has called this the “insurgent political culture”, encompassing ‘norms of group 
solidarity, […] practices such as rituals and symbols, and beliefs concerning the 
feasibility of social change and the potential efficacy of the group’s collective efforts 
towards this change’ (Wood 2003, 219). Group value models in social psychology 
suggest that the extent to which an insurgent group is associated with such 
revolutionary values by its own grassroots depends primarily on whether non-elites 
perceive elite behaviour as being in accordance with these accepted beliefs, norms, and 
practices of proper conduct within a society or social group (Tyler 2001). This is 
primarily communicated by elite interaction with non-elites, which provides status 
relevant information to the latter, i.e. their acceptance or rejection as a recognised 
group members (Tyler 2001, 421–22).  
Alpa Shah’s analysis of intimacy among Maoist insurgents in local Naxalite 
communities in India supports this argument. She describes how the everyday social 
interaction process between commissars and peasants is at the core of elite legitimacy 
among the grassroots of insurgency. India’s Maoist leaders, who have mostly 
originated from urban elites, managed to build legitimacy for their struggle among 
marginalised rural communities first and foremost through ‘their ability to develop 
intimate social relations of dignity and respect with the people’ (Shah 2013, 496). She 
describes that: 
‘In everyday life it was often the small things that mattered in the 
relative reach of the Maoists in comparison to that of the Indian state: 
for instance, the tone of voice in which one was spoken to, the way 
one was greeted, the way one’s house was entered, whether one sat 
on the floor like everyone else or required a chair to be found. In 
contrast to the state officials, the Maoists (whose leaders were also 
                                                        
14 Political culture is defined as ‘the set of attitudes, beliefs, and feelings about politics current in a 
nation at a given time’ (Almond and Powell 1978, 25). 
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outsiders - often high-caste Bihari men) had made it a point to be 
gentle and kind in everyday interactions.’ (Shah 2013, 496) 
This illustrates how experiences of fair procedures and dignified treatment by 
authorities, i.e. procedural justice, convey to the non-elites recognition as valued 
members of a group that is associated with high societal standing and moral values. In 
reverse, this argument implies that if elite behaviour, their decision-making and 
interaction with their movement’s grassroots is perceived as unjust and morally wrong, 
feelings of misrecognition among non-elites can lead to indignation about the group 
as a whole and ultimately to resistance against group authorities. For generating or 
eroding legitimacy within insurgent movements the interactions between elite and 
non-elite actors of insurgency might, therefore, become more important than the 
distributional outcomes of the insurgent social order, i.e. whether everyone actually 
receives their fair share of material benefits.  
4 Conclusion 
The present analytical framework draws inspiration from recent scholarship on the 
internal politics of non-state armed groups. Yet, it moves away from the remaining 
orthodoxy of methodological individualism that focuses exclusively on the strategic 
decision-making of self-propelled rebel leaders. This is because the changing strategies 
of both insurgencies under comparison can neither be inferred from external utilities 
of supposedly unitary actors nor by simply lowering the level of analysis to rival rebel 
elites. In contrast, the following thesis highlights the social dynamics of insurgency by 
adopting relational heuristics, as proposed by the sociologies of Elias and Bourdieu. 
By focusing on social interdependencies, reciprocal power relations, and embodied 
practices, this perspective reveals intertwined and multi-causal social forces that are 
operating at different levels within the wider networks of insurgency and develop a 
momentum of their own in driving collective conduct.  
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Instead of analysing rebels as self-propelled individuals, they are, thus, 
understood as ontologically embedded within an insurgent social figuration, which 
itself is inextricably rooted within a wider socio-temporal space and has indefinite in- 
and outgroup boundaries. The interactions of differently situated elite and grassroots 
actors can lead to the formation of malleable alliances but also fragment movements 
into various rival factions, who struggle against the state and also contest each other 
for the movement’s leadership. The fundamental challenge for rebel leaders in both of 
these contests is how to ensure active support or at least voluntary submission among 
their movement’s grassroots. Building legitimate authority relations to the grassroots 
of a movement, therefore, becomes a pivotal process in the internal contestation of 
non-state armed groups and shapes collective willingness and ability to engage in 
fighting or negotiating with the state. Two interlaced processes seem to be at play in 
the building or erosion of authority between differently situated rebel elites across the 
insurgent social network.  
First, rebel governance arrangements, particularly the provision of public 
goods, including welfare and security, can establish reciprocal exchange relations 
between rebel rulers and local communities in their territory. This relationship can be 
conceived of as an informal social contract. It entails implicit obligations for both sides, 
e.g. taxation in return for security. Non-fulfilment can threaten the legitimacy of 
insurgent social orders. Yet, rebel authority is not solely dependent on the 
distributional outcome of governance arrangements because the motivations to 
support insurgency in situations of prolonged armed conflict might often evolve 
around routinised practices rather than conscious deliberations.  
Second, following recognition and social identity theories, rebel authority 
seems dependent on whether the grassroots of insurgency derives a self-perceived 
positive social identity from affiliation to the collective. In other words, the 
participation and support of non-elite rebel actors is motivated by the latter’s demand 
for due and proper recognition. The grassroots of insurgency perceive rebel elites as 
legitimate if their interaction provides them with feelings of self-respect and self-esteem 
that are denied from the incumbent political order. It is suggested that this is dependent 
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on whether elite behaviour is perceived to be in line with the dominant beliefs, norms, 
and practices of the insurgent project, i.e. the fight against injustice or the protection 
of the community. Elites communicate this to their movement’s grassroots through 
everyday interactions, mainly by way of fair and dignifying treatment that conveys 
recognition as valued group members to the latter. On the flip side, when grassroots 
experience collective misrecognition in their interaction with rebel elites by way of 
perceived injustices - including abuse, social exclusion, or perceptions of insult – the 
morality of elites as well as the insurgency as a social order more generally is 
questioned. This can threaten the positive social identity derived from affiliation to the 
insurgency, and ultimately, result in the erosion of rebel authority and resistance from 
within.   
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CHAPTER III -
METHODOLOGICAL 
REFLECTIONS 
 
1 Introduction 
In order to study how the social process of insurgency between differently situated but 
interdependent elite and grassroots insurgents of the Kachin and the Karen movements 
drives the strategies of both movements, this thesis aims to capture the perspectives of 
the people involved: elite and non-elite insurgents. While rebels are central actors to 
civil wars, their own accounts are rarely captured in the field Conflict and Peace 
Studies. 
Ranajit Guha famously described how generations of historians have inferred 
the motivations and dynamics of peasant uprisings in colonial India from the 'prose of 
counter-insurgency' (Guha 1988, 84): primary sources produced, processed and 
archived by the British Raj. Because an alternative first-hand account by the insurgents 
themselves is missing, the logic of insurgency can only be interpreted through the lens 
of counterinsurgency. This makes it impossible to produce an analysis that can 
‘extricate itself from the code of counter-insurgency’ (Guha 1988, 70), for presumably 
distanced and objective historians and partisan observers alike. Guha writes that the 
historiographic discourse produced on insurgency in colonial India, therefore:  
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‘amounts to an act of appropriation which excludes the rebel as the 
conscious subject of his own history and incorporates the latter as 
only a contingent element in another history with another subject 
[…]. And since the discourse is, in this particular instance, one about 
properties of the minds – about attitudes, beliefs, ideas, etc. rather 
than about externalities which are easier to identify and describe, 
the task of representation is made even more complicated than 
usual.’ (Guha 1988, 77) 
Much of the academic knowledge produced on past and present insurgency in the field 
of Conflict and Peace Studies suffers from the same problem, namely the absence of 
first-hand accounts by insurgents themselves. This seems to be the case for two 
reasons. First, it might often not be feasible or convenient to listen to the first-hand 
accounts of insurgent members and affiliates. Second, scholars view insurgents as 
particularly untruthful sources of information. In fact, the study of insurgency has 
mostly relied on presumably more objective sources to infer the motivations of 
insurgents, which obviates the need to talk to them altogether. Insofar as scholarship 
is interested in the insurgent perspective, it mostly analyses the ideologies and interests 
of rebel elites.  
In contrast, this thesis seeks to gain an “insider perspective” into the Karen and 
Kachin movements in order to provide a plausible account on how social 
interdependencies have driven wider dynamics. It was, therefore, necessary to 
understand the perspectives of people involved. In order to do so, this thesis has chosen 
an ethnographically-informed qualitative approach. This endeavour poses various 
methodological challenges, which this chapter seeks to address by, first, explaining the 
ethnographic bend of my research, including its advantages and challenges. In a 
second step, it will reflect on the most important challenges encountered during my 
own field research with regards to access and positionality. This will serve as a 
reflection on my data and help the reader to assess the overall plausibility of my 
presented account. Moreover, this elaboration can contribute to the nascent but 
Chapter III -Methodological Reflections 
64 | P a g e  
 
growing discussions on using ethnographic methodology within Conflict and Peace 
Studies.  
2 An Ethnographic Bend  
How we see shapes what we see. In February 2015 I presented a paper at a junior 
scholar symposium entitled ‘The Dynamics of Rebel and Militia Group Behavior’ at 
the International Studies Association (ISA). My co-panellists presented on interesting 
topics, such as armed group fragmentation and public service provision by rebel 
groups. All of them were testing well-formulated hypotheses with regression analysis. 
The subsequent discussion to their projects centred on the appropriate deployment of 
control variables and problems of endogeneity in the undoubtedly well-thought 
through models. During the discussion of my own paper, based on findings from 
ethnographic field research, I was made aware how lucky I can consider myself, being 
based at a European University, where I am still allowed to study social sciences 
without “juggling numbers” in the 21st century. Notwithstanding the exoticism with 
which my methodological approach was received as something from a long bygone 
era where the social sciences were not yet scientific, I still encountered genuine interest 
in my findings. After all, I was found to be the only panellist who has encountered a 
living rebel or militia group member during the research process. 
This thesis has chosen an ethnographically-informed qualitative approach to 
the study of insurgency in order to uncover hidden processes that have commonly been 
blinked out by the dominant methodological approaches in contemporary conflict 
research. This entailed extensive stays in the field during which I lived and travelled 
with differently situated actors involved in or related to the Karen and Kachin 
insurgencies. “Deep hanging out”15  - as Anthropologists refer to the practice that 
makes ethnographic research distinctive - enabled me to develop friendly relationships 
                                                        
15  “Deep hanging out” as a common denominator of ethnographic methodology was first 
introduced on a conference by Renator Rosaldo before it was used more prominently in the 
writings of James Clifford and Clifford Geertz (Clifford 1996).  
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with many of my interlocutors over the course of my research and, thus, a profound 
understanding of their social lifeworlds, including their own perspectives and analyses 
of their situation. This said, my thesis is not “an ethnography” of insurgency in 
Myanmar but represents a “mixed” approach that can be best defined as qualitative 
case study research with a strong ethnographic bend. My research methodology also 
entailed elite interviews that I conducted during extensive field research throughout 
which I lived and travelled with differently situated elite and non-elite actors involved 
in or affiliated with the Karen and Kachin insurgencies for about nine months. This 
entailed four months in the Thai-Myanmar borderlands with the Karen insurgency, 
three months in the Chinese-Myanmar borderlands with the Kachin insurgency, and 
two months travelling in other areas of Myanmar, including Yangon as well as in 
Thailand and China. 
Most of this time, I spent living and travelling with a variety of actors linked to 
the Karen and Kachin insurgencies, which allowed for a wealth of informal 
conversations and observations on a daily basis. While I did not tape any of these 
informal encounters, I noted important observations, and the essence of many 
informal conversations, including occasional direct quotations, in field notebooks 
during my stay. In addition, I conducted formal, semi-structured interviews with 
political, social, and economic elites, including rebel leaders, businessmen, activists, 
religious leaders, and members of civil society. In total, I recorded 50 interviews and 
two group interviews, which included: 17 interviews with senior KNU leaders, 11 
interviews with senior KIO leaders, 9 interviews with Karen activists and civil society 
leaders, 9 interviews with Kachin activists, civil society leaders, elders, and religious 
authorities, and businessmen. I also interviewed two foreign experts. Moreover, I 
conducted two group interviews, one with 24 KNU teachers and another one with 
three Thai businessmen. I conducted 29 of these interviews in English. In addition, I 
drew on the help and language skills of local friends and acquaintances for conducting, 
translating and transcribing 12 interviews in Sgaw Karen, 7 in Jinghpaw, and one in 
Myanmar.  
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Many of these formal interviews contained information that was important for 
understanding why the Karen insurgency signed a ceasefire with the government in 
2012, while the Kachin ceasefire broke down one year earlier. This included 
information about political, military, and economic developments, the movements’ 
organisational features, changing internal and external social relations of differently 
situated actors, and the reconstruction of important past events. In order to get access 
to many of these interlocutors, I needed to engage in long processes of trust-building 
and access negotiations. This allowed for a rare glimpse into the lives of ordinary 
insurgents and an appreciation of their world-views. Rather than just being by-
products of my research, these informal day-to-day encounters, however, became a 
crucial part of my data and significantly added to my understanding of my research 
topic. Most importantly, they changed the elite-centrism of my own pre-field 
perspective. While my original project attempted to trace the impacts of changing 
border economies on elite contestation within armed groups, my daily encounters with 
differently situated lower-ranking insurgent actors revealed their often uneasy relations 
with their own superior and the ways in which these develop a momentum of their 
own in driving the strategies of their movements. This has ultimately refocused my 
research on the role of legitimate authority relations within insurgency and the ways 
these interact with wider structural dynamics, including borderland economies.  
Much of the information presented in this thesis, therefore, stems from informal 
conversations and participant observation. While my research is therefore not a “pure” 
ethnography of the Karen and Kachin insurgencies, it may still be subsumed under the 
definition of ethnographic methodology as per anthropologist Rosalind Shaw, who 
writes that 
‘a combination of participant observation and informal 
ethnographic interviews [by which] anthropologists and others seek 
to understand particular processes, events, ideas and practices in an 
informant’s own terms rather than ours. This entails building up 
relationships rather than making a single visit, and spending time in 
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ordinary conversation and interaction, preferably before 
introducing the more direct form of an interview.’ (Shaw 2007, 188) 
This stands squarely opposed to methodological orthodoxies in the study of 
armed conflict and insurgency. Some of the boldest as well as most impactful claims 
produced by students of civil war have relied heavily on formal research methods 
producing parsimonious mono-causal theories. Paul Collier, for instance, famously 
argued that today’s insurgents were mainly motivated by economic profiteering, i.e. 
“greed”, rather than by socio-economic grievances, a claim that has steered heated 
debate among academics for years. To substantiate his thesis, the economist ran large 
n-regression analyses over aggregated data of civil wars in the world finding 
correlations between natural resources and the occurrence of armed conflict. 
According to him, this was the right method “to discover the truth”, while listening to 
accounts produced by rebels themselves would have been a useless endeavour because 
they were little more than propaganda (Collier 1999, 1–2). 
Collier’s 'binary intellectual construct' (Cramer 2006, 165) between greed and 
grievance has fortunately long been refuted on empirical, theoretical, methodological 
and normative grounds (Keen 2012; Cramer 2002; Stewart and Fitzgerald 2001). Its 
underlying epistemological assumptions, however, are deeply anchored in the 
methodological orthodoxies of Conflict and Peace Studies as well as the Social 
Sciences more generally. This is best expressed by one of the most influential books on 
how to conduct “legitimate” research in the discipline, King, Keohane, and Verba’s 
“Designing Social Inquiry” (King, Robert, and Verba 1994). It has become the 
standard reference for positivist political scientists, committed to discerning facts from 
beliefs and on identifying generalizable governing laws behind human behaviour 
through formulating hypothesis, identifying variables, and empirical testing. This 
endeavour to “scientificise” social processes by ‘disciplining the discipline’ (Wedeen 
2009, 76) stems from the concern over the validity of empirical research.  
Unfortunately, this prioritisation of ‘methods over results’ (Wedeen 2009, 76) 
has led to the self-restriction of political scientists, who often only investigate a ’limited 
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repertoire of political objects’ (Jourde 2009, 202). Cédric Jourde notes that this can 
lead to cases where scholarship gropes in the dark without noticing it, which is when 
‘political scientists walk on their path, not realizing that they are surrounded by UPOs 
[unidentified political objects] that could be, and often are, politically significant for 
the actors involved in them, if not more significant than the political objects researchers 
have already “identified”’ (Jourde 2009, 203). Ethnographic enquiries can help to 
uncover such unidentified political objects by providing ‘windows onto hidden politics 
and an opportunity to recalibrate the vision of histories and explanations told from 
above’ (Allina-Pisano 2009, 71). Shaw stresses that this is mainly because of the 
informal methods of knowledge production. These privilege the analyses of people 
involved and helps to recalibrate our conceptual flashlights. In her own words:   
‘When we listen to people on their own terms by developing 
relationships and by observing and participating in events, the 
answers we receive are often more revealing than those that people 
give in an interview. This is both because we exert less control over 
the conditions of their production, and, in interviews that build 
upon participant observation, we tend to ask better questions. What 
we learn through ethnography thus has more potential to challenge 
our assumptions, often forcing us to unlearn as much as we learn. It 
is this that makes ethnography such a powerful tool for challenging 
received wisdom and for understanding events and processes on the 
ground.’ (Shaw 2007, 188) 
Ethnographic methods, therefore, seem particularly helpful, even necessary, in 
situations where it is not clear which are the right questions to ask, i.e. when little is 
known about the phenomena under investigation (Jourde 2009, 203). Despite 
receiving growing attention, the scholarship on the politics of non-state armed group 
is still at a very early stage. The landscape of potentially relevant actors and issues has 
not even been sufficiently mapped in order to know which questions to ask and whom 
to ask. It, therefore, seems that studying non-state armed groups can profit greatly from 
an ethnographic perspective for the following reasons in particular:  
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First, the very clandestine nature of these movements makes the use of more 
formal methods, including archival and survey, less feasible. On the one hand, this is 
because of the lack of reliable primary information (Bayard de Volo, Lorraine and 
Schatz 2004, 269). On the other hand, it is due to the sensitivity of the situation where 
‘people may have good reason to be suspicious of anything resembling official 
information gathering’ (Shaw 2007, 188). Second, ethnographic methodology does not 
only deliver raw data to be incorporated and tested in formal modelling. It rather 
enables an alternative perspective that can provide a better handle on informal political 
processes. In the words of anthropologist and political scientist Edward Schatz, 
primary research ‘conducted at close range [it] invites the researcher to “see” 
differently; heterogeneity, causal complexity, dynamism, contingency, and 
informality come to the fore.’ Third, ethnographic methodology shines light on the 
social environment in question that provides the particular meaning context within 
which the social world is perceived and acted upon (Wedeen 2009, 80–81). This said, 
ethnographic research can still adjudicate truth claims and identify causality in a way 
that Jessica Allina-Pisano has described as the peeling of an onion (Allina-Pisano 
2009, 54). She explains that  
‘ethnography with a realist sensibility […] does not deny the value 
of interpretation in ethnographic approaches to social research. On 
the contrary, it suggests that an understanding of the ways I which 
people think about their world can be a necessary condition for the 
collection and use of reliable empirical data about them.’ (Allina-
Pisano 2009, 55) 
In order to glimpse an ‘insider perspective’ into a certain social context, ‘neck-
deep’ immersion in form of sustained participant observation is often cited as the sine 
qua non (Geertz 1974, 29). Following Clifford Geertz, the aim is to grasp ‘experience-
near’ understandings of the people under research in a way that can inform the 
‘experience-distant’ concepts of academics used to explain wider social processes 
(Geertz 1974, 29). Anthropologists have oftentimes tried to define what qualifies as a 
“proper” ethnography in terms of the length of time spent in ‘the field’ as well as the 
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commitment with which participant observation is practiced. Geertz, however, 
reminded that such formal thresholds are inadequate in times when the ‘myth of the 
chameleon fieldworker, perfectly self-tuned to his exotic surroundings, a walking 
miracle of empathy, tact, patience, and cosmopolitanism’ (Geertz 1974, 27) has long 
faded. To him 
‘the trick is not to achieve some inner correspondence of spirit with 
your informants; preferring, like the rest of us, to call their souls their 
own, they are not going to be altogether keen about such an effort 
anyhow. The trick is to figure out what the devil they think they are 
up to.’ (Geertz 1974, 29) 
In practice it seems that political ethnography in particular ‘is practiced in shades of 
gray’ (Schatz 2009, 13). This is not least because Ethnography remains an underused 
method in Political Science and International Relations. Schatz reminds, therefore, 
that 
‘what constitutes an “insider” perspective (or an “outsider,” for that 
matter) depends on the blind spots in a particular research agenda; 
varying degrees of immersion can generate crucial insights whose 
importance depends upon the state of existing knowledge on 
particular topics.’ (Schatz 2009, 8)  
More important than the particular technicalities of method for the 
construction of any degree of “insider” perspective that helps to illuminate the lived 
experiences of people involved, is to profess an ethnographic ‘sensibility that goes 
beyond face-to-face contact’ (Schatz 2009, 5). This turns ethnography into ‘an 
approach that cares’ (Schatz 2009, 5) for the people and phenomena under study, 
which poses challenges in regards to the standard measures of “objectivity”, 
“reliability” and “validity” commonly applied in positivist social science. Yet, 
ethnography posits that ‘observations are not objective or external to the conditions 
that produce scholars doing the observing’ (Wedeen 2009, 80). “Objectivity”, 
“reliability” and “validity” are therefore not the appropriate criterion to measure the 
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“trustworthiness” of truth claims in ethnographic studies (Yanow 2009, 295). 
Following James Scott’s advice, this thesis rather aims to establish a ‘plausible 
account’ (Scott 1985, 47) of the Kachin and Karen insurgencies in Myanmar that 
should be ‘judged by the standards of its logic, its economy, and its consistency with 
other social facts’ (Scott 1985, 46). In order to do so, self-critical reflexivity, defined as 
the ‘explicit attention to the role of the ethnographer in the ethnography’ (Pachirat 
2009, 144) is pivotal. This is because the researcher’s positionality creates power 
relations, which, ‘shape not only what is seen (a question of access), but also how it is 
seen (a question of the production of ethnographic knowledge itself)’ (Pachirat 2009, 
147). Elucidating the politics of knowledge production is therefore not only a matter 
of intellectual honesty but crucially important for the reader to assess the account’s 
plausibility (Yanow 2009).  
While this has become a main issue of concern in Sociology and Anthropology 
since these disciplines’ “reflexive turn,” 16  similar debates have hitherto had little 
impact on the political sciences, including International Relations and the study of 
armed conflict. This is mainly because most political scientists have instead departed 
into the diametrically opposite epistemological direction in an attempt to ground their 
discipline in the methodological assumptions of natural sciences (Wedeen 2009, 76). 
Richmond’s et al. critique of the ‘the field’ in ‘fieldwork’ as a concept that is enmeshed 
in its colonial past and laden with power hierarchies is a case in point. The authors 
complain that “the field” is associated with exoticism, otherness, and primitivism, 
under-development and instability and, hence, ‘at the bottom of the structural 
hierarchy of power in IR’ (Richmond, Kappler, and Björkdahl 2015, 27). Following 
their argument, this does not only legitimise interventionist policies of northern powers 
into societies of the Global South but also skews the process of knowledge production 
as such. This is because the data collected in “the field” most often only serves to feed 
into the theoretical models produced in the centres of power and knowledge “back 
                                                        
16 See Paul Rabinow’s experiments with objective and subjective ways of writing in his "Reflections 
on Fieldwork in Morocco"(Rabinow 2007) and James Clifford and George Marcus’ engagement with 
"writing culture"(Clifford and Marcus 1986). 
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home”. According to the authors, field research in International Relations has, thus, 
often proven to be futile for challenging our orthodoxies in fundamental ways as ‘the 
field, in its mainstream use, can be considered as an extension, rather than as a 
subversion, of armchair or laboratory research’ (Richmond, Kappler, and Björkdahl 
2015, 29). While their critique is valid, it also illustrates the need to catch up on debates 
about reflexivity in the discipline.  
I acknowledge that escaping such epistemic centre-periphery relations as a 
European doctoral student in Southeast Asia is not entirely feasible. Yet, I hope to 
have mitigated the most obvious “booby traps” in my field research through 
ethnographic sensitivity, reflexivity about my own role as a researcher, and a 
commitment to listening closely to my interlocutors’ analyses rather than simply 
harvesting data. The following reflections are by no means an exhaustive account of 
the various challenges I met during field research on the Karen and Kachin 
insurgencies in Myanmar’s borderlands. Not only would a more comprehensive 
account go beyond the scope of this chapter, a more extensive elaboration would also 
be problematic in ethical terms. While Neumann and Neumann remind that 
ethnographic research in International Relations generally has the obligation to be 
transparent about access and positionality, they also stress that when working in 
conflict zones in general and with clandestine groups in particular, full transparency 
as to how data was gathered is not expedient with regards to the safety of the 
researched and the researcher, as there ‘are situations when you do not have to, indeed 
ought not to, tell how the data have been produced’ (Neumann and Neumann 2015, 
811). The following reflections can, therefore, not provide a full disclosure of my access 
to and positionality within both insurgency movements. They are rather meant as an 
insight into the politics of knowledge production within which this research project 
developed, which should ultimately help to assess the plausibility of my account.  
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3 Reflections on Field Research 
Field research does not only mean travelling to specific geographic sites but is 
primarily about entering and navigating a social space (Clifford 1997). Such spaces can 
be linked with but are not confined to geographic localities. On the contrary, they often 
travel across borders and are embedded within wider global networks (Marcus 1995). 
Finding an entry point to the insurgent social network of the Karen insurgency in the 
Thai-Myanmar borderlands was easier than getting initial access to the Kachin 
insurgent network at the Chinese-Myanmar border. This is mainly because the KIO 
operates from within Kachin State, most of which remains largely fenced off to 
Westerner observers by both the Myanmar and the Chinese government. In contrast, 
the KNU, operating on both sides of the Thai-Myanmar border, has long been 
relatively more exposed to Western journalists, researchers, and aid workers, who 
work in Thailand. This said, the main challenge to researching on both clandestine 
movements was not necessarily about getting initial access.  
More important to reflect upon than the initial access are the ways in which 
access points and positionality were interconnected and shaped the ways in which I 
could navigate both social spaces, which ultimately affected my perspective. This is 
because my entry points came with certain social associations within both movements, 
which opened some doors rather than others and also shaped the ways in which I and 
my research were perceived by my interlocutors. John Van Maanen refers to this as 
“webs of local associations” (Van Maanen and John 1991, 39). Reflecting on his own 
ethnographic research in urban street police units in the United States, he argues that  
‘neutrality in the field is an illusion. Neutrality is itself a role 
enactment and the meaning of such a role to people will, most 
assuredly, not be neutral. Only by entering into the webs of local 
associations does the field-worker begin to understand the 
distinctive nature of what lies within and without these webs.’ (Van 
Maanen and John 1991, 39)  
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Van Maanen, therefore, advises to choose one’s associations wisely before 
entering the field. Timothy Pachirat’s participant research in different sections of an 
industrial slaughterhouse, however, demonstrates that after gaining access to a 
particular social space, the researcher cannot always freely choose her or his webs of 
local association. Her or his positioning is often done by others (Pachirat 2009). This 
was also the case in my experience, at least partly.  
To gain initial access to both movements, I first sought contact to the Kachin 
and Karen diasporas in the UK and Thailand, presenting myself as who I was: a PhD 
student, interested in and sympathetic to the struggle of their communities in 
Myanmar. Indeed, it was my background in higher education in general and 
International Relations in particular, which enabled me to foster a reciprocal 
relationship to the Karen and Kachin movements during my field research. While 
researching on the Karen insurgency, I have, for instance, spent four months with the 
organisation’s educational arm, supporting its staff to survey their extensive parallel 
schooling system in the “liberated areas” of Karen State and their involvement in 
education provision in the refugee camps on the Thai border. In close cooperation with 
KNU education workers, I designed a student survey and trained KNU staff in 
conducting the survey and analying its results with a social science statistics software. 
During this time, I developed friendly relations with the head of this education arm, 
an elderly Karen headmaster and rebel leader, and his confidants, many of whom were 
young and passionate teachers. In addition to their role in education, some of them 
also held military positions in the insurgency’s armed wing. I spent many hours at their 
work places and living quarters, where conversations enfolded mostly over food, 
drinks, and beetle nut. My role also enabled me to travel extensively to small towns 
and refugee camps on the Thai side of the border as well as to villages and camps in 
eastern Myanmar’s Karen State, where I met many other supporters, affiliates, 
members, and leaders of the Karen insurgency.  
While researching on the KIO, I spent three months in government-held and 
rebel-held areas of Kachin State. During this time, I conducted seminars in Conflict 
and Peace Studies for a variety of people located within the Kachin insurgent social 
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network, which I was first asked to do by a Kachin officer who was interested to learn 
about my field of study. In agreement with the KIO leadership, these sessions 
encompassed courses extending to several days or even multiple weeks targeting KIO 
officers and Kachin humanitarian and development workers affiliated with the KIO in 
government held areas of Kachin State and the town of Laiza, the “capital” of the 
KIO. These seminars included topics such as international intervention in civil wars, 
the politics of humanitarianism and international organisations, conflict 
transformation, peacebuilding, including territorial conflict management and the 
transformation of war economies. They were seen as interesting and useful by the KIO 
for several reasons. First, they provided an insight into the Western peacebuilding, 
development, and aid industry that was entering Myanmar since 2011, including 
concepts of political violence and armed groups that underpin Western political 
thought and policy-making. Second, they provided a comparative angle for some of 
the pressing problems faced by Kachin communities. Particularly popular were for 
instance discussions of Afghanistan’s opium industry and the threats they pose to 
peace in comparison with the local narcotics industry. Third, many KIO officers and 
other participants were genuinely interested in learning about Western political 
concepts, similar to many other people I met across Myanmar, a country where 
teaching Political Science had long been banned from universities during the years of 
military dictatorship. During these daily seminars, I gained invaluable insights into my 
seminar participants’ perspective on the Kachin conflict and the KIO and established 
friendly relations with the participants beyond the classroom. Many of my participants 
invited me into their homes and circles of friends, they took me on excursions to go 
fishing and picnicking, and taught me how to sing revolutionary songs in karaoke bars. 
While my background in higher education enabled me to gain meaningful 
access to both movements, my particular entry points also attached me to some webs 
of local association but not others, affecting my positionality within both movements. 
While this was unproblematic in some instances, it turned out to be a more important 
issue to address in others. During my time of research in the KNU, for instance, the 
movement was highly fragmented with parts of its leadership negotiating with the 
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government while others positioning themselves against this conciliatory line. 
Factionalism and mistrust was, thus, pervading the movement when I was with its 
educational arm. On the one hand, my research benefitted from this situation as it 
enabled me to observe the internal power struggle that the literature on non-state 
armed groups speaks about in action. On the other hand, I needed to be careful that 
my own association with one particular part of the movement kept my communication 
channels open to other parts as well. Although, the Karen grassroots from different 
functional parts and geographic regions of the movement were mostly contend to 
speak to and liaise with me, it was easier to interview some leaders rather than others. 
Indeed, it became obvious that leaders from the faction that opposed rapprochement 
with the government were generally more willing to facilitate my research interest than 
the ones who sought conciliation with the government. In addition, the webs of local 
associations that I was embedded in through the educational arm of the movement 
could open the doors to some other parts of the movement better than others. While 
the education department was not central to the power struggle that was being waged 
within the movement itself, its leader and staff were still positioned within one of the 
rival factions.  
In order to gain a balanced perspective and to avoid bias and misrepresentation, 
it was, hence, imperative to a) reflect on my data and b) find ways to triangulate 
information. Reflection needs to include the acknowledgement that gaining full and 
equal access to all sides and parts of both clandestine movements was not feasible. 
After all, my webs of local association reflected the very internal dynamics of 
contestations that large parts of this thesis are ultimately about. While my 
embeddedness enabled me to observe the contestation first-hand and to gain an 
intimate insight into the beliefs held by some of the people involved, it also posed 
challenges in terms of accuracy and bias as it emphasised some voices and muted 
others. Similar challenges are common in all ethnographic and non-ethnographic 
research settings as webs of local association always exist and sharing information is 
never entirely neutral. These issues were, however, accentuated by a situation that was 
charged with instability, violence, and fear. This was similar to other situations of 
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armed conflict, in all of which ‘the flow of information - who controls it, who possesses 
it, and who seeks to share and disseminate it, is highly charged, contextually, specific, 
and always political’ (Kaiser 2013, 114). It was, therefore, necessary to remind myself, 
per Goodhand, that researchers in conflict settings are ‘unlikely to be viewed by local 
actors as neutral or altruistic’ and, therefore, naturally become ‘part of this 
“information economy” and should realize that research necessarily involves political 
and ethical choices about which voices are heard and whose knowledge counts’ 
(Goodhand 2000, 12). 
This does not mean that information in conflict environments is only shared 
with the intention to distort and distract. While some of my interlocutors - particularly 
on the elite level – have certainly presented events in particular narratives that serve 
their own purposes - such as self-legitimisation or mobilisation - many others were 
motivated to speak to me for different reasons. Most Karen and Kachin insurgents as 
well as other people affected by the armed conflict seemed willing to talk to me because 
of an intrinsic eagerness to convey their opinions and experiences to the outside world, 
which they felt had forgotten about them completely or formed opinions about 
Myanmar’s transition without listening to the account of ethnic minorities in the 
country’s conflict areas. 17  This entailed that some interlocutors had certain 
expectations of me, often hoping that my research would raise awareness about their 
plight in the Western world in particular. Karen education workers who provided 
emotional testimonies and personal opinions on the political developments in various 
parts of Karen State, for instance, ended a two and half hour long focus group 
interview with the statement that ‘all the information provided is true’ but coupled it 
with the request about how I was planning to ‘help the Karen people’18. This illustrates 
that people often went out of their way to facilitate my research expecting that my 
research would somehow help the situation of their communities, a belief that I needed 
                                                        
17This resembles Wood’s research experience on supporters of insurgency in El Salvador about 
which she writes: ‘My inquiries met with the enthusiastic collaboration of many residents of 
contested zones […]. Those interviewed frequently expressed a desire for their story to be told, that 
some account (or accounting) be made of the local history of the civil war’ (Wood 2009, 132). 
18 Group interview with KNU education workers, Mutraw, 24 October 2013. 
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to dampen on several occasions by stating that I am unfortunately just an academic 
researcher who hoped to influence the larger discourse on Myanmar but that I could 
not effectuate immediate change.19  
While there is no reason to believe that most of my non-elite interlocutors were 
purposely misrepresenting events, I still needed to interpret the information carefully. 
This is because testimonies can be skewed unconsciously as well, particularly when 
they are about past events, by what Wood calls the social processes of memory 
formation (Wood 2009, 123–24). Personal experiences, e.g. personal losses, societal 
norms, e.g. grieving cultures, or subsequent political events, e.g. new alliances, all 
affect which memories are retained and which are forgotten as well as which are 
accentuated and which are muted (Wood 2009, 123–24). The ethnographic interview 
setting in situations of political violence additionally shape the narration and 
representation:   
‘the respondent’s personal and family trajectories through the war, 
by his or her present political loyalties, beliefs concerning the likely 
consequences of participating in the interview and of expressing 
particular views, and present personal objectives – all as informed 
by his or her understanding of the purpose of the interview.’ (Wood 
2009, 124) 
Another important caveat about the information collected in the secretive 
environment of rebel groups and their internal politics is that it was not always possible 
to verify information independently and discern “facts” from gossip and rumour. This 
does, however, not entail that the narratives presented to me were not believed to be 
true by my interlocutors, which turned rumours into important sources of information 
in and of themselves for my research about authority and internal contestation. For 
understanding judgements about leadership legitimacy among the grassroots of 
                                                        
19 Goodhand also describes that research in conflict zones often comes with the expectation to ‘do 
some good’ from both sides: the researcher and the researched. He also clarifies that these 
expectations need to be kept in proportion to what academic research in such environments can 
actually achieve (Goodhand 2000, 14). 
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insurgency, rumours about Lamborghinis being shipped across the Moei River to buy 
off rebel leaders, for instance, can be as important to the analysis as knowledge about 
the actual existence of such deals. This is because ‘rumors are revealing in and of 
themselves as to what they disclose about the communities’ view of those in power 
and of the power dynamics affecting daily lives’ (Mazurana, Gale, and Jacobsen 2013, 
13).  
Issues of subjectivity and the accentuation of some voices over others are 
inevitable by-products of ethnographic research, if not any empirical research. 
Reflecting on the production of knowledge is, however, no excuse for writing a skewed 
account of actual events and potential biases, misrepresentations and distortions need 
to be mitigated. In order to construct a plausible account, triangulation of data became 
pivotal in my project. The problem for triangulating information about recent 
developments within clandestine movements is that there is very little independent 
information available with which to triangulate. Invaluable in this respect were the 
writings of other academic and non-academic researchers, with some of whom I have 
also liaised and discussed my findings (Lintner and Lintner 1990; Smith 1999; South 
2008; Kramer 2009; Woods 2011; Sadan 2013). Moreover, I also sought to verify 
information with local journalists, aid workers, and members of civil society outside 
of the insurgent social networks. As could be expected, some of the information 
sought-after on the internal politics of insurgency was not to be found in outside 
accounts of the movements in question. 
To mitigate biases and achieve a rounded perspective on the internal politics of 
both rebel groups, I also opted to triangulate information among differently situated 
members of the insurgencies. To do so, I sought multiple, alternative points of entry 
to both insurgent social figurations. The idea was to embed myself within several webs 
of local associations that allowed me to speak with differently situated people from 
across different nodes of the insurgent social networks. The geographical multi-
sitedness of my research aided me in this regard. When travelling from one region to 
another, I could often dis-entangle from webs of local associations and embed myself 
in new ones. People in northern Karen State are, for instance, often more closely 
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networked with individuals in Thailand’s Chiang Mai than with persons in southern 
Karen State. Hence, I did not only embed myself within the Karen educational arm 
but also established alternative points of contact through various other Karen 
organisations in different regions of Thailand and Myanmar. In the case of the KIO, 
which was geographically and organisationally less fragmented than the KNU, I 
triangulated information with KIO insiders from affiliated organisations, including 
local churchmen, community elders, members of Kachin civil society in rebel and 
government-held areas and the diaspora community in the UK. 
It is important to note here that while these various organisations and societal 
nodes are linked to the wider Kachin and Karen insurgent social figurations, they also 
constitute a form of public sphere. While many of them would not publicly criticise 
the rebel leaders and their movements, they critically reflect about their politics and 
were willing to share their opinions to varying degrees. Finding these multiple access 
points became easier as research progressed as I gradually built knowledge of and 
networks to various stakeholders. These networks were often of a personal nature. 
When travelling to Yangon, for instance, I was welcomed by the brother of a Kachin 
acquaintance living in the UK. He then helped me to establish further contacts in 
Myitkyina, the government controlled capital of Kachin State. There I was introduced 
to KIO members and other contacts that helped me to progress further into the rebel-
held areas of Kachin State.  
My gradual progression throughout these networks also shaped the way in 
which I was perceived by my interlocutors many of whom would ask me where I have 
already been and whom I have already spoken to. Important to mention in this regard 
is that the KIO and the KNU have historically been allies and were theoretically still 
allied within the ethnic armed umbrella organisation of United Nationalities 
Federation Council (UNFC) at the time of field research. Despite the organisations’ 
different trajectories as concerns to ceasefire negotiations with the government, which 
have brought about tensions and disagreements between some of their leaders, most 
KNU and KIO members still feel sympathetic towards each other. Therefore, it was 
generally unproblematic to mention that I was speaking to both groups. Some of my 
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interlocutors even welcomed my comparative approach explicitly, as expressed by one 
KNU insider in Chiang Mai, who compared the Karen ceasefire experience to the 
broken down ceasefire of the KIO. In a formal interview he told me: ‘you are doing 
the right thing to compare the KIA and the KNU, or the Kachin case and the Karen. 
For us, we are trying to use the Kachin as a precedent, as a kind of example that, eh, 
we need to learn from, the dynamics, the pattern, the sequence.’20 
His comment also illustrates that local informants are not only a source of raw 
data but engage in sophisticated analyses themselves. They are analysing and 
evaluating the rapidly changing world around them, including Naypyidaw’s political 
transition, incoming foreign investments, changing geopolitics, the dynamics of 
counterinsurgency, the ongoing negotiations between armed groups and the 
government, and not least the internal politics in their own movements. My gradual 
progression from an outsider to a relative insider over time was reflected in the 
interaction with my interlocutors, many of whom started to inquire about my opinion 
on their situation. This often led to long discussions, which helped me to fill gaps, and 
connect dots. To follow Allina-Pisano’s metaphor (Allina-Pisano 2009), peeling the 
onion was in large parts a collaborative process.  
4 Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrated the benefits and challenges of my chosen 
methodology. The ethnographic bend of my approach was essential to gain an insider 
perspective into the social process between differently situated insurgents in both 
insurgency movements and the ways in which this drove their strategies. In order to 
establish a credible and meaningful account from my ethnographic data, I have, 
therefore, used this opportunity to reflect on my research, most importantly on the 
ways in which issues of access and positionality interacted, the advantages and 
limitations of the data collected, as well as my data triangulation strategies that helped 
                                                        
20 Interview with Karen activist, Chiang Mai, Thailand, 30 October 2015. 
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to address potential shortcomings and mitigate against bias and misrepresentation. In 
doing so, I help my reader in assessing the plausibility of the following account. The 
above discussion has also demonstrated the potentials of ethnographic approaches for 
challenging common orthodoxies in the study of conflict and peace in general and the 
emerging scholarship on non-state armed groups in particular.   
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CHAPTER IV -
CHANGING 
BORDERLANDS 
 
1 Introduction  
After following a muddy track from the sleepy provincial capital of Dawei in south-
eastern Myanmar on a small motorbike for almost half a day, I reached the site of a 
proposed deep sea port. The Thai-Myanmar business conglomerate tasked with 
developing these white sand beaches into one of the largest industrial estates of the 
country as a special economic zone (SEZ), including petrochemical facilities, 
automobile assemblage, a steel mill and light industries, was encountering financial 
difficulties at the time. Construction was, therefore, temporarily suspended when I 
arrived at the large clearing on the coast. Although none of the workers were in sight, 
a young government official was eagerly explaining the high-flying development 
ambitions for the area to a small group of potential private investors from across the 
country.  
While the sight of a sweaty foreigner in the middle of nowhere seemed to puzzle 
him a bit, he quickly warmed to the idea of sharing his developmental aspirations with 
a Western student from a university that after all goes by the name of the London 
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School of Economics. Overlooking a halfway finished highway that connects the site 
to Kanchanaburi in Thailand by cutting through dense forests, he praised the strategic 
location of Myanmar that made it a natural geopolitical partner for regional 
development. To him, all what seemed necessary to transform the country’s far flung 
and inaccessible borderlands into prosperous hubs of connectivity for the ever 
increasing cross-border commerce was the construction of physical infrastructure. His 
narrative fits well with a currently popular understanding of Myanmar that portrays 
the impoverished country as Southeast Asia’s “last frontier economy,” among whose 
most valuable assets is its strategic location, sandwiched as it is between the region’s 
affluent economies of China, India, and Thailand. The historian and grandson of UN 
General Secretary U Thant, Thant Myint-U, for instance, stresses the transformative 
powers of these “geoeconomics” in his 2011 book ‘Where China meets India: Burma 
and the New Crossroads of Asia’ as follows:  
‘When geography changes, old patterns of contact may disappear 
and new ones take hold, turning strangers into neighbours, and 
transforming backwaters into zones of strategic significance.’ (Thant 
Myint-U 2011, 3) 
Such grand visions are reminiscent of longstanding historic imaginations of 
Myanmar’s geostrategic relevance, such as in the Second World War, when Myanmar 
became understood as the “gateway to China”, which was manifested in the “Burma 
Road” built by Allied forces to supply Chinese nationalist troops fighting against the 
Japanese (Deignan 1943). They also dovetail with current geopolitical strategies and 
worldviews in the region, including China’s “look south” strategy, India’s “look east” 
strategy, and the Thai outlook to its western neighbour, as well as development 
policies of regional organisations, such as the Asian Development Bank. All of these 
aim at fostering commerce and regional economic integration through increasing 
connectivity by way of infrastructure construction through “the Myanmar 
connection” (Chachavalpongpun 2011, 102; Steinberg and Fan 2012, 280–96; Asian 
Development Bank 2010). 
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What frequently goes missing in these developmental and geostrategic visions 
is that the very areas that are deemed to be developed, Myanmar’s borderlands, are far 
from stable. Indeed, the highway connecting the Dawei industrial project to Thailand 
crosses through territory where units of the country’s oldest rebel army, the Karen 
insurgency, remain active. At first glance, it seems as if these are indeed only the relics 
of a bygone era that will soon give way to the overwhelming forces of state 
consolidation that are driven by powerful regional economic interests. While the 
heyday of ethnic insurgency in Myanmar has certainly passed, large parts of the 
country’s borderlands have, however, remained home to a dazzling array of non-state 
armed groups, some of whom maintain relatively sophisticated state-like structures in 
the pockets of territory under their control. Since 2011, large scale violence between 
various ethnic armies, including the Kachin insurgency, and the state has, however, 
again broken out in the country’s north, an area where economic development coupled 
with bilateral ceasefire agreements had previously provided unprecedented stability 
and an inroad for Myanmar’s state to continually expand its presence.  
Before analysing and comparing the recent trajectories of the Karen and Kachin 
insurgencies, this chapter, therefore, provides a historic background to Myanmar’s 
restive borderlands. This serves to understand the roots and development of the 
country’s protracted ethnic conflict and, therefore, offers an appreciation of the social 
context within which the modalities of authority in both movements will be analysed. 
It is also intended to contextualise the structural changes in the political, economic, 
and military environments of both insurgencies in order to assess their impacts on their 
internal authority relations.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. It will first introduce the concept of Zomia to 
explain how Myanmar’s borderlands have historically emerged from an extensive 
space of limited statehood at the periphery of several Asian kingdoms, states and 
empires (Van Schendel 2002). For understanding the roots and developments of 
Myanmar’s ethnic armed conflicts, taking this long-view on region-wide centre-
periphery dynamics is a more helpful starting point than an imagined polity akin to 
the Westphalian nation-state. Building on this, the chapter will analyse how colonial 
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state-building transformed Myanmar’s Zomian borderlands and their relationship with 
the state centre by solidifying erstwhile fluid identities into salient ethnic categories, 
which in turn, gave rise to competing ethno-nationalist projects. In a next step, the 
chapter will show how militarisation and violence during the Second World War have 
pitched these projects against each other to the extent that Myanmar descendent into 
full-fledge civil war at its eve of independence. Focusing on wider regional dynamics 
during the Cold War, it will then be explained how the social contexts of insurgency 
emerged within a wider transnational insurgent borderworld. In conclusion, the 
chapter will discuss geopolitical shifts that have led to increased commercialisation in 
Myanmar’s insurgent borderlands, and enabled the state to consolidate its presence to 
a still patchy but unprecedented extent. This gave rise to the situation that Myanmar’s 
insurgents face today: overlapping and constantly shifting authority landscapes that 
encompass semi-independent regional commands of the state military, ethnic 
insurgent armies, criminal militias, foreign and domestic business networks, and 
community leaders. 
2 Non-State Histories  
The far-flung mountains that separate Myanmar from India, China, Laos, and 
Thailand have long been a particular source of inspiration for students of borderlands 
in different disciplines (Edmund R. Leach 1960; Van Schendel 2002; Scott 2009). This 
is not least because they are among the last vestiges of a historically grown extensive 
zone of limited statehood, straddling the fringes of strong state centres across Asia, a 
region that has come to be known by the name of Zomia (Van Schendel 2002; Scott 
2009; Michaud 2010; Formoso 2010). It depicts approximately 2,500,000 square 
kilometres of remote and inaccessible upland regions surrounding the outliers of the 
Himalayas, all of which encompass area borderlands that are marginal to the 
traditional spatial compartments of South, Southeast, Central and Eastern Asia (cf. 
map 4) By deriving the term from zomi, meaning “highlander” in various languages 
spoken across the upland regions of Bangladesh, India, and Myanmar, the founding 
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father of the concept, Willem van Schendel, stresses the most important common 
feature underpinning these areas: their distinctive historical development of highland 
political orders among the dazzling array of “hill tribes” in these areas, located far 
from the various lowland centres of power (Van Schendel 2002, 653–54).21  
 
                                                        
21 Willem van Schendel originally promulgated the concept of Zomia as an epistemological critique 
to the artificial scalar boundaries drawn by conventional Area Studies. He argues that such 
regionally compartmentalised systems of knowing create a bias in favour for the area centres, 
creating ‘spaces and social practices that are academically marginal and partitioned’ (Van Schendel 
2002, 665). Area borderlands are, therefore, commonly either neglected in academic knowledge 
production or studied through the prism of the centre. Yet, their own social, economic and political 
dynamics are often better understood in relation to other area borderlands than to their respective 
area centres. Two border towns on the opposite side of the Chinese-Myanmar border, for instance, 
will often bear more similarities and connections with each other than with Beijing and Bangkok, 
two centres of their East and Southeast Asian “areas”, within which they are nominally studied. 
For analysing such flows and processes Van Schendel, therefore, proposed to ‘break out of the 
chrysalis of the area dispensation which occurred after World War 2, and to develop new concepts 
of regional space’ (Van Schendel 2002, 665). Zomia was the result of this endeavour. Despite the 
vast heterogeneity among the highland ethnicities inhabiting this vast region, he and other 
“Zomians” make the case that these highland peoples share long-standing cultural, linguistic, and 
ideational affinities and ties (Van Schendel 2002; Scott 2009). From this perspective, Zomia 
qualifies as a region of its own. 
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Map 4: Non-state Asian borderlands, i.e. ‘Zomia’ as defined by Willem Van Schendel (Source: 
Van Schendel 2002, 653). 
This analytical distinction between the political orders of highlanders and lowlanders, 
or hill tribes and valley peoples, in Asia has a long tradition. The region that now 
comprises the polity of Myanmar has played a prominent role in forwarding this binary 
understanding. Colonial administrator of British Burma, Sir James George Scott, for 
instance, stressed the distinctiveness of Myanmar’s lowland plains from its highlands. 
Describing the latter, he provides an account of the extremely remote gorge of the 
N’Mai River in the northern mountains, which ‘seem to be as wild and unengaging as 
the inhabitants’ (Scott 1900, 4). He describes these inhabitants - the Kachin, as 
‘essentially a hill people’ that are characterised by ethnic fluidity and martial traditions 
(Scott 1900, 360). He, furthermore, stressed that many of them live in rather anarchic 
and rebellious orders:  
‘The race includes a great number of tribes, sub-tribes, and clans, 
divided and sub-divided to an extent which would appear needless 
refinement […]. This is of course due to the isolating character of 
their abrupt hills and valleys and still more to their combativeness 
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and their maintenance of blood feuds. Though therefore the 
classifications and sub-classifications seem bewildering and recall 
the grouping of the Karens […]. It may be noted first of all that 
among themselves there are two political divisions, firstly, Kamsa 
Kachins, those who have a Duwa, or ruler: and secondly Kumlao 
Kachins, those who have no Chief and even sometimes only an 
occasionally summoned village council. Such republican or 
democratic communities are no longer permitted within the 
Burma administrative boundary. The word Kumlao originally 
means rebel […].’ (Scott 1900, 369–70) 
 The basic tenants of this assessment, both in terms of the divided political orders 
between lowlands and highlands as well as the fluid and anarchic characteristics of 
highland societies, have since been reiterated by academic scholarship on Myanmar 
in particular and Zomia more generally. Most prominently, one of the founding fathers 
of modern Political Anthropology, Edmund Leach, noted that the divide between 
highland and lowland societies, driven by different agricultural practices, were 
constitutive for the historical development of state orders in the region: 
My terms "Hill People" and "Valley People" are intended to denote 
the diametrically opposed modes of subsistence associated with 
these two types of terrain. These two modes of subsistence have 
been present in the area throughout historical times and any 
hypothesis concerning historical process must take this into 
account. (Leach 1960, 51) 
The idea behind this is that large-scale paddy rice farming in the more densely 
populated valleys necessitated higher degrees of organisation and hierarchy, as 
opposed to small-scale shifting cultivation practices in the sparsely populated 
mountain ranges that were more conducive to egalitarian forms of social order. In his 
seminal study of the ‘Political Orders of Highland Burma’, Leach, therefore, came to 
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stress the anarchic and egalitarian nature of highland societies, i.e. their opposition to 
hierarchy and rule:  
‘Since the average population density of the hill tracts in this Zone 
is everywhere very low, people living in localities where the rice 
production is only marginal have a choice between remaining 
independent in a small impoverished community or moving into a 
dependent situation in some more prosperous area. It is quite 
evident that in such contexts Kachins often value political 
independence more highly than economic advantage.’ (Leach 
1954, 234) 
Writing about the Kachin in particular, Leach - who himself had previously served as 
an officer in the colonial British Burma Army, stressed that Kachin social orders were, 
therefore, constantly oscillating between egalitarian and hierarchical modes of 
ordering, Gumlao and Gumsa respectively. Their opposition to central rule, which 
created regular resistance to overarching chiefs, naturally pitched them in opposition 
to the hierarchic orders of lowlands kingdom as well. This romanticised idea that the 
Kachin, emblematic for other highland societies in the area, preferred and chose 
‘independence above everything else’ (Leach 1954, 234), influenced James Scott’s take 
on Zomia. In his ‘Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia’ Scott seeks to explain 
why this area has historically given birth to armed insurrection on a scale that the 
‘enumeration of the hundreds, nay thousands, or rebellions mounted by hill people 
against encroaching states over the past two millennia defies easy accounting’ (Scott 
2009, 283). 
 Rather than viewing upland societies as historically separate from the region’s 
centres of power, he explains their development as inherently shaped by relations to 
lowland state-development. In Scott’s reading, swidden agriculture, dispersed modes 
of settlement, and decentral political organisation were not so much a sign of 
backwardness and separateness but reflected conscious state-evasion, practised by 
people who sought refuge from authoritarian modes of extraction, control, and 
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slavery, which the political economy of lowland kingdoms were based upon. While 
concentrating on the area that is nowadays known as Myanmar, he contends that 
similar contentious relationships existed between the hills and other imperial cores, 
including the Siam, Khmer, and Han empires. This essentially turned Zomia into ‘a 
zone of refuge or “shatter zone”’ (Scott 2009, 7). While influential in the study of 
Zomia, Scott’s account has not remained without substantial critique, mostly 
surrounding the historical accuracy and evidence of his claim that Zomia constituted 
itself through active state flight (for a critical engagement with Scott’s work see 
Lieberman 2010; Formoso 2010).  
The basic thrust behind the concept of Zomia as a region whose fluid political 
orders have defied the projection of power by nearby lowland states for centuries, 
nevertheless remains useful for contextualising the modern history of many ethnic 
conflicts in contemporary Southeast Asia, including the one in Myanmar. Similarly, 
centre-periphery conflicts between non-state borderlands and state centres are also 
characteristic of other borderlands in the Global South. These often feature a particular 
‘history of violence’ because colonial powers frequently mapped borders onto 
predating social, cultural, and political entities (Goodhand 2008, 231). In order to 
redraw such pre-existing boundaries, colonial states and their postcolonial successors 
have, therefore, often engaged internal colonisation which turned many borderlands 
in the Global South into militarised spaces of exception and resistance up until today 
(Goodhand 2008, 228–32). 22  This said, Zomia as described above has shrunk 
significantly with the territorial expansion of Asian States since the early-20th century. 
The next section will show that this has, however, not always translated into the linear 
consolidation of statehood in the region’s far-flung borderlands. The attempt to 
incorporate these areas into colonial and postcolonial state-building projects has rather 
transformed and added additional layers to this uneasy relationship between centres 
and peripheries. In Myanmar, this process colonial state-making has solidified once 
                                                        
22 For a good collection of essays addressing similar violent borderland histories and politics in 
different marginalised borderlands of the Global South see Korf and Raeymaekers 2013. 
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fluid social identities and gave rise to competing and militarised ethnonational forces, 
which as a result lay the foundation of ethnic armed conflict.  
3 Emerging Ethnonationalism   
Following the third Anglo-Burmese War in 1885, the British Empire conquered the 
territory that today comprises the polity of Myanmar. Compared to neighbouring 
India, British Burma though was to remain peripheral to imperial core interests. In 
fact, the main guiding principle was to rule the newly annexed territories with minimal 
efforts and costs. This was particularly so in Myanmar’s far-flung, inaccessible, and 
sparsely populated highlands, as they were deemed much less “profitable” than the 
central plains, whose timber, oil, and rice industries were soon to be booming (Smith 
1999, 40–48). The British, hence, divided Myanmar in “Burma Proper” - mainly 
populated by the country’s Burman ethnic majority, and the “Frontier Areas” - mainly 
populated by its ethnic minorities. While the former was governed directly, the latter 
was largely left to govern itself. Similar to other such “unprofitable” peripheries of the 
Empire, as for instance Southern Sudan, the minimal administration of the “Frontier 
Areas” was practised indirectly through local intermediaries (Smith 1999, 40). For 
doing so, colonial administrators mapped the diverse and fluid ethnic structures of 
society in ways that made them intelligible for the bureaucratic colonial state.  
This process of administrative standardisation turned multifaceted identities 
and malleable social orders into fixed categories. The hereditary chieftain system, 
which the colonial government co-opted in order to maintain order in the “Frontier 
Areas”, for instance, was little more than a colonial invention, similar to what has 
been described in other colonial contexts (Ranger 1983). Rather than ruling the 
highlands benevolently through traditional institutions, the colonial government, 
therefore, displaced fluid social orders that had oftentimes incorporated ample 
possibilities to oust overarching rulers. Instead, it sanctioned the despotism of local 
strongmen (Smith 1999, 47). Moreover, the colonial state’s reordering of society 
planted the seeds of ethnic conflict, again in a similar way to other colonial settings 
Chapter IV -Changing Borderlands 
93 | P a g e  
 
(Mamdani 1996). While ethnic self-identification was traditionally fluid and 
oftentimes of secondary importance to other axes of identity – as for instance one’s 
place in the tributary hierarchy (Gravers 1999, 19), the bureaucratic classification 
schemes employed by the colonial state apparatus created and entrenched ethnic 
identities and differences along oftentimes ill-conceived linguistic boundaries in a 
previously non-existent way (South 2008, 3–12). Robert Taylor explains that this has 
led to a situation where ‘the question of how to cope with demands of politicized 
ethnicity’ has become the driving force of politics in contemporary Myanmar (Taylor 
1982, 7):  
 ‘This ascriptive conceptual mode for intellectually mapping the 
structure of Burma has been so widely accepted by Burma’s political 
elite that they, like the Europeans who created it, have tended to 
accept the broad ethnic categories as embodying living social 
formations with political prerogatives. Thus, the politically neutral 
Burmese word lu-myō, literally meaning “kind of man” came to be 
translated as the emotive terms for race or nation. In this century 
ethnic categories have taken on a life of their own, shaping the 
political thought and behaviour of central and regional elites. It is 
now impossible to avoid the use of broad ethnic labels even while 
attempting to demystify them.’ (Taylor 1982, 8) 
The road from ethnic differentiation to ethnic armed conflict was paved with 
militarisation and violence, which led to the emergence of various ethno-nationalisms 
in Myanmar’s borderlands that soon stood in direct competition with growing Burman 
nationalism. Preferential recruitment into the colonial armed service was the most 
important factor driving this development. One aspect why ethnic minority soldiers 
were preferred by colonial army recruiters was because some minorities, such as the 
Karen, already aided the British conquest of Myanmar as guides and porters (Smith 
1999, 44). In addition, Karen, Kachin, and Chin seemed particularly suitable to service 
the colonial apparatus because many of them converted to Christianity and received 
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early and modern education as a result of Western missionaries operating in 
Myanmar’s borderlands since the early 19th century (Taylor 1982, 12). Racial 
stereotypes that depicted some hill people as for instance the Kachin as a particularly 
martial race, moreover, furthered colonial interest in recruiting them into the imperial 
war machine (Sadan 2013, 236).  
The motivations to volunteer for the imperial service among Myanmar’s 
minority communities were manifold. Most highland minorities, as for instance the 
Kachin, had never been integrated into the precolonial state of Myanmar, therefore, 
felt no allegiances to a Myanmar national project. Others even had historic grievances 
against Burman domination and rule (Taylor 1987, 155). Many Karen, for instance, 
seemed to have genuinely viewed the British as liberators from decades of oppression 
under Burmese feudal rule, which followed a series of violent wars between Burmese, 
Mon, and Siamese court under which the Karen suffered heavily as well (Smith 1999, 
44). Large parts of Karen, Kachin, and China communities, moreover, had already 
converted to Christianity and as a result felt more inclined to accept Western rule 
(Taylor 1987, 155). Moreover, complex socio-economic considerations have played 
into the decision to join the imperial military service. Enlistment, for instance, became 
one of the few available career options for young men from remote villages that led to 
status and economic benefits (Sadan 2013, 198–253).  
Recruits from ethnic minorities, therefore, came to outnumber their Burman 
comrades by a wide margin. At the eve of the Second World War, the British Burma 
Army counted 1,448 Karen, 886 Chin, and 881 Kachin soldiers as compared to only 
472 Burman soldiers (Smith 1999, 44). This proved particularly convenient for quelling 
majority dissent and growing Burman nationalism, arguably the main purpose of the 
imperial armed forces in Myanmar. The deployment of ethnic minority units to 
violently supress Burman uprisings, as for instance, the Saya San rebellion of 1930/1, 
unsurprisingly led to resentment among Myanmar’s ethnic majority against minority 
collaboration with imperial rule (Taylor 2006). This had the effect that nationalism in 
“Burma Proper” did not only develop in opposition to British colonial rule but also in 
opposition to its ethnic minorities. As noted by Walton, this emerging nationalism in 
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lowland Myanmar, therefore, was ethnically exclusive, ‘a Burman nationalism that 
gradually began to equate elements of Burman culture and Burman history with a 
presumably broader “Burmese” heritage’ (Walton 2013, 8). 
The deepest societal rifts, however, emerged when the geopolitics of the Second 
World War further pitched Myanmar’s population groups against each other. Many 
ethnic minorities stayed loyal to the British and their Allies and proved instrumental 
for repulsing the Japanese forces that overran Myanmar in 1943.23 In an attempt to rid 
themselves from colonial rule, Burman elites - surrounding nationalist leader Maj.-
Gen. Aung San, initially sided with the Japanese Imperial Army. After training in 
Japan they established the Burma Independence Army (BIA) and aided the Japanese 
to drive the British out of Myanmar. During this campaign, independent units of the 
BIA and adjunct local militias committed reprisal attacks on ethnic minority 
communities, as for instance, several massacres in Karen and Kachin villages 
(Callahan 2003, 75; Sadan 2013, 257). These violent interactions drove mutual 
antagonism and fear between Myanmar’s ethnic majority and its minorities to an 
unprecedented level. The director of the colonial Frontier Areas Administration, H. 
N. C. Stevenson, expressed his worries about this situation in a letter towards the end 
of the Second World War, writing that the war had ‘increased a hundredfold the 
ancients animosities between the hills and the plains’ (Smith 1999). 
While the Second World War, hence, further impaired inter-community 
relations, it also served as a catalyst for the emergence of ethno-nationalist agendas 
and organisations in the country’s borderlands. This minority ethno-nationalism in 
Myanmar has sometimes been viewed as a merely reactive and somewhat less 
authentic phenomenon compared to the emerging Burman nationalism in “Burma 
Proper” (Taylor 2006). Writing about the emerging Kachin nationalism, Mandy 
Sadan, however, argues persuasively that it should rather be viewed as part of ‘the 
region-wide anti-colonial zeitgeist’ (Sadan 2013, 261).24 Similarly, David Rampton 
                                                        
23 The US Department 101 of the American Office of Strategic Services, the forerunner to the CIA, 
for instance, recruited almost 11,000 Kachin soldiers for their war effort in Myanmar (Sadan 2013, 
262-263).  
24 For a good background on wider anticolonial struggle in Southeast Asia cf. (Christie 2001). 
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argues that these various competing nationalisms need to be understood as genuine 
motivating forces that are deeply engrained into the identities of Myanmar’s conflict 
actors rather than a second order phenomenon to the conflict (Rampton 2016). 
Speaking with Smith, the Second World War was indeed not only ‘the major formative 
political experience’ for ‘a whole generation of Burmese of all classes and races, and 
political belief’ (Smith 1999, 60). Ethnic minority regions, in particular, witnessed an 
‘extraordinary political awakening’ during these years (Smith 1999, 63). Central for 
creating the ethno-nationalist projects in both, Kachin and Karen States were two 
kinds of local elites: veterans of the imperial service and Christian missionaries.  
Imperial service often enabled young men from peripheral ethnic communities 
to travel across British Burma and across the globe. By way of this exposure they came 
to appreciate the wider workings of power within which they were serving and also 
exposed them to new political ideas, including the anti-colonialism and nationalism 
emerging across the region. Kachin soldiers, for instance trained and fought alongside 
British Gurkha forces as part of the Mesopotamian campaign of the First World War 
and often returned as highly distinguished war veterans. They were also sent as aids 
to crush the Singapore mutiny of 1915, in which Indian colonial troops rose against 
their British superior. The understanding of and experiences in this global political 
reordering, in turn sharpened their own local identity as “Kachin” among returning 
veterans. This fuelled their desire to create a space for their own community within 
the broader political landscape (Sadan 2013, 230–37). Analogously, global exposure 
shaped the ideas of Karen elites serving in the imperial service. The Karen district 
medical officer Dr. San C. Po, for instance, initially visited London for study purposes 
in the 1920s. There he published his pamphlet ‘Burma and the Karens’ that compared 
Myanmar’s political future to the situation in Great Britain, within which Karen State 
would be an autonomous entity comparable to Wales (Smith 1999, 51). 
In addition to this, the role of Christian missionaries was also instrumental in 
creating ethnic differences in Myanmar as well as encouraging and shaping ethno-
nationalist projects in its borderlands, particularly among Karen and Kachin 
communities. Despite the preferential recruitment into the imperial service of ethnic 
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minorities, their communities in “Frontier Burma” suffered from chronic neglect by 
the colonial state. The provision of public services, such as education, was instead 
often carried out by Christian missionaries. In contrast to their limited success in 
proselytising the Buddhist peoples of the central plains - including the Karen living in 
the Irrawaddy Delta, the animist Kachin, Karen, and Chin communities living in the 
hills were much more inclined to accept the Gospel and converted in large numbers 
(South 2008, 12). In order to translate the Bible into local languages, Western 
missionaries such as Dr Jonathan Wade in Karen State or Olaf Hanson in Kachin 
State developed the first orthographies for Sgaw Karen and Jingphaw respectively. 
They also provided Western-style education by establishing an extensive network of 
mission schools as well as tertiary education facilities, including the Kachin 
Theological College in Myitkyina and the Baptist College that was also known under 
its nickname “Karen College” in Yangon. These colleges trained the local elites and 
quickly turned into the hotbed for their emerging ethno-nationalist projects (Sadan 
2013, 381–82; Smith 1999, 44–45).  
On a larger level, Christian primary and secondary schooling was crucial for 
overriding parochial self-affiliations with local communities and tribes, instead 
fostering the development of transcending social identity categories such as “Kachin” 
and “Karen” (Keyes 2003, 212). Besides providing the infrastructure for minority 
ethno-nationalisms to emerge, Christianity, thus, became an intrinsic part of these 
projects. This was because it served as the ideological vehicle for the imagination of 
national communities and, indeed, modernity by providing new meanings and 
symbols that created cohesion in otherwise loosely connected tribal social orders. In 
the case of the Chin, Lian Hmung Sakhong wrote, therefore, that ‘Christianity itself 
became a new creative force of national identity’ (Sakhong 2003, xvi). With regards to 
the Karen, some analysts have even gone as far as to state that ‘Christianity can be 
said to have created “Karen” identity in Burma’ (Keyes 2004, 212). While there are 
also non-Christian people self-identifying with the label Karen in Myanmar, 
Christianity has certainly shaped the Karen ethnonational project, in a similar way 
than it has in Kachin areas. Writing about the latter, Sadan also notes that ‘Christianity 
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became an important social ideology in the Kachin ethno-nationalist movement’ 
(Sadan 2013, 35).  
In addition to welding ethnonationalist agendas through exacerbating inter-
communal differences and fostering intra-communal cohesion, Christian missionaries 
also actively encouraged local minority leaders in their nationalist quest. This was 
most pronounced in the case of the Karen, which is why subsequent governments of 
independent Myanmar commonly accused Christian missionaries for having sown the 
seeds of ethnic hatred and conflict. One American missionary, for instance, reportedly 
cheered the role of Karen levies in the violent suppression of a Burman-led uprising in 
1886 as follows:  
‘I never saw the Karen so anxious for a fight. This is just welding 
the Karens into a nation, not an aggregate of clans. The heathen 
Karens to a man are brigading themselves under the Christians. 
The whole thing is doing good for the Karen. This will put virility 
into our Christianity…. From a loose aggregation of clans we 
shall weld them into a nation yet.’ (Smith 1999, 45) 
The next section will elaborate how the failure to address ethnonational demands in 
this charged situation led to the outbreak of ethnic armed conflict that has plagued the 
country since gaining independence.  
4 Descent into Civil War  
Instilled with nationalistic ideas, alienated by preceding communal violence, and 
afraid of Burman reprisal for their collaboration with colonial rulers, many ethnic 
minority leaders demanded substantial provisions of regional autonomy or even 
outright secession from Myanmar at the time when the British were preparing to 
release the polity into independence after the Second World War. This was most 
pronounced among Christian Sgaw Karen elites, who were already well organised in 
the Karen National Association (KNA) - the only sizeable ethnic minority party in 
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British Burma and the forerunner of the KNU. Relying on premature promises made 
by local British officers fighting with Karen units behind Japanese lines during the 
Second World War, Karen leaders believed that they were already granted the right to 
self-determination in principle and that, therefore, there was little need to negotiate 
with Burman independence leaders (Smith 1999, 72–76; Walton 2008, 896). 
As a matter of fact, ethnic minorities had prominent advocates among the 
British colonial administration, above all the director of the Frontier Areas 
Administration Stevenson, who expressed his severe concerns about the explosive 
situation at several occasions. In regards to the Karen, he pointed to the looming 
danger of secessionist civil war a year before independence stating that ‘when we go, 
if go we do, the war for the Karen State will start’ (Smith 1999, 75). Cementing his 
belief in this unpromising scenario was not only that after fighting a four-year long 
guerrilla war alongside British forces, the Karen ‘have the guts, the skill, and the allies 
(the northern tribes) necessary to wrest them from the Burmese by force’ (Smith 1999, 
75). He also pointed out that the ‘only thing that restrains them is the belief that we 
will repay their loyalty by giving them a homeland’ (Smith 1999, 75). 
While Karen leaders were, indeed, already preparing for secession as early as 
1945 (Walton 2008, 900), other ethnic minorities, including the Kachin, Shan and 
Chin, were more inclined to negotiate their potential whereabouts in the future state 
with Burman elites. The latter were led by Maj.-Gen. Aung San and the Anti-Fascist 
People’s Freedom League (AFPFL), which grew out of a united front of anti-colonial 
political actors resisting both Japanese and British occupation. While ethnic minority 
positions were much less homogenous than commonly portrayed, 25  their general 
posture was to negotiate considerable autonomy provisions within a wider federal 
union (Smith 1999, 75–77). At a first conference at Panglong in 1946, Kachin elders 
expressed this as follows: 
‘For the hill peoples the safeguarding of their hereditary rights, 
customs and religions are the most important factors. When the 
                                                        
25 For a good discussion of this see Walton 2008, 899–900. 
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Burmese leaders are ready to see this is done and can prove that they 
genuinely regard the hill peoples as real brothers equal in every 
respect to themselves shall we be ready to consider the question of 
our entry into close relations with Burma as a free dominion.’ 
(Smith 1999, 75) 
These demands for autonomy were again supported by Stevenson’s Frontier Areas 
Administration, as for instance in his proposal for the creation of the ’United Frontier 
Union’ - encompassing Kachin, Chin, Shan, Karen, and Karenni territories, at the 
same conference (Walton 2008, 895). Despite a general dislike of this proposal among 
large swathes of the AFPFL, nationalist leader Aung San was open to negotiate 
autonomy provisions and went to great length to convince Myanmar’s ethnic 
minorities to stay within a future federal polity. While touring Kachin, Chin, and Shan 
States, the charismatic leader relentlessly lobbied for a joint national future, stressing 
the common struggle for the independence of a country that would be based on equal 
rights for all its citizens. Shortly before the historic second conference at Panglong in 
1947, he confirmed this vision as follows: ‘As for the people of the Frontier Areas, they 
must decide their own future. If they wish to come in with us we will welcome them 
on equal terms’ (Walton 2008, 896). At the gathering, the present Kachin, China, and 
Shan delegates indeed managed to come to an amicable conclusion with Aung San in 
what has since been known as the Panglong Agreement.  
Signed on 12 February 1947, the agreement states that the parties agree to form 
a new state together ‘believing that freedom will be more speedily achieved by the 
Shans, the Kachins and the Chins by their immediate co-operation with the Interim 
Burmese Government’, under certain provisions, including that the ‘[c]itizens of the 
Frontier Areas shall enjoy right and privileges which are regarded as fundamental in 
democratic countries’ as well as the potential future creation of autonomous ethnic 
states.26 This was delegated to the Constituent Assembly tasked with drafting the soon-
                                                        
26  The full text of the Panglong Agreement can be accessed here 
http://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/~mmpeac5/images/pdf/PangLong-Agreement.pdf 
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to-be-state’s constitution. Taylor notes that the signing of the Panglong Agreement 
‘meant that ethnicity became part of the independence process itself’ (Taylor 1987, 
286). 
Important to mention, however, is that the agreement was only signed by three 
ethnic minorities that later came to fight the Myanmar government. The Karen stayed 
away, the Mon and the Arakan were counted as belonging to “Burma Proper”, and 
smaller minorities, including the Naga and Wa, were excluded on the premises of their 
‘primitive nature’ (Walton 2008, 903). More tragically even, the agreement itself never 
had any significant bearing for the constitution adopted on 24 September 1947. This 
was because Aung San was assassinated by Burman paramilitaries five months after 
the Panglong Agreement had been negotiated. The constitution, therefore, did not 
incorporate any federal provisions and was ‘lopsided and riddled with inconsistencies’ 
(Smith 1999, 79). ‘The most glaring of all the 1947 Constitution’s many failings,’ Smith 
notes ‘was its muddled attempt to resolve the Karen question’ (Smith 1999, 80). This 
was also because the KNA and various other Karen organisations had by then re-
organised into the much more militant Karen National Union (KNU). The new 
organisation boycotted the Constitutional Assembly altogether after the latter failed to 
address its demands, which included the promise to create a separate Karen State and 
to maintain exclusively Karen units in Myanmar’s armed forces (Smith 1999, 83–84). 
The KNU also started to train its first armed wing, which is still in existence today, 
when it formed the movement’s local defence village militia, the Karen National 
Defence Organisation (KNDO). Notwithstanding these signs of ethnic conflict 
looming on the horizon, the British were eager to leave their colonial territories and 
released Myanmar into independence on 4 January 1948.  
At the time of independence, the new government was already confronting 
various insurgencies, not least the Communist Party of Burma (CPB). This multiplicity 
of opposed, armed actors emerged in the wake of fragmentation of the AFPFL 
following Aung San’s assassination (Smith 1999, 79: 102-110). As Mary Callahan 
noted, this situation was essentially the legacy of raising a united front against 
Japanese occupation among disparate political actors that ‘tied together loosely the 
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networks of armed guerillas and soldiers fighting against the same enemy but fighting 
for very different visions of the future’ (Callahan 2003, 85).27 Myanmar’s army, the 
Tatmadaw, itself was established by drawing on the disparate remainders of these anti-
colonial forces and the British Burma Army. Its initial preoccupation was to fight the 
CPB, despite the fact that Karen units of the KNDO took control over the cities of 
Thaton and Moulmein in Eastern Myanmar already. However, the anti-communist 
counterinsurgency campaign soon heightened the tensions within the multi-ethnic 
armed forces. 
This was because Burman officers grew increasingly distrustful of the loyalties 
among the many Karen soldiers and officers within the Tatmadaw. They, therefore, 
raised Burman levy units, the so-called Sitwundan. Rather than only engaging the CCP, 
these forces increasingly mounted attacks against Karen communities. As their attacks 
escalated into full-fledged massacres by the end of 1948, the Tatmadaw’s Karen Rifles 
deserted and joined the ranks of the KNDO instead (Callahan 2003, 127–32). By the 
beginning of 1949, the Karen rebellion was in full-swing. While the Kachin insurgency 
was only established in 1961, some Kachin soldiers already took up arms against the 
government at the time after the First Kachin Rifles refused to retake the city of 
Toungoo from Karen rebels and joined their insurrection instead (Callahan 2003, 
134).28 Trained and experienced in years-long guerrilla war against the Japanese, the 
Karen rebellion quickly took control of most parts of eastern Myanmar. Various other 
insurgent groups, most importantly the CPB, also conquered large swathes of territory, 
including most major cities. One year after independence, the young country was 
already torn apart by full-fledged civil war (Callahan 2003, 134–35). The next part of 
this chapter will trace the development of the Karen and Kachin insurgent social orders 
                                                        
27 For more background on the communist insurgency in Myanmar see Callahan 2003, 69–85; 
Smith 1999, 102–10. 
28 Anderson et al. make the argument that the Kachin conflict has already constituted itself at the 
time of independence because the Second World War pitched Kachin and Burman units against 
each other to the extent that it qualified as an internal ethnic conflict as well. In their reading, 
Kachin forces have voluntarily refrained ‘from further fighting on the basis of promises made to 
them’ at Panglong (Anderson and Sadan 2016, 34). The time between Myanmar’s independence 
and the outbreak of the Kachin insurgency in 1961 can therefore be understood as the “first Kachin 
ceasefire” which broke down after political progress did not materialise.  
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within this escalating civil war as well as a wider, violent and transnational 
borderworld that emerged across the region during the Cold War.  
5 Insurgent Borderworld  
After independence large swathes of Myanmar’s borderlands came under the firm 
control of various non-state armed groups. The Karen and Kachin insurgencies were 
the two most powerful ethnic insurgencies that thrived in this context. Both established 
relatively sophisticated quasi-states in their extensive “liberated territories” known as 
Kawthoolei and Kachinland respectively.  
In Kachin State of the 1980s, for instance, Myanmar government operations 
were limited to the major towns and railway corridors in the south. At the Chinese-
Myanmar border, the Myanmar state was almost non-existent as the Tatmadaw only 
controlled sixty of the 2,100 kilometres long boundary at the time (Smith 1999, 360). 
The KIO, in contrast controlled almost half of Kachin State, hence, presiding over 
40,000 square kilometres and more than 30,000 people. Besides fielding more than 
8,000 regular troops, which were organised into four brigades and aided by adjunct 
village defence militias, the insurgent movement operated an extensive governance 
apparatus. They provided education with 119 primary schools, ten middle schools, 
and five high schools. Moreover, they delivered health care with various medic 
stations and two hospitals fully equipped with X-ray facilities and operation theatres 
(Dean 2012, 121). While the KIO-controlled territory has since diminished to about 
one fifth, mainly along the Chinese border around the rebel-held towns of Laiza and 
Maijayang and in the lesser-populated parts of northern Kachin State, the KIO has 
maintained an extensive non-state bureaucracy, including the provision of public 
services up until today (South 2008, 190–92).  
Analogously, the KNU has once controlled most parts of Myanmar’s much 
denser populated eastern borderlands towards Thailand, spanning from Shan State in 
the north to the Tenasserim Region in the south. In their insurgent state of Kawthoolei, 
they also established state-like structures, including schooling and health facilities as 
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well as several departments, resembling government ministries (South 2011, 14). 
While authoritative numbers are hard to come by, the insurgency’s operating territory 
has likely encompassed a population of more than two million people during its peak 
(South 2008, 55). Since the early 1990s, the KNU has lost most of this territory to 
counterinsurgency campaigns. However, it still fields up to 5,000 regular troops and 
maintains a partly-functioning administrative skeleton (South 2008, 55). In order to 
understand the extent and durability of insurgent social orders in these areas - where 
insurgency has become ‘a way of life’ (Smith 2007, 15), it is important to account for 
the often overlooked international dimensions of Myanmar’s civil war. These have, 
indeed, long been inseparable from the wider ‘regional conflict complexes’, a situation 
that involves multiple neighbouring countries experiencing inter- and/or intra-state 
conflicts whose dynamics sustain each other (Wallensteen and Sollenberg 1998, 623, 
cf. also Smith 2007, 17–20). This transnational conflict system emerged in the wake of 
decolonisation and was further perpetuated by the geopolitics of the Cold War as well 
as lucrative border economies.  
Similar to the situation in Myanmar, British and French colonial rule has 
fortified ethnic identification and differences across South and Southeast Asia. Many 
postcolonial nation-builders heightened these tensions by drawing upon ethnically 
exclusive narratives of the national community, equating national heritage with the 
culture and history of the ethnic majority. This is best reflected in region-wide policies 
that are aimed at assimilating indigenous minority groups - most of which live on the 
fringes of the state, into the larger nation-body by way of social and economic 
development programmes that ‘ostensibly seek to make these minorities conform to 
the norms of the ruling majority in the country’ (Duncan 2008, 1). Such tensions have 
also translated into armed ethnic conflict elsewhere, as for instance is the case in 
India’s north-eastern border provinces. Each of these so-called “Seven Sisters” is home 
to ethnonational insurrections that are fighting for autonomy or secession from India. 
Some of these are inherently intertwined with the ones in neighbouring Myanmar. 
Various Naga movements, for example, operate cross-border from within Myanmar 
where they also claim territory (Egreteau 2006, 91–147).  
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Viewing Myanmar’s borderlands from this perspective reveals that the social 
spaces of the Karen and Kachin insurgencies are not only constituted by their 
peripheral location to the state but simultaneously by their central location within 
Zomia, whose postcolonial remnants have transformed into a transnational insurgent 
landscape, which Sadan calls a ‘borderworld […], beset by violence from every vantage 
point’ (Sadan 2013, 347). The relations between these manifold insurgency 
movements are multi-faceted, involving various degrees of conflict and cooperation. 
On the one hand, historical tensions and rivalries, for instance, have long fuelled 
resentments between different minority communities, as for instance between the Wa, 
Sha, and Kachin (Scott 2009, 150–53). On the other hand, pragmatic working relations 
and strategic alliances have fostered cooperation between these various movements, 
ignoring country boundaries and professed ideological differences. Despite formally 
siding with opposing sides of the Cold War, many rebel groups have at times 
cooperated widely. Some even fought alongside each other, adopting so-called “united 
front” tactics, as for instance the CPB/KNU People’s Peace Forces of the late 1950s 
(Smith 1999, 183–86). Insurgents, moreover, travelled frequently in this borderworld 
between Myanmar, China, India, Thailand, and Laos. This served to trade intelligence 
and weapons as well as to train each other’s cadres (Smith 1999, 329–31). In the 1980s, 
for instance, it was common for Kachin officers to use their ties to the Assam and 
Naga insurgency in order to enter India’s higher education system before returning in 
the service of the Kachin rebellion (Sadan 2013, 1–3). The far-flung and rugged 
borderlands provided the ideal geography for the “flourishing” of this rebellious, 
transnational borderworld (Smith 2007, 16–17). 
The unfolding politics of the Cold War, have, moreover contributed to this 
regional conflict complex in several aspects. Maoist China was pivotal for supporting 
the communist forces of the CPB, which operated mostly from border areas in Shan 
State. Moreover, Maoism as a successful organising method of guerrilla warfare rather 
than as a political ideology has inspired and shaped many insurgencies in Myanmar 
and beyond (Smith 1999, 93; Mampilly 2011, 11–13). While the KNU and the KIO 
nominally opposed communism as an ideology and identified with the capitalist camp 
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instead, they have both relied heavily on Maoist methods and tactics for organising 
guerrilla warfare and building their insurgent social orders. This is reflected in their 
emphasis on organising the peasantry by embedding the insurgent organisation within 
local communities, the decision-making structure of their revolutionary organisation, 
and the institutional make-up of their insurgent quasi-states (Smith 1999, 150–51; 
Smith 2007, 16).  
Both insurgencies and their quasi-state structures were built upon a mirrored 
structure of their organisation’s political and military wings, which reaches all the way 
to the village level. Local and central leaders are represented in central committees 
which are headed by executive committees, comparable to the politburo system of 
communist parties. Both committees are constituted by periodic meetings reminiscent 
of regular party congresses. The peasantry is organised through the provision of 
services as well as their participation in mass-level organisations, including women’s 
organisations and youth wings. Late long-term leader of the Karen insurgency, David 
Taw, for instance, described how the KNU decision-making structure resembles a one-
party state as follows:  
‘The KNU’s decision-making structure is that of a one-party state, 
topped by a periodic party congress. Between congresses the party is 
led by a Central Committee and an Executive Committee. The 
congress is ‘selected’ to represent the seven administrative districts 
making up the state of Kawthoolei, each headed by a District 
Chairman. Until the military defeat of 1994-95, the KNU also formed 
a Kawthoolei government, with the post of Prime Minister held by 
the KNU General Secretary. The KNU’s army, the Karen National 
Liberation Army (KNLA), is a parallel command structure of seven 
military brigades each headed by a Brigade Commander and subject, 
in theory at least, to the KNU’s Defence Minister.’ (Taw 2005, 41) 
Despite their Maoist organisational characteristics, the Kachin and Karen insurgencies 
have both sided with the capitalist camp of the Cold War. While this has brought them 
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into conflict with the CPB at times, it did not prevent them from forging strategic 
alliances with the CPB during most years of the latter’s existence.29 The staunchly anti-
communist rhetoric of both insurgencies under comparison also brought them into the 
orbit of Thailand, whose own fear of communist insurrection had drawn the country 
deep into the Cold War on the side of the United States. Thailand, therefore, became 
one of the most important supporters of the KNU. In return, the Karen rebellion 
functioned as a proxy force against communists as well as against the rapidly 
expanding “narco-armies”, most importantly the forces of legendary drug kingpin 
Chang Shi-Fu alias Khun Sa, dubbed the “Opium King of the Golden Triangle”.30 
Thai support encompassed material goods, including arms, as well as providing 
sanctuary on the Thai side of the border. While these relations have significantly 
cooled off since the end of the Cold War, the KNU maintains close relationships with 
elements from the Thai security establishment up until today. Many KNU leaders, 
indeed, have come to live in Thailand since the fall of their Manerplaw headquarters 
in the mid-1990s. Thailand has, moreover, also long hosted the liaison offices of 
various Myanmar insurgency groups, including the KIO, which has provided a 
platform to coordinate activities (Sadan 2013, 358; Smith 1999, 293–300; South 2011, 
39–40). 
 In addition to outright support from neighbouring states, the existence of 
extensive illicit border economies has sustained Myanmar’s conflict by enabling 
insurgents to fund their military campaigns and quasi-states. The smuggling of drugs, 
timber, and gemstones has become a particular lucrative trade in that regards (Jones 
2014a, 791). For many years, however, the most important source of insurgent 
revenues was Myanmar’s self-isolationist economic policy itself. During Ne Win’s 
“Burmese Way to Socialism”, Myanmar suffered under an immense shortage of 
                                                        
29 For a good account on the malleable relations between the CPB and ethnic insurgency forces, 
which oscillated between strategic alliances and outright armed conflict see Lintner 2015, 171–203. 
30 Ironically, Khun Sa and the narcotics trade of the “Golden Triangle” were bi-products of the 
Cold War. They emerged from a failed CIA intervention aimed at supporting the eventual 
reinvasion of Communist China by Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) forces that have previously fled 
to northern Myanmar’s Shan State after Mao’s victory in China’s civil war. In order to make these 
units self-sufficient, the CIA is said to have directly and indirectly promoted the growth and trade 
of opium in northern Myanmar (McCoy 1972, 166–67; Chouvy 2009, 23-36, 65). 
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everyday goods - from medicine to petrol and textiles. While these needed to be 
smuggled into the country, raw products, such as teak, gem stones, rice, cattle and 
opium were used to pay for these imports in return. The annual volume of illicit border 
trade in 1988 was estimated at US$3 billion, equivalent to 40 percent of the country’s 
then gross national product (Smith 1999, 25). By taxing 5-10 percent levies on smuggle 
operators, this black-market trade used to be the ‘armed opposition’s lifeblood’ (Smith 
1999, 99) for many years. According to KNU officials, the Karen insurgency earned 
up to 500 million Myanmar Kyat per year during the mid-1980s - at the time £50 
million at the official exchange rate - by controlling the most strategic smuggling gates 
at the Thai border (Smith 1999, 283).  
While this figure might well be overstated, there is no doubt that these border 
economies empowered insurgent movements, including the KNU and the KIO, to the 
extent that ‘[d]efeating the insurgencies was impossible while this trade flourished’ 
(Jones 2014a, 791). The next section explains how the changing regional geopolitics 
after the end of the Cold War has enabled Myanmar’s state to reverse these economic 
flows and as a result consolidate its presence over large parts of its restive borderlands 
for the first time. 
6 From Battlefield to Marketplace 
With the end of the Cold War the power relations between Myanmar’s state and the 
various insurgent armies started to shift in favour for the former that has since 
managed to territorialise its restive borderlands to an unprecedented extent. The 
crucial driving force behind this was a wider rearrangement of regional geopolitics, 
most importantly due to changing interests in China and Thailand. Instead of Cold 
War-era policies that provided covert support to various non-state armies, Beijing and 
Bangkok became increasingly interested in profiting from their neighbour’s auspicious 
economic potentials to develop their own land-locked and marginalised peripheries.31 
                                                        
31 While relation between Myanmar, China and Thailand generally improved since the end of the 
Cold War, it also needs to be noted that tensions still exist between Myanmar and its immediate 
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Myanmar’s vast but largely untapped natural riches, comparatively large but 
undeveloped export market, and strategic location for the construction of trade and 
energy infrastructure, presented ideal opportunities for this. Thai Prime Minister 
Chatichai Choonhavan’s reflected this new thinking in his famous 1988 pledge to 
direct Indochina from ‘battlefield to marketplace’ (Jones 2014a, 791).  
Since then, Myanmar has, indeed, seen a rapid influx of foreign direct 
investment (FDI), most of which originated from China and to a smaller degree from 
Thailand. The bulk of official incoming FDI - recorded as US$38 billion between 1988 
and 2012 – went into large infrastructure projects, such as gas and oil pipelines and 
hydropower stations (Buchanan, Kramer, and Woods 2013, 28). These projects 
created export rents for the state, empowering it vis-à-vis the borderlands. This was 
also mirrored in the steep decline of border smuggling, whose estimated ratio to official 
trade fell from 85 to 50 per cent between 1990 and 2005 (Jones 2014a, 794). This 
notwithstanding, most incoming investments accumulated in the borderlands. Two 
thirds of official incoming FDI between 1988 and 2012 was invested in the country’s 
borderlands, 25 per cent of it in Kachin State alone (Buchanan, Kramer, and Woods 
2013, 28). On the one hand, this is because many infrastructure projects, particularly 
hydro-electrical dams and pipelines were constructed partly or entirely in the country’s 
border provinces. On the other hand, much investment has gone into the extraction of 
natural resources, including gems stones, precious metals, and timber, which are 
mostly located in the border regions.  
                                                        
neighbours in particular with regards to issues of regional and border security. While China’s 
continued interference in the Chinese-Myanmar borderlands and support of some ethnic armed 
groups including the Kokang and Wa movements frustrates Naypyidaw, Myanmar’s generals have 
also long sought to improve their relations with the US to the dislike of China (Haacke 2006, 2010). 
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Map 5: Investments and conflict areas in Myanmar (Source: Burma News International 2013b, 4). 
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With regards to these natural resources, official trade and investment figures 
only capture the tip of the iceberg. Most money in this sector flows through illicit 
channels. Actual investment and trade volumes in these border provinces are much 
higher. This is best exemplified with the jade trade. Global Witness - an organisation 
specialising in the study of war economies, concluded in a 2015 report that 
‘Myanmar’s jade industry may well be the biggest natural resource heist in modern 
history’ (Global Witness 2015, 95). Exact figures of Myanmar’s jade industry are 
impossible to compile for various reasons. This is because almost all jade mines are 
located in Kachin State’s conflict areas and the mining and trading is controlled by an 
in-transparent network of actors. According to Global Witness, the main profiteers 
include the families of former dictator Senior General Than Shwe, former General 
Secretary of the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and retired army 
general Maung Maung Thein, former regional army commander in Kachin State and 
Minister for Livestock, Fisheries and Rural Development under the U Thein Sein 
administration Ohn Myint. They also include drug-lords with links to non-state armed 
groups such as the ethnic Kokang Lo Hsing-Han, and Wei Hsueh Kang, a narcotics 
kingpin and long-time supporter of the UWSA who has a US$2 bounty from the US 
government on his head. The latter are invested through crony business corporations, 
such as the Asia World and Ever Winner groups (Global Witness 2015, 10–12). Jade 
has also long been the main funding source of the KIO (Lintner and Lintner 1990, 
164). While some of its leaders also amassed personal riches by collaborating in the 
ever expanding Jade business during the ceasefire period, Kachin rebel leaders and 
businessmen were increasingly squeezed out of the most lucrative parts of the industry 
(cf. Chapter 6). Indeed, the Tatmadaw has taken over control of the main mining sites 
in Hpakant since the 1994 ceasefire, which left the KIO to tax smuggling operator at 
the Chinese border (Global Witness 2015, 87–91; cf. also Chapter 6).  
The high amount of cross-border smuggling further complicates the estimation 
of the jade sector’s actual value. While high-quality jade is officially only allowed to 
be sold at the annual Myanmar Gems Emporium in Naypyidaw, industry insiders 
report that between 50-80% of jade stones are smuggled directly across the border to 
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China - the key market for jade gem stones, to avoid taxation and tariffs in both 
countries (Global Witness 2015, 36). Third, there are no standard rules to determine 
the worth of jade per kilogram. Prices at the 2014 Emporium ranged from about US$2 
per kilogram for low-quality jade to over US$2.89 million per kilogram for the highest 
valued stones, which are known as Imperial Jade (Global Witness 2015, 98). 
Unsurprisingly, available figures of the jade sector diverge extremely. The official 2014 
Emporium reported the total value of jade sales as US$ 3.5 billion. In contrast, Chinese 
official import data from the same year recorded an overall import value of precious 
and semi-precious stones from Myanmar - the vast majority of which was jade, at US$ 
12.3 billion. Figuring in the rampant smuggling activities, Global Witness estimates 
that the sector’s actual value in 2014 was at least US$ 31 billion, which is equivalent 
to almost half the country’s total GDP (Global Witness 2015, 98–106).  
 The ability of state elites to reverse much of these economic flows from rebel 
leaders to themselves as well as to consolidate their presence in Myanmar’s 
borderlands to an unprecedented extent was because the newly incoming economic 
interests were accompanied by a shift in counterinsurgency strategy. This happened at 
a time when Myanmar’s regime struggled to prevent a united front between ethnic 
armed groups and militarised democracy activists, following the crackdown of the 
nationwide pro-democracy protests in 1988. Under the auspices of the newly formed 
State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), the Tatmadaw, therefore, 
reversed its previous strategy of total war. The head of Military Intelligence, then-
Major General Khin Nyunt, instead sought to conclude individual ceasefires with 
ethnic armed groups. This policy proved successful to appease the remainders of the 
CPB, which emerged as various ethnic splinter armies, following the communist 
insurgency’s disintegration after its ethnic rank-and-file mutinied against a 
predominantly Burman leadership in 1989. By 2004 almost all non-state armed groups 
in Myanmar - including the KIO but excluding the KNU, entered into bilateral 
ceasefires with the state and renounced separatism (Jones 2014a, 795).32  
                                                        
32  In 2004, the KNU was literally the only sizeable rebel group left fighting the Myanmar 
government. Smaller groups included the Karenni National Progressive Party, the militarised pro-
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While these armistices did not lead to substantial political dialogue, they 
allowed insurgents to retain their arms and govern pockets of territory (Smith 1999, 
421–41). Moreover, these pacts encouraged the involvement of non-state armed 
groups in what has since been referred to as the country's ‘ceasefire capitalism’: the 
collaborative exploitation of the area's natural riches by army generals, rebel leaders 
and Chinese businessmen (Woods 2011). Indeed, political economy scholars have 
attributed the success of Myanmar’s ceasefire politics in the 1990s foremost to the 
economic benefits that they yielded to elites on all sides, which provided rebel leaders 
with a ‘lucrative “exit option”’ from armed conflict (Snyder 2006). According to this 
argument, Myanmar’s ceasefires challenge the common “resource curse” narrative 
(Sherman 2003, 246). Instead of fuelling violent conflict over lootable resources, Jake 
Sherman argues that the country’s ceasefire politics seemed to demonstrate that 
‘economic self-interest can also move combatants to cease hostilities' (Sherman 2003, 
225). Long-term observer Smith also hints at the importance of these economic 
dimensions for understanding the de-escalation of conflict at the Chinese border since 
the early 1990s. He notes that by turning rebel leaders into businessmen, the 
Tatmadaw, indeed, ‘was to have far more success in seizing the local initiative from 
armed opposition groups than it had ever had in 26 years of fighting’ (Smith 1999, 
441).  
It would of course be wrong to reduce the motivation of rebel groups to sign 
ceasefire agreements to economic interests only. Lee Jones points out that their 
motives were of rather mixed nature and mostly included battle fatigue, humanitarian 
considerations, a desire for socio-economic development, and the genuine belief in 
political negotiations over the root causes of conflict (Jones 2014a, 792). 33  This 
                                                        
democracy activists that trained in ethnic territories post-1988 and formed a movement called 
known as the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF), and the geographically isolated 
National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang at the Indian border, which despite operating 
on Myanmar territory has mostly fought against the Indian military and other non-state armed 
groups in Northeast-India’s Nagaland Province (Kramer 2009). 
33 It also needs be noted that the material ceasefire benefits, with regards to autonomy provisions 
and business opportunities, were generally more favourable for rebel groups that signed in the early 
1990s and less favourable for the ones who signed ceasefire in the mid and late 1990s (Oo, Min, 
and Washington 2007). 
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notwithstanding, he points out that ‘the co-optation of borderland elites and the 
centralization of politico-economic power through “ceasefire capitalism”’ was central 
for state elites to gain the upper hand in Myanmar’s civil war since the early 1990s. 
Co-optation in this context can be understood as the state’s attempt to negotiate 
control in a situation of fragmented state authority, i.e. the indirect projection of 
power, as was promulgated in scholarship on the “mediated state” and public 
authority (Menkhaus 2007). In contrast to concepts such as domination or imposition, 
co-optation stresses a degree of interdependency and constant renegotiation between 
state and non-state actors, despite power balances skewed in whichever direction. In 
this sense, co-optation has long been a well-established practice of government in 
contexts of fragmented statehood around the world, including the borderlands of 
Myanmar, from the pre-colonial era until now (Scott 2009).34  
In the wake of increased business interests, a securitised development agenda 
further enabled state territorialisation in previously off-limits territories since the 
1990s. The main vehicle for this was the “Program for the Progress of the Border Areas 
and National Races Development”, which was first introduced in 1989, later upgraded 
to the Ministry of Border Affairs, and is locally known as Na Ta La. Its stated objective 
is to develop ethnic minority regions, mainly through the expansion of physical 
infrastructure and the state bureaucracy itself. Directly responsible for carrying out this 
agenda have since been the frontline commanders of the Tatmadaw (Lambrecht 2008). 
Indeed, bureaucratic reform established the military’s regional commands as the de-
facto governments in border provinces. Regional Tatmadaw units have since engaged 
in local governance, including policing and economic development. The army’s 
overall troop size has also increased dramatically from 200,000 troops in 1988 to 
320,000 troops in 1995 (Smith 1999, 426–27). Most of these units were stationed in 
the country’s border areas and were outfitted with US$2 billion worth of modern 
Chinese weaponry (Jones 2014a, 792). According to local sources, the Tatmadaw 
                                                        
34 It has been shown that the selective co-optation of different warring factions is common practice 
in peace negotiations around the world (Driscoll 2012). Accommodating the economic interests of 
rebel groups in this process is also not unique to Myanmar (Le Billon and Nicholls 2007; 
Wennmann 2009). 
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presence in Kachin State increased from 26 battalions at the time it signed a ceasefire 
with the KIO in 1994 to over 100 battalions by the time the accord broke down in 2011 
(Burma News International 2013b, 3). Significant military built-up has also been 
reported in Kayin State since the signing of the KNU ceasefire in 2012 (Karen Human 
Rights Group 2014, 106–18).   
Despite the Tatmadaw’s substantial expansion in terms of troop size and 
mission, the central government has provided little funds to support regional 
commands. Between 1989 and 1998, the reported expenditure for borderland 
development was a modest US$79 million, disregarding corruption. 35  Moreover, 
regional commands have been tasked to become self-sufficient – or to “live off the 
land” - by generating the bulk of their revenues themselves since the late 1990s 
(Meehan 2015, 269). To finance its operations the Tatmadaw has, therefore, partly 
relied on extortion. Reports indicate that a large portion of development funding 
during the 1990s and early 2000s has been extorted from local communities as so-
called “people’s contributions” in form of labour, cash, and material (Lambrecht 2008, 
156–58). For feeding their troops and maintaining operational viability, local army 
units have also often relied on levying informal taxes on the commodities and assets 
of local communities - including land, crops, livestock, and small-scale businesses 
(Meehan 2015, 2270). 
In addition, the Tatmadaw transformed itself into Myanmar’s most powerful 
economic actor, controlling access to the country’s most lucrative assets by setting up 
its own company conglomerates - the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited 
(UMEHL) in 1990 and the Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC) in 1997. While 
the MEC is mostly invested in heavy industry and commodities, UMEHL controls 
most of the lucrative gem stone industry in Myanmar’s borderlands, including the jade 
mines in Kachin State and the ruby mines in Shan State, which makes it a major 
business stakeholder in Myanmar’s borderlands (Myoe 2009, 175–87; Jones 2014b, 
                                                        
35 Resource commitments for borderland development have, however, since been significantly 
increased. By 2003 the government spent US$506 on borderland development (Jones 2014a, 
793).  
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149). These military holdings tie private entrepreneurs to officials who are in charge 
for granting trade licenses, joint venture deals and other business concessions. This has 
since squeezed armed groups out of the most lucrative businesses, as for instance the 
KIO from large-scale jade mining in the Hpakant area (Jones 2014a, 794). It also 
provided regional commanders of the Tatmadaw with significant sources of wealth and 
power, upon which could they establish personal fiefdoms (Jones 2014b, 149).36  
While the changing regional geopolitics and domestic counterinsurgency 
strategies have worked hand in hand in driving state territorialisation in Myanmar’s 
borderlands, state consolidation remains far from complete. The empirical analysis in 
the following chapters will indeed dispute the oft underlying idea that economic 
development necessarily leads to a teleological progression whose outcome will be 
peace and a consolidated state in Myanmar’s borderlands. What emerged instead are 
patchy and often overlapping landscapes of political authority that involve the state, 
semi-autonomous army commands, armed groups, business actors and informal 
institutions to varying degrees. Callahan proposed a good way of conceptualising this 
fluid and multifaceted web of power. Drawing on Mark Duffield’s concept of an 
‘emerging political complex’ (Duffield 2001, 156), she writes:  
‘Governance in Burma today, then, takes place within […] a set of 
flexible and adaptive networks that link state and other political 
authorities to domestic and foreign business concerns (some legal, 
others illegal), traditional indigenous leaders, religious authorities, 
overseas refugee and diaspora communities, political party leaders, 
and NGOs. […] They exist in a competitive, yet often complicit and 
                                                        
36 SLORC’s successor, the previous State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) government, 
attempted to curtail this emergence of independent powerbases with appointing union level 
positions to regional commanders (Jones 2014a, 794). Moreover, recent administrative reforms 
under U Thein Sein transferred local administrative powers back to the chief ministers of the states 
and regions (International Crisis Group 2012, 10). The extent to which this has been effective, 
however, remains unclear. The escalation of conflicts with various EAOs in Myanmar’s north 
since 2011 and the Tatmadaw’s repeated violation of President U Thein Sein’s executive orders to 
cease fire have sparked worries about an ongoing fragmentation of military authority in Myanmar’s 
borderlands and competing agendas between the Tatmadaw and the semi-civilian government 
(International Crisis Group 2014, 11–12; Transnational Institute 2015, 9).  
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complementary, milieu that varies across geographical space and 
time.’ (Callahan 2007, 4–5) 
Rather than viewing the socio-temporal space of the Kachin and Karen insurgencies 
as part of an entity akin to the Westphalian nation-state, Duffield’s notion of an 
emerging political complex remains useful to understand the fluid political and social 
orders in the country’s borderlands up until today. This is despite the remarkable 
political transition that large parts of central Myanmar have witnessed since 2011 and 
the new bilateral ceasefires that the transitionary administration has negotiated with 
various other ethnic armed groups, including the Chin National Front (CNF), the New 
Mon State Party (NMSP), and the KNU. At first glance, this new wave of ceasefires 
appears to be the result of the country’s wider political changes. This notwithstanding, 
the lenses of “ceasefire capitalism” and “emerging political complexes” remain 
insightful. With regards to the new wave of ceasefires, Veteran Myanmar 
correspondent Lintner, in fact, notes that up until today ‘rebel commanders who have 
entered into ceasefire agreements with the government have invariably got, in return, 
profitable business opportunities—once they have stopped fighting’ (Lintner, May 05, 
2015).  
A report on the ‘Economics of Peace and Conflict’ by the Myanmar Peace 
Monitor platform of the local Burma News International network, also makes the 
argument that economic interests are among the main drivers behind the new ceasefire 
wave under U Thein Sein’s semi-civilian government. It encapsulated this in the 
following cartoon, which depicts former president U Thein Sein as a teacher-like figure 
lecturing how the “Burma Government Peace Process Plan” to the leaders of various 
ceasefire groups. These include Sai Leun aka Lin Mingxian, in the centre right of the 
cartoon. The ethnic Shan leads the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), a 
splinter group of the former CPB that was the first non-state armed group to sign a 
ceasefire in 1989. He rules over Mong La, a small town at the Chinese border that has 
become one of the most well-known symbols of “ceasefire capitalism”, featuring an 
elaborate entertainment industry, including prostitution, gambling, drugs, as well as 
functioning as a hub for the global trade of endangered animals. Together with his 
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“teacher” U Thein Sein, the “model student” Sai Leun explains to the other “students” 
how the “Burma Government Peace Process Plan” works by dint of a black board. 
The chart on it describes that ceasefires lead to a nexus of economic projects, including 
resource exploitation and infrastructure development. While this generates money for 
the ceasefire leaders, political negotiations fade away and legal safeguards such as land 
rights are denied. The other “students” are depicted as eagerly listening. They 
comprise of leaders of the new ceasefire movements, i.e. rebel groups that signed a 
ceasefire with U Thein Sein’s government in 2012. On the far left is Pu Zing Cung of 
the CNF and to Sai Leun’s right stands Nai Htaw Mon of the NMSP.  To Sai Leun’s 
left is General Mutu Say Poe, the Karen leader who led the KNU into the movement’s 
historic ceasefire of 2012.  
 
Figure 1: Cartoon about the new wave of ceasefires in 2012 (Source: Burma News International 
2013b, 26). 
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 To be sure, caricatures exaggerate and Myanmar’s overall political landscape 
has certainly changed significantly since 2012. The point here is that economic benefits 
have long played a pivotal role in forging and sustaining the country’s extensive 
ceasefire politics and continue to do so. Chapters five and six will highlight that 
leadership co-optation by economic means facilitated the Kachin ceasefire in 1994 and 
also seemed to play a role in the 2012 Karen ceasefire. While a focus on material 
interests, hence, helps to explain the formation and relative durability of Myanmar’s 
ceasefires, it can neither explain why the Kachin movement remobilised despite 
mutual business collaboration with the government and why its ceasefire ultimately 
broke down, nor can it account for the increased contestation that surfaced within the 
Karen movement in the wake of its ceasefire. While Sherman deploys a political 
economy framework himself to assess Myanmar’s ceasefires of the 1990s, he also hints 
at the shortcomings of an overly economistic understanding, warning about the 
potential pitfalls of ‘a rough and ready peace through economic incentives’: 
‘[A]greements reached on the basis of economic interests do not lead 
to sustainable peace because they fail to address the root causes of 
conflict. As Burma also shows, such cease-fire deals encourage 
corruption and criminality, exacerbating existing grievances while 
also creating secondary rivalries, both of which may contribute to 
new cycles of violence.’ (Sherman 2003, 246–47) 
The breakdown of the Kachin ceasefire and subsequent reescalation of conflict 
with other ceasefire groups along large swathes of the Myanmar-Chinese border were 
to prove him right indeed. To explain why this was the case in Kachin State and how 
similar developments can be witnessed beneath the Karen ceasefire, the next chapters 
will focus on the social process of insurgency. By doing so, it will be shown how the 
politico-economic changes in Myanmar’s borderlands have impacted on dynamics of 
authority and contestation within the Kachin and Karen insurgencies. These, have, in 
turn, developed a momentum of their own in driving the strategies of both movements.  
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7 Conclusion 
Back at the deep sea port construction site in south-eastern Myanmar’s Dawei, 
one is inclined to brush over the existence of continued ethnic armed conflict, 
including units of the Karen insurgency’s 4th Brigade that operate not far from there. 
From here, Myanmar indeed just seems like a latecomer to the region-wide trend of 
state consolidation and is now repelling the last unruly corners of a bygone Zomian 
borderworld (cf. Formoso 2010). This chapter has shown that geopolitical forces have 
indeed already tilted the power balance between Myanmar’s insurgent borderlands 
and its state centre in favour for the latter. Increased economic interaction between 
Myanmar and its neighbours, in particular, has provided an inroad for the state to 
consolidate its presence in once off-limits territories by way of turning rebels into 
business partners. Even though state territorialisation and consolidation in the 
country’s restive borderlands are far from complete, observers generally expect this 
trend to continue. In Thant Myint-U’s reading, ethnic insurgencies seem like an 
already waning issue of the past that will eventually cower to the new geopolitical 
realities that have started to transform Myanmar into a hub of connectivity on the ‘new 
crossroads of Asia’ (Thant Myint-U 2011). South also sees little alternatives for 
Myanmar’s ethnic armed groups than that they conform to these new politico-
economic trends and reinvent themselves as partners for development and business. 
With regards to the Karen insurgency he writes: 
‘For the Karen and other ethnic nationalities in Burma, much will 
depend on how community leaders position themselves in relation 
to such economic developments. Will they be able to demonstrate 
to the international community, and in particular the private 
corporate sector, that they are part of the solution to developing a 
modern, equitable and sustainable economy, or will they remain 
stuck in the politics of opposition or defiance which has 
characterized much of the past half-century in Burma?’ (South 2011, 
22) 
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In light of these powerful structural forces, even Scott, who was often criticised 
for romanticising the agency and resistance of highland minorities, has written his 
obituary to Zomia. With reference to increased state territorialisation and economic 
development, he notes that Southeast Asia witnesses ‘the world’s last great enclosure’ 
(Scott 2009, 282).  
While this thesis’ subsequent analysis appreciates these powerful structural 
forces, it contests that economic development drives a linear progression of state 
consolidation that simply overrides long-grown ethno-nationalisms and insurgent 
identities, an assumption which seems to underlie popular narratives today. This is not 
least because, anno 2016, some of these areas are again embroiled in heavy fighting, 
unseen since the heyday of Myanmar’s insurgencies in the 1980s. In fact, some of the 
same rebel movements that were ostensibly bought off with “ceasefire capitalism”, 
including the KIO, have again taken up arms again and resumed calls for greater ethnic 
minority rights and federalist constitutional amendments. During a conference at the 
London School of Economics in 2015, Smith called this renewed escalation of conflict 
the most pressing and puzzling question that Myanmar currently faces. Indeed, Smith 
followed this up by asking why some ethnonational armed movements have been able 
to remobilize on such a scale after years of ceasefire and, in some cases, eroding 
capacities. The following comparative analysis of the KNU and the KIO addresses 
exactly these issues by revealing the dynamism beneath the surface of both 
insurgencies, asking how the shifting politico-economic context in Myanmar’s 
borderlands have impacted on the social authority relations within both movements 
and how these have, in turn, driven their wider collective trajectories.  
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CHAPTER V – KNU: 
FROM WAR TO 
CEASEFIRE 
1 Introduction  
On 12 January 2012, Myanmar’s oldest ethnic armed groups, the KNU signed 
a ceasefire agreement with Naypyidaw. The truce received much international praise, 
not least because the KNU was the only sizeable rebel movement which continued to 
battle Myanmar’s government during the 1990s and 2000s, when most other ethnic 
armed groups entered bilateral ceasefire agreements. In light of Myanmar’s wider 
political transition, commentators also noted that compared to previous such 
ceasefires, the Karen agreement could potentially lead to lasting peace in one of the 
world’s longest ongoing civil wars as ‘[h]opefully this historic cease-fire, with the 
imprimatur of a new regime, will be different’ (Beech, December 01, 2012). At times 
of remarkable democratisation, the Karen ceasefire seemed like a direct result of 
political reforms. While applauding the release of political prisoners in an official 
statement that heralded the restoration of full diplomatic ties between the United 
States and Myanmar, U.S. President Barack Obama mentioned the ‘important 
ceasefire agreement’ as yet another mile stone on the country’s windy road to 
democracy and peace (Obama 13/01/2012; Myers and Mydans, January 13, 2012). 
At the signing ceremony, long-term Karen leader Saw David Htaw also referred to the 
altered political landscape as the main game changer and stated that the agreement 
would garner broad popular support among Karen people:  
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‘According to the changing situation everywhere, peace talks are 
unavoidable now; this is something we have to pass through without 
fail. The people have experienced the horrors of war a long time. I’m 
sure they’ll be very glad to hear this news. I hope they’ll be able to 
fully enjoy the sweet taste of peace this time.’ (Saw David Htaw cited 
as in Mydans, December 02, 2012) 
Since 2012 observers could follow the rapidly ‘growing friendship between 
Naypyidaw and the KNU’ (Yan, June 06, 2014). The erstwhile most uncompromising 
ethnic armed group, indeed, became one of the country’s main peace advocates. This 
culminated in October 2015 when it signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement 
(NCA) as the only sizeable rebel group. At the summit, KNU General Secretary Padoh 
Kwe Htoo Win declared in a statement, which he jointly read with the Government’s 
chief peace negotiator U Aung Min, that the ‘NCA is a historical agreement to achieve 
lasting and sustainable peace in Myanmar.’37 In contrast, representatives of the wider 
Karen society seemed less supportive than KNU leaders have hoped for. Days before 
the NCA was signed, 41 Karen civil society organisations (CSOs) condemned it as 
deeply flawed. They also denounced the KNU leaders who advocated the agreement 
as a small clique of corrupted and intransparent elites. According to them, these 
leaders represented neither the Karen revolution nor the local communities. In a joint 
letter they wrote:  
‘We, Karen CSO’s [sic], are alarmed by the fact that: 
1. Currently, the small group of KNU leaders has demonstrated a 
chronic lack of transparency and accountability to the Karen 
people and to their own organization by making the 
undemocratic and non-inclusive decision to rush to sign the NCA 
[…]. 
2. Currently this group of KNU leaders is in Yangon with the 
expectation of signing NCA [sic.]. They do this in violation of 
                                                        
37 http://www.knuhq.org/pdoh-kwe-htoo-win-and-minister-u-aung-min-reading-aloud-together/ 
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KNU and KNLA official procedures and without properly 
informing or receiving the majority’s consent from members of 
the KNU’s Central Executive Committee or the Central Standing 
Committee. 
3. These senior KNU leaders refuse to heed the concerns and voices 
of other Karen leaders, of civil society organizations, of 
community groups and the local people whom they claim to 
represent.’(41 Karen Civil Society Organisations 04/10/2015) 
The following chapter will ask why the KNU signed a ceasefire in 2012 and 
why its leaders advocated for peace afterwards, although the movement had long been 
the least compromising ethnic armed group in Myanmar. The chapter will also 
investigate the tensions this has sparked within the group, asking why Karen civil 
society leaders vocally oppose ceasefire and peace negotiations, although local 
communities have long borne the brunt of civil war. By zooming into the movement’s 
intramural relations, it will challenge the common assumption that the ceasefire can 
be inferred from the country’s wider political reform process. As will be argued, the 
agreement rather resulted from the internal contestation between rival rebel factions 
and has given rise to an increased struggle over authority within the movement. 
To build this argument the chapter starts with explaining how changing 
military and geopolitical pressures in the Thai-Myanmar borderlands have had 
differential impacts on the movement’s scattered brigade territories. The second 
section will trace these diverging impacts through the lens of reciprocal exchange 
relations between rebel units and local communities to understand how they have 
fragmented the authority landscape of the KNU. In a third step, the chapter reveals 
how group fragmentation has translated into factional rivalries, giving rise to the 
conciliatory incumbent rebel leadership and a growing internal resistance, which is 
opposed to the ceasefire proceedings. Building on this, the last section will use insights 
from Recognition Theory and Social Identity Theory to explain why the so-called 
“hard-liners” within the group enjoy more support across many of the movement’s 
grassroots, not only from the faction’s northern stronghold but also from across the 
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wider social network of the Karen insurgency, as observed above. It will be argued that 
this is primarily due to the interactions of the new incumbent leaders with the 
movement’s grassroots, which are perceived as disrespectful rather than dignifying by 
the latter. In effect, this poses a significant social identity threat to non-elite members 
and supporters of the Karen insurgency to the extent that they have become 
increasingly alienated from the movement. Leaders of the internal opposition, by 
comparison, convey recognition to the Karen movement’s grassroots in their 
interactions with them. Identifying with these “hard-liners”, therefore, enables the 
grassroots to maintain a positive social identity from continued affiliation to the 
insurgency. This in turn generates significant authority for the group’s internal 
opposition. 
2 Shifting Power Relations  
On the way to the KNLA 5th Brigade stronghold in northern Karen State a 
KNU official was speeding a Japanese utility truck along the Thai side of the Myanmar 
border. The relatively well and recently built roads in Thailand are often the quickest 
route to go from one rebel-held area in Karen State to the other, particularly to regions 
where roads and cars cease to exist and dense forests take over completely. While 
chewing beetle nut, the KNU officer cursed at the sight of regular checkpoints manned 
with Thai border police, who were searching for narcotics smuggled from the 
neighbouring Golden Triangle and were also extorting bribes from undocumented 
Myanmar migrants and refugees. He explained: ‘You know, we [the KNU] don’t 
really have a problem with them, I mean they know us well and we had good relations 
for a long time. In fact, the Thai relied on us to control this border for a long time. We 
used to be in control here, we used to be the police. All that,’ he waved his arm across 
the lush green that surrounded us, ‘is Karen land: Kawthoolei. I still remember when 
we could roam around here freely.’38  
                                                        
38 Conversation with KNU officer, Thai-Myanmar border, 19 October 2013. 
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His words describe how much the power and territorial control of the once 
mighty rebel rulers have deteriorated since the early 1990s. As elucidated in chapter 
four, the KNU is Myanmar’s oldest ethnic insurgency movement, which has formerly 
posed a viable threat to the country’s rulers with more than 10,000 well-trained rebel 
soldiers. During its heyday the movement ruled over vast parts of eastern Myanmar, 
spanning from Shan State in the north all the way to the Tenasserim Region in the 
south, which it administered as a quasi-state, known as Kawthoolei (cf. map 6). While 
the KNU still operates across the whole of Karen State with approximately 5,000 
soldiers today,39 chapter four has shown how the power relations between Myanmar’s 
insurgent borderlands and the state have shifted in favour of the latter since the Cold 
War due to changing geopolitics and counterinsurgency strategies. In the case of the 
KNU, the insurgents were particularly hard hit from two parallel developments: 
(1) Militarily, the KNU lost ground to the Tatmadaw’s counterinsurgency and 
rival non-state armed groups that emerged from increased fragmentation of the main 
movement.  
(2) Geopolitically, the changing bilateral relations between Thailand and 
Myanmar brought powerful, outside economic interests from Thailand and Myanmar 
to the former periphery.  
These pressures have not only shifted the power balance in favour for 
Myanmar’s government, but have also shifted power relations within the movement 
and led to the significant fragmentation of the KNU. This has in turn driven power 
struggles between internal rival factions, competing against the state as well as against 
each other. As Chapter Two argued per Cunningham et al., this ‘dual contest’ is crucial 
for understanding a rebel movement’s collective behaviour (Cunningham, Bakke, and 
Seymour 2012, 69). Before analysing the role legitimate authority relations play in 
these contestations - particularly why many Karen grassroots feel alienated by the 
conciliatory incumbent leadership, while supporting the “hard-line” opposition within 
the group – the chapter will, therefore, first proceed to explain the origins of group 
                                                        
39 Cf. http://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/component/content/article/57-stakeholders/161-knu 
Chapter V – KNU: From War to Ceasefire 
127 | P a g e  
 
fragmentation and assess how fragmentation translated into contestation between rival 
factions, holding diverging ideas about the ceasefire negotiations with Myanmar’s 
government.  
Before doing so, it needs to be understood that fragmentation is no new 
phenomenon in the Karen insurgency, which has always been a heterogonous 
movement, comprised of members from different political, religious geographic, 
economic and educational backgrounds. 40  In addition to diverse identities, the 
heterogeneous nature of the KNU stems from its organisational make-up, which is 
divided in seven geographic districts41, each of which is under control of a KNLA 
Brigade: Thaton District (Brigade 1), Toungoo District (Brigade 2), Nyaunglebin 
District (Brigade 3), Mergui-Tavoy District (Brigade 4), Papun District (Brigade 5), 
Duplaya District (Brigade 6), and Pa’an District (Brigade 7)(South 2008, 55). 
                                                        
40 In fact, the ethnic category Karen is inherently fluid and incorporates different linguistic and 
cultural heritages. Most important are the distinctions between Sgaw Karen and Pwo Karen as 
well as hill Karen in the rugged forests of eastern Myanmar and so-called “Delta Karen” from 
central Myanmar. The former speak three different Karen languages, the latter often only speak 
Myanmar. As explicated in chapter four, instrumental for generating a relatively coherent sense of 
identity, cohesive organisational structures, and unifying the “liberated territories” of Kawthoolei 
over the past decades was the colonial state, missionaries, and the emerging insurgent political 
culture under an ethno-national agenda that was forwarded by Karen elites (Smith 1999, 390–91). 
41 These do not correspond with official administrative demarcations. Officially the government 
calls Karen State Kayin State and divides it up into seven townships: Pa’an, Kawkareik, Kya-In, 
Seik-Gyi, Myawaddy, Papun, Thandaung, and Hlaingbwe (South 2008, 55). 
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Map 6: KNU Administrative Districts and Brigades, (Source: South 2011, 9). 
Power imbalances between the movement’s brigades and their administered 
areas have also existed since the movement’s inception, particularly in terms of troop 
strength and prosperity. While finance flows and mobilisation processes within the 
KNU are centralised on paper, each brigade recruits and finances itself in practice. For 
this reason Brigades 6 and 7 emerged as the strongest forces of the movement during 
the heydays of the Karen revolution in the 1970s and 1980s when they controlled the 
main smuggling routes to Thailand. In comparison, the much smaller Brigades 1 and 
2 in Nyaunglebin and Toungoo have long been the struggling to make ends meet 
(Smith 1999, 395).  
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For understanding the movement’s current fragmented situation, including the 
origins of its rival factions that hold different opinions in regards to the 2012 ceasefire, 
it is crucial to explain how the military and geopolitical changes at the Thai-Myanmar 
border throughout the 1990s and 2000s have impacted differently on this multifaceted 
power landscape within the KNU. Most importantly was the shifting internal power 
balance from central to northern units of the KNLA, particularly to Mutraw’s Brigade 
5. Various KNU members, elite and grassroots, have explained to me that this is where 
the different stances regarding the ceasefire have emerged from. One leader from the 
central KNU district of Duplaya - controlled by the movement’s struggling Brigade 6 
- has put it this way: ‘The Burman [the government] activity is different from places to 
places. And so we have to make different moves as well. So we also have different 
opinions in different brigades.’ 42  This section will, therefore, trace how changing 
military and geopolitical dynamics have impacted differently on the movement’s 
different brigade territories.  
2.1 Battlefield: From Kawthoolei to Lost Ground  
The KNU had been hard-pressed by Tatmadaw offensives since the 1980s. Yet, 
it has suffered particularly since the breakdown of ceasefire negotiations in 1994, at a 
time when most other ethnic rebel groups signed truces with the government. 
According to the official version of long-term KNU leader David Taw, this was despite 
the recognition of a ‘younger, middle-level section of the KNU leadership […] that the 
burden of the conflict had become unbearable for the Karen population in the conflict 
area’ (Taw 2005, 41). Many KNU members wished to conclude a ceasefire along 
similar lines of the KIO and other northern groups, which granted territorial pockets 
as well as the rights to do business and economic development to armed groups while 
excluding political dialogues on the underlying causes of conflict, such as federal 
reforms. However, following several rounds of negotiation this was rejected by the 
KNU leadership owing to pressure from its allied National Coalition Government of 
the Union of Burma (NCGUB), a formerly powerful exiled NLD grouping that 
                                                        
42 Interview with KNU leader from Duplaya, Law Khee Lar, 4 December 2013. 
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emerged after the violent crackdown of the 1988 pro-democracy demonstrations. It 
asked the KNU not to sign a ceasefire in order to not undermine its own ‘efforts at the 
UN to win decisive international action against the SLORC’ (Taw 2005, 42). Similar 
alliance pressures from the Myanmar democratic diaspora movement again prevented 
the conclusion of a ceasefire in 1997 and in 2005 (South 2011, 16–17). 
The decision to continue fighting came with heavy costs for the KNU as the 
Tatmadaw made large and rapid advances in eastern Myanmar.  This was mainly 
because the ceasefires with most northern armed groups freed the Tatmadaw from 
fighting on multiple fronts allowing it to concentrat its new firepower on eastern 
Myanmar, particularly its “arch-enemy” the KNU. Myanmar’s generals also invested 
heavily in the modernisation and enlargement of their armed forces by way of large-
scale recruiting and the purchase and production of modern weaponry with help from 
China. By the mid-1990 Myanmar’s armed forces expanded to over 400,000 soldiers 
from only 180,000 soldiers in 1988 (Callahan 2007, 36). In addition, erupting internal 
tensions within the Karen movement played into the hand of the state’s 
counterinsurgency campaigns. 
Just after the break-down of the 1994 ceasefire negotiations, the KNU 
experienced a mutiny from which it never fully recovered. The upheaval was, 
however, not instigated by the pro-ceasefire faction but by Buddhist elements of the 
KNU. Years of grievances among Buddhist Karen soldiers against the Christian-
dominated KNU leadership peaked when it disallowed the followers of the influential 
Buddhist Karen monk U Thuzana to build Pagodas in the vicinity of the KNU 
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headquarter at Mannerplaw. 43  While KNLA commanders feared that the bright 
structures might turn the site into an easy target for Tatmadaw air attacks, this incident 
brought these long-standing sectarian tensions among KNU troops to boil over. In 
December 1994 Sgt.-Major Kyaw Than defected and founded the Democratic Karen 
Buddhist Army (DKBA). He quickly gathered approximately 3,000 disillusioned 
soldiers from the KNLA and the Karen National Defence Organisation (KNDO), a 
KNU affiliated village defence militia, which originally had constituted the KNU’s 
main armed wing. The DKBA was soon courted by the Tatmadaw with logistical and 
military support and started to fight alongside its former foe against its ethnic brethren 
and former comrades. The insider intelligence and manpower provided by DKBA 
defectors was instrumental for the counterinsurgency to finally overrun the 
Mannerplaw headquarter of the KNU in 1995, which marked a crucial turning point 
in the history of the KNU (South 2011, 18–20).  
The joint military and DKBA offensives of the mid 1990s concentrated on 
central Karen State and dealt a serious blow to the once mighty KNLA ‘mother 
brigade’ (South 2008, 55): Brigade 7 that used to form the military and logistical 
backbone of the movement. Located in Pa’an district, Brigade 7 used to preside over 
the KNU headquarters at Mannerplaw as well as the area’s main trade and smuggling 
routes, including the strategic border crossing between Myawaddy and Mae Sot in 
Thailand. The loss of territory to the Tatmadaw and the DKBA also meant a major 
loss of revenue for the KNU in general and its Brigade 7 in particular, with many 
lucrative smuggle gates at the border falling into the hands of the DKBA. After years 
                                                        
43 While many commentators on the KNU have stressed the Christian identity of the Karen, only 
20 percent of the Karen population might actually be of Christian faith, including Baptist, 
Anglican, and Catholic denominations (South 2011, 10). The vast majority, particularly the so-
called Delta-Karen in lowland Myanmar are of Buddhist denomination. These divides are also 
reflected in intra-ethnic differences. The majority of Christian Karen speaks Sgaw Karen. Many 
Buddhist Karen speak Pwo Karen (Ibid.). While sectarian divides have not played a significant 
role in the current fragmentation of the movement, they have certainly done so in the early and 
mid-1990s. This was captured in a conversation with a Karen civil society leader and KNU insider 
who told me that in the past there existed the following cynical saying within the movement: 
“Everything is controlled by the Seven Day Adventists, everything is managed by the Baptists, the 
Anglicans have to fight, and those who have to die are Buddhists” (Interview with Karen civil 
society leader, Yangon, 23 January 2014). 
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of further group fragmentation, Pa’an District today is contested by even more armed 
actors. In 2007, the so-called KNU/KNLA Peace Council (KPC) splinter group 
emerged as a 500 men strong government-supported militia after the then Brigade 7 
commander Maj.-Gen. Htein Maung negotiated an individual ceasefire with the 
SPDC. In addition to military pressure in the area, personal motivations were said to 
have played a role in bringing about this move as he and his companion, Pastor 
Timothy, saw their political influence within the KNU decline after their patron and 
long-term KNU strongmen Gen. Bo Mya died in 2006. The individual ceasefire 
provided the splinter group with government aid, a small pocket of territory and 
business opportunities (Core 2009, 98–99). Complicating the situation in Pa’an even 
further, the 5th Brigade of the DKBA then split from its main organisation after 
rejecting to follow its transformation into a formal Tatmadaw controlled government 
militia, a so-called Border Guard Force (BGF). The 1,500 men of the so-called DKBA-
5, or Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA), are once again pitched against 
Myanmar’s armed forces, formally acting in a loose alliance with the KNU (Myanmar 
Peace Monitor n.d.).  
The following maps illustrate the different military situations of the 
movement’s northern and central brigades in 2012. Map 7 depicts central Karen State’s 
Pa’an, where the KNLA’s 7th Brigade, marked in blue, has been pushed back 
considerably by the Tatmadaw and the DKBA (cf. map 7). Map 8 represents northern 
Karen State’s Mutraw, where the KNLA’s 5th Brigade, again marked in blue, has 
maintained relatively strong territorial control and the Tatmadaw only maintains 
outposts along the few existing roads (cf. map 8).  
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Map 7: Central Karen State (Source: The Border Consortium 2012, 31). 
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Map 8: Northern Karen State (Source: The Border Consortium 2012, 29). 
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2.2 Geopolitics: From Periphery to Border Hub 
In addition to these military dynamics that have demoted the formerly 
uncontested rulers of Kawthoolei to being one armed actor among many, the changing 
geopolitics along the Thai-Myanmar border at the end of the Cold War weakened the 
KNU even more. These impacts were again particularly severe in central and southern 
brigade territories, which shifted the internal power balance within the movement 
towards further towards its northern units.  
For many years Thailand used the KNU as a convenient proxy force against 
the CPB and drug-traffickers from the Golden Triangle, including the infamous 
“narco-army” of legendary Shan State drug kingpin Chang Shi-Fu alias Khun Sa, 
dubbed the “Opium King of the Golden Triangle”.44 This changed in the early-1990s 
when Thailand embarked on a “constructive engagement policy” with Myanmar to 
promote bilateral trade and investment in order to develop its underdeveloped and 
landlocked western provinces. Initially Thai businesses were investing into Myanmar’s 
timber sector after the Thai government implemented a logging ban in Thailand 
following multiple floods that were caused by heavy deforestation (South 2008, 73–
74). Since then Thai logging companies decimated the dense forests of Karen State to 
an unprecedented extent. Cash-striped and not able to oppose the economic interests 
of their erstwhile benefactors, the KNU quickly became part of this destructive 
industry by way of receiving compensation from logging companies and by granting 
their own logging concessions.45 At the same time, Thai companies have also started 
to mine for tin, wolfram, and lead in Karen State (South 2008, 75). 46  The Thai 
government, moreover, set out to tap into its neighbour’s energy resources, including 
hydropower and natural gas (South 2011, 21). As a result the Thai establishment soon 
                                                        
44 For more information on Khun Sa and the drug trade in the Golden Triangle see Chouvy 2009, 
23–36.  
45 According to Smith, the KNU received 5,000 baht per ton of teak (Smith 1999, 409). 
46 Mining and logging are still the most profitable businesses in Karen State today. In addition to 
teak, wolfram, tin, and lead, other minerals in Karen State include gold, antimony, tungsten, and 
zinc (Adam Smith International 2015, 68). The 2012 ceasefire with the KNU, has more, sparked 
increased agro-business investment, including rubber and palm oil plantations (Global Witness 
2014, 3) 
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lost interest in supporting the Karen insurgency as a strategic buffer force and began 
to consider the movement as a ‘nuisance impeding investment in the borderlands’ 
(South 2011, 20). While the Thai security establishment has not cut its ties with the 
KNU entirely and individuals continue to turn a blind eye to its transborder 
operations, the insurgents nevertheless had to give way to Thai economic interests.47 
In southern Karen State, these new geopolitical realities enabled the joint 
exploitation of natural gas in the Gulf of Martaban in the late 1990s. A consortium 
between French Total, US American UNOCAL, Thai PTT-EP and Myanmar MOGE 
started to transport 15 to 20 per cent of Thailand’s natural gas needs via a 63km long 
onshore pipeline through southern Karen State to the Tai border (Kolås 2007, 628). 
This area, locally known as Mergui-Tavoy District, used to be the stronghold of the 
KNLA’s 4th Brigade. In 1997 and 1998 the Karen insurgents came under heavy 
pressure by both the Tatmadaw as well as its former allies in the Thai security 
establishment to allow construction of the pipeline. Heavily outnumbered and careful 
not to displease the Thais, local rebel leaders negotiated their strategic withdrawal into 
demarcated areas with Tatmadaw front-line commanders. Disregarding this informal 
deal, a Tatmadaw offensive of 21,000 army soldiers advanced well beyond the 
pipeline’s corridor and drove the KNU further into the jungle.48 The demise of Brigade 
4 was accelerated by its inability to protect local communities from wide-spread forced 
displacement and other well-documented human rights abuses at the hands of the 
advancing government troops, such as forced labour and confinement.49 This sense of 
abandonment among Karen civilians is mirrored in the local tale of two chain smoking 
nine year old twin-brothers, who allegedly led several hundred brave Karen villagers, 
                                                        
47 Conversation with KNU officer, Thai-Myanmar border, 19 October 2013. 
48 Interview with Karen activist, Chiang Mai, Thailand, 30 October 2015. 
49  International NGOs documented the severe human rights abuses accompanying the 
construction of the pipeline and filed lawsuits against Total and US-based Unocal in Europe and 
the US for ‘complicity in crimes against humanity’ (Kolås 2007, 630).  
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known as God’s Army, into battle against the advancing Tatmadaw after the KNLA 
had retreated.50 
Liberalising trade policies in Myanmar exerted further pressure on the Karen 
insurgency. Like other rebel armies in Myanmar’s borderlands, the movement relied 
on incomes from taxing an extensive smuggling industry for many decades. During 
the self-isolationism under Ne Win’s “Burmese Way to Socialism” the immense 
shortage of everyday goods - from medicine to petrol and textiles - had to be smuggled 
into the country. Raw products, such as teak, rice, cattle and opium were used to pay 
for these imports in return. The annual volume of border trade in 1988 was estimated 
at US$3 billion, equivalent to 40 percent of the country’s then gross national product 
(Smith 1999, 25). By taxing 5-10 per cent levies on smuggle operators, the black-market 
trade used to be the ‘armed opposition’s lifeblood’ (Smith 1999, 99) for many years. 
According to KNU officials themselves, the Karen insurgency earned up 500 million 
Myanmar Kyat per year - at the time £50 million at the official exchange rate - in the 
mid-1980s by controlling smuggling gates (Smith 1999, 283). While this figure might 
well be overstated, there is no doubt that due to its strategic location at the Thai border, 
the KNU was for long one of the main beneficiaries of Myanmar’s isolationist trade 
policies. The main smuggle gates by Shwe Hser at Phalu and Wangkha by 
Kawmoorah were operated just south and north of Myawaddy, the only government 
stronghold at the Thai-Myanmar border at the time. With up to 1,000 head of cattle 
per day into Thailand and tons of manufactured small commodities back into the 
country, smuggling produced up to one hundred thousand kyat per day at the hand of 
the KNLA’s Brigades 6 and 7 (Smith 1999, 283–84). This revenue base eroded with 
the successive liberalisation of formal border trade between Myanmar and Thailand 
since 1988. According to Thai traders who have operated across the border for many 
years, the loss of these revenues is ultimately what heralded the demise of the Karen 
insurgency. In 2013 most commodities could legally be traded along official check 
                                                        
50 Whereas it is unknown to what extend the claimed battlefield success of the two-twin brothers 
against the Tatmadaw are true, the unit did reportedly exist and recruited up to 300 local Karen 
(Human Rights Watch 2002, 157). 
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posts, such as the Mae Sot-Myawaddy border crossing. Only some goods remain 
banned from being imported to Myanmar, including beer and palm oil. These still 
need to be traded ‘the classic way’.51 While these economic developments undermined 
the power of the KNU in general, they had particularly disastrous impacts on its 
central Brigades 6 and 7, who had already suffered from territorial loss due to joint 
Tatmadaw/DKBA offensives.   
The military and geopolitical shifts at the Thai-Myanmar border since the mid-
1990s severely weakened the power of Myanmar’s oldest and once strongest 
insurgency. At the time of writing the overall movement is only a shadow of its once 
mighty self. To understand the trajectory and conduct of the movement - including its 
2012 ceasefire with the government and the emerging internal opposition against it – 
it is important to trace how these developments impacted the figuration of differently 
situated and interacting insurgent actors. As the southern and central brigades, the 
KNU’s traditional power base, were particularly hard-hit by military and geopolitical 
pressures, the northern Brigade 5, emerged as the movement’s new stronghold as its 
military strength in the rugged mountains of Mutraw remained least challenged during 
the developments of the 1990s. The next section will show how these diverging 
impacts have fragmented the movement, particularly with regards to internal authority 
relations by dis-embedding the insurgency from local communities in some areas more 
than in others. As will be argued, this has disrupted reciprocal exchange relations 
between local communities and the insurgency, i.e. the implicit social contract as 
explicated in Chapter Two, and eroded the legitimacy of insurgent leaders. This 
process has been precipitated by the loss of territorial control in central and southern 
brigade areas, which explains why it has not happened to the same extent in the 
movement’s northern brigade areas. 
                                                        
51 Group interview with Thai businessmen, Mae Sot, 03 December 2013. 
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3 Fragmenting Authority  
The shifting power relations within the KNU resulted in the factionalising of 
the movement along different regions, whose increasingly parochial brigades have 
faced starkly diverging realities since the 1990s. To be sure, power and wealth 
disparities always existed between the seven KNLA brigades and the territory they 
ruled over was never homogenous in terms of their physical and human geography. 
Despite this heterogeneity and decentralised organisation, the KNU was a relatively 
coherent movement prior to the fall of its headquarters at Mannerplaw in 1995. While 
local units wielded considerable autonomy over day-to-day administrative and 
military operations, the movement’s central command used to be the undisputed 
decision-making organ responsible for the movement’s overall political direction. On 
paper this still holds true today. The KNU District Chairmen and the KNLA Brigade 
Generals are jointly responsible for the movement’s administrative and military 
operations in their region. Each administrative KNU department, e.g. the Education 
or Forestry Department, also has a regional branch. On the other hand, the movement 
operates a central command that encompasses a similar double-structure between 
KNU administrative departments and the central command of the KNLA overseen by 
the Chief of Staff and his deputy (Taw 2005, 41).  
The nature of this arrangement means that the KNU central leadership organs 
have only limited means to raise revenues of their own. They mostly depend on 
resources from district level administrators and brigade generals who traditionally 
generated funds from taxing smuggling operators, mining and logging businesses in 
their territory and the local population. While there was never a set quota of revenue 
sharing, wealthier brigades, such as Brigade 7 or 6, traditionally surrendered up to 40 
percent of their incomes to support the central revenue department, which then 
allocated these funds to its central command structure as well as to support regional 
operations, where deemed necessary. 52  Together with the District Chairmen and 
Brigade Commanders and their deputies, the central KNU department heads form the 
                                                        
52 Interview with KNU leader from Duplaya, Law Khee Lar, 4 December 2013. 
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central committee of the KNU. In theory, this is the main decision-making organ of a 
quasi-one-party state, which elects the movement’s top five leaders every four years, 
who are then represented in the KNU executive committee  (Taw 2005, 41). In 
practice, individual strongmen have always dominated both committees, degrading 
them to little more than consultative organs. In fact, long-term leader Gen. Bo Mya 
ruled the movement in a staunchly authoritarian fashion, permitting little dissent with 
no congress elections being held between 1974 and 1991 (Smith 1999, 390–92).  
Notwithstanding the decentralised mobilisation and funding structures of the 
KNU, political decision-making of the KNU has therefore been relatively centralised 
for many years. Until the early 1990s, the Karen insurgency, indeed, managed to 
maintain a cohesive organisation despite internal heterogeneity and power 
imbalances. The military and geopolitical developments since, have, however, 
impacted these power disparities in a way that fragmented and decentralised the 
movement considerably. Severe military defeats sent large contingents of the KNU 
fleeing to Thailand. Many rebels found refuge in the ever-growing camps along the 
border together with tens of thousands of civilian refugees. The lower rebel ranks 
increasingly blended in with other refugees in what was to become permanent forest 
settlements along the Thai border. The organisation’s top leaders mostly settled down 
in urban centres along the Thai-Myanmar border, particularly in and around the 
border town of Mae Sot. This detached many KNU leaders from the everyday realities 
of their organisation’s grassroots in the refugee camps as well as those left fighting in 
the Karen forests. A KNU officer, who grew up in Mae La refugee camp expressed 
this by stating that, ‘[t]he Burmese government should be thankful to the Thai 
government for welcoming us [the KNU] in Thailand, because now we are too busy 
going shopping and to the cinema, which distracts us from fighting.’53 
Geographic fragmentation also created an ever growing cleavage between the 
individual brigades and districts that have since largely been left to fend for 
                                                        
53 Conversation with KNU officer, Mutraw, 20 October 2013. 
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themselves.54 This led to an increasingly parochial outlook of different organisational 
parts, factionalising the movement along geographic lines. Upon discussing the central 
leadership’s stance on the increasing collaboration between individual brigade leaders, 
Tatmadaw generals, and Thai and Myanmar businessmen in ceasefire Karen State, a 
retired officer of the KNLA central command explained:  
‘Power today lies with the district level. It does not depend on the 
KNLA headquarter anymore. You see, Pa’an district is 7th Brigade 
territory. The KNLA headquarter has no land, no territory. Like the 
German High Command, hahaha, they are only in a building and give 
orders. But the district commissioner and brigade commander have 
the full authority within their territory. Today they do a lot of things, 
like warlords, like kings. But they have to feed their troops, you see. 
So they will do what they need to do. People sometimes don't like it, 
and think they are crazy. But this also depends on the population.’55 
Pa’an, the area in central Karen State that he is referring to, was formerly home 
to the most powerful and wealthiest district of the insurgent state of Kawthoolei. The 
following section will compare reciprocal exchange relations between local rebel units 
to local communities in Brigade 7 area of Pa’an with the ones in Brigade 5 territories 
of northern Karen State’s Mutraw. Doing so reveals how the differential military and 
geopolitical changes on the Thai-Myanmar border had divergent effects on authority 
relations within different brigades of the KNU insurgency. Southern and central 
Brigades, including Brigade 7, have been challenged significantly by the military and 
geopolitical pressures explained above. They lost large swathes of territory and 
military strength. These developments also dis-embedded them from local 
communities, which undermined their erstwhile legitimate authority relations to the 
movement’s grassroots in these areas. The northern units of the KNU, Brigade 5 in 
particular, remain relatively isolated from the outside world and emerged as the last 
                                                        
54 This impression emerged from interviews with differently situated KNU leaders from different 
KNU Districts in Law Khee Lar, 5-6 December 2013. 
55 Interview with retired KNLA central command officer, Mae Pa, 12 October 2013. 
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stronghold of the Karen insurgency. In contrast to their central and southern 
comrades, northern KNU units maintain comparatively strong control of territory, 
over which they continue to rule as a quasi-government, delivering social services and 
security in return for taxes and recruits, and in effect maintain reciprocal exchange 
relations to local communities. 
To briefly recapitulate from Chapter Two, establishing reciprocal exchange 
relations to local communities is a key mechanism behind rebel authority. This mostly 
happens through the provision of public goods in return for which local communities 
provide support to the insurgency or at least willingly obey rebel rule. If these relations 
are working an implicit social contract between rebels and local communities 
underpins the established insurgent social order. This creates legitimacy and, hence, 
provides authority to rebel leaders. In case of non-fulfilment the legitimacy of insurgent 
rule is threatened, i.e. when rebels struggle to provide public goods relative to the same 
extent as they did before. This is not to say that local support for rebellion in areas of 
prolonged armed conflict is the result of conscious deliberations over the distributional 
outcome of rebel governance arrangements. The proposed relational approach rather 
understands the motivations to support and partake in insurgency as routinised 
practices that emerge from the embodied social context, i.e. the habitus. This is 
important as the social context, and in effect local practices, change with shifting 
degrees of embeddedness that an insurgency achieves in local communities by way of 
reciprocal exchange relations.   
What will emerge from the below comparison of the insurgent social orders in 
two different KNU territories is that territorial loss and increased commercialisation 
has significantly dis-embedded the southern and central KNU units from local 
communities, while this has not happened to the same extent in the insurgency’s 
northern areas. This in turn disrupted the implicit social contract between southern 
and central rebel units and local communities, which eroded the legitimacy of regional 
rebel leaders among their grassroots. In contrast, comparative isolation from these 
wider changes on the Thai-Myanmar border has left the implicit social contract in 
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northern areas and legitimate authority relations between elites and grassroots of 
insurgency relatively intact.  
3.1 Brigade 7: In the Doorway of Globalisation 
The best spots to witness the vast transformations of the Thai-Myanmar border 
are the two border towns of Mae Sot and Myawaddy, located just opposite each other 
on the Moei River. For many years Mae Sot, in Thailand’s Tak province, has been a 
hub for an eclectic mix of people connected to the Karen conflict and other Myanmar 
ethnic conflicts in one way or the other, including humanitarian workers who provided 
aid in the nearby refugee camps, KNU rebels who relocated their unofficial 
headquarters after the fall of Mannerplaw to Mae Sot, smugglers operating their illicit 
business, mercenaries and volunteers from around the world seeking to join various 
insurgent armies in Myanmar, and spies from all sides who exchanged intelligence on 
the local night market. The town of Myawaddy in Karen State’s Myawaddy 
Township, which according to KNU District demarcation belongs to the 7th Brigade 
area of Pa’an, has long been one of the rare outposts of statehood in an area that had 
otherwise been dominated by non-state armed groups. The Tatmadaw and pro-
government militias - so-called Border Guard Forces (BGF), secure the corridor to 
Myawaddy via Hpa’an the government-held capital of Karen State along a windy mud 
road. Today, Mae Sot and Myawaddy form the backbone of the thriving border trade 
between the neighbouring countries as the main crossing for goods shipped across the 
Thai-Myanmar border and Myanmar’s second largest trade gate after Muse on the 
Chinese-Myanmar border. In Mae Sot, sporadic gun fire has given way to the noise of 
construction works and busy traders filling the streets of a new boom town with 
modern shopping malls and droves of Myanmar migrant workers. According to 
official trade figures, the formal import-export volume rose from US$27.32 million in 
2001 to US$156.09 million in 2006 (Kudo 2013, 194).  
In a meeting at the Tak chamber of commerce in Mae Sot, three Thai 
businessmen, one of them with a Chinese and another with an Indian family 
background, elaborated on the new prosperous realities of the region to the constant 
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rumble of jack-hammers outside. Seated on bright pink sofas and surrounded by 
trophies made from rubies and other precious stones sourced in Myanmar, the 
discussion revolved about the plans for a special economic zone to further liberalise 
trade, investment and labour markets in the transborder region. In their perspective, 
the armed conflict was already an issue of the distant past. They explained that the 
tightest bottleneck for further development was really the dire state of physical 
infrastructure, including insufficient roads on the Myanmar side and the crumbling 
Thai-Myanmar friendship bridge that can only be crossed by trucks carrying up to 25 
tons.56 Hopes were flying high for the ongoing construction of the Asian Highway 1 
that will connect Da Nang at the Vietnamese coast to Mawlamyine at Myanmar’s Gulf 
of Martaban through Lao PDR and Thailand in what is meant to become the Greater 
Mekong Subregion East-West Economic Corridor. The section from Mawlamyine to 
Myawaddy - some of which remained a dusty road that could only be travelled in one 
direction each alternate day in 2013 - is financed with support of the Thai Government 
and the Asian Development Bank (Asian Development Bank 2010). Speaking about 
why the area has changed so rapidly, one of the businessmen explained that the 
Myanmar government understood that the smuggling economy strengthened the 
Karen insurgency and, therefore, decided to liberalise border trade in order to dry up 
its funds:  
‘So they changed the policy and opened the Myawaddy side for 
official trade. First this was only twice a month, than once a week and 
then regularly every day. Initially they needed to protect the road from 
the Karen because there was a lot of fighting about this road. Then 
step by step they developed everything. And now there is peace.’57 
He continued to explain that the insurgents pose little viable threat to trade 
since the 2012 ceasefire ‘because they can do legal business now. They now have the 
right to do so and there are no taxes and no duties for them’.58  
                                                        
56 Group Interview with Thai businessmen, Mae Sot, 03 December 2013. 
57 Group Interview with Thai businessmen, Mae Sot, 03 December 2013. 
58 Group Interview with Thai businessmen, Mae Sot, 03 December 2013. 
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His depiction of rebels-turned-businessmen comes to life when crossing to 
Myawaddy and driving onwards to Hpa’an. On the other side of the river, in 
Myawaddy, the KNU indeed opened its first legally registered company under the 
name of Moe Ko San Travel and Tour Company Limited and Trading Company 
Limited in 2013. In a public statement, their manager declared that the combined 
travel and import/export business aims ‘to get into international market[s]’ and ‘can 
be regarded as the KNU 7th Brigade economic office’ (KNU official cited as in S' 
PhanShaung, September 07, 2013). When travelling further, various non-state armed 
groups, including the BGF, DKBA, KPC, and the KNU - extorted fees from passenger 
and commercial vehicles along the windy road to Hpa’an in 2013, even though the 
route is meant to be under the control of the government. Reports from 2015 indicate 
that this practice is continued along the Asian Highway 1 that was frequented by many 
vehicles even before its official opening (Weng, December 06, 2015). Local Karen who 
live in the area or frequently travel back and forth from Thailand described to me on 
various occasions that they often have problems discerning between the various armed 
groups. The most demeaning behaviour at road checkpoints and unofficial border 
gates is usually associated with units of the pro-government Karen BGF militia. The 
KNU has, however, also lost much of its former standing among local communities 
in this area, particularly since its units do not provide effective social services or 
protection anymore but continue to collect informal taxes.  
The ceasefire concluded in 2012 has aggravated these legitimacy problems for 
local KNU units, in southern and central Karen State. This is because the agreement 
does not specify demarcation of territory, buffer zones and troop demobilisation 
between the warring factions. As in previous ceasefires with other armed groups 
(Human Rights Watch 2005, 55), the Tatmadaw has used this situation to expand its 
presence in Karen State, leaving the KNU unable to stop this development without 
breaking the truce. 59  In an area where the counterinsurgency has historically 
committed human rights violations on a much larger scale than the insurgency (South 
                                                        
59 Group interview with KNU education workers, Mutraw, October 2013. 
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2011, 15), 60   this has led many local Karen to feel that their security has not 
significantly improved, despite an end to fighting, as was expressed by the following 
comment of a KNU grassroots member:  
‘Before the ceasefire it was difficult for the Tatmadaw to send 
reinforcements and supplies to the frontline areas because we 
attacked them. Now they can bring everything easily. So they send 
much more support and reinforce their military bases. Today there 
are much more government soldiers in our areas. This is a great 
concern to us and the local villagers. They also don’t feel safe. They 
had to run away from soldiers [Tatmadaw soldiers] for all their life. 
How can you expect them to feel safe now?’61  
A disillusioned Karen English teacher in Mae Sot, who had sympathised with 
the KNU years ago, described the loss of legitimacy that the KNU central and southern 
brigades have experienced among local communities as follows: ‘In the end it does not 
matter who they are, they just come into your village and demand money. But they do 
not give anything in return. They just make our lives more difficult.’62  
3.2 Brigade 5: The Last Stronghold  
Mutraw district of Kawthoolei, an area that mostly overlaps with the official 
Papun Township in northern Karen State, stands in stark contrast to the rapid 
transformations witnessed further south on the border. A trip to KNU-held parts of 
the area feels like a journey back in time. The rugged hills of northern Karen State are 
easily one of the most remote and underdeveloped regions of Southeast Asia. Lacking 
any noteworthy road network, travel is only feasible by boat along the Salween or 
Moei rivers to some parts of the region. Most villages are located in the hills and 
                                                        
60 Targeting and displacing civilians had for many years been an instrumental component of the 
Tatmadaw’s “Four-Cuts” strategy, with which it aimed to divide insurgents from non-insurgents in 
an attempt to cut rebel groups from food, revenues, recruits, and information (Human Rights 
Watch 2005, 8).  
61 Group interview with KNU education workers, Mutraw, October 2013. 
62 Conversation with Karen teacher in Mae Sot, Thailand, 12 November 2013. 
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remain accessible only by long and tedious hikes on small foot-paths through the dense 
rain forest. Instead of using mobile phones - which today are widely available in most 
parts of Myanmar’s border areas – villagers often share a radio and satellite phone to 
communicate with the outside world or other parts of Mutraw. Their settlements 
consist of simple wooden huts, which are built of bamboo on stilts. Electricity is 
produced only sporadically by shared generators, which frequently lack fuel to operate. 
The overwhelming majority of people are farmers, practising small-scale agriculture 
or breeding small livestock such as chicken or toads. Most parts of the local economy 
are not monetarised. People commonly conduct barter trade or produce basic goods 
communally. Items of daily need are produced locally and the area is still largely 
detached from the rapid developments that are taking place further south along the 
border. Ever growing infrastructure, booming investment and commerce, and state 
consolidation all seem far away in this part of Karen State.  
The area also gives an impression of the years when the Karen insurgents were 
still the uncontested ruler of Kawthoolei.63 Much less affected by the army offensives of 
the 1990s and 2000s or the emergence of rivalling armed groups, the 5th Brigade is still 
in firm control of large pockets of territory in Mutraw and maintains an extensive and 
remarkably well-functioning insurgent state. Most children go to school in KNU 
operated primary and middle schools, where students learn Sgaw Karen as their first 
language and Myanmar as their second. The history curriculum portrays the Karen as 
the first settlers of Myanmar and provides an extensive narrative of the KNU and its 
decades-long armed struggle, including the biographies of legendary martyrs and 
meticulous accounts of historical battles. Teachers, trained in a two year course at the 
local teacher training college, then go on to graduate with certificates and ceremonies. 
Small health stations provide healthcare in the larger villages and disciplined KNLA 
units provide security together with local village defence militias organised under the 
KNDO. In return villagers are expected to pay taxes in kind and to send one son per 
family to serve in the KNLA. The conscripts usually serve for up to seven years in the 
most basic conditions. While they are being provided with food, shelter and some 
                                                        
63 For an account of insurgent life in Kawthoolei in the 1980s see Smith 1999, 394. 
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“luxury” allowances, such as cheerot cigars, they are not compensated monetarily for 
their service in any significant way. Similarly, KNU members in administrative roles 
or KNU teachers also earn negligible amounts. This arrangement only works because 
KNU staff and soldiers in Mutraw are deeply embedded within the local communities 
and mostly receive additional pocket money from their families. This has constructed 
a tightly knit social network where the social identities of insurgents and non-
insurgents commonly overlap. It has also established a well-working informal social 
contract between the KNU and local communities, which is evidenced by many local 
Karen who speak of ‘our government’ when they mean the KNU. Sitting under 
mosquito nets at dawn, a local KNU administrator, who served the Karen movement 
for almost all his life in various roles but never travelled outside of Mutraw, explained 
the workings of this implicit social contract as follows:  
‘We all earn our living as farmers here. As KNU members we also 
have our farms. Even if we are in the army, we come back to help our 
families with the harvest if we have the time. We do not say: “Give 
me money and then I will serve in the army!” It’s not like that. We 
fight to protect our people, ourselves. Our soldiers are all very 
motivated. […] To organise all this we have a policy to pay taxes 
depending on the acres that you farm. Some people can follow it, but 
some cannot. They don’t have to give money to the administration. 
We don’t have cash in our hands very often here. Instead, they give 
food, and the administrative committee uses the food to support 
soldiers on the front. […] Most people understand that civilians have 
to feed the government, and in return, the government will have to 
look after its people. So people try to pay tax to their best ability.’64 
Rather than just stressing the exchange of material goods in the context of rebel 
governance, his statement illustrates how working reciprocal relations has left the 
insurgency enmeshed in local communities to an extent that conflates social identities 
                                                        
64 Interview with KNU administrator, Mutraw, 23 October 2013. 
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between local communities and the Karen revolution. Insurgency therefore, remains, 
embodied in large parts of the local population, which is generating legitimacy for 
local rebel elites, stabilising their insurgent social order. In the words of Smith - who 
visited and described various ‘liberated’ territories of Myanmar’s ethnic armed groups 
during their heydays in the 1980s, insurgency appears to remain ‘a way of life’ in 
Mutraw (Smith 1999, 88). 
The following section will explain how the KNU’s fragmentation of power and 
authority - into northern units on the hand and central and southern units on the other 
hand - has translated into the emergence of two different rival factions within the 
movement. At the time of writing, these comprise the incumbent leadership 
surrounding Chairman Gen. Mutu Say Poe and General Secretary Kwe Htoo Win. 
This faction has pushed for the 2012 ceasefire and has professed a conciliatory stance 
towards Naypyidaw since. They emerged from and remain to be backed by central 
and southern Brigades 1, 3, 4, 6, and 7. These leaders are pitched against an internal 
opposition, surrounding Vice-Chairperson Naw Zipporah Sein and the KNLA’s 
Vice-Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Baw Kyaw Heh. The latter faction has its roots and 
stronghold in the northern Brigades 5 and 2 and opposes the incumbent leaders and 
their conciliatory policies. 
Besides explaining the differing stances towards the ceasefire within the KNU, 
the next section also serves as an illustration of factional contestation within armed 
groups, an issue that has only recently garnered attention among students of armed 
conflict (Pearlman 2009; Cunningham, Bakke, and Seymour 2012; Staniland 2014). 
The following observations particularly underpin the importance to analyse the ‘dual 
contest’ rival rebel leaders engage in (Cunningham, Bakke, and Seymour 2012, 69). 
Besides competing over power with the state adversary, factions also struggle for 
group leadership against each other. It will show that peace negotiations with the state 
can intensify this internal competition even further, with one faction possibly striving 
for compromise with the government and the other simultaneously mobilising against 
it (cf. also Pearlman 2009).  
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4 Factions beneath the Ceasefire    
In December 2013, the central KNU leadership met for its annual strategy 
meeting in the organisation’s new headquarters at Law Khee Lar to discuss post-
ceasefire developments. Located at the Moei River, the new KNU “capital” was a 
large bulldozed clearing in the forest at the time. It featured one meeting hall that was 
surrounded by four sleeping barracks and one canteen. The place was clearly meant 
for temporary meetings only as the various central departments of the KNU have 
mostly remained in Mae Sot, even though plans have been discussed to move these at 
some point in the future. For the aforementioned leadership meeting, however, the 
group’s top five leaders, i.e. the KNU executive committee, and the various district 
leaders and administrative department heads, who together form the KNU central 
committee, came together for five days. Their assistants brought office stationery, 
laptops, and printers along; canteen workers shipped piles of vegetables, fish and rice 
across the Moei River from Thailand; and heavily armed special units of the KNLA’s 
7th Brigade guarded the temporary transformation of a jungle clearing into the bustling 
hub of Karen insurgent politics.  
The discussions at the gathering were fierce from the onset and it was obvious 
that there were two rivalling factions. One side welcomed the ceasefire, articulated 
trust in Thein Sein’s new semi-civilian government, and wanted to speed up the peace 
process. This pro-ceasefire faction surrounded KNU Chairman Gen. Mutu Say Poe, 
formerly commander of Brigade 6, KNU General-Secretary Padoh65 Kwe Htoo Win, 
formerly district chairman of Brigade 4’s Mergui-Tavoy district, and the KNLA’s 
Chief of Staff Gen. Saw Jonny, who used to command Brigade 7. Their main 
supporters were leaders from central and southern brigade areas, particularly from the 
areas of Brigades 6 and 7. They were pitched against a much larger grouping of central 
KNU leaders, including Vice-Chairperson Naw Zipporah Sein, Joint-General 
Secretary Padoh Thawthi Bwe, most administrative department heads, and many 
                                                        
65 Padoh is Sgaw Karen for elder. KNU leaders who lack other civilian or administrative titles are 
usually given this prefix. 
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leaders from the northern brigade areas. These second-rank leaders expressed their 
deep mistrust in Naypyidaw as well as their objection to the conditions and conduct 
of the ceasefire and attempted to slow down a peace process that they felt was slipping 
beyond their control. This more wary faction was backed by the 5th Brigade of the 
KNLA, whose previous long-term commander Lt.-Gen. Baw Kyaw Heh now serves 
as the KNLA’s Vice-Chief of Staff. The split between these two internal groupings was 
not only about diverging opinions on the movement’s current strategy towards shared 
goals, as KNU leaders sometimes tend to portray their internal division in official 
interviews.66 Rather it reflected deep-seated tensions and mistrust between two factions 
that have increasingly grown apart over the past years. Tellingly, leaders from both 
sides would neither sleep nor eat together at the meeting venue. In fact, the sleeping 
arrangements at Law Khee Lar spoke volumes about the rift within the movement. 
The pro-ceasefire faction stayed secluded in a barrack on top of the hill, overlooking 
the gathering place. Most of the others shared the three barracks downhill of the 
meeting hall.  
4.1 Incumbents: ‘The big powers play the tune. We have to 
dance to it.’ 
The organisation’s top-leader Chairman Gen Mutu Say Poe did not appear 
very happy at the sight of a foreigner in the headquarters. Similarly uncomfortable, 
seemed a senior KNU central committee member, with whom I stayed in one of the 
down-hill barracks, when I asked him to introduce me to Gen. Mutu - as he is often 
referred to - for a potential interview. Among local Karen as well as among many 
KNU members the Chairman who came to power in December 2012 is known to be 
secretive, authoritarian, and disapproving of internal dissent to his conciliatory course 
with Naypyidaw. After some convincing, the central committee leader, who knew me 
and my research well, agreed to bring me to Gen. Mutu on the evening after the first 
meeting day. When we reached the up-hill sleeping place of the pro-ceasefire leaders, 
the General lay in a hammock listening to the radio. Disenchanted with the 
                                                        
66 See for (Karen News, July 10, 2013, October 21, 2014). 
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unexpected guests, he harshly rebuked the central committee member for bringing me 
there after he revealed that I am a researcher at a university in London. To me he said: 
‘The British never helped us. In fact, they abandoned us. Why should I help you 
now?’67 In a more conciliatory tone he invited us to speak to one of his confidants 
inside the barracks Padoh Mahn Nyein Maung. The old Karen leader is nicknamed 
“Burma’s Papillon” for his mysterious escape from the infamous, high-security Coco 
Prison Island 300km off the Myanmar coast as a young pro-democracy activist from 
the Delta region in 1970 shortly before joining the KNU. He received us in an 
unexpectedly welcoming manner and excused Chairman Mutu as being frustrated 
over the negotiations with the group members ‘who don’t have trust yet and are still 
afraid of the government’.68 Pointing to the other leaders present in the barrack, he 
clarified:  
‘We here trust the President. Every leader here today, they all trust in 
him. We can see that president U Thein Sein really wants to reform 
the country. We have met him three times already. He said he wants 
to end this civil war. He doesn’t want to pass it to the next generation. 
[…] For us, we have been suffering from the civil war for more than 
60 years, so our people want peace, so we have decided to build peace, 
we must. […] Especially our current chairman, he is a peace man. He 
is a leader who truly believes in peace. He believes to solve the 
political problem on the table. […] The world today does not support 
resolving problems with violence. The government itself cannot act 
the same way they used to do anymore. They also don’t have a choice 
but to reform.’69 
After some further discussion, Padoh Kwe Htoo Win, KNU General Secretary 
and 2nd most powerful leader of the KNU entered the barrack and extended a friendly 
greeting in fluent English. The leader, who became General Secretary in December 
                                                        
67 Conversation with KNU Chairman Gen. Mutu Say Poe, Law Khee Lar, 05 December 2013. 
68 Interview with Padoh Mahn Nyein Maung, Law Khee Lar, 05 December 2013. 
69 Interview with Padoh Mahn Nyein Maung, Law Khee Lar, 05 December 2013. 
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2012, is one of the most pragmatic figures in the KNU and has been a driving force 
behind the 2012 ceasefire. He studied Economics at Rangoon University before “going 
underground” with the KNU in the mid-1970s, where he rose to be District Chairman 
in the KNU area of Mergui-Tavoy and assumed responsibility for negotiating the 
retreat of the KNLA’s 4th Brigade in the late 1990s when the Tatmadaw advanced along 
the corridor of the Yadana gas pipeline, transporting offshore-gas from the Adaman 
sea to Thailand. Sitting on a bamboo matt in the corner of the barracks, he explained 
the shifting geopolitics of the border, highlighting the changing interests of Thailand 
in particular. According to him, the KNU had become too weak to continue its armed 
struggle and needed to give into the powerful economic interests of Thailand and 
Myanmar in areas historically claimed by the KNU. Therefore, the revolutionaries 
would be required to learn how to do business in order to participate in the region’s 
expanding economy in a way that best benefits the Karen people. In his words:  
‘We are trained to fight, we are not trained to do business. That has 
been a problem for a long time here. […] From the KNU, we are now 
forming an economic committee to find opportunities to train our 
people to get knowledge on how to do business. We invited some 
economic experts to train our people. So some people blame us and 
say: “Hey, you revolutionary, you should not do any business!” But 
we have to do that. You see, when they want to build a road, we 
cannot stop them. The problem is not only the Myanmar 
government. We are reliant on the Thai side. The problem started 
from the Thai side, the Thai companies supported by their 
government. Both governments understand that they can benefit from 
each other here, so they make development projects like the Italian-
Thai [planned deep-sea port close to Dawei, affecting the KNLA 4th 
brigade area in southern Karen State]. We cannot stop them. We 
could disturb them to delay the project but we cannot stop them. But 
we are reliant on the Thai side, especially after we crossed to the other 
side. The Thai government will only do what’s best for their people. 
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So we also have to find a way that benefits our people. You see we 
are not the decision-makers here. The bigger countries are playing the 
tune. We have to dance to it.’70 
His faction, including Gen. Mutu Say Poe, and the group’s late foreign minister Saw 
David Taw, has, therefore, pushed for a ceasefire with Naypyidaw since the mid-
2000s. This was already outlined in a report for Conciliation Resources in 2005 by Saw 
David Taw (Taw 2005), who was described to me as the original ‘mastermind behind 
the ceasefire.’ 71  While this group is officially directing the KNU’s strategy and 
behaviour since 2012, it is pitched against a powerful internal opposition. 
4.2 Opposition: ‘They are pleasing the government’ 
Some weeks before the meeting at Law Khee Lar, I was invited for a long 
conversation to one of the organisation’s offices in a village outside Mae Sot in 
Thailand by a senior KNU leader, who preferred not to be identified. He used to be a 
KNU Executive Committee member at the time the ceasefire was signed but was 
demoted to second rank when Gen. Mutu and Padoh Kwe Htoo Win became top 
leaders in December 2012. He made it very clear that he and many other KNU leaders 
were concerned about the ceasefire because they perceived the focus to rest on business 
and economic development while there had not yet been any significant discussions 
on how to solve the political issues underlying the conflict, including constitutional 
amendments with regards to minority rights and power sharing.72 His worries were 
aggravated by the fact that a Yangon-based crony company investing in infrastructure 
and resource exploitation across Karen State under the auspices of a retired Tatmadaw 
Major – the Princess Dawei Company - funded the ceasefire negotiations and follow-
up meetings. The KNU leader put it as follows:  
‘The government at the beginning pushed and pressured us. […] 
Because in the first meeting and the second meeting, when we 
                                                        
70 Interview with KNU General Secretary Padoh Kwee Htoo Win, Law Khee Lar, 4 December 
2013. 
71 Interview with KNU leader, Mae Sot, 8 November 2013. 
72 Interview with KNU leader, Mae Pa, 25 October 2013. 
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started, the business people paid for all the transport and paid 
everything for us. [...] So we feel that the Burmese government, 
when they start the ceasefire, they just want to have a ceasefire and 
then say it is peace in order to do business and development. But we 
are worried that it will only remain a business agenda, because the 
government said: “We cannot talk about the politics. It is hard to do 
because we need to talk about that in the parliament. But business, 
we can give you right now, the economics we can give you right 
now. And we can sign right now.” But we said: “No, no, we don't 
want to do it like that. We have to work on the political first and the 
business will come later.” […] So our policy should be something 
more like self-determination, how we want to do the business, 
sharing the revenues. But now I think that the [Executive] 
Committee members, they are pleasing the government and will 
provide what kind of business they ask for. They established a 
business committee at the 15th Congress. But most of these 
committee members, they work with the Burmese government 
closely.’73 
In contrast to the new incumbent leadership under Gen. Mutu Say Poe, the 
rebel leader insisted that the KNU should only sign a preliminary ceasefire and 
articulated his opposition to furthering the cooperation with the government. In fact, 
on 12 January 2012, after the Myanmar government announced that a KNU 
delegation had signed the historic agreement in Hpa’an, his previous leadership 
refuted that the KNU had even agreed to a truce. According to him, this was because 
the ceasefire delegation led by General Mutu Say Poe - who at the time served as the 
KNLA’s chief of staff – had only been sent to Yangon to discuss controversial points 
in the negotiations with the U Thein Sein government but was not supposed to sign 
an agreement. After the dust settled it became clear that the delegation had 
                                                        
73 Interview with KNU leader, Mae Pa, 25 October 2013. 
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overstepped its authority and by signing the ceasefire accord without consent from the 
KNU Executive Committee. The top leadership at the time, headed by Naw Zipporah 
Sein and David Tharckabaw, however, quickly backpedalled and accepted the accord 
for the sake of unity in a movement that had experienced many splits in the past. The 
demoted KNU leader also highlighted that he was careful not to displease the 
international community, 74  particularly Western observers, who overwhelmingly 
praised the agreement (AFP, Kean, and Than, January 16, 2012). 
During the following months negotiations intensified between Gen. Mutu Say 
Poe’s delegation and the government’s peace initiative headed by Railway Minister U 
Aung Min. These meetings were, however, marked by the striking absence of the 
movement’s then-top leadership, including Naw Zipporah Sein, Padoh David 
Tharckabaw, and the movement’s Chief of Staff and former leader of the strong 
northern Brigade 5, Lt.-Gen. Baw Kyaw Heh, all of whom refused to take part. Indeed, 
a significant rift was looming between them and the ceasefire delegation, which 
according to the previous incumbent leadership continued to overstep its authority. 
One KNU leader complained about their ‘activities like organising working groups, 
informing the government about our discussions and setting up a liaison office without 
letting the headquarter know,’ stating that ‘their way was not proper according to the 
rules and regulations of our organisation’. 75  On 2 October 2012 these tensions 
escalated, leading the then-executive committee to dismiss Gen. Mutu, Gen. Saw 
Johnny, and David Taw for ‘repeated violations of KNU rules and regulations’ (Radio 
Free Asia, April 10, 2012). Yet, three weeks later, a KNU central committee meeting 
reinstated the sacked leaders for the ‘sake of unity’, stating that:  
‘There will never be an end to the discussion on the leaders [sic.] 
dismissal because each side claims they are right. The Karen people 
do not want the KNU to be divided, and so, for the sake of unity, the 
KNU leaders have decided to forgive each other and move forward in 
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75 Interview with KNU leader, Mae Pa, 25 October 2013. 
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their respective positions until the upcoming 15th congress’ (Yan, 
October 29, 2012).76 
Briefly afterwards, in December 2012, Gen. Mutu Say Poe and his faction 
managed to take power at the KNU’s 15th Congress, a general leadership meeting 
comprising of all regional and central KNU and KNLA leaders that is supposed to 
elect the movement’s Executive Committee every four years. The congress was to 
decide between the leadership headed by Naw Zipporah Sein and the new one led by 
Gen. Mutu Say Poe. Held at a time of severe infighting, the meeting was mired in 
controversies from the outset. Both factions insisted that it takes place in their own 
stronghold. Zipporah Sein’s faction wanted it to be organised in 5th Brigade territory 
of Mutraw. whereas Gen. Mutu Say Poe’s group preferred the venue to be in 7th 
Brigade territory of Hpa’an. The latter prevailed and 171 KNU representatives, thus, 
met in the 7th Brigade headquarters of Lay Wah between 26 November and 26 
December 2012 to discuss and vote for the new leadership. The first round of voting 
ended so close that none of the candidates reached the necessary 51 per cent, in effect 
necessitating a new vote, out of which Gen. Mutu Say Poe emerged victorious.77  
Despite the formal victory of the pro-ceasefire faction in this internal 
contestation, the internal opposition of the KNU has grown since. This is not least 
because it garners significant support among the movement’s grassroots, particularly 
in comparison to the new incumbent leadership. The next section will show that this 
is not only the case among the grassroots in the “hard-liner” stronghold of Mutraw, 
                                                        
76 Central committee member Padoh David Taw passed away in the meantime due to a long-term 
health condition.  
77 Trustees of Zipporah Sein, however, disputed the result and demanded for a recount. This turned 
out to be impossible as the electoral committee burned the ballot box straight after the first count. 
One elderly KNU member, who served as an electoral observer, told me how shocked he was by 
the overall procedure. According to him, delegates felt intimidated in the 7th Brigade headquarters, 
known as staunch supporters of Gen. Mutu. This was aggravated by the fact that they were not 
allowed to vote in secret, as was demanded by Zipporah Sein’s faction. Moreover, he stated that 
the burning of the ballot box was no proper procedure and delegitimised the elections as a whole. 
He as well as many other Karen grassroots, therefore, believe that the elections were rigged and 
Naw Zipporah Sein should have become the organisation’s Chairman (Interview with KNU 
member, Mae Pa, 14 October 2013. Various other KNU members expressed similar resentments 
against the 15th Congress election in conversations and interviews between September 2013 and 
December 2013). 
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where working reciprocal exchange relations have maintained legitimate authority for 
the 5th Brigade, as explicated above. In fact, grassroots support for the internal 
opposition is prevalent across the social networks of the Karen insurgency, including 
individuals and community-based organisations in various regions on both sides of the 
Thai-Myanmar border and overseas.  
5 Alienated Grassroots and Internal Contestation 
In October 2013 a series of bombs hit various sites frequented by foreigners in 
Yangon and Mandalay. The rumour mills in the country’s teahouses were grinding 
wildly. Their customers spun conspiracy theories and pointed fingers into the usual 
directions, including Myanmar’s marginalised Muslim community and the country’s 
armed forces, the Tatmadaw. Government investigators, however, soon presented a 
suspect believed to be linked to the Karen National Union (KNU). The country’s 
oldest ethnic insurgency movement had signed its first ever ceasefire agreement with 
Naypyidaw in the previous year and has since surprised with its ‘growing friendship’ 
to Myanmar’s establishment (Yan, June 06, 2014). The suspect was portrayed as 
belonging to rogue elements of the movement, a peace spoiler who also wanted to 
scare off foreign investors from the country’s recently opening and liberalising 
economy. Top KNU leaders were quick to join U Thein Sein’s government in 
condemning the terrorist acts and promised to assist in the official investigations (Yan, 
October 18, 2013).  
The bombings took place shortly before a meeting of the KNU’s educational 
arm, which has operated an extensive parallel schooling system in areas controlled by 
the insurgency along the Thai-Myanmar border for many years. I was invited to join 
the gathering that took place at the KNU’s teacher training college in northern Karen 
State’s remote Mutraw region deep inside Brigade 5 territory. The government 
suspected the bombers to originate from this region. Gathering in one of the half-open 
bamboo stilt-barracks, the KNU education workers, who joined the meeting from 
various parts of Karen State, listened to a multi-band radio and fiercely discussed the 
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news of the bombings in the far-away urban centres, where most of them have never 
been to. Nobody knew whether the bombings were really carried out by one of their 
own. Yet, in concert they condemned their own leadership for publicly promising full 
cooperation in the government investigations rather than vowing to protect someone 
who was potentially a Karen revolutionary. Their criticism of their own leadership 
seemed emblematic of a wider disillusionment with the ceasefire that held sway among 
these rank-and-file of the Karen insurgency. Speaking about his hopes and 
expectations for a potential peaceful future in Karen State, a senior KNU education 
worker, who has served the insurgents in the forests for most of his life, did not hide 
his pessimism and argued that the ceasefire was ‘just like a tree with cut roots. From 
the outside people think that this ceasefire is beautiful and that it benefits the Karen 
people. But from the inside the tree is already dead.’78 
When I told a Karen political activist, who is well-networked within the KNU, 
about this situation in an interview, he responded in just the same way, blaming the 
current rebel leadership as being too ‘soft-soaped.’ To him, their quick condemnation 
of the bombers and their pledge to investigate the incident in collaboration with the 
government made this very clear:  
‘This is absurd, you know, it’s like discrediting your own 
organization. How can you even trust this Government with 
information? But you see, some of our leaders had a secret meeting 
with the government and excluded the other leaders. Now they 
can point the fingers at them for not cooperating. But the ones who 
are cooperating, they are already submitting to the laws of the 
government. This is a big issue. We never accepted the 
government’s law. We have our own system, our own laws. Don’t 
they fight for all this anymore? So can you see now why we are 
frustrated with this kind of leadership these days?’79 
                                                        
78 Group interview with KNU education workers, Mutraw, 24 October 2013. 
79 Interview with Karen activist, Chiang Mai, 30 October 2015. 
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This situation illustrates the increasing alienation of the KNU’s insurgent 
grassroots from their post-ceasefire leadership and its conciliatory strategy. Despite 
having borne the brunt of decades-long civil war, the overwhelming majority of lower 
ranking insurgents and local supporters of the KNU, whom I met, viewed the 
movement’s current top leaders with deep suspicion. Counterintuitively, many of them 
were inclined to support the group’s “hard-liners” rather than the new leadership, 
pushing for a bilateral and nationwide ceasefire agreement. 
In order to understand why this is the case, this section builds on the insights 
drawn from Social Identity Theory and Recognition Theories, as elaborated in 
Chapter Two. To briefly recapitulate, the thesis’s conceptual framework argued that 
motivation to support or partake in armed struggle, particularly in identity conflicts 
such as Myanmar’s ethnic conflict, is foremost driven by claims to due and proper 
recognition. Becoming a valued member of an insurgency movement that is associated 
with high social standing and moral principles, i.e. charismatic ideas such as protecting 
the community and fighting against perceived injustices can, hence, meet the insurgent 
grassroots’ demands to recognition denied by the dominant political order. Joining or 
supporting insurgency, can, therefore generate self-perceived positive social identities, 
which lead to feelings of self-esteem and self-worth, and in turn render the insurgent 
social order and its elites as legitimate. Rebel leaders convey both - the moral principles 
of the movement as well as their recognition of others as valued group members - by 
way of using fair procedures and dignified treatment in their interactions with the 
grassroots. On the flip side, elite interaction that is perceived as unjust and disrespectful 
by the grassroots conveys misrecognition, which threatens positive social 
identification with the rebel collective. This, in turn, undermines the legitimacy of 
rebel leaders and their insurgent social orders, which can ultimately lead to resistance 
from within. 
The following observations will illustrate how the new incumbent leaders’ 
legitimacy has eroded because the Karen grassroots perceive their leadership style as 
authoritarian and their negotiations with Naypyidaw as the corrupted sell-out of 
decades-long revolutionary struggle for independence. This has given rise to collective 
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perceptions of misrecognition among the latter, particularly surrounding feelings of 
disrespect. This has in turn threatened social insurgent identities, leading to the 
growing alienation of the lower ranks of the movement and its traditional supporters 
among wider Karen society. In contrast, interactions with the movement’s internal 
opposition are viewed as respectful and dignifying among the insurgent grassroots. 
Identifying with the group’s “hardliners”, therefore, enables the grassroots to maintain 
a positive social identity from continued affiliation to the KNU. This generates 
significant authority for the group’s internal opposition across the social network of 
the Karen insurgency.  
5.1 Eroding Legitimacy: ‘They do not listen to our concerns’ 
Since the 1990s the Tatmadaw has utilised economic incentives for a 
counterinsurgency approach that is best understood as conflict containment. The 
country’s generals have sought to contain and weaken the country’s insurrections by 
negotiating separate ceasefire agreements with individual armed groups. While these 
armistices did not lead to substantial political dialogue, they allowed insurgents to 
retain their arms and govern pockets of territory (Smith 1999, 421–41). Moreover, 
these pacts encouraged armed group involvement in the collaborative exploitation of 
the area's natural riches by army generals, rebel leaders and foreign businessmen. The 
co-optation of rebel leaders by economic means has often led to remarkably durable 
stability and allowed the state to territorialise parts of its formerly off-limits 
borderlands to an extent that has not been possible by military means only (Smith 
1999, 441; Sherman 2003). This thesis argues, however, that the increasing 
involvement of rebel leaders in business ventures, as well as the corruption sparked by 
this among the higher echelons of ethnic armed groups, has posed serious challenges 
for the relations between the leaders of ceasefire groups and their grassroots. 
While the KNU had remained locked in combat during the first ceasefire wave 
of the 1990s and early 2000s, ‘ceasefire capitalism’ has also entered Karen State since 
it concluded a ceasefire of its own in 2012 (Woods 2011). The ceasefire economy in 
Karen State - where ongoing militarisation goes hand in hand with an uncontrolled 
influx of venture investments in the area’s natural resources, agro-businesses, and the 
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construction of large infrastructure - resembles these historical patterns (Karen Human 
Rights Group 2015). Long-term observers of Myanmar’s civil war, Bertil Lintner and 
Tom Kramer, have pointed out that these developments in Karen State are catalysed 
by new liberal land and foreign investment laws that additionally ‘opened up the flood 
gates for local and international companies to enter ethnic borderlands and buy up 
land - pushing local communities off their ancestral lands’ (Lintner, June 25, 2013). 
Of particular concern to the KNU grassroots is that some of their own leaders 
appear to partake in these developments. To be sure, the Karen insurgency was never 
immune to individual interests of power and wealth. Some individual leaders have 
long amassed personal fortunes, which they mostly invested in Thailand. This became 
particularly notorious with the rapid expansion of border trade in the 1970s and 1980s 
and large-scale logging in the 1990s (Smith 1999, 395). Shortly before his death in 
1982, former KNU Chairman and first commander of the KNDO, Mahn Ba Zan, even 
warned of the effects of increasing economic opportunities on the movement, saying 
that: ‘The Karen can survive poverty, but I am not sure they will be able to withstand 
prosperity’ (Mahn Ba Zan cited as in Smith 1999, 395). Nevertheless, local and outside 
accounts about life in the ‘liberated territories’ of Kawthoolei during the heydays of the 
KNU suggest that Karen leaders have mostly utilised revenues from taxing border 
smuggling and extractive industries for the benefit of the KNU and the building of a 
self-supporting and fairly well-working quasi-state, which was largely perceived as 
legitimate among local communities and the KNU grassroots (Smith 1999, 283; 395; 
384-401). 
Today KNU members are well aware that many of their leaders favour a 
luxurious lifestyle in Thailand over the hardships of armed struggle in the jungle. The 
local KNU administrator in Mutraw, who praised the high motivation of local 
insurgents and working local insurgent governance arrangements above, worried 
about other parts of the KNU and their involvement in various business activities. He 
expressed particular concern that the current incumbent leadership surrounding Gen. 
Mutu had pushed for the ceasefire agreement out of personal economic interests rather 
than revolutionary ideals, stating that ‘[i]f we care about money and serve the 
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revolution for money, we will forget about our motivation and our revolution will not 
last long and collapse quickly’.80 His concerns are shared among many lower and 
higher ranking insurgents, whom I have spoken to. A retired KNLA colonel expressed 
his worries that leaders at various levels are susceptible to co-optation by economic 
incentives at a time when Myanmar and Thai companies were increasingly eying 
business opportunities in Karen State:  
‘Especially after the 2010 elections this here [he rubbed his fingers to 
gesture money] became everything. At many meetings I warned my 
colleagues that the British army never really occupied Burma, only 
the British timber companies occupied Burma. So I told them to be 
aware of the companies. The Burmese [Tatmadaw] are very clever. 
They approach low-level officials of our administration and low-level 
officers of our army, to infiltrate our land area by area. After the 
ceasefire they can come freely. They don’t carry guns, they don’t carry 
bullets. They carry money.’81 
At a group interview with KNU education workers from across different parts 
of Karen State, people expressed their outrage at Myanmar’s chief peace negotiator, 
U Aung Min, who reportedly postulated after a meeting with KNU leaders that if  'they 
become rich, no one will want to hold arms. If their regions are developed, no one will 
hold arms. If we do all these [sic.] for them they will automatically abandon their arms' 
(U Aung Min cited as in Phan, December 10, 2013). One KNU teacher vented his 
anger, stating that ‘they know that our Karen people are thirsty for money and material 
goods because most of us local people and KNU members are poor. So they think that 
we will agree with them, once they give us a car or motorbike. But our main point is 
to get our country back. We have not fought for the last 60 years to get some cars.’82 
One of his colleagues expressed his worry that some of their leaders who signed the 
ceasefire and pushed the peace process might not see it the same way: ‘We don’t know 
                                                        
80 Interview with KNU administrator, Mutraw, 23 October 2013. 
81 Interview with retired KNLA colonel, central command officer, Mae Pa, 12 October 2013. 
82 Group interview with KNU education workers, Mutraw, 24 October 2013. 
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exactly why they signed the ceasefire now, they keep everything top secret. But we see 
that they get nice cars. I think that the government also gives them money and 
positions.’83 Another rebel educator expressed the viewpoint that the behaviour of his 
new leaders made it difficult for him to identify with the organisation as ‘[m]ost of 
them are poisoned by the enemies, their hearts have change and they believe our 
enemies because of their gifts. That’s why they don’t stand firmly on our revolutionary 
principles. We feel bad about our organisation because they deviated.’84 
Similar sentiments have been taking hold across the wider Karen insurgent 
social network, as was evidenced by 41 Karen civil society organisations that 
condemned the signing of the 2015 NCA in a public letter, which was quoted at the 
beginning of this chapter. In an interview with the founder of one of the signing 
organisations, the popular and well-connected Karen political activist also highlighted 
that the incumbent KNU leadership’s behaviour made it difficult for the Karen 
grassroots to still identify with the movement. According to him, the increased 
corruption among the KNU’s higher echelons had brought about a ‘moral self-
destruction [that] has negatively affected the KNU leaders’ relationship with the 
normal soldiers [which has] started to split the movement.’ 85 The Karen CBOs and 
their work on social justice in Karen State were also affected by these developments 
because they made the ceasefire KNU leadership secretive and unresponsive to their 
demands. He explained that this severance of the relationship between the KNU and 
local communities became most obvious to him at a meeting between Karen 
community based organisations and the KNU in 2013. At the annual gathering that 
was established as a means of consultation between local CBOs and the KNU in the 
mid-2000s, representatives of the Karen civil society raised their concerns over social 
and environmental problems that had reportedly deteriorated in Karen State since the 
ceasefire, including land confiscation for economic usage by companies and the 
military, adverse side-effects of unsustainable natural resource extraction, and the 
increasing narcotics problem among local youth. According to the political activist 
                                                        
83 Group interview with KNU education workers, Mutraw, 24 October 2013. 
84 Group interview with KNU education workers, Mutraw, 24 October 2013. 
85 Interview with Karen activist, Chiang Mai, Thailand, 30 October 2015. 
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present at the meeting, the way a senior KNU leader responded at this meeting 
alienated many participants:  
 ‘Suddenly [he] became angry and answered in the most 
inappropriate, crazy way you can imagine. He said that the KNU is 
not the saviour of the Karen people. I mean if he would have said 
that they are not solely responsible for all this, ok, but he basically 
said that this is none of their concern. Many people were really upset 
and angry. This told us very clearly that they do not listen to our 
concerns. It is the complete opposite than what they have told us for 
years, I mean that the KNU represents the Karen as a political 
organisation or even like a de-facto government. Usually you tell 
your government if you have problems and it should not answer that 
this is not its problem.’86  
In contrast, the activist highlighted that the previous KNU leadership, which 
was headed by Naw Zipporah Sein, had consulted with the Karen civil society about 
the concerns of local communities. He also stressed that this faction continued to seek 
the opinion of civil society, despite its relegation at the movement’s 15th Congress. 
According to him, this clearly turned them into the movement’s legitimate leaders. 
The next section will turn to these so-called “hard-liners”, explaining why they garner 
significant support among the estranged grassroots of the KNU. 
5.2 Growing Internal Resistance: ‘We are hardliners in the right 
respects’ 
At first glance, it is puzzling that the “hard-line” faction that has opposed the 
new KNU leadership’s conciliatory ceasefire politics has garnered so much support 
among the insurgent grassroots, many of whom have suffered the most in the past 
decades of civil war. To explain this, it is helpful to consider one of the “hard-line” 
faction’s key figures. At the time of writing, the relatively young Lt.-Gen. Baw Kyaw 
                                                        
86 Interview with Karen activist, Chiang Mai, 30 October 2015. 
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Heh is probably the most popular Karen rebel leader among the KNU grassroots. The 
commando soldier has a reputation as a fierce fighter, staunch revolutionary and 
caring leader. He used to be the long-term commander of the strong 5th Brigade in 
Mutraw before serving in his current role as the KNLA’s Vice-chief of Staff (VCS). 
While many other high-ranking KNU leaders have long indulged in comparatively 
luxurious lifestyles in Thai exile, “Baw Kyaw” or “the VCS”, as he is often fondly 
referred to, is said to live among his soldiers in the dense forests of Mutraw. It is, 
therefore, unsurprising that many KNU grassroots regard him as the personified 
opposite to the incumbent top leaders, whose alleged luxurious lifestyle has put them 
out of touch with the grassroots.  
According to one KNDO sergeant, Gen. Mutu Say Poe, who became the 
KNU’s Chairman in 2012, ‘is old now, very old and should retire but he wants to hold 
on to power like a dictator. You know, like the guy in North Korea or Ne Win, Pol 
Pot, Gaddafi, all these very old dictators.’87 A young administrator in his early twenties 
at the KNU Department of Health and Welfare (KDHW) also complained about the 
authoritarian attitude of the movement’s elderly Chairman, which he views as being 
aggravated by strong hierarchies between older and younger members of Karen 
society. In a conversation he revealed his frustration, stating that:  
‘Sometimes we young people have too much respect of the old 
leaders. Actually it is not respect, but it is fear. Being afraid is 
different than having respect, no? It is like the military, where 
you have to listen. But you are not allowed to question. This is 
maybe the culture. But we have to wait when the young people 
come back from abroad, the U.S. Then they have a different 
culture. But for us from the inside it is different, really 
different.’88 
                                                        
87 Conversation with KNDO sergeant, Mutraw, 23 October 2013. 
88 Conversation with KDHW member, Mae Sot, 02 November 2013. 
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The same young KNU member spoke fondly of the ‘strong and passionate’89 
Lt.-Gen. Baw Kyaw Heh, “the VCS”, whom he perceives as breaking with such 
authoritarian attitudes by ‘listening closely to the people.’ 90  Many other KNU 
grassroots that I met also expressed their trust in the young general and his factions. 
This is particularly so, as both key figures of this internal opposition, former KNU 
General Secretary Naw Zipporah Sein and Lt.-Gen. Baw Kyaw Heh, have repeatedly 
and publicly picked up the concerns of the KNU grassroots at a time when the 
movement’s incumbent leadership is perceived as increasingly detached from the 
concerns of local Karen communities. In public interviews, they have criticised the 
ceasefire process for its lack of political dialogue on the underlying causes of conflict, 
the continued militarisation of ceasefire territories, a lacking military code of conduct, 
including territorial demarcation, the territorialisation of KNU-held areas by way of 
securitised economic development, and the detrimental social and environmental side-
effects of increased resource extraction and infrastructure construction.91  
Similar to the suspicions of many grassroots insurgents, leaders of this faction 
express particular worries that KNU leaders, who have pushed for the ceasefire, have 
done so out of personal interests rather than the common interest of the movement or 
the Karen communities they claim to represent. A leader of the internal opposition, 
who wished not to be identified, expressed his concerns over the involvement of 
businessmen in the ceasefire talks of 2012, stating that ‘not only the KNU but also the 
local people think that it is not appropriate. Because they are worried if business people 
are part of the negotiations, business people will take the benefits.’92 Lt.-Gen. Baw 
Kyaw Heh even publicly denounced economic incentives as the main drivers of 
cooperation between the incumbent leadership and Naypyidaw stating that ‘business 
development and other issues have taken over the agenda’ (Baw Kyaw Heh cited as in 
Eh, May 09, 2013). When I met the highly praised young general, I encountered a soft-
spoken man, who considered his answers very carefully. While his heavily armed 
                                                        
89 Conversation with KDHW member, Mae Sot, 02 November 2013. 
90 Conversation with KDHW member, Mae Sot, 02 November 2013. 
91 See for instance Eh, May 09, 2013; Karen News, July 10, 2013; Yan, January 29, 2014.  
92 Interview with KNU leader, Mae Pa, 25 October 2013. 
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bodyguards prepared rice with pumpkin curry and fermented fish paste for lunch, he 
expressed grave concerns over what the increased commercialisation of Karen State 
after the ceasefire agreement is doing to the Karen insurgency:  
‘If we work together with all the businessmen coming here, we 
will turn into businessmen ourselves. I mean, we are members 
of the armed resistance. We shouldn't engage in business too 
much. But the Burmese government and some of our own 
leaders don't see it this way. You know, the ceasefire has largely 
been driven by business interests. This is our concern.’93  
In contrast to the insurgent grassroots’ trust in “the VCS” and his internal 
opposition, Western peacebuilders have nourished a deep mistrust in what they 
perceive and portray to be uncompromising KNU “hard-liners” (Yan, January 29, 
2014). According to Baw Kyah Heh himself, Charles Petrie, former UN diplomat in 
Myanmar and head of the Norwegian-initiated but now suspended Myanmar Peace 
Support Initiative (MPSI), for instance, ‘came to meet me and asked me not to destroy 
the peace process. He questioned me repeatedly, “You won’t break the peace process, 
right?” He asked me three times’ (Baw Kyaw Heh cited as in Yan, January 29, 2014). 
While international peacebuilders in Myanmar are anxious that the KNU “hardliners” 
are spoiling the peace process out of a lack of pragmatism, the leaders of this internal 
opposition are aware of their popularity among the movement’s grassroots and seem 
to oppose the ceasefire developments out of moral convictions. This was expressed by 
one of them, for whom it was important to clarify in an interview that  
‘some people criticize that we are hardliners in the KNU who don't 
like peace and just want to continue fighting. I say that this is not 
true. We are no hardliners, we are steady. Maybe it is fair to say that 
we are hardliners in the right respects.’94  
                                                        
93  Interview with KNLA Vice-Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Baw Kyaw Heh, Law Keeh Lar, 06 
December 2014.  
94 Interview with KNU leader, Mae Pa, 25 October 2013. 
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Conscious about the detrimental impacts of past internal divides, leaders of all 
sides within the KNU asserted the need for unity in various interviews. Despite this, 
the group has further fragmented and the internal resistance to the incumbent 
leadership and its conciliatory ceasefire policies towards the government has grown. 
This surfaced most poignantly in mid-2014 when the incumbent leadership 
surrounding KNU Chairman General Mutu attempted to leave the ethnic armed 
group alliance organisation United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC). The 
alliance was originally founded in 2011 jointly by the KIO and the KNU as well as 
four other ethnic armed groups as a means of promoting the unity of ethnic armed 
groups at a time when the reescalation of the Kachin conflict was looming already. 
Since then, the new KNU leadership has grown increasingly uncomfortable with their 
movement’s membership in the alliance, which they perceived as putting constraints 
on their bilateral negotiations with the government. Their attempt to leave the 
organisation, however, led to stark disagreements with the internal KNU opposition 
(Lwin, Ei Ei Toe, August 09, 2014). The latter, whom this decision reportedly caught 
by surprise, pressured the incumbent leaders to remain within the UNFC, fearing that 
the departure from the other ethnic organisations would speed up the rapprochement 
with between the KNU and Naypyidaw even more (Karen News, March 10, 2014).  
In October 2014, they took an initiative of their own in an attempt to join forces 
with similarly disillusioned factions from other Karen armed groups. Gen. Baw Kyaw 
Heh and the Commander of the KNDO Col. Ner Dah Mya met with representatives 
of the DKBA and the KPC and signed an agreement that founded a new armed group, 
the Kawthoolei Armed Forces (KAF) on paper (Yan, October 14, 2014). This time it 
was the incumbent KNU leadership, which was caught off-guard and renounced the 
creation of the KAF, worried that this would de-facto split the majority of its armed 
wing from its control. The two factions renegotiated both of these disagreements in an 
emergency meeting in October 2014 (Lwin, Ei Ei Toe, October 17, 2014). The meeting 
ended with a compromise declaration, stating that ‘reunification of the Karen armed 
organizations under the political leadership of the KNU or the formation of 
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Kawthoolei Armed Forces (KAF) is accepted, in principle’ but also decided that the 
‘temporary suspension of [UNFC] membership will be sustained.’95  
While the KAF remains existent only paper, the KNU’s two rival factions have 
continued to drift further apart. The KNU’s official leadership was the most important 
ethnic armed groups that signed the NCA in October 2015. Indeed, KNU General 
Secretary Kwe Htoo Win and Chairman Gen. Mutu Say Poe were among the main 
advocators of the agreement. Addressing the public after President U Thei Sein as the 
second keynote speaker at the ceasefire summit, Gen. Mutu Say Poe declared that the 
‘NCA is a new page in history […]. More than just a ceasefire agreement, the NCA is 
the first step on the important road towards the establishment of a federal and 
democratic Union’ (Mutu Say Poe 15.10.2015). A few days before, an alternative 
summit took place in Panghsang, the mountain headquarters of the UWSA at the 
Chinese border. The meeting featured representatives of ten ethnic armed groups that 
objected the NCA and met to coordinate their actions.96 In addition to these non-
signatories, some of whom remained locked in fierce battles with the Tatmadaw, KNU 
internal opposition leaders Naw Zipporah Sein and David Tharckabaw also attended 
the meeting. Instead of joining as representatives of the KNU, they were present on 
behalf of the KNDO. Interviewed at the meeting, David Tharckabaw publicly 
denounced the current leadership of the KNU and declared that his faction is looking 
for closer ties to the non-signatory ethnic armed groups:  
‘The KNDO and the KNU have the same fundamental standpoint, 
but some leaders did not walk on the right path. Our right stance is 
that we need to work and cooperate with our alliance of ethnic armed 
forces. Then our alliance will fight for equal rights and the right to 
                                                        
95 Karen National Union Supreme Headquarters, Central Standing Committee after 15th KNU 
Congress third Emergency Meeting Statement, 29 October 2014. Obtained by the author.  
96  These included the UWSA, the KIO, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army 
(MNDAA), the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), the National Democratic Alliance 
Army (NDAA), Shan State Army (SSA), New Mon State Party (NMSP), Karenni National 
Progressive Party (KNPP), Arakan Army (AA), Kayan Newland Party (KNLP). According to the 
UWSA, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Kaplan (NSCN -K) was not able to attend the 
meeting because of the long distance (Sai Wansai, November 04, 2015). 
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govern ourselves with self-determination for our ethnic region. Our 
KNDO stance is that if we do not have our allied force, we need to 
form it. In the case that we need to lead our alliance, we need to 
prepare for that. This is our stance. We do not want to lose our path, 
which is why we will continue to work with our alliance of ethnic 
armed forces.’ (David Tharckabaw cited as in Weng, May 11, 2015) 
At the time of writing, it is impossible to predict the future of the KNU and the 
prospects of Myanmar’s fragile peace process. The internal tensions within the Karen 
insurgency, however, have the potential to cause an organisational split or an internal 
coup, which could jeopardise the group’s ceasefire and the nationwide peace 
negotiations. Whether the ceasefire will hold or depends on various factors. The most 
important one will be whether or not genuine grievances among the movement’s 
grassroots as well as claims to power of the internal opposition can be accommodated 
within the current ceasefire framework and ongoing peace process. Another important 
factor is to do with the KNU’s internal opposition’s ability to use its garnered authority 
among the movement’s grassroots for building alliances across the wider Karen 
insurgent social network and a more cohesive movement again. This would allow 
them to retake leadership or break apart from the main movement.  
6 Conclusion  
This chapter has analysed why the KNU signed its historic ceasefire in 2012 and the 
tensions that have boiled within the movement since. It explicated how military and 
geopolitical pressures along the Thai-Myanmar border have left the once powerful 
rulers of Kawthoolei fragmented along parochial brigades, which face significantly 
different individual circumstances. The foothold of Karen rebels in central and 
southern areas of Karen State has been challenged considerably by the Tatmadaw and 
by other non-state armed groups since the early 1990s. Changing regional geopolitics 
has, moreover, brought powerful commercial interests to south-eastern Myanmar. In 
their wake, the legalisation of border trade eroded the black-market revenues of central 
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KNU brigades while infrastructure construction eased state territorialisation central 
and southern brigade areas. In contrast, the movement’s northern units maintain 
relatively strong control over a rugged territory that remains isolated from the same 
extent of military and geopolitical change. External changes on the Thai-Myanmar 
border have, thus, shifted the internal power balance of the movements from central 
to northern brigades. 
By tracing the impacts of these diverging pressures on the insurgent social 
orders in both areas through the lens of reciprocal exchange relations between the 
insurgency and local communities, that chapter has also shown how this fragmented 
the internal authority landscape along the same lines. This is because territorial loss 
and increased commercialisation has significantly dis-embedded the southern and 
central KNU units from local communities, while this has not happened to the same 
extent in the insurgency’s northern areas. This in turn disrupted the implicit social 
contract between southern and central rebel units and local communities, which 
eroded the legitimacy of regional rebel leaders among their grassroots. In contrast, 
comparative isolation from these wider changes on the Thai-Myanmar border has left 
the reciprocal exchange relations in northern areas relatively intact, which is why local 
rebel units remain enmeshed in local communities to the extent that social identities 
between civilians and insurgents are conflated. Insurgency in these parts of Karen 
State, hence, remains embodied as a ‘way of life’ similar to past decades (Smith 1999, 
88), stabilising local rebel authority. 
The chapter has also explained how this regional fragmentation has given rise 
to two factions with diverging outlooks towards negotiations with the government. 
The new incumbent leaders emerged from the movement’s central and southern 
brigades, by whom they remain to be backed. Having lost significant military power 
and authority within local Karen communities, these commanders have sought to 
compromise with Naypyidaw, signed the 2012 ceasefire, and promoted the peace 
process with Myanmar’s government ever since. In contrast, the previous top leaders, 
now demoted to second rank, have their stronghold in the relatively powerful northern 
units of the KNLA. This alliance has formed an internal resistance, which is pitched 
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against the new incumbent leadership and their conciliatory policies. This internal 
opposition, often depicted as the group’s “hard-liners”, has attracted significant 
support from the movement’s grassroots. This is not only the case in the faction’s 
northern stronghold, where the insurgency has remained comparatively well-
embedded within wider society.  
The grassroots support the internal KNU opposition is enjoying across the 
wider Karen social insurgent network was explained by analysing at the politics of 
recognition and processes of social identification. Many among the movement’s 
grassroots view the leadership style of their new top leaders as overly authoritarian and 
their increasing conciliation with Naypyidaw as driven by personal profiteering rather. 
This has given rise to collective perceptions of misrecognition, particularly 
surrounding feelings of disrespect. This has in turn threatened social insurgent 
identities, leading to the growing alienation of the KNU’s lower ranks and its 
traditional supporters from the insurgent movement. In contrast, interactions with the 
movement’s internal opposition are viewed as respectful and dignifying among the 
insurgent grassroots, not least because of their outspoken criticism against the 
controversies of the ceasefire, including personal business interests, increased 
militarisation, and the detrimental social and environmental side-effects of increased 
business investments affecting local communities. Identifying with the group’s 
“hardliners”, therefore, enables the grassroots to maintain a positive social identity 
from continued affiliation to the KNU. This has generated significant authority for the 
group’s internal opposition across the social network of the Karen insurgency. The 
official KNU leadership, which has championed the peace process, has, thus, become 
increasingly isolated within its own movement. The next chapter will analyse how 
similar dynamics have, indeed, led to the remobilisation of insurgency in Kachin State 
and the break-down of the country’s most important ceasefire of the 1990s in the 
thesis’s second case: the KIO.  
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CHAPTER VI – KIO: FROM 
CEASEFIRE TO WAR 
 
 
 
1 Introduction 
When the KNU signed the so-called nationwide ceasefire agreement (NCA) in 
Naypyidaw in October 2015, I was chatting to a Karen friend on a social media 
platform, inquiring about his opinion on recent developments. The KNU member 
voiced his strong disagreement with his own leaders’ decision to sign the accord at a 
time when government forces were battling various other ethnic armed groups – 
including Kachin, Kokang, Shan, and Palaung movements - which has resulted in 
heavy losses on both sides and the displacement of more than 120,000 civilians along 
the Myanmar-Chinese border. 97  To him, the strongest of these rebel groups, the 
Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO), and its continued armed struggle for 
greater ethnic minority rights and federalist constitutional amendments seemed more 
worthy of support than his own conciliatory leadership of the KNU at the time. 
Knowing that I had visited the KIO’s informal capital - Laiza, the year before, he 
expressed his wish to travel there as well. In his imagination, Laiza featured as the last 
symbol of ethnic armed struggle, which he craved to see for himself.  
                                                        
97 Concrete numbers are difficult to obtain. This is not least because many Kachin flee behind rebel-
held lines where international humanitarian agencies have limited access. Government figures 
from 2014 estimate that the renewed conflict in Kachin State alone has displaced 123,000 civilians. 
43,000 of them were living in government-controlled camps and 80,000 in KIO-controlled camps 
(Burma News International 2014, 23; 2015, 25–29). 
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The armed conflict in Kachin and Shan States has, however, only escalated 
again since the Kachin ceasefire with Myanmar’s government broke down in 2011. 
After 17 years of relative stability in the hills of Kachin State bordering China, the 
KIO’s armed wing – the Kachin Independence Army (KIA)98 - and the Tatmadaw have 
since engaged in fierce fighting. The ferocity of this renewed escalation came to the 
surprise of many observers who had long thought of the Kachin ceasefire as 
comparatively stable and the KIO as relatively weak and conciliatory (Global Witness 
2003, 117–18; International Crisis Group 2003). During the ceasefire years, Kachin 
leaders indeed established intimate ties with Tatmadaw commanders and were 
relatively accommodating towards the government (Woods 2011, 761; International 
Crisis Group 2012, 5–6). Moreover, the revolutionary ambitions and military 
capacities of the KIO seemed to have withered away over the long ceasefire years, 
while its leaders profited from the spoils of a lucrative ceasefire economy. In 2003, a 
Global Witness report assessed the disintegration of the ceasefire KIO as follows: 
‘To some extent, the discipline and a sense of duty, evident during 
the conflict, have been replaced by self-interest, opportunism, 
corruption and incompetence. […] Increased corruption has 
subverted the functional and political capacity of the KIA, to conduct 
public works, maintain political direction and to oppose the SPDC 
and provide an alternative to it. They have become less cohesive and 
the rank and file more disillusioned and frustrated as a result. Since 
the ceasefire, the KIO’s image and self-image have been damaged, it 
has become marginalised and its popular support has waned. […] 
One way for the KIO to regain direction and power would be to 
reassert its military strength’ (Global Witness 2003, 118). 
A potential revitalisation of the movement was, however, deemed ‘unlikely’ (Global 
Witness 2003, 118). In a similar vein, an International Crisis Group report of the same 
                                                        
98 In theory the KIA is subordinate to the KIO. In practice, the distinctions between military and 
political arm of the organisation overlap to the extent that even local people use both names 
interchangeable. 
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year also assessed the movement’s eroding power, concluding that any ‘renewed 
armed struggle in Kachin State would almost certainly quickly be contained’ 
(International Crisis Group 2003, 11). Since the war broke out again the Kachin 
insurgents have, despite these predictions, surprised with uncompromising political 
demands, military strength, organisational discipline, endurance on the battlefield, 
and a vast popular support base among the wider Kachin public. Against this 
background, this chapter asks why the 17-years long ceasefire with the KIO eventually 
collapsed. It also enquires why and how the KIO's willingness as well as ability to 
wage war against Myanmar's government increased so dramatically again. 
It will be argued that behind the movement’s puzzling trajectory stood eroding 
authority relations between incumbent rebel leaders and the movement’s grassroots in 
the ceasefire years, which have sparked group fragmentation and internal contestation 
and ultimately led to the rebuilding of the movement from within. Similar to the more 
current developments as observed within the ceasefire KNU in the previous chapter, 
reciprocal exchange relations between local communities and the Kachin insurgency 
suffered significantly in most of the ceasefire years. Most importantly, the KIO could 
not protect communities from forced displacement induced by increased militarisation 
and resource exploitation. In addition, the increasingly authoritarian and corrupted 
leadership style – particularly the overt self-enrichment of individual rebel leaders, led 
to the alienation of the movement’s lower rank-and-file. These interlaced processes 
were at the heart of the insurgency’s declining legitimacy and authority. The 
previously elaborated case of the ceasefire KNU allowed tracing how these dynamics 
impact on group fragmentation and the formation of an internal opposition that 
contests the incumbent rebel leadership. The case of the KIO will demonstrate how 
such dynamics can unfold further over time to the extent such internal oppositions can 
successfully take over an entire movement and change its trajectory. As will be argued, 
the key to the aspiring Kachin leaders’ success was their careful rebuilding of the 
broken legitimate authority relations with the insurgency’s grassroots. They managed 
to do so by seeking an alliance with the local Kachin churches, the only powerful 
political institution left wielding significant legitimacy among the Kachin public for 
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most of the ceasefire years. In partnership with them, they established consultative 
mechanisms with the wider insurgent social network, which signalled dignity and 
respect - i.e. conveyed due and proper recognition, to the movement’s grassroots, 
particularly to the disillusioned Kachin youth. This allowed the latter to rebuild self-
perceived positive social identities from their affiliation with the insurgency, upon 
which the KIO’s internal opposition could recruit a new generation of rebels on a large-
scale and ultimately take over the leadership.  
To explain the movement’s trajectory, the first part of the chapter will analyse 
the erosion of rebel leadership authority in the wake of the 1994 ceasefire. To do so, it 
will first introduce the ceasefire arrangement, with a particular focus on the changing 
political economy in Kachin State. It will then trace how new business opportunities 
incrementally corrupted individual Kachin leaders and spurred leadership 
factionalism, which resulted in disastrous infighting. In a next step, the chapter will 
analyse how these developments eroded leadership authority due to impairing 
previously established reciprocal exchange relations between the KIO and local 
communities. This planted the seeds of new grievances among local communities and 
alienated the KIO grassroots’ social insurgent identities, sparking resentment against 
their own superior. Building on this, the chapter’s second section will analyse the 
rebuilding of the movement from within. To do so, it will first trace the emergence of 
a new faction surrounding aspiring young KIA officers and their alliance with the 
powerful local churches of Kachin State, which enabled them to rebuild the KIO’s 
authority by re-embedding the movement within local communities. It will then 
explain how they used their re-gained legitimacy to mobilise the region’s disillusioned 
youth and recruit them into the insurgency on a large scale. In a final step, the chapter 
explains how this new force within the KIO managed to achieve a take-over of the 
leadership, which prompted the change of the movement’s strategy. 
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2 Ceasefire: Losing their Way 
The KIO capital of Laiza is a small town straddling the Chinese border. 
Protected by rebel units dug into fortified hilltop positions, it is inhabited by about 
20,000 people. Rebel policemen patrol the streets, tailors produce KIA uniforms, 
nurses are being trained to work in the KIO-operated hospital and Kachin soldiers sing 
revolutionary songs while their self-manufactured AK-81 assault rifles lean against the 
tables of dingy karaoke bars. Soldiers from various other allied insurgencies are also 
regular guests in town. While this fits within the imaginations of my Karen friend who 
told me that he longed to visit this “Mecca” of armed ethnic resistance, Laiza did not 
always look like this. Before the KIO signed a ceasefire with the Tatmadaw in 1994, 
the settlement had only been a small village. After the truce was in place, it quickly 
developed into a bustling border town. Not only did the KIO move its quasi-
government, including “civilian” departments, from its mountain fortress in Pa Jau to 
the valley settlement. Increased economic activities also turned Laiza into a bustling 
border trade-hub with China. In addition to the rapidly expanding resource 
economies, a buzzing entertainment industry opened its doors to Chinese costumers. 
It included casinos, which reportedly featured dancers, transvestites, and prostitutes 
from as far away as Russia (Boehler, 06/2012). According to a foreign diplomat in 
Yangon of the early 2000s, international diplomats have formerly regarded the KIO 
as one of the “good” ethnic armed groups that had not colluded with the Tatmadaw 
during the Cold War. With its increasing business activities after the ceasefire, they 
increasingly came to identify the Kachin movement with the “bad” armed groups 
mostly associated with running illicit businesses along the Myanmar-China border 
(Sherman 2003, 234). 
The days when the Kachin conflict resembled a mutual business enterprise 
rather than a revolutionary struggle, seemed long gone as I visited in 2014. Three and 
a half years after war had returned to Kachin State the town’s once bustling central 
bus station lay deserted as normal traffic could not cross through the nearby frontline 
to the rest of Myanmar. Yet, its sheer size and modern facilities spoke of more 
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prosperous days, as did the paved roads, the quality of which equalled the 
infrastructure found in neighbouring China’s Yunnan province rather than in most 
standard Myanmar towns further south. The receptionists at the spacious Laiza Hotel, 
the best address in town, featuring hot running water and Chinese Wi-Fi internet, 
waited for guests from China that would no longer arrive now that heavy fighting had 
resumed in the area. Meanwhile, the small golf course on the outskirts of Laiza was 
only occasionally still used by KIA officers keen on practising their swing. Lorries 
arrived sporadically at the border gate with China to be checked by the KIO’s customs 
authority, and Chinese traders, hawking small commodities at the town’s market, 
complained about their declining profits. The sight of Laiza’s largest casino summed 
up this transformation. Since its business dried up after the ceasefire broke down and 
Chinese tourists stayed away, the KIA had turned it into its operational headquarters, 
where senior officers turned to planning the movement’s military campaigns on the 
first floor. Locals proudly call the building complex “the Pentagon” or “the war 
room”. When asked about the remnants of the ceasefire entertainment industries, 
many KIO members seemed to feel uneasy, insisting that this was a long gone issue of 
the past. One KIA officer explained the new realities by stating that: ‘Laiza is not a 
town for businessmen anymore. This is a political town now.’99  
The following parts of this chapter will explain why and how the Kachin 
insurgency had seemingly come to lose its way, in so far as it came to resemble a 
business-minded armed group more than a revolutionary enterprise. It will then 
analyse why and how the movement was transformed back into a capable insurgency 
that resolutely struggles for autonomy and minority rights and is supported by large 
swathes of the Kachin public.  
2.1 Fragmentation and Infighting 
When Myanmar old-hand Lintner visited KIO territory as the first foreign 
correspondent during the 1980s, he noted that the movement was the 'strongest ethnic 
rebel army in Burma' (Lintner and Lintner 1990, 6). The insurrection was founded on 
                                                        
99 Conversation with KIA officer, Laiza, 15 March 2014. 
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5 February 1961 minorities by a broad coalition - including Kachin university students 
in Yangon, intellectuals in Kachin State’s capital of Myitkyina, and Kachin veterans 
of the Second World War - in reaction towards repressive state policies that 
discriminated against ethnic minorities. It quickly developed into one of the most 
powerful and best organised ethno-nationalist insurgencies in Myanmar. By the end 
of the 1980s it controlled vast parts of Kachin State and northern Shan State, 
administering them as a para-government (Smith 1999, 191–92). During these decades 
the KIO was at the forefront of Myanmar’s ethnic minority struggle against the central 
state.100  
In 1994 the KIO signed a ceasefire with Yangon. According to Nicholas 
Farelly, the agreement became ‘integral to the security of northern Burma’ for the 17 
years to follow (Farrelly 2012, 54). There are different accounts regarding why that 
has happened. Most important was the state’s changing counterinsurgency strategy in 
the early 1990s. Being faced with pressures of their own, Myanmar’s generals changed 
from applying all-out military force to crush various insurgent armies to a strategy that 
sought to pacify these restive borderlands by granting various insurgency movements 
the concessions to hold on to pockets of territories, retain their arms, and pursue their 
own businesses. The truce agreement with the KIO in 1994 materialised at a time when 
many other armed groups in Myanmar's north had already signed individual 
ceasefires. The Kachin movement was under pressure to do so for different reasons. 
Most importantly, a Tatmadaw offensive had isolated its strong southern brigade, 
which was fighting in neighbouring northern Shan State. Without possibilities of being 
resupplied, these units formed an independent movement in 1991 – the Kachin 
Defence Army (KDA) – and signed an individual ceasefire with the government 
(Kramer 2009). A little known fact, moreover, is that shortly before the KIO signed 
their own armistice, Chinese arms dealers had cheated the group, disappearing with 
                                                        
100  While the KIO started out as a separatist movement, it later demanded for autonomous 
provisions under a federal constitution rather than outright secession. For more background on the 
history of the movement see Smith 1999, 60-87, 190-198, 301-333; Sadan 2013, 331–60. 
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almost its entire war chest without delivering the promised weaponry in return.101 
According to the General Secretary of the KIO, another major incentive behind their 
agreement lay in the provisions that allowed a war weary-movement to retain their 
arms and to administer a sizeable part of Kachin State: the so-called Kachin State 
Special Region-2.102 This ceasefire territory spanned approximately one fifth of Kachin 
State, mainly along the Chinese border around the rebel-held towns of Laiza and 
Maijayang and in the lesser populated parts of northern Kachin State. Most other areas 
- including the state capital of Myitkyina – remained under government control (Dean 
2005, 131). These areas are approximated in red on the following map that illustrates 
territorial control in Kachin State in 2005. The green areas demarcate the control of 
the Tatmadaw. The yellow area is the Kachin State Special Region-1, which was 
controlled by the New Democratic Army-Kachin (NDA-K).103  
                                                        
101 This was confirmed in various conversations with differently situated KIO insiders, among them 
a Kachin religious leader, interviewed in Laiza, Kachin State, Myanmar, 29 March2014. 
102 Interview with Brig.-Gen. Dr. La Ja, KIO general secretary, Chiang Mai, November 2013. 
103 The NDA-K, which was made up of mostly non-Jingphaw Kachin, split from the KIO due to 
intra-ethnic grievances and ideological differences in 1968, when it joined the communist umbrella 
of the CPB. After the collapse of the CPB in 1989, the NDA-K concluded a ceasefire with the 
Myanmar government and transformed into a Tatmadaw controlled Border Guard Force (BGF) 
militia in 2009. While its territory demarcated on the map below seems relatively large, the NDA-
K was of comparatively minor strength, commanding about 1,000 soldiers. In contrast to the KIO, 
it never exerted exclusive control over its assigned territory and did not attempt to create a state 
within a state. Observers agree that the group was focused on business rather than politics (Global 
Witness 2005, 54; South 2008, 153; Callahan 2007, 42–45). Writing during the ceasefire years, 
Callahan notes that ‘the NDA-K operates more like an armed syndicate, while the KIO has tried 
to establish a kind of state-within-a-state’ (Callahan 2007, 42). 
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Map 9: Territorial control in Kachin State as of 2005 (Global Witness 2005, 56) 
Outside observers also highlighted the importance of economic incentives that 
additionally made the armistice palatable to rebel leaders (Sherman 2003; Smith 2007). 
The government granted the KIO the right to exploit their area's vast natural resources 
by allowing it to set up their own legal corporations, to sell concessions to other 
companies, and to tax the ever growing transborder trade with China. Subsequently, 
the KIO became one of the most accommodating ceasefire groups, some of whose 
leaders seemed more interested in plundering their territories together with Tatmadaw 
generals and Chinese businessmen than in waging revolutionary war (Global Witness 
2003, 117–18). As a KIO leader admitted, 'the government gave a lot of business 
opportunities to the armed groups and some leaders made a lot of benefits from that, 
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not only within the KIO but also in other groups.'104 Yet, he explains that the KIO 
leaders hoped that the arising economic opportunities will help to develop the 
marginalised region to the benefit of the Kachin people.105 The government, in fact, 
welcomed the KIO to take part in its Border Regions Development Programme, whose 
alleged success was propagandised by the regime’s mouthpiece newspaper “The New 
Light of Myanmar” on February 1994: 
‘Border regions of today are not like before. Education, public health, 
communications and agriculture have progressed and developed. The 
city of Yangon has now become more easily accessible to border 
regions. Post and telegraph services are already functioning. Electric 
lights have brightened the border regions. National races who had lived 
in darkness in the past are now enjoying the fruits of progress.’ (The 
New Light of Myanmar, 14 February 1994 cited as in Lambrecht 
2000). 
Although the idea of economic development was welcomed in impoverished and war-
torn Kachin State, many Kachin eyed the construction of roads and bridges with 
mixed feelings because they allowed the state – mostly in the form of the Tatmadaw – 
to gradually tighten its grip over formerly off-limits territory.106 In addition, it soon 
transpired that Myanmar’s military government was not willing to seek a broader 
political solution to end the country’s civil war, arguing that it could not decide on 
political matters due to its own status as an interim administration.  
The ceasefire, however, left the KIO with the formal authority to govern an 
own designated territory. This transformed the movement from an insurgent army into 
a local para-government. With no means to achieve its original political goals, it was 
left to focus on administration and economic development. As a local leader stated in 
2002, ‘we agree on the need for development. Instead of talking (politics), which will 
not bring agreement, we should practice (development). We need to build for the 
                                                        
104 Interview with KIO Joint-General Secretary U La Nan, Laiza, 29 March 2014. 
105 Interview with KIO Joint-General Secretary U La Nan, Laiza, 29 March 2014. 
106 Interview with Kachin religious leader, Myitkyina, 13 February 2014. 
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future’ (International Crisis Group 2003, 10). While the KIO always had governing 
ambitions in its controlled territories and possessed rudimentary administrative 
structures, before 1994 it was primarily a guerrilla war-fighting organisation (Lintner 
and Lintner 1990). With the ceasefire in place, its civilian components proliferated. 
The KIO established functional departments, including the departments of health, 
education, agriculture, and women’s affairs. In addition, it started to operate several 
civilian hospitals, equipped with Chinese utensils and run by Chinese-educated 
doctors and technicians. Nurses have since been educated in their own dedicated 
training school, similar to teachers who work in a non-accredited schooling system 
(International Crisis Group 2003, 10). 
The major focus of the KIO rested on the development of physical 
infrastructure as described by the KIO General Secretary Brig.-Gen. Dr. La Ja. 
Construction of roads was mostly outsourced to private companies in return for 
logging and mining concessions. The road from Myitkyina to Sumprabum and further 
on to Putao was, for instance, built by Jadeland Company owned by Kachin 
businessman Yup Zaw Hkawng (Global Witness 2005, 69). Looking back at the 1990s, 
Dr. La Ja assesses:  
'Our most significant achievement during these years was 
infrastructure development. […] So we developed many roads, for 
cars.. for example from Bhamo to Myitkyina, more than 100 miles. 
These were very good roads, perfect roads. But now they are destroyed 
by the war.'107  
The KIO also sought to improve the dire electricity supply in Kachin State. To 
do so the KIO set up their own development corporation, the BUGA Corporation, 
which hired the Chinese company Jinxin to develop two hydropower plants at the 
Mali and the Dabak rivers in return for extensive logging rights in the area (Global 
Witness 2009, 59). Since 2006 these dams have provided electricity to Myitkyina—the 
                                                        
107  Interview with KIO General Secretary Brig.-Gen. Dr. La Ja, Chiang Mai, Thailand, 14 
November 2013. 
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government-controlled provincial capital of Kachin State—and neighbouring 
Waimaw Township. 108  Interestingly, BUGA still provides electricity to the 
government-held towns of Myitkyina and Bamo despite the return to war in 2011. A 
company representative explains this with reference to the Kachin civilians living in 
these towns, stating that 'they are also Kachin. So we cannot just shut down the 
power.'109 Zawng Buk Than - head of the KIO's Economics Department - describes the 
paradoxical situation of this rebel company, which continues to operate despite the 
collapse of the ceasefire that had originally sanctioned it: 
'We established the company when we signed the ceasefire agreement 
in 1994, because with the ceasefire agreement the government allowed 
us to open official companies. And it can legally exist even now, after 
the ceasefire. We still get a lot of income through the BUGA 
company.'110 
Besides such revenues from own KIO-companies, the rapidly expanding 
ceasefire economy – fueled by Chinese hunger for the area’s natural riches - was 
instrumental in funding the KIO and its developmental ambitions, Brig.-Gen. Dr. La 
Ja explains that the KIO ‘used taxes collected from all the companies working with 
natural resources, you know... timber and mining, to develop our infrastructure.’111 
Apart from large-scale land sales, Kachin civilians were not taxed in this newly 
established order. 112  This reliance on and entanglement with incoming business 
interests, however, had fundamental consequences for the KIO, detrimentally 
affecting leadership cohesion, which in turn affected legitimate authority relations 
between elites and grassroots.  
                                                        
108 Interview with BUGA company representative, Myitkyina, 14 February 2014. 
109 Interview with BUGA company representative, Myitkyina, 14 February 2014. 
110 Interview with Head of the KIO Economics Department Zawng Buk Than, Laiza, 25 March 
2014. 
111  Interview with KIO General Secretary Brig.-Gen. Dr. La Ja, Chiang Mai, Thailand, 14 
November 2013. 
112 Interview with Head of the KIO Economics Department Zawng Buk Than, Laiza, 25 March 
2014. 
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To be sure, the KIO has long been involved in illicit economic activities on the 
Myanmar-Chinese border to fund its armed struggle, most importantly jade mining 
and small commodity smuggling (International Crisis Group 2004, 10).113 Yet, the 
1994 ceasefire stabilised the area to an extent that enabled Chinese, Myanmar and 
Kachin companies to exploit natural resources on an unprecedented scale and pace 
(Buchanan, Kramer, and Woods 2013, 17–18). Since then, the Myanmar government 
has gradually taken control of the most resource-rich parts of the region, including the 
infamous jade mines of Hpakant. Yet, the head of the Kachin’s Economics 
Department explains: 
'Even though the Hpakant region has fallen under the official control of 
the Burmese generals since the ceasefire in 1994, we have our 
clandestine ways to manoeuvre there. Although we don't use formal, 
or… let's say legal methods, we can still acquire taxes from the 
companies.'114 
These informal taxation practices are mostly related to protection rackets 
imposed by the KIO on companies operating within its reach as well as KIA mobile 
and stationary toll gates along illicit trade routes towards the Chinese border. Yet, the 
KIO official explicated that since the Tatmadaw’s intrusion into and incremental take-
over of the jade sector,115 the KIO has started to rely more heavily on timber logging.116 
This became additionally attractive by rising prices paid by Chinese consumers due to 
a newly imposed logging ban in China (Buchanan, Kramer, and Woods 2013, 18). 
                                                        
113 While other ceasefire groups, including the Shan, Kokang and Wa as well as Kachin militias, 
have relied on the de-facto legalised narcotics production to fund themselves, the KIO was never 
a big player in the narcotics industry  and has refrained from drugs-related business since 1991 
(Interview with Head of the KIO Economics Department Zawng Buk Than, Laiza, 25 March 
2014). 
114 Interview with Head of the KIO Economics Department Zawng Buk Than, Laiza, 25 March 
2014. 
115 Since the 1994 ceasefire the Tatmadaw has taken control over the most lucrative jade mining 
areas, particularly around Hpakant. Today the jade industry is controlled by senior Tatmadaw 
commanders who control access for mining companies by granting mining concessions to crony 
businessmen, who often work as proxies for Chinese investors, which as foreign companies are not 
permitted to invest directly into Myanmar’s mining sector (Global Witness 2015, 40–71).  
116 Interview with Head of the KIO Economics Department Zawng Buk Than, Laiza, 25 March 
2014. 
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Asked about the massive deforestation in KIO territories, reported by Global Witness 
(Global Witness 2009), the KIO leader nods: ‘We know that it's not good for the 
environment and environment agencies prohibit timber cutting like that,’117 yet, he 
justifies: ‘but we need to manage our income. So we need to do it. We need that 
business up until now‘.118 After the ceasefire in 1994 Chinese companies also started 
with large-scale hydraulic gold mining – mostly along the river banks of the Irrawaddy 
River and its two tributaries: Mali and N’mai. Since then taxing gold mine operators 
has also provided the KIO with new sources of income. 119  Participating in these 
lucrative industries, however, sparked greed among the top leadership of the KIO.  
A well-connected leader of the Kachin Baptist Convention (KBC) - the most 
important religious institution in Kachin State - explained how these new 
opportunities turned rebel leaders into businessmen: 
'The KIO has many departments and the department heads know the 
Chinese businessmen well. Until 2008/9 many KIO leaders became 
big businessmen, including the heads of the mining and forest 
department. They became rich. [...] They have many nice houses in the 
cities and a lot of land. They worked very close with the Myanmar 
leaders [and in this respect were] not faithful to the KIO.’120 
Business interests indeed facilitated cooperation between individual rebel 
leaders and Myanmar officials. This was mainly because of the central role the 
Tatmadaw was playing in the ceasefire economy. Despite the formal devolution of 
power to ceasefire groups in their specially designated administrative zones, Tatmadaw 
generals and military intelligence acted have long acted as gatekeepers to most “crown 
jewels” in the region. This is due to their cachet of officialdom, which allows them to 
                                                        
117 Interview with Head of the KIO Economics Department Zawng Buk Than, Laiza, 25 March 
2014. 
118 Interview with Head of the KIO Economics Department Zawng Buk Than, Laiza, 25 March 
2014. 
119 Interview with Head of the KIO Economics Department Zawng Buk Than, Laiza, 25 March 
2014. 
120 Interview with Kachin religious leader, Myitkyina, 13 February 2014. 
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sell land concessions with ostensible investment security to foreign companies in ways 
that rebel armies cannot. Warm relations with state elites is, hence, key to doing big 
business in these territories even for the KIO (International Crisis Group 2004, 10). 
Observers also noted that ‘during the KIA ceasefire years, collaboration with the 
Myanmar government became socially acceptable among Kachin elites’ (Farrelly 
2012, 55).  
At the same time as many Kachin leaders developed intimate ties with their 
erstwhile enemies, competing business interests sparked rivalry among them. 
Individual strongmen often lined the pockets of their own families first. This led to the 
fragmentation of the movement’s leadership, turning KIO strongmen against each 
other (Sherman 2003, 235). In the early 2000s, these tensions peaked violently. In 
2001, Lt.-Gen. N’ban La ousted the organisation's top-leader since the ceasefire - Gen. 
Zau Mai - in a coup. According to the KBC elder this happened because of rival 
business interests: 
'Inside the KIO they had many individual conflicts, you know.. Zau 
Mai, he took too much opportunities, advantage to do business, 
working with the Chinese, and also his own relatives, very close 
relatives. This is why the power struggle happened in the KIO [...]. 
Many people viewed him as too much selfish, giving our jade 
mining concessions to his relatives. That's why N'ban La took over 
the power from him. This is one reason. And the second reason is 
[...] he came very close to Myanmar leaders. That is why the KIO 
Central Committee worried about that. This was the foundation for 
the conflict.’121 
When asked about the assassination of the rebel army's vice-chief of staff and 
head of intelligence in 2004 following another coup attempt, he adds that 'all the 
conflicts within the KIO back then were based on business, based on personal business 
                                                        
121 Interview with Kachin religious leader, Myitkyina, 13 February 2014. 
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interests.’ 122  The KIO’s new Joint-General Secretary U La Nan explains that he 
retrospectively understands that the offered economic opportunities were part of a 
'government policy to weaken us as well as the other armed groups.'123 Speaking about 
these days he admitted:  
‘We thought that the ceasefire will lead to a political settlement. But 
as time went by without [political] talks, we were given incentives, 
such as business, whatever you want. In that time, some of us wanted 
to do business […]. The division among us appeared […]. When we 
left the political and revolutionary aims behind in exchange for 
personal businesses, we had a separation in the group. This happened 
to every [ceasefire] organisation.’ 124 
Besides sparking disastrous infighting within the movement’s leadership, the 
increased entanglement in the region’s lucrative ceasefire economies has weakened the 
movement by damaging its vertical relations - i.e. legitimate authority relations 
between the movement’s elites and their grassroots, as will be shown next. This was 
because the same economies that enriched individual rebel leaders infringed on the 
livelihoods of local communities sparking new grievances among the latter as well the 
KIO’s own rank-and-file. This time, however, the resentments were not directed 
against Yangon, but against the KIO leadership itself, leading to the erosion of the 
rebel leaders’ legitimacy among their grassroots. Crumbling authority relations in turn 
eroded the group’s previously stable support networks among the wider Kachin public. 
2.2 Eroding Authority – New Grievances and Growing 
Alienation  
The new prospects for increased security and welfare initially had the potential 
to benefit the standing of KIO leaders after the ceasefire was inked. In 1994 many 
Kachin civilians indeed felt optimistic that their insecure and impoverished 
                                                        
122 Interview with Kachin religious leader, Myitkyina, 13 February 2014. 
123 Interview with KIO Joint-General Secretary U La Nan, Laiza, 29 March 2014. 
124 Interview with KIO Joint-General Secretary U La Nan, Laiza, 29 March 2014. 
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circumstances would improve after decades of brutal civil war.125 To be sure, the end 
of fighting removed the most significant source of insecurity. The developmental 
agenda of the KIO also contributed to increased access to education, health and 
electricity in their administered areas (South 2008, 55: 190-192). Moreover, incoming 
investments and better transport links made many towns of Kachin state modestly 
prosperous (Farrelly 2012, 56). Despite these tangible benefits, many ordinary Kachin 
today feel as if their socio-economic lots as well as their security situations have not 
significantly improved during the ceasefire period. This is mostly due to the large-scale 
unsustainable resource exploitation and further militarisation, which were unleashed 
after the ceasefire. Despite the KIO’s attempt to expand its governance arrangements, 
the movement’s reciprocal exchange relations with local communities had, hence, 
suffered, mainly because it could not protect communities from forced displacement 
and other insecurities. The following section will show how this failure has added to 
resentments over the increasingly authoritarian and corrupt leadership style. This 
posed a threat to the social identities of lower ranking insurgents and rebel supporters, 
which sparked alienation among the movement’s grassroots and ultimately eroded 
leadership authority. 
To briefly recapitulate, Chapter Two posited that reciprocal exchange relations 
between rebels governing territory and local communities form a key mechanism 
behind legitimate rebel authority. Rebel rulers provide public goods, such as basic 
welfare and security, in return for which local communities support or at least willingly 
obey rebel rule. If these relations are working an implicit social contract between rebels 
and local communities underpins the insurgent social order. When rebels struggle to 
provide public goods relative to the same extent as they did before, the legitimacy of 
insurgent rule suffers. The following observations suggest that the failure to deliver 
security to local communities against external enemies eroded leadership authority in 
the KIO, indeed. It seems, however, that this was not so much the case because of 
undelivered material promises, as contractualism would suggest. Under the conditions 
of prolonged rebel rule, the Kachin insurgent social order has become naturalised for 
                                                        
125 Interview with Kachin religious leader, Laiza, 29 March 2014. 
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many decades and embedded the movement into the social context to the extent that 
insurgents and civilians are often impossible to distinguish. Support for the insurgency 
should, therefore, best be understood as a routinised practice rather than a conscious 
deliberation over material obligations. The inability to provide security for local 
communities has, thus, eroded leadership authority within the movement because it 
posed significant threats to the self-conception of the insurgent’s own-rank-and-file. 
This undermined the second proposed key mechanism behind rebel authority: the 
ability of its grassroots to derive positive social identities from affiliation to the 
insurgent collective.  
The livelihoods of local population in Kayin and Kachin States traditionally 
depend on smallholder and subsistence farming. Before the 1994 ceasefire these were 
often undermined by forced displacement as a result of armed conflict. The Kachin 
ceasefire has, however, not always improved this situation. The end to fighting has 
enabled large-scale investments, most of which originated from China, that created 
new sources of displacement and environmental degradation impeding on livelihoods 
of local communities. The logging and mining sectors saw the most rapid expansion 
after the ceasefire was in place. Small scale-mining industries, such as jade mining in 
Hpakant or gold-mining in Hugawng, industrialised their operations with the influx of 
Chinese capital. The use of heavy machinery and explosives has since degraded entire 
mountain ranges (Global Witness 2015, 38). The following sequence of satellite 
images show the rapid expansion of jade mining in the Hpakant valley. 
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Figure 2: Satellite images of jade mining operations in Hpakant before and after the Kachin 
ceasefire (Source: Global Witness 2015, 39). 
Gold mining has become the second largest mineral extraction activity in 
Kachin State. While 14 small-scale gold mines existed in Western Kachin State’s 
Hugawng Valley at the time of the ceasefire in 1994, they expanded to 31 industrialised 
mines in 2006. Relying on mercury as a chemical reagent to loosen the gold, hydraulic 
mining has since polluted the rivers and soil. Since the ceasefire, timber logging also 
increased dramatically, which led to large-scale deforestation. This was not least 
because the KIO lost access to the most profitable mining areas, including Hpakant to 
the Tatmadaw, and relied more heavily on timber logging for generating its revenues, 
as explained above (Global Witness 2009). Since, the mid-2000s Chinese agro-
businesses have, moreover, invested in large mono-crop plantations for cash and food 
crops. While these have benefitted Chinese businessmen and local authorities, they 
further marginalised local communities who suffer under the impacts of large-scale 
monoculture, including soil degradation, land encroachment, and the dependence on 
volatile market forces (Buchanan, Kramer, and Woods 2013, 47). 
Private concessions for commercial land use, for mining, logging, and agro-
businesses, have, hence, impeded on local livelihoods and often additionally led to the 
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displacement of smallholder farms, resulting in land-poverty and landlessness. This 
development has been accentuated across Myanmar’s ethnic border areas because of 
the uncodified status of communal land ownership that often goes hand in hand with 
traditionally practised swidden agriculture in the highlands. In areas of resource 
extraction and agro-business this has facilitated large-scale “land-grabbing”, in effect 
resulting in the landlessness of more than half of the rural population in most areas of 
Kachin State (Buchanan, Kramer, and Woods 2013, 47). Some of these “land grabs” 
and business-related displacements are well documented by local rights activists. The 
Kachin Development Networking Group, for instance, reports about the Hukawng 
Valley. In 2001 the Myanmar government officially designated the area as the world’s 
largest tiger reserve in cooperation with an US-based NGO, The Wildlife 
Conservation Society (Kachin Development Networking Group 2012). The 
establishment of such nature conservation areas since the early 2000s has posed 
additional burdens to local livelihoods because they restricted access to forests, 
including their resources such as game and timber, for local people (cf. Buchanan, 
Kramer, and Woods 2013, 18). The Kachin organisation also reported that despite the 
stated aim of conservation, most parts of the valley were granted to the Myanmar-
based Yuzana Company in 2006, which established an 81,000 hectares mono-crop 
plantation for cassava and sugarcane. About the subsequent displacement of local 
communities, the organisation writes as follows:  
‘Bulldozers have razed forest areas, animal corridors, and farmlands of 
ethnic people living in the valley for generations. […] Local people 
have been forced from their homes into a relocation camp’ (Kachin 
Development Networking Group 2012). 
In addition to the environmental costs and investment-induced displacement, 
the ceasefire economies brought about new social problems. The most obvious one 
relates to the spread of narcotics and related HIV/Aids. This was due to increased 
availability and demand. Poppy production itself is nothing new to the area long-
known as the ‘golden triangle.’ After most local insurgent groups agreed to ceasefires 
opium, heroin and amphetamine production in Shan and Kachin State flourished 
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further as it became part of the area’s ‘ceasefire capitalism’ (Woods 2011; Meehan 
2011). Richard Synder argued that the Tatmadaw granted ceasefire groups the right to 
engage in narcotics production as a ‘lucrative “exit option”’ from violence (Snyder 
2006, 959). With the de-facto legalisation of the narcotics industry, drugs in Kachin 
State have since become cheaper and more readily available, even though the KIO 
itself officially stopped growing poppy in 1991.126 Impoverishment and insecurity have 
been the key drivers of the burgeoning opium industry, which is mostly located in 
Kachin and Shan States.127 As Patrick Meehan showed in the case of Shan State, the 
opium and heroin trade is controlled foremost by pro-government militias. The actual 
growing of poppy is, however, often done by impoverished highland farmers as a 
means of survival (Meehan 2011). Large-scale Chinese crop substitution programmes 
that have involved Chinese investment in monoculture rubber plantation in northern 
Myanmar since 2006, however, might have done more harm than good to the 
livelihood of local farmers as elaborated above (Buchanan, Kramer, and Woods 2013, 
47). 
At the same time narcotics have spread throughout Kachin State, demand for 
drugs has also surged. This was due to the expansion of labour-intensive extractive 
industries, which have attracted droves of migrant workers from all over the country 
to the mining towns of Kachin State (Buchanan, Kramer, and Woods 2013, 18). The 
practice among heroin users of sharing needles in combination with the expansion of 
prostitution in these commercial hubs sparked HIV/Aids epidemic in northern Burma 
(Kachin Development Networking Group 2007, 37–56). A local social worker – who 
is working with drug affected youth in the government-controlled state capital of 
Myitkyina - states that these developments had a particularly severe effect on the 
Kachin youth.128 According to him, half of the local university students were drug-
                                                        
126 Interview with Head of the KIO Economics Department Zawng Buk Than, Laiza, 25 March 
2014. 
127 Although the opium industry had steadily declined between 1997 and 2006 as a result of opium 
bans by various ceasefire groups, including the KIO, it has risen steadily again since, doubling its 
output from 2006 to 2012 (Buchanan, Kramer, and Woods 2013, 2; United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime 2014). 
128 Conversation with Kachin social worker, Myitkyina, 10 February 2014. 
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addicts. While exact figures could not be verified, the severity of the narcotics problem 
among Kachin youth was evidenced by a visit to Myitkyina University in February 
2014. Heroin, needles, and amphetamines were readily available on campus. In the 
social worker’s opinion, which is shared among many local Kachin, government 
officials turned a blind eye to these activities because narcotics provided a convenient 
to crush ethnic resistance. He states that ‘the army has stopped killing us directly. Now 
they leave us to destroy ourselves.’129 
These developments severely undermined the legitimacy of KIO leaders among 
local communities.  A local priest described that ‘some of our leaders back then 
behaved just like warlords’130 and that the legitimacy of the KIO in local communities 
eroded after the ceasefire. He remembered that in the late 1990s and early 2000s many 
former supporters ‘didn't accept the KIO as their representative anymore.’ 131 
According to him, continued impoverishment of local communities at a time when 
KIO leaders grew rich was only one of the reasons for that. More, important was that 
displacement and repression did not end for ordinary Kachin with the cessation of 
fighting in 1994. Consulting with internally displaced persons (IDPs) in various IDP 
camps - which have mushroomed once more since the renewed escalation of conflict 
across Kachin state - indicates that for some communities who previously enjoyed the 
protection of the KIA, insecurity had even increased during the ceasefire years. A 
father of five, for instance, reported that his family had to flee four times during the 
last twenty years, which two of his sons did not survive: 'Now we ended up here 
because of the war. But before that we had to leave because the companies and 
Burmese soldiers took our land for doing business.'132  
The Tatmadaw, moreover, used the ceasefires of the 1990s to build up military 
capacities in northern Myanmar, particularly in areas of economic interests. In Bhamo 
District of Southern Kachin State, the Tatmadaw maintained four battalions before the 
                                                        
129 Conversation with Kachin social worker, Myitkyina, 10 February 2014. 
130 Interview with Kachin religious leader, Laiza, 29 March 2014. 
131 Interview with Kachin religious leader, Laiza, 29 March 2014. 
132 Conversation with IDP, KIO-administered IDP camp outside Laiza, 15 March 2014. 
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1994 ceasefire. Ten years later, its presence increased to ten battalions, all of whom 
have confiscated approximately three hundred acres of land each (Human Rights 
Watch 2005, 55). For local communities, this was often accompanied by abuses at the 
hands of Tatmadaw soldiers - including extortion, forced labour, and expropriation 
(Global Witness 2009, 64–66). Sitting on his desk in the KIO’s “Pentagon” – the 
abandoned Chinese casino in Laiza, the Joint-General Secretary of the KIO U La Nan 
pondered about this predicament: 
 'This became a dilemma and weakened the KIO. Within the ceasefire 
it was very difficult for the KIO to manoeuvre between the government 
and the civilians. They were trying to get trust from the civilian side 
but also not to break down the ceasefire with the government. [..] From 
the civilians view, the KIO sometimes even looked like a government 
agency.'133  
Another senior KIA officer in the movement’s liaison office in Chiang Mai had 
equally bad memories of these days, admitting in a conversation that among the 
biggest problems arising of this situation was that 'we could not provide security for 
the public. We simply had no power to protect them.'134 According to a local priest in 
Laiza, this lack of protection was, indeed, one of the major issues why ‘people became 
very disillusioned about the KIO and thought it lost its revolutionary goals.’135 The 
provision of effective physical security, including protection against external enemies 
and the upholding of internal order, has become a particular important source of 
legitimacy for the Kachin insurgency. This is even more so as protecting the 
community is arguably the essential moral principle of an insurgent movement built 
on ethnonational ideology. The KIO’s lacking ability to protect Kachin civilians from 
abuses by government troops, from the land-grabs of Chinese companies, and the 
rampant environmental and social problems arising from the ceasefire economy, 
therefore, led to the rapid erosion of rebel leaders’ authority by the early 2000s. This 
                                                        
133 Interview with KIO Joint-General Secretary U La Nan, Laiza, 29 March 2014. 
134 Interview with senior KIA officer, Chiang Mai, 14 November 2013. 
135 Interview with Kachin religious leader, Laiza, 29 March 2014. 
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happened not only among local communities but also among the movement’s own 
rank-and-file, particularly among the foot soldiers of its armed wing.136 
While civilian departments in the KIO expanded during the ceasefire years and 
individual leaders enriched themselves, the loser of this transformation from a guerrilla 
army into a business and development-focused quasi-government was the 
organisation’s armed wing: the KIA. At the same time as its senior commanders 
capitalised upon the ceasefire economy, defections and low morale withered the KIA’s 
base away. Young officers and foot soldiers were barred from similar lucrative 
opportunities. In order to feed their families and themselves, they had to supplement 
their nominal monthly sold of 100 Chinese Renminbi - equivalent to $16 – with 
operating petty businesses, such as small-scale cross-border jade smuggling or being 
supported through family networks.137 Witnessing their own leaders’ self-enrichment 
and their amicable ties with Myanmar’s establishment, their complicity in exploiting 
their own territories, their internal feuds, as well as experiencing their own inability to 
protect Kachin civilians, the morale plunged within the middle and lower ranks of the 
KIA. A Kachin soldier remembers these days as ‘really dark,’ explaining his 
estrangement from the insurgency at a time when ‘we just didn’t know what to fight 
for anymore’.138  
The dilapidated state of the KIA during this time was a far cry from its pre-
ceasefire situation. When Lintner visited the area in the 1980s he wrote: ‘Discipline in 
the KIA was always impressive by any standards’ (Lintner and Lintner 1990, 174). In 
contrast, a local journalist elaborates how the armed wing threatened to collapse in the 
early 2000s, as many soldiers 'really didn't like the ceasefire but wanted to continue 
fighting for their rights. Some ran away and tried to organise something else.'139 A local 
priest recaptures the waves of desertions during these years when 'almost all of them, 
something like 80 percent of the KIA soldiers went back home. They got very 
                                                        
136 Interview with Kachin religious leader, Laiza, 29 March 2014. 
137 Conversation with KIA soldier, Laiza, 20 March 2014. 
138 Conversation with KIA soldier, Laiza, 20 March 2014. 
139 Interview with local journalist, Maijayang, 14 April 2014. 
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discouraged and went home.'140 Another Kachin elder remembers that the general 
problem the movement faced during this time was that 'the KIO, the organization 
itself, was poor, but the leaders, personally, they became rich.'141  
This almost collapse of the KIO signified how the tides have changed over time. 
While the ceasefire had seemed to be in the interest of both sides – the KIO and the 
Tatmadaw – in 1994, it brought the KIO to the brink of collapse by the early 2000s. 
This was mainly because the ceasefire’s modus operandi ruptured reciprocal exchange 
relations, i.e. the implicit social contract, between the KIO and local communities, 
thereby, causing the insurgency’s previously stable support networks among the 
Kachin public to crumble. The testimonies of Kachin soldiers and supporters of these 
days elucidate that such relations are not based on conscious deliberations over the 
distribution of public goods. In a region where local communities and the grassroots 
of insurgency are inherently intertwined, the delivery of public goods to local 
communities, particularly security from outside enemies, rather forms part of the 
expectations of rebels, in line with their self-conceptions of insurgent social identities. 
Experiencing their own inability to protect the Kachin community from insecurities 
that were partly caused by their own leaders’ self-enrichment, therefore, alienated 
many lower ranking Kachin insurgents.  
To explain how the movement could rebuild authority among its grassroots and 
remobilise on a large scale, the next section traces a disillusioned group of young 
officers who gathered around a charismatic leader and realigned with the powerful 
Kachin churches, the only powerful political institution left wielding significant 
legitimacy among the Kachin public during most of the ceasefire years. This alliance 
enabled these aspiring rebel leaders to rebuild legitimate authority relations to local 
communities, to remobilise the movement by recruiting a new generation of rebels on 
a large-scale, and ultimately to take over the KIO leadership.  
                                                        
140 Interview with Kachin religious leader, Laiza, 29 March 2014. 
141 Interview with Kachin religious leader, Myitkyina, 13 February 2014. 
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3 Rebuilding Popular Insurgency 
By February 2014, renewed armed conflict had ravaged Myanmar’s northern-
most province of Kachin State for more than three and a half years already. At first 
glance, the inhabitants of Myitkyina - the government-controlled provincial capital - 
were going after their everyday business as usual, frequenting the bustling markets and 
beer bars in the southern part of the city, where people from Myanmar’s Bamar 
majority mingle with Kachin, Shan, and other ethnic minorities. After dark, however, 
the streets quickly emptied of inhabitants, most of whom had become used to curfews 
and the omnipresence of the infamous agents of the Myanmar military intelligence in 
a city that had headquartered the dreaded Northern Command of the Tatmadaw for 
decades. 142  Many of the trains arriving at the nearby train station came from 
Mandalay. Their waggons were bursting with Tatmadaw soldiers on their way to fight 
Kachin rebels in the trenches of the nearby frontlines just north of Myitkyina. 143 
Transferred to cargo trucks, they rode past intimidated civilians, who were rushing by 
without raising their heads. 
The city’s northern part offered an intriguingly different sight. The 
neighbourhood remains almost exclusively populated by ethnic Kachin. It also hosted 
many IDPs who had sought refuge from recent fighting in more conflict-ridden parts 
of Kachin State. Two of the largest constructions in this part of town were the 
ceremonial Manau ground, used for traditional festivities, and just opposite of it, the 
office of the KIO’s Technical Advisory Team (TAT), the movement’s former ceasefire 
liaison office, which still housed a small delegation of KIO negotiators. On the street 
in between, enthusiastic Kachin students from nearby Myitkyina University were 
selling the insignia of the Kachin insurgency printed on t-shirts for men and women, 
mugs, keyring holders and protective smart-phone covers from a pop-up stand 
decorated with KIO flags. Local youth, zipping by on their scooters, frequently 
                                                        
142 For more information on the conduct and power of frontline Tatmadaw commands in ethnic 
minority areas, cf. Chapter 4. 
143 In Kachin State contemporary armed conflict is largely fought over hilltop positions, where both 
rebel and government forces are dug into trenches.  
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stopped to stock up on the accessories, which were deemed stylish among the young 
Kachin population of Myitkyina. Surprised at the boldness with which young people 
distributed and wore the insignia of the insurgency in a city, which still felt beleaguered 
by years of militarisation, I asked one of the students why they did so. To her, my 
question seemed misplaced, even more so as it came from someone who professed to 
study the Kachin conflict. In her opinion, the dire situation in Kachin State was self-
explanatory as to why the local youth would support the KIO.  
The following section will explain this renewed popular support for the Kachin 
insurgency, showing that the eroding legitimacy of the KIO’s old leadership was, 
indeed, the breeding ground for an aspiring faction of young officers who set out to 
rebuild legitimate authority relations within the movement. With the help of the 
powerful Kachin churches and consultative mechanisms they managed to convey due 
and proper recognition to their rank-and-file and the wider grassroots support 
networks of the Kachin movement. In effect, large swathes of Kachin started to 
identify with the insurgency after years of alienation again by the mid- to late-2000s. 
Utilising this regained authority, the young KIA officers recruited a new generation 
into the KIO, forming a strong internal force that ultimately enabled them to topple 
their own superior.   
3.1 Re-establishing Authority – ‘He is a good gangster now’ 
The eroding legitimacy of the KIO’s incumbent leadership gave rise to young 
aspiring KIA officers.144 A close companion of them recounted how the young officers 
were increasingly pitched against their superior:  
'There was a gap between old officers and young officers, their ideas 
and many other things [...]. For example, the old men acted just like 
Burmese soldiers. They wanted to control the organisation and make 
profit. But the young officers wanted to change that behaviour.'145 
                                                        
144 Since 2008 Sumlut Gun Maw serves in the position of Major General as the KIA’s vice-chief of 
staff. 
145 Interview with co-founder of the EEDY, Maijayang, 14 April 2014. 
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Ranked at the middle of a top-down military organisation in a strictly age-based 
traditional society, these officers were largely excluded from the power and wealth 
enjoyed by more senior commanders. They were also faced with the potential collapse 
of their army, a disintegrating central leadership, and the erosion of overall support 
among local communities. Against this background, they set out to change this 
unpromising status quo. Crucial to their success was the rebuilding of legitimate 
authority relations to the movement’s grassroots. They managed to do so by 
establishing new ways of interactions with the insurgency’s rank-and-file and, 
crucially, with the wider Kachin public. In contrast to the old leaders, their methods 
conveyed due and proper recognition to the movement’s grassroots, which enabled the 
latter to derive positive social identities through affiliation to the insurgency again.  
As posited in Chapter Two, positive social identification with the insurgency is 
a key mechanism behind rebel authority because the motivation of grassroots rebel 
supporters seems foremost driven by claims to due and proper recognition. The 
recognition as a valued member of a rebel group that itself is associated with high 
social standing and moral principles allows for deriving a self-perceived positive social 
identity. Both of this, collective moral principles as well as relevant status information, 
i.e. appreciation as a valued group member, is conveyed when the interactions with 
group authorities are perceived as fair and dignifying. Likewise, the authority of rebel 
leader erodes, when their interaction with their grassroots is perceived as unjust and 
disrespectful by the latter and, hence, undermines the insurgent grassroots’ positive 
social identification with the rebel collective.  
The widespread grievances among the KIO’s rank-and-file and local 
communities against the movement’s ceasefire leaders, whose overt corruption and 
loss of revolutionary ideals alienated the Kachin insurgent grassroots at the time, 
provided the young officers with fertile grounds for mobilising against their superior. 
Building support networks to local communities, nevertheless, posed an immense 
challenge to the aspiring rebel leaders in a situation where the KIO was widely 
discredited among the Kachin public. This was highlighted by their aforementioned 
confidant, who stressed how difficult it was to find ways with which it was possible to 
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'relate to the people again. I mean the people of Myitkyina [the 
government-controlled capital of Kachin State]. Before that, the people 
of Myitkyina were afraid of the KIA. Even though they are Kachin, 
they were afraid of the KIA. [...] Afraid because before that most of the 
KIA leaders were like businessmen.'146 
At a time when the government and the insurgency were viewed with 
significant mistrust, the young KIA officers, therefore, sought the cooperation of the 
only remaining institution that many ordinary Kachin were still identifying with: the 
powerful Kachin churches. As elaborated in Chapter 4, the large Kachin Baptist 
Convention (KBC) and the smaller local Catholic Church have had a significant 
influence on Kachin society, including the production of Kachin ethno-nationalism, 
and the Kachin armed struggle since the arrival of Christian missionaries in the late 
19th century. In fact, most early Kachin ethno-nationalist leaders were educated in 
church institutions, such as the Kachin Theological College in Myitkyina. While the 
KIO was never a religiously inspired movement, the interests of the KIO and the 
Kachin churches have historically overlapped to a significant degree. Most 
significantly KIO and church elites co-constructed a unified modern Kachin identity 
in a society that comprises six major ethnic subgroups: Jinghpaw, Lawngwaw, Zaiwa, 
Nung-Rawang, Lisu, Lachik (Sadan 2013, 331–60).147  
Although these taxonomies are not entirely uncontested up until today, the 
creation of ethnic coherence was perpetuated by the nationalistic project of Kachin 
                                                        
146 Interview with co-founder of the EEDY, Maijayang, 14 April 2014. 
147 The boundaries between them have always been fluid and permeable as explained in Chapter 
4. 
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elites, most of who belong to the majority Jinghpaw sub-ethnicity. 148  With the 
outbreak of armed conflict in 1961 a coherent Kachin identity became an additional 
requisite for forging a capable and coherent ethno-nationalist rebel army across sub-
ethnic divides. From the outset, Christianity served as both, a mechanism to delineate 
from the Buddhist Bamar majority, and an imagination of modernity to overcome a 
self-perceived backwardness (Sadan 2007). This created inextricable ties between the 
local churches and the Kachin armed movement, which was captured by a local 
Baptist leader with the following words:  
‘Yes, we have a good relationship because we all belong to 
Christianity. And most of the KIO are Kachin, very few are 
non-Kachin, almost all are Christian. We are all relatives. So 
KIO, KBC, we became the same. Same motivation, same 
goal.’149 
Unsurprisingly then, church leaders have historically been influential elites in 
Kachin society, possessing a moral authority that makes them highly respected within 
Kachin society. Due to their close ties with the KIO, they have also always been 
influential within the Kachin insurgency, and for instance played a driving role in 
pushing for a ceasefire in 1994 as well as in mediating in the negotiations.150 At the 
time of field research local churches also enjoyed warm relations between religious 
elites and the rebel leadership in the area, as I was assured by Father Abraham,151 a 
                                                        
148 Historically, there have been instances of grievances against Jinghpaw domination in the KIO. 
These intra-ethnic power imbalances still persist, which was captured in a conversation with one 
staff of a Kachin CBO. He lent me his motorbike, to which he referred jokingly as a “Lisu-cycle” 
because the sturdy but cheap model was popular among low-ranking Kachin foot soldiers, who are 
often recruited from the Lisu subtribe. When thanking him for the “Lisu-cycle” upon returning his 
motorbike he hushed me, asking me not to use this designation because it was politically incorrect 
(Conversation with CBO member, Laiza, 20 March 2014). The relationship between the different 
denominations has historically also not been without tension, particularly because of Baptist 
predominance (Smith 1999, 332). These tensions did, however, not play a role in the recent 
upheaval, which pitched young officers against their superior, because of the latter’s corruption 
and profiteering. This motive is also not unheard of in the long history of the movement (Smith 
1999, 330). 
149 Interview with Kachin religious leader, Myitkyina, 13 February 2014. 
150 Interview with Kachin religious leader, Myitkyina, 13 February 2014. 
151 Name changed.  
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Catholic priest in Laiza, stating that ‘[i]t's very, very friendly. We really have great 
trust on one another, the KIO has great trust on the Catholic Church and we also have 
great trust in the KIO. We have no problem at all.’ 152  The priest, however, also 
conceded that these relations have only recently improved again after they had 
significantly cooled off during the ceasefire years. He explained that this was primarily 
because the senior KIO leaders at the time were becoming 'increasingly secretive, who 
didn't let the younger leaders or the public know about their plans, and did not listen 
to us [the churches] either.'153   
The leader of the young officers, Sumlut Gun Maw, who ranked as a Brigadier 
in the early 2000s, in contrast, turned out to be an eager listener. While he managed 
to strike an alliance with some individuals in the more senior ranks of the KIA, 
including General Gam Shwang, he focused on partnering with the local churches to 
regain the trust of the Kachin public. When Father Abraham described how he first 
met Brig. Sumlut Gun Maw in 2002, he stressed his approachability and popularity, 
which stood in sharp opposite to the old, corrupted, and secretive incumbent leaders. 
In the priest’s own words: 
‘At that time he was a very active young officer. He had a lot of 
friends in the towns. He is a very friendly person also, he had a 
lot of friends among the university students, even though they 
were very much younger. He was a friend of them. Everybody 
was talking: Duba154 Gun Maw, Duba Gun Maw! The elders 
were different, very secretive, they didn't listen to the younger 
ones, including their ideas. So they didn't let the younger ones 
or the civilians know. Because of this they [KIO leaders] 
became divided. […] Gun Maw and other young officers did 
not like this. They said: let the people know all the ideas, people 
                                                        
152 Interview with Kachin religious leader, Laiza, 29 March 2014. 
153 Interview with Kachin religious leader, Laiza, 29 March 2014. 
154 Duba means “General” in Jinghpaw language. 
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should know what we are discussing and where we are going. 
Only then they will come and cooperate with us.’155  
Gun Maw’s consultative approach transpired to be particularly successful in rebuilding 
legitimacy among the organisation’s grassroots. A diaspora Kachin political activist 
explained this by stressing the importance that relatively flat hierarchies and practices 
of consultation play within traditional cultural norms of Kachin society: ‘If you want 
to understand the Kachin rebellion, you need to understand Kachin society first. We 
are very loyal but we want to be asked. The leaders cannot leave us out of their 
decisions. But once a decision is made we will follow.’156 In their attempt to build and 
expand consultative mechanisms between KIO leaders, KIO grassroots, and wider 
Kachin society, the young officers relied heavily on the wide-reaching networks of the 
Kachin churches, which unlike the KIO has not suffered a loss of legitimacy during 
the ceasefire years. Father Abraham proudly explicated the key role that the churches 
played in reviving the movement’s authority:  
‘I advised him [Gun Maw] about the importance of organising 
the local, the village level. Just like the Vietnamese did. But here 
we need to organise through the religious churches. So our 
churches became a great force in that. Because when the people 
from the different towns and the different villages when they 
came here and saw me with my clothes in white among the 
other people [the KIO officers] who came for the meeting 
[consultation], they were very inspired. They saw that there is 
change.’157  
                                                        
155 Interview with Kachin religious leader, Laiza, 29 March 2014. 
156 Conversation with member of the Kachin diaspora, London, 28 October 2015. In her account 
of traditional Kachin society, she referred to Edmund Leach’s work, which stresses the constant 
flux of traditional Kachin political organisation between more hierarchical forms  (gumsa) and 
more egalitarian ones (gumlao), in which consultative councils play an important role (Edmund 
Leach 1954). While the plausibility of Leach’s seminal depiction of Kachin society is a matter of 
ongoing debate, the above expressed beliefs regarding relatively flat societal hierarchies and 
consultative decision-making appear to be widely shared among my interlocutors.  
157 Interview with Kachin religious leader, Laiza, 29 March 2014. 
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In Laiza, the KIO’s capital, I could attend one of these consultative meeting, 
which was held in “the Pentagon”. At the event, young men and women in colourful 
traditional costumes were welcoming the families of KIA soldiers to gather in one of 
the large and empty casino rooms-turned-meeting-halls. In the court yard, heavily-
armed commando units waited for the arrival of a senior KIO leader, who was 
supposed to address the soldiers’ families. Eventually an elderly general arrived in a 
$300,000 bullet-proof, luxury-edition Hummer SUV. To my surprise he was not one 
of the young officers but one of the movement’s old former strongmen, who had made 
a fortune from jade mining but was said to have lost his revolutionary ideals along the 
way.158 After the old general had addressed the crowd with a long speech about the 
need to endure current hardships for the freedom of future generations, he patiently 
responded to many questions of concerned parents asking about recent developments 
on the frontline, where their sons and daughters were battling against the militarily 
much superior Tatmadaw. When the meeting finished after more than three hours, the 
general disappeared as quickly as he came. 
I asked a local aid worker, who helped me translate at the meeting, to explain 
why people would now trust the same old leader that they have disregarded as a 
“warlord” just a few years ago, especially as he shamelessly displayed his jade millions 
up until this day. The aid worker looked at me a bit amused and shrugged his 
shoulders, declaring: 'Sure he is a gangster, but he is a good gangster!'159 After having 
heard this comment, a local journalist and KIO insider laughed out loud:  
Journalist: 'Hahaha. Ja, [he] is the good gangster. Yes, sure. He is a 
good gangster now because he is guided by some good people these 
days. […]  He has a lot of money. [...] But now, Duba Gun Maw and 
Duba Gam Shwang, they advise him and organise him in the right 
way. Now he knows the political side of our struggle more. Before 
that he didn't know this well.' 
                                                        
158 As this rebel leader continues to be powerful and maintains a role in the movement’s leadership, 
I wish to anonymise his identity.  
159 Conversation with local aid worker, Laiza, 02 April 2014. 
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Me: 'So when he overthrew Zau Mai in 2001, it wasn't about politics?' 
Journalist: 'No, no, no. You just said it, he is a good gangster. Just 
like that.' 
Me: 'So?' 
Journalist: 'At the time it was all about the jade business. But now he 
changed. His political stand is good. Just now.'160 
The above observations and exchange illustrate the importance of elite 
interaction with their grassroots for building authority within non-state armed groups. 
They show that perceptions about the legitimacy of rebel rulers among the grassroots 
of a movement are not much shaped either by material interests or binary judgements 
about the morality of elite behaviour. To be sure, the rampant corruption among the 
higher echelons of the Kachin insurgency during the ceasefire years has been a cause 
of growing resentment among the movement’s impoverished rank-and-file as well as 
local communities. It appears, however, that this is not to do with distributional 
outcomes but depends on whether or not elite interaction with their grassroots conveys 
respect and dignity to the latter, satisfying their demand for due and proper 
recognition. Only then it seems can affiliation to insurgency generate positive self-
perceived social identities for the insurgent grassroots. This was also illustrated in a 
conversation with a Kachin diaspora activist in London. Speaking about the jade trade 
in Kachin state, he clarified that some of the new KIO leaders were also making 
personal profits from industry. He put it this way: ‘David, don’t be naïve. They are no 
angels. They also profit from the jade. But these days, they show that they care about 
the local population and the KIO.’161 The above discussion also highlights that it might 
be less important whether rebel leaders are conveying recognition in their interaction 
with the grassroots out of their own moral convictions. Crucial for turning a “bad 
gangster” into a “good gangster” in the case above was the old leader’s performance 
and the way it was perceived.  
                                                        
160 Interview with local journalist, Maijayang, 14 April 2014. 
161 Conversation with a member of the Kachin diaspora, London, 12 November 2014. 
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The next section will show how the young KIA officers were able to use their 
regained popular support to rebuild and remobilise the faltering Kachin insurgency by 
large-scale recruiting among the disillusioned Kachin youth.  
3.2 Mobilising the Youth – “The Love for the Revolution” 
After gradually regaining popular support by way of tapping into the social 
networks and legitimate standing of the Kachin churches that enabled to implement 
consultative mechanisms, i.e. the conveyance of due and proper recognition to the 
movement’s grassroots, the young officers have utilised their gained authority to 
rebuild the faltering movement by recruiting a new generation of rebels into the KIO 
from among the disillusioned Kachin youth. Their recruitment strategies directly 
address the social pressures and problems of young Kachin, and, in effect, satisfy their 
claim to recognition, which turns affiliation with the insurgency into a means for 
positive social identification.  
The most instrumental recruitment tool for this was the establishment of a KIO 
youth wing, the so-called Education and Economic Development for Youth (EEDY). 
Gun Maw and Gam Shawng jointly established this organisation in 2002 but it only 
started operating on a large-scale in the mid-2000s. It has targeted youth across Kachin 
State with a special emphasis on government-controlled areas, where recruiting often 
happened among school, college and university students. Since then hundreds of 
youths have travelled to KIO-controlled areas to participate in 45-day-long workshops, 
in which they learn about Kachin history, the ethnonational political agenda of the 
KIO and receive basic guerrilla warfare training. One of the founding members of the 
EEDY explained that the internal upheavals and eroding strength of the KIO in the 
early 2000s – which he described as ‘a very troublesome time’ – were the reasons why 
the young KIA officers  
‘decided that the university system should participate in the 
KIO. By participating in the KIO, the KIO will become stronger 
again. It needed much more strength because at the time they 
faced many problems. Duba Gun Maw also knew about that. 
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So after we started the EEDY many more people got to know 
about KIO because the youth came into the KIO area and 
participated in training. We give a lot of lectures, like religious, 
like politics, like history, a lot of lectures, and also armed 
training.’162 
The centrality of educational campaigns demonstrate that youth mobilisation 
in Kachin State was about more than only filling up the deserted lower ranks of the 
insurgency’s armed wing.  
Indeed, the emphasise on youth was essential for reviving the wider social 
movement behind the Kachin insurgent organisation, including the ethnonational 
project and insurgent political culture in Kachin State, both of which have withered 
away during the ceasefire years. The aforementioned Joint-General Secretary of the 
KIO, U La Nan, is one of the young officers loyal to Gun Maw. Since the Kachin 
ceasefire broke down in 2011, U La Nan became the deputy head of the EEDY as the 
two previous EEDY leaders, Gun Maw and Gam Shawng, were busy leading the 
movement’s military campaign by the time. He spoke at length about the importance 
of rebuilding the ethnonational identity and revolutionary spirit of urban youth living 
in Kachin State’s government-controlled population centres for remobilising the 
ethnonational insurgency. His youth wing, therefore, focused on rebuilding the ethnic 
Kachin identities of urban youth and their social identities as revolutionaries opposing 
a Burman-dominated political and social order. In his words:  
‘The government has been ruling with Burmese Nationalism for very 
long. Other ethnic youths gradually became unaware of their culture 
values, literature and mother languages and so on. Most began to 
practice Burman culture and language. This began to happen to us, 
too. Because we have to go to Burmese schools where we are taught 
with a Burmese curriculum. The Burmese government teaches only 
the Burman language, history, culture and religion and so on. But we 
                                                        
162 Interview with co-founder of the EEDY, Maijayang, 14 April 2014. 
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Kachin are predominantly Christian and we do not become Burman 
easily like others. However, we Kachin youth have little or no 
knowledge of Kachin culture, customs, history, literature even when 
graduating from Burmese Universities. […] If we are following this 
kind of Burmese system, we will gradually end up with the extinction 
of our identity. So our Kachin youth should understand Kachin 
affairs such as history, literature, language and culture. In addition, 
some youths have a burning desire to learn more. And we have to 
find ways to go further for those who are talented. In our country, 
have a crisis of the political system. So, we have to do revolution. So, 
it is important to know why we have to do revolution. […] In this 
respect, we focus on our youth.’163 
While U La Nan managed these activities of the insurgency’s youth wing when 
I met him in Laiza, he stressed also stressed that Gun Maw’s intimate relations to the 
movement’s grassroots was crucial for establishing the EEDY in the first place. Similar 
to Father Abraham above, he praised the young rebel officer for his extraordinary 
charisma:  
‘Leadership ability differs. When General Gun Maw established the 
EEDY program, he was the Joint- General Secretary in the Central 
Committee, the position that I am serving in now. The EEDY was 
established in that time in 2003. But human ability differs from one 
person to another. He performed this role better, organising youth 
and the general public from towns and villages to become more 
united. He could perform so well because of his innate ability to 
relate to the people. But at the moment he has to travel a lot and has 
other things to do. So I am the one who is responsible to look after 
the EEDY. Although I am not as popular as him because I cannot 
perform like him, I am completing the job as good as I can. When 
                                                        
163 Interview with KIO Joint-General Secretary U La Nan, Laiza, 29 March 2014. 
Chapter VI – KIO: From Ceasefire to War 
211 | P a g e  
 
we implement this job, it is not identical in terms of performance. I 
find he has a better ability in this role.’164 
The young officers did, however, not solely rely on Gun Maw’s charisma but 
sought assistance from various professionals to organise the EEDY successfully. One 
co-founder of the EEDY is a journalist. He explained that the young officers originally 
approached him for his media expertise to coordinate the youth wing’s public 
outreach. Besides building the EEDY, he also got involved in the wider propaganda 
efforts of the KIO, as for instance running the Laiza-based television station Laiza TV, 
which screens regular news on the ongoing armed conflict between the Kachin rebels 
and the Myanmar government. He recounted his shock about the dilapidated and 
backward state of the KIO’s media efforts when he first joined the insurgency in 2002:   
‘When I arrived in here they had a media department but they didn't 
know how to do it. In their offices they still used typewriters. We 
trained all the PAs [personal assistants to the KIO’s department 
heads] how to use computers, how to use the internet, how to use 
email, so we trained them. After that they knew all that and their way 
around the media. And then I started with radio broadcasting. They 
had some equipment but they didn't know how to use, they didn't 
know how to write the news, how to broadcast. So I taught them.’165 
In their effort to reach out to Kachin youth in government-held areas of Kachin 
State, the KIO also utilised social media platforms. One of the methods utilised was 
the remaking of classic Kachin revolutionary songs into karaoke version music clips, 
whose visuals and audio resemble Asian popular music videos from across eastern 
Asia. These videos can be watched on Laiza TV and on YouTube. One well-known 
song from the 1970s, for instance, is called ‘Shanglawt Sumtsaw Ga Leh’ - which 
means “the love for the revolution”.166 Its lyrics are about daring KIA soldiers calling 
on beautiful young Kachin women graduating from high schools and colleges to marry 
                                                        
164 Interview with KIO Joint-General Secretary U La Nan, Laiza, 29 March 2014. 
165 Interview with co-founder of the EEDY, Maijayang, 14 April 2014. 
166 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cRpUq8ozgcw, last accessed 02 October 2015. 
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them. According to the song, this way everyone was doing their part for the revolution. 
Moreover, the verses promise economic safety and physical security and comradeship. 
One verse, for instance, tells about the commanding officer who will share his troop’s 
rations with the women. While the unchanged song text of the revolutionary oldie 
might seem somewhat outdated in the 21st century, the video depictions clearly appeal 
to the desires of Kachin urban youth. Besides featuring ethnonationalist and 
revolutionary symbols - including dashing uniforms, minority costumes, and a 
traditional Manau ceremonial ground - in parts of the video, large parts resembles the 
videos of popular Asian boybands. The KIA soldiers are portrayed as handsome and 
well-off young men who are leaning against an expensive car and are singing with their 
guitars in jeans, shirts and sunglasses. The girls wear make-up and fashionable clothes 
whilst watching from the balcony of a luxuriously looking building. 
 These idyllic worlds and heroic lyrics stand in stark contrast to the depressed 
realities of urban Kachin youth, which are characterised by rampant drug abuse and 
widespread disillusionment about the dire state of the local economy. At a visit to 
Myitkyina university students seemed generally unenthusiastic about their chosen 
courses, fearing that higher education will not better their prospects for the future in a 
region where employment for university graduates is lacking. One physics student 
expressed this, saying that ‘it does not matter what I study. I could study philosophy 
or law. No job will be there for me.’167 It is, hence, not surprising, that young Kachin 
– who have not experienced war before the 1994 ceasefire - were particularly 
susceptible to revolutionary agendas promising an end to injustice, improved security, 
and generally a better life, which were broadcasted by way of the EEDY. While some 
graduates of the EEDY training courses return home afterwards, often operating as 
recruiters and multipliers in their home communities, others stay on working in the 
bureaucratic KIO apparatus or joining the organisation’s armed wing as part of a three-
year long voluntary enlistment service. 
                                                        
167 Conversation with university student, Myitkyina, 10 February 2014. 
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Many of the young soldiers who are defending Laiza in hilltop positions outside 
the town, for instance, have come to join the rebellion by way of the EEDY. One 21-
year old KIA soldier, who has lived in the muddy trenches for more than two years, 
told me that before joining the rebellion he had been a student in a college in 
Myitkyina, where he had been using heroin and amphetamines. He declared that he 
would certainly have perished if it was not for the lifeline of the EEDY and later on 
the KIA.168 Father Abraham, the catholic priest in Laiza, who was aiding the young 
officers to set up consultative mechanisms, was also involved in building the EEDY, 
teaching classes on religion and ethics. He explained that many Kachin youth came to 
the EEDY experiencing similar social problems themselves or witnessing them within 
their immediate social circles. According to him, the EEDY scheme was so successful 
because it addresses these problems providing for a purposeful alternative. In his 
words: ‘So EDDY is about reformation, moral reformation. The youth became very 
weak in their morality, so we needed to correct this. We teach them the value of 
God.’169 
Indeed, it is important to appreciate that by establishing the KIO youth wing, 
the young officers did not only create a vehicle for rebel propaganda which simply 
converted urban Kachin youth into gun trotting rebel soldiers. It rather established a 
platform for the positive social identification with insurgency and the co-production 
of insurgent political culture. This becomes obvious when tracing the evolution of 
mobilisation videos on social media platforms, many of which have increasingly been 
produced by independent Kachin musicians outside the rebel organisation. Their 
music videos often picture the suffering of Kachin civilians in the renewed conflict and 
many of these singers profess unambiguous support for the KIO, wearing rebel 
insignia. In comparison to the EEDY remakes of revolutionary oldies, many of these 
songs also feature quite radical and violent lyrics.170 Independent youth mobilisation 
                                                        
168 Conversation with KIA soldier, frontline position near Laiza, 8 April 2014. 
169 Interview with Kachin religious leader, Laiza, 29 March 2014. 
170 A good example is the song “Share Shagan Nampan Lahkawng” (Two Heroic Flowers) by Ah 
Tang. It is dedicated to two female volunteer teachers who were allegedly raped and murdered by 
Tatmadaw soldiers in Northern Shan State in January 2015. The incident sparked protests across 
Kachin State, not least because government investigators denied army responsibility (Weng, 
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dovetails with the KIO agenda, which is evidenced by the fact that they are 
broadcasted by Laiza TV. Yet, they also lodge their own claims, which also impacts 
on the Kachin insurgent organisation and demonstrates the extent to which the 
insurgent’s youth mobilisation has taken on a life of its own, providing an additional 
spin to the social process of insurgency.  
The impact of this could be witnessed in the case of the so-called Pat Jasan 
movement. The social movement emerged in the wake of the deteriorating narcotics 
problem in Kachin State as a vigilante movement in 2014. Its objective is to end the 
narcotics problem in Kachin State as the state seems unwilling and the KIO unable to 
do so. Besides eradicating poppy fields, the movement also targets drug user directly, 
and seeks to correct their behaviour with extrajudicial punishment, including beatings 
and incarceration. The movement has also used music videos to spread its message. 
Videos that emerged from within the Pat Jasan movement refer to narcotics as the ‘cold 
enemy’ of the Kachin people and all activities related to producing, selling and using 
narcotics as a ‘cold war’. While these videos emerged independently from the KIO in 
the wake of the Pat Jasan movement, it is interesting to note that the KIO propaganda 
efforts have picked-up on the discourse using the same themes and terms, such as ‘katsi 
hpyen’ (cold enemy) and ‘katsi majan’ (cold war).171 One KIO video, for instance, 
shows a band of young Kachin soldiers rocking hard tunes in front of an IDP camp, 
declaring the rebel’s intend to join into the struggle against drugs: ‘It is our duty to 
                                                        
November 02, 2015). It features footage of the crowded funeral march/rally, which was organised 
by the KBC in Myitkyina for the two young teachers. Wearing a cap with KIO insignia, the 
musician appeals to the Kachin public to fight their repressors in revenge for the dead women, 
singing ‘It hurts a lot. Two heroic flowers who sacrificed their lives. Tears drop from everyone […] 
the two flowers had no opportunity to blossom. We will claim blood debt. All the people who love 
their country and serve their duties. Forward!!! …in harmonious manner… Fight, fight, fight!!! We 
will fight the enemy while holding up the winning flag… the unjust abusers will lose/fall…we will 
get rid of the enemies…there will be no footprints of them …fight all the devils… we will win this 
unjust war. God is with us.’ (Cf. 
https://www.facebook.com/856928137743956/videos/858292547607515/?theater, last accessed 
02 October 2015, Translation received on a social media platform from Kachin student, 15 January 
2015). 
171 See for instance ‘Katsi Majan’ Hpe Yawng Rau Gasat Ga    
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cT9WyHlwL28 and ‘Katsi Majan’  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VA0XjH2_mCU  
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fight against the cold enemy who has destroyed many of our young beautiful lives and 
happy families... Let us prevent this awful disease, let us fight against the cold 
enemy!’172 
After having shown how Maj.-Gen. Gun Maw and his faction of young KIA 
officers managed to rebuild legitimacy among Kachin society and how created a 
powerful social movement, the next section analyses how the young officers utilised 
this newly established force to take over leadership from their superior. This will link 
back to the larger question about how authority relations interact with the factional 
power struggles between rival rebel factions in driving the strategies of armed groups.  
3.3 Take-Over – ‘They could change the old people’ 
The puzzling change of the KIO’s trajectory, with regards to its willingness and 
ability to take-up arms again after 17 years of ceasefire, cannot be understood as the 
outcome of top-down decision-making. It rather emerged from the social interaction 
process between differently situated but interdependent actors, as was argued in 
Chapter Two. Leadership co-optation during the ceasefire had alienated the 
movement’s grassroots and brought about an internal opposition surrounding a faction 
of young officers. By re-establishing the insurgencies local networks, these junior 
leaders managed to repair the movement’s ruptured authority relations between local 
communities and the KIO and to recruit a new generation of rebels loyal to their 
faction. Creating this strong internal force eventually enabled the young officers to take 
power from their own superior. While the remainder of this chapter will explain how 
they managed to do so without encountering noteworthy resistance, it also stresses the 
dynamic and reciprocal power relations the KIO’s new leaders themselves are acting 
within and to which they have to respond to.  
Buoyed by their successful recruitment among Kachin youth, Gun Maw and 
his followers rebuild the movement’s armed wing, which has suffered from mass-
desertions during the early 2000s. They, therefore, established an officer’s school in 
                                                        
172 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rRMUCCwR14Q, translated by member of the Kachin 
diaspora in London, 17 May 2016. 
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the mountains surrounding Laiza in 2007. Since then the facility trained a new 
generation of able and motivated KIA officers. Most of the school’s new cadets have 
a background with the previously established youth wing. Having gone through its 
ideological education programme, they are staunch Kachin nationalists and loyal to 
the faction of young KIA officers. After graduating, they have come to occupy key 
positions within the expanding rebel army. This has enabled the young officers to 
gradually take-over power from their own superior. The co-founder of the EEDY 
proudly explained this as follows:  
'Now most of the young officers are educated men. They came from 
universities to the EEDY and then to the new officers school. With that 
they could change the old people, the old officers [...] after that 
everything changed in the KIA.'173 
The new recruits were loyal to the young officers and provided a power base 
with which they could reform the movement from within and eventually take over 
leadership. On the face of things, the group still looked and behaved as it has done for 
most of it ceasefire years: a significantly weakened, business-minded, and conciliatory 
ceasefire group. Yet, the new internal realities soon became visible. 
The shifting power relations within the KIO surfaced in 2008 at a time of 
heightened tension with the Myanmar government. In an attempt to exert tighter 
control over non-state armed groups in its borderlands, Naypyidaw demanded that the 
various ceasefire organisations transform themselves into so-called Border Guard 
Forces (BGFs). This aimed at legalising armed groups as militias in return for their 
subordination under Tatmadaw command. Moreover, it was meant to minimise their 
political ambitions by offering the registration of political ethnic minority parties 
instead, which were promised to compete in future election campaigns (Woods 2011). 
After long years of ceasefires and militarised state-building - which has significantly 
reduced the strength of most ethnic armies - Myanmar’s generals seemed to have 
concluded that they finally changed the balance of forces in their favour and were 
                                                        
173 Interview with co-founder of the EEDY, Maijayang, 14 April 2014. 
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determined to bring the country’s borderlands under more direct control (Jones 
2014a). While the BGF issue was not at the heart of the new generational divide within 
the KIO, it brought the internal struggle for leadership to the fore. According to KIO 
insiders, many within the old elite were initially inclined to accept the KIO’s 
transformation from a ceasefire group to a government militia.174 Some of them had 
previously taken part in other government initiatives, including the National 
Convention process in 2003, which was tasked with drafting the country’s 2008 
constitution. An International Crisis Group report in 2012 remembered that even 
‘despite its failure to have any influence over the National Convention process and 
outcome, the KIO maintained a fairly cooperative stance’ (International Crisis Group 
2012, 6). For a long time the movement’s old guard – entangled as it was with 
Myanmar’s establishment – had ensured the conciliatory stance of their organisation. 
In their opinion, accepting the transformation to a government militia and establishing 
a political party was better than risking a return to armed conflict.175 
In contrast, the new faction of young officers vehemently opposed the 
Tatmadaw's demand. In their eyes submitting to the government scheme would have 
dealt ‘the deathblow to the KIO.’176 This internal controversy provided the trigger for 
the young officers to finally take over leadership, which they carefully did. First, they 
mobilised the KIA brigades against the BGF demand and the attempts of the 
movement’s old guard to deescalate the situation by promoting demobilisation. The 
young officers managed to overcome their own superior because most ranks of the 
movement’s military wing were by that time filled with new recruits and under the 
firm control of young officers, most of whom had a background with the EEDY. By 
winning this row over re-mobilising the movement’s armed wing, the young officers 
demonstrated how the internal power relations have shifted over the past years in their 
favour. By 2008, their faction has indeed become a formidable and coherent force 
                                                        
174 Interview with Kachin religious leader, Myitkyina, Myanmar, 13 February 2014. Interview with 
co-founder of the EEDY, Maijayang, 14 April 2014. 
175 Interview with Chairman of the Kachin State Development Party (KSDP) and former KIO 
Vice-Chairman Dr. Manam Tu Ja, Myitkyina, 10 February 2014. 
176 Interview with KIO Joint-General Secretary U La Nan, Laiza, 29 March 2014. 
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whereas the established leadership stood weakened by years of infighting. Yet, the 
officer faction still needed to overcome the resistance of the old leaders. Although they 
viewed the senior leaders’ political stance as having 'become very soft', they were 
aware that some of them still wielded individual power and commanded small but 
strong units that were loyal to their own persona.177 One insider tells that the young 
officers, therefore, developed 'a secret plan' to topple their superiors without a direct 
coup.178 The faction of old ceasefire KIO leaders was, however, not a monolithic bloc 
but rather fragmented. Some of the old guard proved more resistant to change than 
others. The young officers therefore engaged three different kinds of leaders them with 
different means. Some were incorporated into the new order. Others were retired from 
the organisation. Again others were skill-fully side-lined without stripping them of 
their formal standing.  
Many senior leaders actually agreed with the young officer’s less compromising 
stance, particularly after the organisation has found back to former strength and 
popularity. They, therefore, allied with the junior officers and have remain part of the 
revived rebellion’s leadership. KIO General-Secretary Brig.-Gen. Dr. La Ja, for 
instance was a proponent of the 1994 ceasefire negotiations and sought for significant 
rapprochement with the government during the ceasefire years. Yet, he asserted in an 
interview that he has long felt alienated himself by the conciliatory approach of the 
former KIO leadership. According to him, this was because a political solution did not 
materialise during the ceasefire:  
‘We have long waited for the political negotiations to be started with the 
government. But nothing came from it. So there is no way to have peace 
by political solution. So finally, we have to fight with the military means. 
Only by military means we can have the rights, the ethnic rights. If there 
                                                        
177 Interview with Kachin religious leader, Myitkyina, Myanmar, 13 February 2014. 
178 Interview with co-founder of the EEDY, Maijayang, 14 April 2014. 
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is no alternative solution, to have the ethnic rights we have to rely on 
military means.’179 
Others were perceived as genuinely co-opted by Naypyidaw. One of the 
EEDY’s co-founders described them to me as 'the ones who wanted to listen to the 
government, and join the government'180. These were given the opportunity “to retire” 
from the organisation. One prominent example was former KIO Vice-Chairman Dr. 
Manam Tu Ja, who was said to have been most inclined to give in to Naypyidaw 
pressure in 2008 and transform the KIO into a Tatmadaw controlled BGF-militia. After 
the young officers won this dispute and formally took power, he left the KIO with a 
group of confidants and formed a political party known as the Kachin State 
Democracy Party (KSDP) instead. According to him as well as one of the young 
officers, this decision was made unanimously as it was regarded to be in the best 
interest of everyone.181  
Again others were incorporated into the new order. This happened to some of 
the movement’s former strongmen whom the young officers deemed to be too 
powerful still to openly confront. One of them was the old general, the “bad gangster” 
turned “good gangster”, whom I witnessed consoling the soldier’s families in one of 
the movement’s new consultative meetings in Laiza, described above.182 He emerged 
triumphantly from the leadership’s disastrous infights over competing business 
interests in the early 2000s and is said to have 'formerly decided all things in the 
KIO'.183 While he did not enjoy much backing among the young rebel generation, he 
still commanded units loyal to him personally.184 To prevent an open confrontation 
and more infighting, the young officers accommodated his personal interest whilst 
                                                        
179 Interview with KIO General Secretary Brig.-Gen. Dr. La Ja, Chiang Mai, 14 November 2013. 
180 Interview with co-founder of the EEDY, Maijayang, 14 April 2014. 
181 Interview with Chairman of the Kachin State Development Party (KSDP) and former KIO 
Vice-Chairman Dr. Manam Tu Ja, Myitkyina, 10 February 2014. Interview with KIO Joint-
General Secretary U La Nan, Laiza, 29 March 2014. 
182 As above, I wish to anonymise this person’s identity in light of his continued role within the 
KIO leadership.  
183 Interview with co-founder of the EEDY, Maijayang, 14 April 2014. 
184 Conversation with a member of the Kachin diaspora, London, 12 November 2014. 
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isolating him from the centre of decision-making. Hence, he was retained as the KIO 
vice-chairman, but placed far from actual power in the group's liaison office in 
Thailand’s Chiang Mai, working with the UNFC ethnic armed alliance organisation. 
A close companion of the young officers explained how this has made the old general 
more susceptible to the revolutionary line or, as described above, at least to act 
accordingly:  
Yes, he has a lot of money. We can say we should remain the 
good things for him. We should give him the good things, so 
that he decides good things. But we should advise good things. 
Just now, Duba Gun Maw and Duba Gam Shwang, they advise 
him and organise him to act like that. In the UNFC they [Maj. 
Gen. Gun Maw and Lt. Gen. Gam Shwang] gave him [a 
position], so that he can learn from other people, other ethnic 
people. Now he knows the political side of our struggle more. 
Before that he didn't know this well.'185 
These different ways in which different types of old leaders were retired or 
incorporated into the new order do not only expose the skill with which the aspiring 
faction took over control. They also highlight the multiplicity of interests within rebel 
groups and the fluidly changing relations between differently situated insurgents over 
time. 
After the young officers took control of the helm, the KIO refused to transform 
the movement into a government militia, and the once intimate relation between the 
rebels and Naypyidaw deteriorated rapidly. Since then the KIO has rejected many of 
its formerly conciliatory policies. Having formerly consented to the 2008 constitution, 
the KIO now began to fiercely oppose it, instead making demands for federal reforms 
and political autonomy for ethnic minority groups. The new KIO leadership has also 
started to raise concerns about the detrimental effects of joint Myanmar-Chinese 
infrastructure projects in the region, an issue the former leaders have silently condoned 
                                                        
185 Interview with co-founder of the EEDY, Maijayang, 14 April 2014. 
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to. In an open letter to China's then President Hu Jintao, it demanded an end to the 
construction of a mega-dam at Myitsone. This site lies at the confluence of two rivers, 
source of Myanmar's main stream, the Irrawaddy, and a sacred place in Kachin 
culture. The letter warned that the project could spark full-blown civil war as ‘Burma 
(Myanmar) Military troops will not be allowed to invade the KIO area in this current 
situation [to secure the construction site]’ (Kachin News Group, November 24, 2011). 
Only weeks afterwards, in June 2011, Tatmadaw troops attacked KIA positions at 
another, already operating, Chinese hydropower plant in Tarpein in an attempt to 
clear the site of rebel units. This incident triggered the new round of fighting, which 
has displaced more than 120,000 civilians up to date (Burma News International 2014, 
23). 
Despite this humanitarian toll, the KIO has gardened immense popularity 
across Kachin State as well as in other ethnic minority areas of Myanmar since the 
outbreak of conflict.186 In contrast to the early 2000s, many Kachin again view the 
organisation as their legitimate representative. Thousands of Kachin civilians 
evidenced this in November 2013 by waving KIO flags and cheering at a KIO envoy 
arriving for negotiations in government-held Myitkyina (Yan, March 11, 2013). This 
new-found popular support, the return to ethno-nationalist agendas, and the re-
established morale and loyalty within the organisation, have transformed a business-
driven ceasefire group on the brink of collapse back into a capable and popular 
insurgent fighting force. These developments also impacted on the movement’s 
negotiations with the government about a new ceasefire since the former’s breakdown. 
As discussed in the previous section on youth mobilisation, the young officers’ 
endeavour to rebuild the KIO has revived more than just organisational capacities. 
Their efforts have indeed produced the resurgence of a strong ethnonational identity 
and uncompromising insurgent political culture across wide parts of the Kachin public 
and Kachin youth in particular. According to one Kachin elder in Myitkyina, large 
parts of the Kachin public are therefore less willing to compromise with Naypyidaw 
                                                        
186 This appeared to be the case in government and rebel-held parts of Kachin and Karen State as 
well as Thailand during field research conducted between September 2013 to April 2014. 
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than the KIO leadership.187 This has also been noted by other analysts. David Dapice 
wrote that KIO leaders told him ‘that the Kachin population was more radical than 
the Kachin army (KIA) and leadership’ (Dapice 2012, 5).188  
In negotiations between Naypyidaw and the KIO about a potential new 
ceasefire since 2011, the KIO grassroots, indeed, appeared to urge their new leadership 
to maximise demands for a political solution of the conflict. They also cautioned 
against settling for another ceasefire along similar lines as before. This was evidenced 
in various consultation meetings, which the KIO held with representatives of Kachin 
civil society after talks with the government.189 One community leader, for instance, 
reportedly urged Maj. Gen. Gun Maw at a meeting: 
 ‘If there is a real need for KIO to sign a ceasefire agreement then ask 
Burmese military to pull back all its troops and frontline posts that 
have never been established in Kachin state. […] Unless a firm date 
has been set for political dialogue, please do not sign any agreement 
or make any commitment to Burmese government [sic.].’ 
(Kachinland News, May 29, 2013) 
The Kachin elder in Myitkyina explains these positions among the KIO’s 
grassroots with their dire experiences of the past ceasefire. According to him, they have 
directly translated into present expectations for the new leadership. Regarding a future 
settlement he, therefore, warns:  
'It is very dangerous for the Kachin leaders to agree to another ceasefire 
now. We have experienced this before you know: 17 years of ceasefire. 
This brought a lot of business opportunities and many leaders got 
involved with business. So they became rich but lost their target.'190 
                                                        
187 Interview with Kachin religious leader, Myitkyina, 13 February 2014. 
188 This has also been noticed by other observers. David Dapice writes that today it might well be 
that ‘the Kachin population [is] more radical than the Kachin army (KIA) and leadership’ (Dapice 
2012, 5). 
189 Interview with Kachin religious leader, Laiza, 29 March 2014. 
190 Interview with Kachin religious leader, Myitkyina, 13 February 2014. 
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This situation illustrates the dynamism and reciprocity that underpin the power 
relations within the social process of insurgency. It, therefore, highlights the 
importance to analyse the figurational pressures within which rebel leaders take 
decisions. By re-embedding the insurgency in wider social networks, including the 
powerful local churches, and by co-creating a vibrant youth movement, the young 
officers were able to rebuild legitimate authority relationship to the insurgency’s 
grassroots. Yet, they also created new dependencies by empowering the KIO 
grassroots vis-à-vis the higher echelons of the movement. In their negotiations with the 
government they have to respond to these exerted pressures. 
5 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that the 17 years-long ceasefire in Kachin State 
produced a façade of stability, which, however, contained within itself the seeds of its 
own destruction. Despite years of conciliatory policies and near organisational 
collapse, the KIO emerged strengthened and willing to fight. The main reason for this 
is the ripple effects that the co-optation of some KIO leaders sparked across the rest of 
the movement, most importantly the erosion of leadership legitimacy, which gave rise 
to a new faction determined to rebuild the movement. 
Economic incentives drove cooperation between the KIO and the government 
after the ceasefire of 1994. Yet, this was limited to elite business deals and an 
unsustainable development agenda, while excluding discussions on fundamental 
political issues. This led to the incremental corruption of Kachin elites who initially 
followed a developmental agenda but soon rather collaborated for their personal 
interests rather than the interests of their movement as a whole or their acclaimed 
constituency. The co-optation of leaders with economic incentives factionalised the 
Kachin leadership to the extent that it sparked fierce infighting between individual 
strongmen. This led to a situation where the KIO leadership was primarily 
preoccupied with itself rather than with the situation of local communities or its own 
organisational base. The rampant social and environmental impacts of unsustainable 
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resource exploitation - in which KIO leaders have taken part – infringed on the 
livelihoods of ordinary Kachin. In combination with the lack of protection against land 
grabs and abuses at the hand of Tatmadaw soldiers, these new grievances eroded the 
movement’s legitimacy among local communities. The erosion of local legitimacy, the 
disarray among KIO leaders, as well as their apparent greed and tight grip on power 
sparked a social identity crisis among the lower and middle ranks of the KIO. 
This alienation of the movement’s grassroots led to plunging morale and mass 
desertions to the extent that its armed wing almost collapsed. The situation also 
provided fertile grounds for a group of young KIA officers, to mobilise against their 
own superior’s unpromising order. To do so they rebuilt legitimate authority relations 
by re-embedding insurgency within wider social networks by way of allying with the 
powerful and authoritative Kachin churches. In combination with the creation of a 
strong youth movement and new organisational institutions, the aspiring faction 
managed to recruit new members to the insurgency on a large scale and place them 
into key positions within the movement, creating their own power base within the 
KIO. By utilising this internal coalition for change and simultaneously side-lining or 
accommodating the losers of change, the internal opposition managed to take over 
leadership. Re-embedment within wider social alliances and the organisation of 
disillusioned Kachin youth, has not only rebuilt the movement’s capacities to confront 
the state militarily but also its inclination to do so. The mobilisation of the KIO’s 
grassroots has indeed, revived insurgent political culture to the extent that it created a 
momentum of its own. This has since made it more difficult for KIO leaders to 
negotiate an elite pact along similar lines as before.  
Similar to the Karen case, the Kachin case highlights the importance of 
legitimate authority relations in the social process of insurgency, showing how change 
in these relations affects the collective outlook and conduct of armed groups. 
Testimonies showed that ruptured reciprocal exchange also dragged on perceptions of 
legitimacy among the Kachin grassroots. Yet again, it was suggested that this was not 
so much the result of conscious deliberations over distributional outcomes but had 
more to do with the threat it posed to the positive self-conception of Kachin insurgents, 
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not least because of their inability to protect local communities from external enemies. 
Social identification processes and challenges thereof, hence, seemed to play a major 
driver behind the building and erosion of authority. The Kachin case has also shown 
how a situation of eroding leadership authority can serve as a breeding ground for 
aspiring elites, who can build their own authority by conveying due and proper 
recognition to the movement’s estranged grassroots, in effect, enabling the latter to (re-
)derive a positive self-perceived social identity from affiliation with the insurgency. 
The successful construction of an internal force that enabled the aspiring Kachin 
leaders to take power and change the movement’s trajectory, furthermore, illustrated 
the centrality of authority relations within the internal contestations driving collective 
armed group behaviour. It also served to show the reciprocal quality of power, which 
has created new interdependencies between rebel elites, their grassroots and other 
social forces. This has given additional spin to the social process of the Kachin 
insurgency, whose new leadership face additional grassroots pressures in their 
negotiations with the government. The next chapter will use the empirical insights 
uncovered in both case studies to compare the authority processes behind the shifting 
conduct of the Karen and the Kachin insurgencies.  
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CHAPTER VII - 
CONCLUSION 
 
1 Introduction  
This thesis analysed the ways in which social interaction processes between differently 
situated rebel leaders and insurgent grassroots drive the strategic choices of rebel 
groups to negotiate with the government or escalate conflict. It did so by investigating 
the puzzling dynamics of armed ethnic conflict that unfolded in Myanmar with the 
country’s transition in 2011: the de-escalation of conflict in the country’s eastern 
borderlands with Thailand and the concurrent escalation of conflict in the country’s 
northern borderlands with China. It, hence, focused on the country’s most important 
ethnic insurgent movements, asking why Karen rebel leaders, who were long known 
for their uncompromising stance, have become the champions of the country’s peace 
process, while the previously conciliatory Kachin insurgents have spearheaded a new 
wave of ethnic armed resistance. In so doing it investigated why and how Karen 
leaders signed a ceasefire in 2012 and why and how the Kachin ceasefire broke down 
in 2011. The concluding chapter will concentrate on the main arguments put forward 
in this thesis, its key contributions to knowledge, and its implications. 
The chapter will proceed by first summarising the main empirical findings from 
both case studies in comparison. This will highlight four mutual stages in their 
trajectories: partial leadership co-optation, group fragmentation, internal contestation, 
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and renewed resistance from within. It will then elaborate on the contribution of my 
findings to the study of Myanmar’s armed conflict. The chapter will then summarise 
my theoretical arguments surrounding the social process of insurgency that drives the 
strategic decisions of rebel groups and the modalities of leadership authority within 
insurgency movements before it highlights the contributions of my thesis to the wider 
literature on Conflict and Peace Studies, particularly with regards to the emerging 
scholarships on the internal dynamics of non-state armed groups and rebel 
governance. Building on this, the chapter will elaborate on my thesis’s implication for 
engaging insurgent movements, with particular regards to rebel fragmentation and 
violence as well as the pitfalls of economistic approaches to counterinsurgency, 
conflict resolution, and peacebuilding. The concluding remarks will evaluate the most 
recent developments in Myanmar in the light of my findings. 
2 Empirical Arguments and Contributions 
This thesis forwarded two main empirical arguments that explain the puzzling 
conflict dynamics in Myanmar: 1) Internal contestations between rival rebel factions 
drove the strategies of both the Karen and the Kachin insurgencies with regards to 
negotiation and conflict vis-à-vis the state. 2) The Karen ceasefire has created 
challenges inside the movement which resemble the ones that led to the eventual 
breakdown of the Kachin ceasefire. The following sections will summarise both 
arguments.   
2.1 Internal Contestations and Strategic Decisions 
Internal contestation between rival rebel factions is essential for explaining why the 
KNU signed a ceasefire in 2012 and why the Kachin ceasefire broke down the year 
before. At the core of these contestations lay shifting internal authority and power 
relations that were largely driven by politico-economic changes in both borderlands.  
In the case of the KNU, Chapter V showed that the 2012 ceasefire was the result 
of leadership contestation after power relations inside the movement had shifted 
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considerably from central to northern brigade territories within the Karen movement. 
The rapprochement with the government was led by central brigade leaders who 
sought to compensate for their declining power and authority, while leaders affiliated 
to northern units opposed the organisation’s new conciliatory line. These changing 
power relations and the resulting factional split resulted in parts from increasing 
military and geopolitical pressures at the Thai-Myanmar border that have built up 
since the early 1990s and fragmented the organisation along its individual brigades. 
Importantly, these external pressures impacted central and southern rebel units more 
severely than the ones in the remote northern mountains of Karen State, also with 
regards to leadership authority among their grassroots. This has effectively shifted the 
KNU’s internal power balance from its traditional backbone in central Karen State to 
the north and has, in turn, given rise to two competing factions in the KNU leadership 
and their diverging strategies towards the state. Leaders linked to central Karen 
brigades sought to compromise with the state in order to compensate for their loss of 
power and authority, signed the 2012 ceasefire with Naypyidaw. 
In the case of the KIO, Chapter VI revealed that the breakdown of the 2011 
ceasefire also followed internal contestations and leadership change. After the Kachin 
leaders pursued an accommodating strategy towards the government for most parts of 
its 17 years-long ceasefire, young rebel leaders began to oppose their own superiors in 
the early 2000s in order to remobilise a faltering movement that was characterised by 
eroding power and authority as well as waning revolutionary agenda. This 
generational split resulted from the modalities of the ceasefire. Tied to the changing 
political economy at the Chinese-Myanmar border, the ceasefire benefitted the higher 
echelons of the Kachin leadership but left the underlying grievances of the insurgent 
grassroots unaddressed. This eroded the authority of Kachin ceasefire leaders among 
their own rank-and-file and the movement’s standing among local communities as a 
whole. It also gave rise to a faction of young leaders that set out revert these 
developments by mobilising against their own superiors’ ceasefire policies. They re-
embedded the insurgency into local networks and recruited a new generation of rebels 
with whom they managed to take over the leadership in the KIO. Since then the KIO 
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has refuted its previous conciliatory stance towards the state and remobilised 
militarily, which contributed to the re-escalation of conflict. 
2.2 Between Co-optation and Resistance  
Analysing dynamics inside both insurgencies revealed that the Karen ceasefire faces 
challenges similar to the ones that led to the breakdown of the Kachin ceasefire. In 
both cases the ceasefires involved the partial co-optation of rebel leaderships, which 
aggravated existing and caused new organisational fragmentation and internal 
contestation over authority. While the case of the KNU sheds light on the movement’s 
fragmentation and contestation over authority following partial leadership co-
optation, the case of the KIO shows how such processes can enfold over time and lead 
to renewed resistance from within the movement. Rather than contradicting each 
other, the case studies, therefore, illuminate different stages along a similar trajectory: 
a) partial leadership co-optation, b) group fragmentation, c) contestation over 
authority, and d) renewed resistance from within.  
 
a) Partial leadership co-optation 
Partial leadership co-optation seemed to be a central mechanism in both 
ceasefires analysed here. Co-opting rebel elites by way of economic incentives played 
a crucial role in the ceasefire politics of Myanmar’s northern border areas in the 1990s, 
including Kachin State. The coalescing economic interests of state and rebel elites as 
well as outside business networks transformed decades-long violent conflict in these 
borderlands into a mutual enterprise. This was enabled by a rapid post-Cold War 
rapprochement between China and Myanmar, which was itself partly driven by 
commercial interests, with regards to natural resource exploitation, border trade, and 
infrastructure construction in these borderlands. While the KIO signed the 1994 
ceasefire for a variety of reasons, economic benefits granted to its leaders have widely 
been cited as a key driver behind the movement’s ceasefire and subsequent conciliatory 
stance towards the state (Smith 1999, 441; Sherman 2003; Woods 2011).  
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Political economy dynamics have featured less prominently in analyses on the 
Karen ceasefire. Outside observers and pro-ceasefire KNU leaders maintain that the 
Karen ceasefire of 2012 was the direct result of wider political transition in Myanmar 
(cf. Chapter 5, International Crisis Group 2011; Burke, December 02, 2012; Mydans, 
December 02, 2012). This notwithstanding, dynamics of co-optation by economic 
means seemed to play a significant role as well. Similar to developments at the Chinese 
border, large parts of the Karen borderlands have also witnessed significant 
commercialisation with regards to resource exploitation, border trade, and 
infrastructure developments. While these politico-economic changes were less fast 
paced during the 1990s, they have become more prominent since the turn of the 
millennium. Pro-ceasefire KNU leaders acknowledged these powerful forces and 
presented themselves as partners for regional economic development. They also 
established companies to tap into the expanding ceasefire economy. Business actors 
have also promoted and financed the ceasefire negotiations between the KNU and 
Naypyidaw. From this perspective, the political economy of the Karen ceasefire 
resembles previous settlements in northern Myanmar.191 My field work has shown that 
many Karen insurgent grassroots are, indeed, worried that some of their leaders are 
negotiating with the government to maximise personal gains rather than bearing 
collective interests in mind.  
 
b) Group fragmentation 
In both cases under comparison, partial leadership co-optation aggravated already 
existing dynamics of group fragmentation and sparked new ones. In retrospective, it is 
difficult to assess the extent of fragmentation within the KIO at the time it signed the 
ceasefire in 1994. The previous break-away of its southern Brigade had certainly 
weakened the KIO and weighed heavy on the latter’s decision to sign an armistice. 
Reports suggest that the Kachin organisation at the time was nevertheless more 
                                                        
191 These parallels have also been drawn by long-term observers of Myanmar’s ethnic conflict 
Bertil Lintner and Tom Kramer (Lintner, June 25, 2013). 
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coherent and centralised than the Karen insurgency in 2012 (South 2011). That said, 
this thesis has shown that the 1994 ceasefire has led to significant organizational 
fragmentation inside the KIO. On the one hand, it fragmented the movement’s 
horizontal relations among its top leadership that was competing over rival business 
interests. This led to severe internal strife in the early 2000s. On the other hand, 
leadership co-optation eroded the vertical authority relations between KIO leaders and 
the grassroots of their movements. This was partly because the ceasefire ruptured 
reciprocal exchange relations between the insurgency and local communities. Rebel 
units, for instance, could not continue to provide security against state militarisation 
and investment-induced forced displacement without breaking the ceasefire. In 
addition to the business-focused rivalries of KIO leaders, whose behaviour was 
increasingly perceived as disrespectful among their grassroots, the powerlessness to 
protect Kachin communities undermined the ability of insurgent grassroots to derive 
a positive social insurgent identity from affiliation to the KIO, which ultimately led to 
their large-scale alienation.   
The KNU was already highly fragmented when it signed the ceasefire in 2012. 
Eroding military strength and authority was indeed the main reason why part of the 
movement’s leadership sought for accommodation with the government. The ceasefire 
concluded with the U Thein Sein government has, however, exacerbated 
organisational fragmentation along already pre-existent fault lines between different 
leaders as well as between rebel elites and grassroots. On the one hand, the ceasefire 
further increased horizontal fragmentation between more and less accommodating 
leaders, linked to central/southern and northern brigades respectively. On the other 
hand, the ceasefire also widened the vertical gap between pro-ceasefire leaders and the 
movement’s grassroots. These authority relations between insurgent elites and non-
elites in the central and southern brigades had already suffered after military and 
geopolitical pressures in the 1990s dis-embedded the insurgency from local 
communities in these areas. This ruptured the KNU’s traditional reciprocal exchange 
relations with local communities in these areas, i.e. the insurgency’s support networks. 
This explains why leaders linked to central and southern units, including the group’s 
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Chairman Gen. Mutu Say Poe and its General Secretary Kwe Htoo Win, were more 
inclined to reach rapprochement with Naypyidaw in order to compensate for their 
declining authority among their grassroots. In contrast, the movement’s remote 
northern units, which were less challenged by these military and politico-economic 
pressures at the Thai border, have remained more embedded within local 
communities, i.e. they maintained their vertical social ties to a much greater extent. 
Their relative power and authority explains why leaders affiliated with these units, 
including Vice-Chairperson Naw Zipporah Sein and its armed wing’s Vice-Chief of 
Staff Lt.-Gen. Baw Kyaw Heh, have felt less of an urge to strive for accommodation 
with Naypyidaw. While it, hence, appears that group fragmentation has facilitated the 
co-optation of individual KNU leaders that lacked vertical social ties to their 
grassroots, their rapprochement with the state has, in turn, provoked further horizontal 
and vertical fragmentation of the Karen insurgency. It widened the rift between 
incumbent leaders and the KNU grassroots, while driving an even larger wedge 
between the two already existing internal, rival factions.  
 
c) Contestation over authority 
In both compared cases, partial leadership co-optation and group fragmentation 
stimulated internal contestation between incumbent and aspirant leaders. In both of 
these internal power struggles, one leadership faction sought alliances with state forces 
by promoting conciliatory ceasefire policies, while another mobilised their 
movements’ grassroots from below against this cooperation. In the Kachin insurgency 
inter-generational grievances and inter-organisational divides between the political 
and military wing delineated the main fault lines along which an internal opposition 
materialised in the early 2000s when top KIO leaders were preoccupied with lining 
their pockets with the spoils of an unleashed ceasefire economy. This new oppositional 
faction initially emerged from within the organisation’s armed wing at the initiative of 
young KIA officers, who themselves were largely excluded from the power and wealth 
enjoyed by their own superiors in a movement, which merged the top-down 
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hierarchies of a military organisation with the ones of a strictly age-based society. Their 
own subordinates, KIA foot soldiers, deserted in the hundreds at a time of rapidly 
eroding leadership authority due to wide-spread alienation among the movement’s 
grassroots. Faced with the disintegration of their army, the young KIA officers, 
surrounding the young Brigadier Sumlut Gun Maw and the more senior Gen. Gam 
Shwang, set out to change this unpromising situation by rebuilding authority among 
the grassroots to mobilise against the group’s incumbent leadership and to remobilise 
a coherent movement that was willing and able to resist the state again.  
In the Karen insurgency, KNU leaders who were demoted to second rank after 
the 2012 ceasefire but remained backed by relatively coherent and strong northern 
brigade units, opposed the group’s top leaders and their accommodating line by 
seeking to appeal to the wider Karen grassroots. At the time of field research, many 
traditional members and supporters of the KNU were indeed inclined to support these 
“hardliners”, despite having borne the brunt of armed conflict in previous years. This 
was because the increasing rapprochement between the pro-ceasefire leadership and 
Naypyidaw has given rise to large-scale alienation among the movement’s grassroots 
for several reasons. First, they perceived their pro-ceasefire leadership to be co-opted 
into the ceasefire by economic means, including personal gifts and benefits. Second, 
they regarded the KNU’s post-ceasefire collaboration in economic development as 
opposed to their own interests due to investment-related social problems, including 
land grabs and environmental degradation. Third, the new leadership’s rapid 
rapprochement with former Tatmadaw generals was viewed with deep suspicion, not 
least because militarisation has increased in ceasefire areas. Fourth, secretive 
negotiations between pro-ceasefire leaders and Naypyidaw sparked feelings of 
misrecognition among the KNU grassroots, who felt left out of the decision-making 
process. The internal opposition, in contrast, was perceived as more legitimate by 
many insurgent grassroots. This was mainly due to its leaders’ outspoken disagreement 
with the new incumbent leadership and conciliatory policies with Naypyidaw, 
including their voiced resistance against economic development projects as well as 
against increasing militarisation. The high regard in which the internal opposition was 
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held by the movement’s grassroots can, moreover, be attributed to its association with 
the movement’s northern units that, at the time of writing, remained embedded within 
local communities. 
 
d) Resistance from within 
The Kachin and Karen ceasefires both involved the partial co-optation of rebel 
leaderships, which sparked organisational fragmentation and internal contestations 
over authority between rival rebel factions. In the case of the KNU, field research in 
2013/14 took place amidst heightened tensions within the movement after it signed a 
ceasefire agreement in early 2012. When researching on the KIO in 2014, the Kachin 
ceasefire had already broken down after many years of fragmentation and 
contestation, which had brought a new generation of less conciliatory rebel leaders 
into power, such as Gen. Sumlut Gun Maw. During the time I spent with the KNU it 
was possible to observe first-hand how the ceasefire sparked significant internal 
contestation over authority. By comparison, the time spent with the KIO made it 
possible for me to trace how the ceasefire in practice had led to renewed resistance 
from within, both against pro-ceasefire leaders and the Myanmar state.  
In the case of the KIO, disaffected young rebel officers managed to rebuild the 
insurgency’s coherence from within. This enabled them to take power in order to reject 
the movement’s conciliatory ceasefire policies and to remobilise resistance against the 
state. Essential for their success was the rebuilding of authority relations between the 
new leadership and the movement’s grassroots. By tapping into the authority and 
reach of the local churches, the young officers had established consultative 
mechanisms with local communities that served to re-embed the insurgency in the 
wider Kachin society and to counter widespread feelings of alienation among the 
insurgency’s traditional members and supporters. This in turn enabled them to recruit 
a new generation of rebels from among the disillusioned Kachin youth. Before too 
long, the young KIA officers, hence, managed to build stable support networks for 
their own faction, a crucial power resource that the factionalised old guard of the KIO 
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lacked at the time. When the contestation for group leadership erupted in 2008, the 
then aspiring leaders were able to mobilise a strong coalition bringing together young 
rebel soldiers, local communities, and the powerful Kachin churches. At the same 
time, these emerging leaders managed to convince, side-line, or retire potential 
opponents among the movement’s old guard. As a result, the young officers took over 
the movement’s helm without much resistance and steered the revitalised insurgency 
back into confrontation with the state. 
Within the heavily fragmented and deeply divided KNU, internal contestation 
between rival rebel factions had also surfaced at the time of research. This was 
evidenced by stark disagreements between the movement’s pro-ceasefire leaders and 
leaders who oppose rapprochement with Naypyidaw. While these developments had 
already worried observers over a potential organisational split or internal coup within 
the KNU, growing internal opposition against the top leaders and their conciliatory 
stance had not translated into renewed resistance against the state at the time writing. 
This said, the Karen insurgent grassroots appeared inclined to support the “hard-line” 
faction of the KNU linked to its northern stronghold. Whether the internal opposition 
surrounding Gen. Baw Kyaw Heh and Vice-Chairperson Naw Zipporah Sein will be 
able use their authority to retake power and revitalise resistance against the state will, 
hence, depend on their ability to mobilise these Karen grassroots. It will also be 
contingent on whether the conciliatory incumbent leadership can accommodate the 
aspirants’ claim to power within the current ceasefire order and the degree to which 
they can counter wide-spread alienation among their grassroots and regain authority 
among them. While the movement’s future trajectory is highly uncertain, not least 
because of Myanmar’s rapidly changing political environment, the Kachin case 
suggest that the likelihood of renewed KNU resistance should be taken seriously. 
2.3 Contributions to the Scholarship on Myanmar 
Since Myanmar embarked on its transition from military rule, the country has 
attracted renewed scholarly interest. While questions surrounding democratisation 
and political change in the country’s central lowlands have become the primary focus 
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(Cheesman, Skidmore, and Wilson 2012; Cheesman, Farrelly, and Wilson 2014), 
many scholars with a long-term interest in Myanmar point out that solving ethnic 
conflict in the border areas is of central importance to the country’s wider transition 
(cf. for instance Jones 2014a; Farrelly 2012; Sadan 2016b).  
Empirically, this thesis contributed to our understanding of Myanmar’s conflict 
and some of its main actors at a crucial time. It did so by providing an insight into the 
two most important ethnic insurgencies through combining a wealth of original data 
from extensive ethnographically-informed field research with an analytical framework 
that analyses the strategies pursued by rebel groups as the outcome of a social 
interaction process between differently situated insurgents. In doing so, the thesis 
showed how intramural relations drove wider dynamics of conflict, which offers an 
explanation that is better suited for understanding the puzzling conduct of the KNU 
and the KIO than approaches that infer their conduct from external incentive 
structures. Its findings are particularly significant as scholars and other analysts have 
struggled to explain the shifting tides of conflict since Myanmar’s transition, including 
the breakdown of the Kachin ceasefire, which led to large-scale escalation of conflict 
between various ethnic armed groups and Myanmar’s armed forces in the country’s 
north at a time when other groups, such as the Karen, have entered negotiations.  
To briefly recapture, the prisms through which the dynamics of ethnic armed 
conflict are conventionally viewed in Myanmar - i.e. the country’s political transition 
and its changing borderland economies - are both unable to explain the country’s 
conflict dynamics. Policy and media analysts have mostly highlighted political 
liberalisation in Naypyidaw when explaining why KNU leaders signed a ceasefire in 
2012 and subsequently pushed for a peace process (International Crisis Group 2011; 
Burke, December 02, 2012; Mydans, December 02, 2012). According to this lens, 
Karen rebel leaders have seized the opportunity presented by an overall shift in the 
political incentive structure, which enabled to negotiate a peaceful settlement to their 
six decades of guerrilla war. Adherents of this narrative have, however, struggled to 
explain the concurrent outbreak of conflict with previous ceasefire groups at the 
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Chinese border, including the KIO, brushing this away as an anomaly to the wider 
trend towards peace and democracy (cf. Sadan 2016a for a critical discussion).  
Scholars have long pointed to the effects of Myanmar’s borderland economies 
on the conduct of Myanmar’s ethnic rebel groups. This perspective has become 
particularly prominent since rapprochement between China, Thailand and Myanmar 
at the end of the Cold War has brought increased economic investments into 
Myanmar’s borderlands since the early 1990s (Woods 2011; Sherman 2003; Jones 
2014a). Following this train of thought, increased integration of borderland economies 
has not only created pressures on the ethnic insurgent armies, whose peripheral 
location had previously benefitted them militarily and financially for most parts of the 
Cold War. Incoming foreign investments have also allowed the state to co-opt rebel 
leaders with economic incentives. Political economy frameworks, thus, explained the 
previous stability on the Myanmar-Chinese border between the 1990s and 2011 with 
the economic benefits that these arrangements entailed for rebel leaders (Woods 2011; 
Sherman 2003; Jones 2014a). While the same logic might be applied to new ceasefires 
in eastern Myanmar, it cannot explain why “ceasefire capitalism” ceased to work in 
the case of the KIO in 2011 since when the Chinese-Myanmar border has again been 
embroiled in armed conflict.  
To be sure, scholars studying Myanmar’s ceasefire economies appreciate that 
economic incentives work in a complex interplay and rebel leaders had several 
motivations for signing ceasefire agreements, including battle fatigue, humanitarian 
purposes, developmental aspirations, and a genuine believe in solving the ethnic 
conflict with peaceful means (Jones 2014a, 792). They have also assessed the effects 
of “ceasefire capitalism” in a more critical way than scholars who have no background 
in Myanmar but used the country to exemplify how economic incentives can be 
conducive to finding peaceful solutions to conflict.192 Woods, Jones, and Sherman, for 
instance, appreciate the shortcomings and potential pitfalls of Myanmar’s ceasefire 
                                                        
192 Scholarship that has used the case of Myanmar rather uncritically in large comparative 
analyses includes Le Billon and Nicholls 2007 and Wennmann 2009. 
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economies, including local grievances over unsustainable resource exploitation and 
corruption (Woods 2011; Sherman 2003; Jones 2014a). While their analysis point to 
the dangers inherent in the economistic engagement with Myanmar’s ethnic armed 
groups, their political economy frameworks can neither explain the eventual 
breakdown of the Kachin ceasefire and remobilisation of the insurgency nor the 
mounting challenges within the ceasefire KNU.  
To address these limitations, this thesis looked to dynamics internal to the 
Karen and Kachin movements in order to explain their divergent conduct vis-à-vis the 
state. To be sure, understanding the changing environment of insurgency is important 
in Myanmar as it is elsewhere. The point of this thesis was not to discard such 
structural factors altogether but to highlight their insufficiency for explaining the 
puzzling conflict dynamics in Myanmar. My account is, therefore, not meant as a 
fundamental critique of previous political economy scholarship on Myanmar, but as 
an important corrective that enables us to appreciate why “ceasefire capitalism” can 
lead to renewed conflict, despite yielding economic benefits to key elites from all sides. 
In forthcoming essays, Jones and Woods have both referred to some of my findings 
for understanding these non-linear developments in the case of the Kachin insurgency 
(cf. Jones 2016; Woods 2016; Brenner 2015). Jones writes: 
‘On the basis of extensive fieldwork, David Brenner persuasively 
argues that the social, political and economic grievances described in 
the previous section had, by the early 2000s, generated a support base 
for a younger generation of KIA officers seeking to remobilise the KIO. 
[…] This outcome stemmed directly from the contradictions of 
‘ceasefire capitalism’ in Kachin State, illustrating the importance of a 
dynamic and dialectical analysis of Myanmar’s society, rather than 
assuming stasis and stagnation.’ (Jones 2016) 
The ability of my empirical findings to contribute significantly to our 
understanding of ethnic conflict in Myanmar is not least due to the ethnographic bend 
of my approach, without which I would not have gained an insider perspective into 
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Myanmar’s most important ethnic armed groups. Immersion was not only essential 
for identifying how internal contestation within the Kachin and Karen movements has 
driven their external conduct vis-à-vis the state in ways that cannot be identified from 
the outside. Close-range research also provided a rare window into the everyday lives 
of insurgent grassroots, including the middle and lower ranks of both organisations 
and a variety of insurgent affiliates and supporters. This fostered my appreciation of 
the complex social fabric that underpins political violence in the Karen and Kachin 
borderlands, which pushed my analysis beyond a narrow focus on strategising elites 
and their decision-making. Most importantly, it revealed the interdependencies of 
rebel elites with their insurgent grassroots and how these often uneasy elite-grassroots 
relations have driven the strategies of both movements.  
3 Theoretical Arguments and Contributions 
This thesis drew inspiration from a small group of Political Sociology scholars 
working on armed conflict (cf. Schlichte 2009a; Bakonyi and Bliesemann de Guevara 
2014b). Following in their footpath, it adopted the relational heuristics of Elias and 
Bourdieu (Elias 1978; Bourdieu 1990). This ontological perspective revealed 
intertwined and multi-causal social forces that are operating at different levels within 
the wider networks of insurgency in driving collective behaviour. Instead of analysing 
differently situated elite and grassroots actors as self-propelled individuals, they were, 
hence, understood as ontologically embedded within insurgent social figurations, 
which themselves are inextricably rooted within the wider socio-temporal spaces of 
insurgency. Despite these structural attributes, it was shown that insurgent figurations 
are by no means static. On the contrary, uneven and constantly shifting power 
relations continuously rework these figurations along chains of interdependencies 
between differently situated elite and non-elite actors who are part of or affiliated to 
the insurgent social network. This creates dynamics of its own in driving the collective 
conduct of rebel movements in ways that is unintended and unforeseen by any of its 
individual actors. 
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This focus on interdependencies highlighted the reciprocal nature of power 
located within social relations rather than viewing power as the sole property of rebel 
leaders. While insurgent grassroots might not direct or intend to direct the insurgent 
collective as do incumbent and aspirant rebel leaders, this understanding sheds light 
on their agency and indeed power, because their willing support and obedience is 
crucial for sustaining the movements’ asymmetric struggle against the state as well as 
for rebel leaders to struggle against their internal rivals. Emphasising the reciprocal 
and dynamic nature of power relations, therefore, pointed to the most fundamental 
challenge that rebel elites face in their parallel struggle against incumbent states and 
against rival rebel elites: to build and maintain active support for or at least passive 
compliance with their insurgent social order among their insurgent grassroots. 
Questions of legitimate authority have, therefore, become the pivot for analysing the 
power dynamics driving the social processes of both insurgencies in question. Speaking 
with Weber, the thesis has, thus, focused on explaining the conditions under which 
insurgent grassroots take an interest in supporting, partaking, or obeying insurgent 
rulers and their social orders, and under which they do not (cf. Weber 1947, 324). On 
a theoretical level, the thesis hence investigated the modalities of leadership authority 
within rebel movements. 
In contrast to contractualist approaches to non-state authority, which are 
grounded in methodological individualism and explain authority on the basis of 
distributional outcomes, this thesis has found two interlaced, relational processes at 
the core of leadership authority in both rebel groups under comparison: social 
embeddedness and social identification.  
3.1 Embeddedness: Insurgency as Practice 
My analysis showed that ethnonational insurgencies that command territory 
can engage in building sophisticated quasi-states. It was argued that this serves to 
embed their movements within local communities by way of reciprocal exchange 
relations, which can generate legitimacy for the insurgent collective among local 
communities as well as leadership authority of rebel elites among their rank-and-file. 
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Insurgencies do, hence, often not only comprise of guerrilla armies but also of political 
and administrative departments that are in charge of wide-ranging governance 
activities, including the provision of public goods, such as health care and education, 
as well as the creation and management of revenues through taxation. The thesis also 
demonstrated that the degree of embeddedness in and the reciprocal exchange 
relations with local communities can vary across time and space within the same 
movement. While an insurgency might be able to provide security and welfare to local 
communities at one point of time or in one certain area, it might struggle to do so at 
another time or in another region, for instance when losing territory. In regions or at 
times where reciprocal exchange relations are ruptured, the insurgents’ legitimacy 
among local communities is threatened and leadership authority within the movement 
can be undermined. 
The notion of embeddedness explains why authority relations between rebel 
elites and their own lower ranks suffer when established governance arrangements 
between the organisation and local communities are undermined. This is because 
embedding insurgency within the wider social field by way of basic public goods 
provision, including security and health care, shapes local social identities to the extent 
that the distinctions between rebels and civilians are increasingly blurred. In other 
words, insurgency itself becomes part of the wider social context, whose 
internalisation shapes identities, interests, and practices. This seems to be particularly 
important in decades-long protracted armed conflicts and conditions of limited 
statehood, where rebel movements are intertwined with other non-state governance 
arrangements. In such areas, the insurgency “proper” often relies on community-based 
organisations, e.g. relief, development, activist organisations, as well as traditional 
social institutions, e.g. local churches and village elders, for governing local 
communities. In addition, these institutions also fulfil crucial roles for the insurgency 
beyond service provision, including capacity building, legitimisation, and even 
mobilisation. Other non-state authorities can, thus, become important nodes of the 
wider insurgent social network themselves.  
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Commonly assumed distinctions, such as between civilians and combatants or 
between active support and passive obedience are, therefore, inherently blurred. In 
fact, the social spaces of insurgency and non-insurgency can sometimes be conflated 
to the extent that it is impossible to conceptually delineate strict in- and outgroup 
boundaries. Long-term embeddedness of rebel groups in local communities, hence, 
turns insurgency itself into an intrinsic part of the past and present social context, 
through whose internalisation an “insurgent habitus” evolves in local communities. In 
rebel-held territories of protracted armed conflicts, such as Myanmar’s insurgent 
borderlands, people do then not choose to support or partake in rebellion because of the 
better quality of rebel operated hospitals and schools. In fact, studying and teaching at 
a rebel-operated school, nursing at a rebel-operated hospital, or joining ranks of the 
rebel army might often simply appear as the “right” or “normal” thing to do.  
Material exchange by way of service provision can, hence, play an important 
role in establishing legitimate authority. This notwithstanding, my argument disputes 
that the link between reciprocity and authority is primarily or even necessarily based 
on material payoffs, as commonly suggested by contractualist takes of rebel 
governance, where local communities deliberately sell their allegiance to the highest 
bidder among local authorities (cf.Wickham-Crowley 1987; Weinstein 2006; Kalyvas 
2006, 87–110). This is because many members and supporters of insurgency neither 
enter nor leave contractual arrangements in a conscious manner based on 
distributional outcomes. This seems particularly so in situations of protracted armed 
conflict and limited statehood where insurgency has become an intrinsic part of the 
social fabric. Grassroots affiliation to, their support of, and their partake in 
insurgencies can then better be understood as a pre-reflexive routinised practice, 
flowing from the “insurgent habitus”, rather than as the result of conscious 
deliberations over material pay-offs. 
This “insurgent habitus” matches the rebel grassroots’ subjective expectations 
with their objective opportunities derived from their position within the insurgent 
social figuration (cf. Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 130; Elias 1994, 446). 
Shortcomings and injustices that underlie insurgent social orders are, therefore, 
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commonly naturalised and often remain unquestioned, which, in turn stabilises rebel 
authority. This explains why the existence of stark inequalities between wealthy 
leaders and impoverished grassroots alone does not necessarily undermine legitimate 
authority relations, which was for instance evidenced by the self-display of wealthy 
rebel generals that were perceived to be the “good gangsters” among their grassroots. 
When the matching mechanism between expectations and chances produced by the 
insurgent habitus breaks down, however, leadership authority is undermined. As 
witnessed in both cases, this happened when the self-perceived positive insurgent 
social identities were threatened by internal and external sources, which is linked to 
the second relational process this thesis found to be at the core of leadership authority 
within both rebel groups under comparison: social identification.  
3.2 Social Identification: The Struggle for Recognition  
This thesis argued that leadership authority in insurgency movements is inherently 
linked to social identities and the struggle for recognition. In ethnocratic states that 
discriminate against ethnic minorities, it is difficult or even impossible for ethnic 
minority communities to derive a positive self-perceived social identity from the 
affiliation to the dominant political order. As per Honneth, the struggle for due and 
proper recognition, hence, becomes the ‘moral grammar’ of social conflict and serves 
as the motivational basis of collective resistance (cf. Honneth 1996). Affiliation to the 
alternative, insurgent political order can then generate positive social identities for 
grassroots insurgents if the insurgent collective is associated with moral principles, as 
for instance the protection of a particular community, the struggle against unjust state 
structures, and the creation of political order that is perceived as more just. Feeling 
recognised as a valued member of an insurgent collective can, therefore, lead to 
feelings of self-esteem and self-worth among insurgent grassroots. This, in turn, 
generates legitimacy for the insurgent social order and authority for its leaders. If 
positive social identification with the insurgent collective is threatened though, the 
authority of rebel leaders is undermined. In line with Social Identity Theory (cf. 
Branscombe et al. 1999, 46–55), social insurgent identities are threatened when a) the 
moral principles and social standing of the insurgent collective are questioned from 
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sources both within and without the group and/or b) elite interactions are perceived 
as unjust and disrespectful, thus, conveying misrecognition rather than recognition of 
valued group membership to their grassroots.  
As was shown, external social identity threat that questions the moral standing 
and social status of the insurgent collective can, for instance, occur when rebel soldiers 
fail to protect their own local communities. This does not only undermine the 
insurgency’s standing among members of the local communities. It also estranges the 
movement’s own soldiers. This is because their feelings of powerlessness counteract 
their sense of self-esteem derived from being part of collective that is associated with 
the ability to effectuate political agency against powerful and unjust structures. 
Speaking with Wood, rebel soldiers who are unable to protect their own communities 
are threatened in their insurgent identities exactly because they are inhibited in taking 
‘pleasure in agency’, which is ‘the positive affect associated with self-determination, 
autonomy, self-esteem, efficacy, and pride that come from successful assertion of 
intention’ (Wood 2003, 235). It is important to note that, similar to Wood’s 
observations in El Salvador, my own observations in Myanmar suggest that insurgent 
grassroots are not seeking to assert just any intention, but intention that is specifically 
aimed at ‘making history, and not just any history but a history they perceived as more 
just.’ (Wood 2003, 235). Losing this sense of insurgent agency thus severely challenges 
the perceived moral principles and social standing of the insurgent collective among 
its grassroots. This threatens their self-perceived positive social identities derived 
through affiliation to the movement, which, in turn drags on the authority of rebel 
leaders. 
The thesis, moreover, showed how social identity threats can also emerge from 
within the rebel group itself. It was observed how rebel leaders, for instance, 
undermine the ability of their grassroots to associate the collective movement with 
moral principles and social standing if their behaviour is perceived to be motivated by 
personal gains rather than the interest of the insurgent collective and its claimed 
constituency. In addition, self-perceived positive social identification with the 
insurgent collectives can be hampered by elite interaction and communication that is 
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perceived as disrespectful by the insurgent grassroots. This is because the recognition 
as a respected member of an insurgent movement is communicated by rebel leaders in 
their interactions with their grassroots. To be perceived as respectful by their 
grassroots, rebel elites need to behave in accordance to certain beliefs, norms and 
practices that are considered as proper conduct in the wider social context within 
which the insurgency is embedded. If they do not, rebel elites undermine the feelings 
among their insurgent rank-and-file of being recognised as valued group members. 
Analogous to the ways in which the struggle for due and proper recognition can form 
the motivational bedrock for collective resistance against the state, it can, thus, also 
form the moral context for insurgent grassroots to rebel against their own rebel leaders. 
If rebel leaders manage to satisfy their grassroots claim to recognition, their insurgent 
social orders are stable. If they do not, their authority erodes and is likely to be 
challenged from below.  
 
3.3 Contributions to Conflict and Peace Studies 
My analysis contributed to the field of Conflict and Peace Studies in theoretical and 
methodological respects.  
 First, it contributed to the literature on non-state armed groups in the field of 
Conflict and Peace Studies by looking at the ways in which internal contestation over 
authority drives the strategies of insurgency movements vis-à-vis the state. In doing so 
it joined an emerging literature on the micro-level dynamics of armed conflict, 
highlighting the insufficiency of aggregate country-level analyses for explaining 
dynamics of civil war (cf. for instance Kalyvas 2003; Justino, Brück, and Verwimp 
2013; Korf 2011). Tracing the effects of changing politico-economic structures on the 
social relations within armed groups, moreover, shed light on the ways in which micro 
and macro-levels of conflict interact. Most importantly, my thesis has advanced our 
understanding of the role that authority relations between differently situated rebel 
elites and their grassroots play in the internal contestation within armed groups. 
Although Scott argued years ago that students of revolutionary movements need to 
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focus on the often uneasy relations between rebel leaders and their rank-and-file for 
understanding dynamics of political violence (Scott 1979), scholarship has hitherto 
seen little advance in this respect. While the literature on armed group fragmentation 
mostly focuses on the horizontal relations between rival rebel leaders (Pearlman 2009; 
Cunningham, Bakke, and Seymour 2012; Bakke, Cunningham, and Seymour 2012), 
the literature on rebel governance is primarily concerned with the vertical relations 
between insurgents’ and local communities (Wickham-Crowley 1987; Mampilly 2011; 
Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly 2015). In contrast, this thesis has analysed the vertical 
relations within insurgency movements themselves - i.e. between differently situated 
leaders, their rank-and-file soldiers and affiliated supporters. In analysing how rival 
rebel leaders capture and lose legitimacy within their own movements, the thesis has 
addressed an important but under-researched issue in the scholarship on non-state 
armed groups.  
Second, the thesis has contributed to the Political Sociology literature in 
Conflict and Peace Studies by focusing on the social dynamics of armed conflict and 
collective violence (Wood 2008; Schlichte 2009a; Beck 2009; Bakonyi and Bliesemann 
de Guevara 2014a). In order to understand the politics of legitimacy and authority 
within armed groups, I have drawn inspiration from other conflict scholars and built 
on the relational sociologies of Elias and Bourdieu (Schlichte 2009a; Bakonyi and 
Bliesemann de Guevara 2014b). I combined this approach with the insights from 
Honneth’s recognition theory for understanding political conflicts. Scholars of 
International Relations have already demonstrated the relevance of recognition for 
explaining dynamics of inter-state conflict (Haacke 2005; Gustafsson 2015; 
Lindemann and Ringmar 2015). Understanding the struggle for recognition as a core 
motivation of social conflict also dovetails with early scholarship in the field of 
Conflict and Peace Studies, as for instance Edward Azar’s perspective that views the 
‘denial of separate identity of parties involved in the political process’ as the core driver 
of protracted social conflicts (Azar 1986, 30). This notwithstanding, the use of 
recognition theory in the sub-field of Conflict and Peace Studies has hitherto been 
surprisingly limited (Strömbom 2014). By grounding itself within this understanding, 
Chapter VII - Conclusion 
247 | P a g e  
 
my thesis forwarded an understanding of the internal dynamics of armed group that 
goes beyond rationalistic elite politics. While the literature on micro-conflict dynamics 
has shifted our analytical focus to a lower spatial level, most of it remains grounded 
within the framework of methodological individualism, an ontology that has also 
underpinned the aggregate unitary actor models of civil war. Instead of understanding 
strategic choices of armed groups as the sum of self-propelled insurgent leaders, in 
rather technical, ahistorical, and non-contextual accounts, my own analysis has 
analysed insurgency as a social process between differently situated but interdependent 
elite and non-elite actors. This relational understanding of violence stressed the 
reciprocal nature of power within constantly fluctuating social figurations that are 
embedded within their wider socio-temporal space. In contrast to rationalist 
perspectives, this thesis emphasised process over outcome and identity over interests 
for explaining leadership authority in rebel movements.  
Third, my thesis has contributed to our understanding of insurgency and armed 
conflict with extensive field research and an ethnographically-informed qualitative 
methodology. By doing so it addressed one of the biggest challenges for studying the 
internal politics of armed groups: the lack of empirical data, which is why most studies 
on the topic have hitherto relied on secondary material (Kalyvas 2003; Bakke, 
Cunningham, and Seymour 2012; Pearlman 2009). While some scholars have based 
their analyses of armed groups on interviews (Reno 2009; Mampilly 2011; Staniland 
2014), ethnographic approaches to the study of insurgency remain the exception 
(Wood 2003; Beck 2009; Shah 2013). This study thus contributed to our understanding 
of non-state armed groups through ethnographic immersion and sensitivity, which 
provided a rare window into the everyday lives of insurgent grassroots, including the 
middle and lower ranks and a variety of insurgent affiliates and supporters. This 
fostered an appreciation of the complex social fabric that underpins political violence. 
Most importantly, it revealed the agency of insurgent grassroots and their 
interdependencies with rebel elites, i.e. the social process of insurgency that develops 
a momentum of its own in driving political violence. That said, the same 
ethnographically-informed approach also points to the existence of many more 
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unidentified political objects that remain concealed in Myanmar’s restive borderlands 
as well as in other conflicts. To be sure, close-range field research on armed conflict in 
general, and on non-state armed groups in particular, entails practical and ethical 
challenges. It also needs to be noted that while getting access to ethnic armed groups 
in Myanmar turned out to be feasible for this research, this might not be the case in 
many other non-state armed groups, particularly when the researcher her- or himself 
is perceived as part of the immediate conflict. Yet, there seem to be little alternatives 
for generating knowledge about the actual people involved in political violence. While 
my thesis, hence, contributed to the emerging interest in ethnographic inquiry in 
International Relations (Vrasti 2008; I. B. Neumann 2012; Nair 2015), it also suggests 
that the potentials of Ethnography for adjusting the discipline’s traditional birds-eye 
perspective remain far from exhausted. 
4 Implications  
The thesis’s findings have two main implications for engaging insurgent movements 
in Myanmar and elsewhere: 1) Counterinsurgency approaches that aim at fragmenting 
rebel groups and eroding rebel authority might weaken insurgency, but are likely to be 
counterproductive to finding peaceful solutions to civil war and might even reproduce 
violence. 2) In a similar vein, economic development is no silver bullet for ending civil 
wars. While an economistic approach to counterinsurgency, conflict resolution, and 
peacebuilding can achieve temporary stabilisation of armed conflict, it is inapt to 
address the root causes of political violence and might instead exacerbate already 
existing grievances.  
4.1 Fragmentation and Violence  
The first implication of my thesis is that a counterinsurgency approach aimed at 
fragmenting rebel groups is undesirable for finding a durable peaceful solution to 
armed conflict. On the contrary, organisational coherence and leadership authority 
within rebel groups is pivotal for transforming violent into non-violent organisations. 
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States and international stakeholders involved in peace processes, therefore, need to 
be careful not to erode their negotiations partners’ authority within the latter’s’ own 
movements. This means that inclusivity in peace negotiations cannot be limited to 
inviting representatives of all warring parties to the negotiation table. In order to 
prevent spoiling dynamics by excluded actors, more care needs be taken to also engage 
factions internal to those armed groups that are already negotiating in order to ensure 
that their leaders can garner support for a peaceful settlement within their movement. 
This stands in stark contrast to common counterinsurgency practices that aim 
at breaking the organisational structures of insurgency by decapitating key leaders via 
targeted killings as well as dis-embedding insurgency from local support networks by 
denying them access to local communities (Staniland 2014, 39–41). While this 
approach might be able to weaken insurgencies militarily, it is ill-suited to end conflict 
and is instead likely to produce new violence. This is because group fragmentation 
incites outbidding and spoiler dynamics, which prolong rather than shorten civil 
wars.193 The ongoing civil war in Syria is a case in point. Part of its intractability stems 
from the extremely fragmented actor landscape, where rebel groups have proliferated 
as a result of organisational splintering. Competing for local support, these multiple 
groups resort to outbidding, i.e. the increased use of violence in order to sway local 
communities by signalling their strength and resolve (Perkoski, July 30, 2015). At the 
same time, the multiplicity of warring factions complicates peace negotiations by 
increasing the likelihood of spoiling dynamics, i.e. hard-line factions using violence to 
derail talks between moderates (Berti, August 11, 2013). 
This thesis has shown that the internal fragmentation of rebel groups further 
exacerbates these dynamics. Its findings also demonstrated that settlements that seem 
stable from the outside might be highly contested from within fragmented movements. 
This is because leaders of fragmented groups only represent part of their insurgent 
collective. Even though they might enter peace negotiations with the state, their 
contentious relationship with rival co-leaders and their limited authority among their 
                                                        
193 For a theoretical discussion on outbidding and spoiling cf. Kydd and Walter 2006. 
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own rank-and-file puts their actual ability to implement decisions reached on the 
negotiation table into question. In addition, taking an accommodating stance towards 
the state can further the erosion of moderate rebel leaders’ authority among their rank-
and-file and exacerbate factional tensions with less accommodating elements within 
the same movement. While rebel fragmentation, hence, complicates peace 
negotiations, it might also derail already agreed settlements at a later point in time.  
 In the case of Myanmar, peace negotiators should, therefore, not only expand 
negotiations to include all ethnic armed groups, including the ones previously 
excluded from the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, as for instance the Ta’ang 
National Liberation Army (TNLA) negotiations, and the ones that did not sign the 
accord in 2015, as for instance the KIO. They also need to secure the participation of 
factions internal to the groups that are officially negotiating already, such as the 
internal opposition of the KNU, surrounding the KNLA’s Fifth Brigade. These 
findings are, however, also relevant for peace negotiations beyond the Myanmar 
context. In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, for instance, negotiations have not least 
been complicated due to the leadership competition between Fatah and Hamas 
(Pearlman 2009). Factional tensions within both organisations, as for instance 
between the political and armed wings of Hamas as well as its Gaza and diaspora-
based arms, have further complicated negotiations and contributed to the escalation 
of conflict on several occasions (Berti 2013, 125, 2014). In the run-up to the 2016 peace 
accord between the Colombian Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia 
(FARC) and the Colombian government, political commentators were also worried 
that fragmentation would lead to internal spoiling dynamics of disaffected elements 
within the movement (Findley, Ponce de Leon, and Denly, September 05, 2016). 
While this has eventually not derailed the historic signing of Colombia’s peace accord, 
rebel fragmentation still poses one of the greatest challenges to the country’s fragile 
peace.  
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4.2 The Pitfalls of Economistic Approaches to Peace 
The second major implication of this thesis is linked to the above: attempts to buy rebel 
leaders out of violence with economic incentives can be contra-productive to peace. 
This is because they can spark organisational fragmentation and erodes the authority 
of moderate rebel leaders that are engaging in negotiations. Following the argument 
above, organisational coherence and leadership authority are, however, pivotal for 
ensuring the stability of peace agreements and for facilitating the transformation of 
violent political organisations into non-violent political organisations.  
Contemporary practices of counterinsurgency, conflict resolution, and 
peacebuilding have, however, often taken an economistic approach. This is not least 
because scholars and policy-making have increasingly viewed economic profiteering 
rather than ideology or political grievances as the main driving force behind 
contemporary civil wars, which effectively depoliticised political violence (Collier and 
Hoeffler 1998; Duffield 2002; Kaldor 1999).194 The development of the spoiler concept 
is particularly telling. Originally proposed by Stephen Stedman, spoilers attempt to 
sabotage peace negotiations for their own self-interest (Stedman 1997). With the 
increasing popularity of economistic explanations for violence, spoilers have also 
become understood as having vested interests in maintaining their assets in war 
economies (Zahar 2008). Scholars have since asked how peace can come about if 
conflict is so profitable. One seemingly obvious answer is to buy “greedy” spoilers off 
with economic incentives (Le Billon and Nicholls 2007; Wennmann 2009). In addition 
to the idea that insurgents can be corrupted into peace with economic incentives, the 
                                                        
194 Since then, Collier’s famous proposition that present-day insurgency is motivated by economic 
“greed” rather than political grievances (Collier and Hoeffler 1998), has been criticized on 
theoretical, methodological, and normative grounds (Cramer 2002; Keen 2012). While this 
discussion cannot dwell at length upon this debate, it is important to note that more recent 
quantitative research has refuted Collier’s founding argument, showing that grievances – if 
measured differently - are indeed a major driver of civil wars (Stewart and Fitzgerald 2001). 
Nevertheless, economistic understandings of conflict have become deeply engrained in conflict 
studies, while identity explanations have taken a backseat. As Siniša Malešević points out, 
contemporary conflict analyses, thus, rarely features identity as an ‘original generator of social 
action, but always a second order reality, a reactive force to some other supposedly primary cause’ 
(Malešević 2008, 107). 
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economistic strand of conflict studies has shaped the practice of peacebuilding. 
Goodhand criticised this ‘economization of peace-building (and counter-insurgency) 
efforts’ before, writing that  
‘from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)’s 
promotion of quick-impact projects to win hearts and minds in 
Afghanistan, to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s 
declared ambition to foster economic peace with the Palestinians, 
there is an assumption that economic incentives can somehow 
override or short-circuit complex political processes.’ (Goodhand 
2013, 234) 
The idea that rebel leaders can be co-opted with business opportunities, and 
marginalised communities swayed with the fruits of economic development, has 
indeed taken root in counterinsurgency doctrine around the world. This thesis has 
shown how Myanmar’s generals have based their ceasefire politics around mutual 
business collaboration with rebel leaders and securitised development of borderland 
peripheries. Analogously, Turkish state officials have long viewed economic 
underdevelopment and societal backwardness as the core causes of conflict in its 
Kurdish periphery (Aydin and Emrence 2015, 89–106). This framing therefore invited 
a two-pronged counterinsurgency approach against the insurgent Kurdish Partiya 
Karkerên Kurdistanê (PKK). Similar to Naypyidaw’s engagement with restive ethnic 
minorities in its borderlands, Ankara has committed simultaneously to the co-optation 
of Kurdish elites by material benefits and a ‘developmentalist agenda that would 
civilize the Kurds and bring peace and prosperity to these backward regions’ (Aydin 
and Emrence 2015, 89-106: 90). Sri Lanka’s government also attempted to co-opt 
leaders of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and garner support among 
local Tamil communities during the country’s failed peace process in the early and 
mid-2000s, wrongly believing that ‘the fruits of economic development would corrupt 
the LTTE and undermine Tamil nationalism’ (Goodhand 2013, 234). When distilling 
his lessons from Iraq, US counterinsurgency mastermind Lt.-Gen. David Petraeus 
stressed the importance of economic strategies to win civil wars by stating that: 'Money 
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is ammunition. In fact, depending on the situation, money can be more important than 
real ammunition' (Petraeus 2006). 
The implications of his thesis, however, illustrate the pitfalls of an economistic 
engagement with insurgency. While some political economy scholars referred to the 
economic dimensions of Myanmar’s ceasefires as examples that show how economic 
interests can be harnessed for fostering accommodation between warring factions 
(Sherman 2003; Snyder 2006; Le Billon and Nicholls 2007), my findings demonstrate 
that they have become part of the conflict’s intractability. This is because the co-
optation of rebel leaders with business incentives tends to undermine their leadership 
authority by alienating their own grassroots. This is likely to drive dynamics of 
organisational fragmentation leading to further violence. Economic development can, 
moreover, not override political grievances centred on political marginalisation and 
competing nationalisms. On the contrary, if the political demands and grievances of 
rebel movements and their support base are not appreciated, the economistic 
engagement of armed groups is likely to cause new violence, as was evidenced in the 
case of the KIO.  
In order to end this cycle of conflict, Myanmar’s new NLD-led administration 
needs to strengthen moderate elements within ethnic armed movements by creating 
trust among ethnic minority communities in a genuine peace process. It, therefore, 
needs to break with the country’s overly economistic engagement with insurgency and 
focus on the political solution of conflict, including negotiations of federal 
constitutional amendments, that addresses the claims to due and proper recognition of 
minority rights and identities which have long been the core driver behind ethnic 
minority nationalism and armed rebellion against an authoritarian and ethnocratic 
state. That said, economic issues are still of major importance to end a conflict that is 
as much about the political sources of economic marginalisation as it is about 
ethnicity. This, however, means inclusive economic development and the 
institutionalisation of revenue-sharing that contributes towards overcoming the 
grievances of local communities rather than business agendas surrounding resource 
extraction for the profit of a small elite.  
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5 Concluding Remarks  
When I started this project in 2012, it was unclear where Myanmar’s transition process 
was heading to and how this would affect the country’s decades-old ethnic conflict. 
Four years down the road, there are still no easy answers to these questions. Since 
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and her NLD came to power in March 2016, she has pushed 
for a remake of the country’s peace process. Her efforts have thus far culminated in a 
large peace conference, which was styled as the “21st century Panglong conference”. 
In contrast to the relatively small original Panglong conference of 1947, the meeting 
that was held in August and September 2016 in Naypyidaw featured some 1,800 
delegates from government, the Tatmadaw and 17 ethnic armed organisations. 
Unsurprisingly then, it did not end with a binding agreement. At best, it marked the 
beginning of a long and windy road towards national conciliation. Progression on this 
road however, remains uncertain. At the time of writing, fierce battles are taking place 
in Kachin State with the Tatmadaw pushing against KIA positions with heavy artillery 
shelling and aerial bombardments. Moreover, ongoing clashes between a Karen 
splinter group and Myanmar’s armed forces threaten the embryonic stability at the 
Thai border (Nyein Nyein, September 23, 2016; Yan Naing, September 12, 2016).  
 To be sure, one major reason for the continuation of armed conflict is the 
limited control that Myanmar’s new democratic government exerts over the country’s 
armed forces. As Tatmadaw generals have long profited from perpetuating conflict, it 
was naïve to belief that they would simply give up their sources of power and wealth. 
At the same time, Myanmar’s rebel groups do not exhibit much willingness to 
demobilise either. In fact, many of them seem determined to continue with their armed 
struggle. In order to end this cycle of violence, the findings of this thesis suggest that 
we need to reconceptualise the phenomenon of insurgency. The strategies of rebel 
groups are not driven by presumably self-propelled rebel leaders who act according to 
fixed preference sets but by a social interaction process between differently situated 
rebel leaders and their grassroots. The latter include rebel soldiers on the frontline, 
teachers in rebel-held schools, and local youth singing revolutionary songs in karaoke 
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bars. Their motivation is driven by the struggle for due and proper recognition. In order 
to find peaceful solutions to Myanmar’s civil war as well as other comparable conflicts, 
policy-makers need to push for settlements that address the identity needs of insurgent 
grassroots. As scholars we can contribute to this endeavour by developing a better 
understanding of political violence and its social foundations. This thesis has shown 
that listening to insurgents themselves is an important first step into this direction.  
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Interviews 
 
Karen National Union (KNU) 
1. Colonel, KNLA central command, Mae Sot, Thailand, 12 October 2013 
2. P'doh Saw Dot Lay Mu, Head of Agriculture Department, Mae Sot, 
Thailand, 12 October 2013 
3. KNLA officer, Mutraw (Brigade 5), 21 October 2013. 
4. KNU education workers (group interview), Mutraw (Brigade 5), Karen State, 
Myanmar, 21 October 2013 
5. KNU administrator, Mutraw (Brigade 5), 23 October 2013. 
6. Karen leader, Executive Committee member (asked not to be identified), Mae 
Sot, Thailand, 25 October 2013 
7. P’doh Saw David Tharckabaw, Head of Alliance Affairs Department, Mae 
Sot, Thailand, 08 November 2013 
8. P’doh Saw Lah Say, Head of Education and Culture Department, Mae Sot, 
Thailand, 15 November 2013 
9. Chairman of Thaton District (Brigade 1), Mae Sot, Thailand, 24 November 
2013 
10. Chairman of Duplaya District (Brigade 6), Law Keeh Lah, Karen State, 
Myanmar, 04 December 2013 
11. Saw Mahn Nyei Maung, Executive Committee, Law Keeh Lah, Karen State, 
Myanmar, 04 December 2013 
12. Saw Roger Khin, Executive Committee, Law Keeh Lah, Karen State, 
Myanmar, 04 December 2013 
13. P’doh Saw Hkwe Htoo Win, General Secretary, Law Keeh Lah, Karen State, 
Myanmar, 04 December 2013 
14. Chairman of Toungoo District (Brigade 2), Law Keeh Lah, Karen State, 
Myanmar, 05 December 2013 
15. P’doh Saw Mahn Ba Tun, Head of Forestry Department, Law Keeh Lah, 
Karen State, Myanmar, 05 December 2013 
16. P’doh Saw Ker Ler, Head of Mining Department, Law Keeh Lah, Karen 
State, Myanmar, 05 December 2013 
17. Lt.-Gen. Baw Kyaw Heh, KNLA Vice-Chief of Staff, Law Keeh Lah, Karen 
State, Myanmar, 06 December 2013 
 
Other Karen 
1. Activist, Chiang Mai, Thailand, 30 October 2014 
2. Activist, Chiang Mai, Thailand, 31 October 2014 
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3. Col. Saw Dah, KNU/KNLA Peace Council (KPC), Mae Sot, Thailand, 11 
November 2013 
4. Teacher, Mae La refugee camp, Thailand, 10 December 2013 
5. Headmaster, Mae La refugee camp, Thailand, 10 December 2013 
6. Activist, Yangon, Myanmar, 22 January 2014 
7. NGO worker, Yangon, Myanmar, 22 January 2014 
8. Priest, Dawei, Karen State, Myanmar, 28 January 2014 
9. NGO worker, Dawei, Karen State, Myanmar, 28 January 2014 
 
Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO)  
1. Dr La Ja, General Secretary, Chiang Mai, Thailand, 14 November 2014 
2. Member of Technical Advisory Team, Myitkyina, Kachin State, Myanmar, 
10 February 2014 
3. Member of Technical Advisory Team, Myitkyina, Kachin State, Myanmar, 
12 February 2014 
4. Deputy Manager, Buga Company, Myitkyina, Kachin State, Myanmar, 14 
February 2014 
5. Salang Kaba Doi Pisa, Head of Humanitarian Affairs, Laiza, Kachin State, 
14 March 2014 
6. Sara Kaba Sum Lut Gam, Senior Negotiator, Laiza, Kachin State, 17 March 
2014 
7. KIA Officer, officer school outside Laiza, Kachin State, Myanmar, 17 March 
2014 
8. Zawng Buk Than, Head of Economics Department, Laiza, Kachin State, 25 
March 2014 
9. KIA Officer, drug eradication centre outside Laiya, Kachin State, Myanmar, 
27 March 2014 
10. U La Nan, Joint General Secretary, Laiza, Kachin State, 29 March 2014 
11. Co-founder of the Education and Economic Development for Youth, 
Maijayang, Kachin State, Myanma, 04 April 2014 
 
Other Kachin 
1. Kachin elder, Myitkyina, Kachin State, Myanmar,07 February 2014 
2. Dr. Manam Tu Ja, Chairman of the Kachin State Development Party 
(KSDP), Myitkyina, Kachin State, Myanmar, 10 February 2014 
3. Staff, Kachin Baptist Convention, Myitkyina, Kachin State, Myanmar, 10 
February 2014 
4. Religious leader, Myitkyina, Kachin State, Myanmar, 13 February 2014 
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5. Kachin businessmen and members of Peace Talk Creation Group (group 
interview), Myitkyina, Kachin State, Myanmar, 13 February 2014 
6. Humanitarian worker, Laiza, Kachin State, Myanmar, 12 March 2014 
7. Activist, Laiza, Kachin State, Myanmar, 28 March 2014 
8. Religious Leader, Laiza, Myanmar, 29 March 2014 
9. Journalist, Maijayang, Kachin State, Myanmar, 03 April 2014 
 
Other 
10. Paul Keenan, Independent Researcher, Chiang Mai, Thailand, 31 October 
2013 
11. Chairmen of the Tak Chamber of Commerce (group interview), Mae Sot, 
Thailand, 03 December 2013 
12. Tim Schröder, Myanmar Peace Support Initiative (MPSI), Yangon, 
Myanmar, 22 January 2014   
   
 
259 | P a g e  
 
References 
 
41 Karen Civil Society Organisations. 2015. “Karen Civil Society Has Lost Trust in 
the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) Negotiations as a Gateway to 
Political Dialogue.” News release. April 10. Accessed July 05, 2016. 
http://www.burmapartnership.org/2015/10/karen-civil-society-has-lost-trust-in-
the-nationwide-ceasefire-agreement-nca-negotiations-as-a-gateway-to-political-
dialogue/. 
Adam Smith International. 2015. “Institutional Regulatory Assessment of the 
Extractive Industries in Myanmar.” Accessed October 14, 2015. http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2015/05/1
4/090224b082e8301f/1_0/Rendered/PDF/Main0report.pdf. 
AFP, Thomas Kean, and Zaw W. Than. 2012. “Govt, KNU sign ceasefire.” 
Myanmar Times, January 16. Accessed January 19, 2016. 
http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/1258-govt-knu-sign-
ceasefire.html?start=1. 
Allina-Pisano, Jessica. 2009. “How to Tell an Axe Murderer: An Essay on 
Ethnograghy, Truth, and Lies.” In Schatz 2009, 53–75. 
Almond, Gabriel A., and G. B. Powell. 1978. Comparative Politics: System, Process, and 
Üolicy. London: Little, Brown. 
Anderson, Robert, and Mandy Sadan. 2016. “Historical perspectives on war and 
peace in Kachin space: The First Kachin Ceasefire, 1944-1961.” In Sadan 2016b, 
34–53. 
Apter, David. 1997. “Political violence in analytical perspective.” In The 
legitimization of violence, edited by David Apter and M. Nicholson, 1–32. New 
York: NYU Press. 
Arjona, Ana, Nelson Kasfir, and Zachariah Mampilly. 2015. Rebel Governance in Civil 
War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Asad, Talal. 1972. “Market model, class structure and consent: a reconsideration of 
Swat political organisation.” Man 7 (1): 74–94. 
Asian Development Bank. 2010. “Strategy and Action plan for the Greater Mekong 
Subregion East–West Economic Corridor.” Accessed January 19, 2016. 
https://openaccess.adb.org/bitstream/handle/11540/1035/gms-action-plan-east-
west.pdf?sequence=1. 
   
 
260 | P a g e  
 
Aung Naing Oo. June 5, 2014. “Myanmar’s Labyrinthine Peace Process.” The 
Irrawaddy, June 5, July 2014. Accessed July 10, 2014. 
http://www.irrawaddy.org/contributor/myanmars-labyrinthine-peace-
process.html. 
Aydin, Aysegul, and Cem Emrence. 2015. Zones of Rebellion: Kurdish Insurgents and the 
Turkish State. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Azar, Edward E. 1986. “Protracted International Conflicts: Ten Propositions.” In 
International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice, edited by Edward E. Azar and 
Tom W. Burton, 28–39. Brighton: Wheatsheaf. 
Bakke, Kristin M., Kathleen G. Cunningham, and Lee J. M. Seymour. 2012. “A 
plague of initials: Fragmentation, cohesion, and infighting in civil wars.” 
Perspectives on Politics 10 (02): 265–83. 
Bakonyi, Jutta, and Berit Bliesemann de Guevara, eds. 2014a. A micro-sociology of 
violence: Deciphering patterns and dynamics of collective violence. London: Routledge. 
———. 2014b. “The Mosaic of Violence: An Introduction.” In A micro-sociology of 
violence: Deciphering patterns and dynamics of collective violence, edited by Jutta 
Bakonyi and Berit Bliesemann de Guevara, 1–17: London: Routledge. 
Barth, Fredrik. 1959. Political leadership among Swat Pathans. London: Athlone Press. 
Baruah, Sanjib. 2003. “Confronting constructionism: ending india's naga war.” 
Journal of Peace Research 40 (3): 321–38. 
Bayard de Volo, Lorraine, and Edward Schatz. 2004. “From the inside out: 
Ethnographic methods in political research.” Political Science and Politics 37 (02): 
267–71. 
Beck, Teresa K. 2009. “Staging Society: Sources of Loyalty in the Angolan 
UNITA.” Contemporary Security Policy 30 (2): 343–55. 
Beech, Hannah. 2012. “A Cease-Fire in Burma: Is One of the World’s Oldest 
Insurgencies About to End?” Time, December 1. Accessed May 07, 2012. 
http://world.time.com/2012/01/12/a-ceasefire-in-burma-is-one-of-the-worlds-
oldest-insurgencies-about-to-end/. 
Berti, Benedetta. 2013. Armed political organizations: From conflict to integration. Boston: 
JHU Press. 
———. 2013. “Syria' Rebels: Between Talks and a Hard Place.” The National Interest, 
August 11. Accessed October 08, 2015. 
http://www.inss.org.il/uploadImages/systemFiles/Syria's%20Rebels-
   
 
261 | P a g e  
 
%20Between%20Talks%20and%20a%20Hard%20Place%20-
%20An%20article%20By%20Benedetta%20Berti%20in%20The%20National%20I
nterest.pdf. 
———. 2014. “Hamas and Israel at the Brink.” Accessed November 07, 2014. 
http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2014/07/08/hamas-and-israel-at-
brink/hfe3. 
Boehler, Patrick. 2012. “The Kachin borderlands.” Le Monde diplomatique (English 
Edition), 06/2012. Accessed January 22, 2016. 
http://mondediplo.com/2012/06/12kachin. 
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1990. The Logic of Practice. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Bourdieu, Pierre, and Loïc J. D. Wacquant. 1992. An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Branscombe, Nyla R., Naomi Ellemers, Russell Spears, and Bertjan Doosje. 1999. 
“The context and content of social identity threat.” In Ellemers, Spears, and 
Doosje 1999, 35–58. 
Brenner, David. 2015. “Ashes of co-optation: from armed group fragmentation to the 
rebuilding of popular insurgency in Myanmar.” Conflict, Security & Development 15 
(4): 337–58. 
Buchanan, John, Tom Kramer, and Kevin Woods. 2013. “Developing Disparity: 
Regional Investment in Burma's Borderlands.” Accessed April 28, 2013. 
http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/tni-2013-
burmasborderlands-def-klein-def.pdf. 
Burke, Jason. 2012. “Burma signs ceasefire with Karen rebels in step towards ending 
isolation.” The Guardian, December 2. Accessed August 03, 2016. 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jan/12/burma-ceasefire-karen-rebels-
isolation. 
Burma News International. 2013a. “Deciphering Myanmar's Peace Process.” 
Accessed October 05, 2015. 
http://mmpeacemonitor.org/images/pdf/deciphering_english_2013.pdf. 
———. 2013b. “Economics of Peace and Conflict.” Accessed July 21, 2014. 
http://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/images/pdf/economics_peace_and_conflict_e
ng.pdf. 
———. 2014. “Deciphering Myanmar's Peace Process.” Accessed October 05, 2015. 
http://mmpeacemonitor.org/images/pdf/deciphering_myanmar_peace_process_
2014.pdf. 
   
 
262 | P a g e  
 
———. 2015. “Deciphering Myanmar's Peace Process.” Accessed September 05, 
2016. http://mmpeacemonitor.org/images/2015/august/deci-myan-peace-
process-2015-eng.pdf. 
Callahan, Mary P. 2003. Making enemies: War and state building in Burma. Ithaca, 
N.Y., London: Cornell University Press. 
Callahan, Mary P. 2007. Political authority in Burma's ethnic minority states: devolution, 
occupation and coexistence. Washington: East-West Center; Singapore: ISEAS.  
Chachavalpongpun, Pavin. 2011. “Look East Meets Look West: Indian–Southeast 
Asian Relations in Flux.” The International Spectator 46 (2): 91–108. 
Chandra, Kanchan. 2006. “What is ethnic identity and does it matter?” Annual 
Review of Political Science 9: 397–424. 
Cheesman, Nick, Nicholas Farrelly, and Trevor Wilson, eds. 2014. Debating 
democratization in Myanmar 233: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
Cheesman, Nick, Monique Skidmore, and Trevor Wilson, eds. 2012. Myanmar's 
Transition: Openings, Obstacles and Opportunities. Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies. 
Chenoweth, Erica, and Adria Lawrence, eds. 2010. Rethinking Violence: States and 
Non-State Actors in Conflict. Belfer Center studies in international security. Edited by 
Adria Lawrence. Cambridge Mass. MIT Press. Conference Proceeding. 
Chouvy, Pierre-Arnaud. 2009. Opium: uncovering the politics of the poppy: Harvard 
University Press. 
Christie, Clive J. 2001. Ideology and Revolution in Southeast Asia 1900-80. Richmond: 
Curzon. 
Clifford, James. 1996. “Anthropology and/as Travel.” Etnofoor (2): 5–15. 
———. 1997. “Spatial practices: fieldwork, travel, and the disciplining of 
anthropology.” In Anthropological locations: Boundaries and grounds of a field science, 
edited by Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson, 185–222. Berkeley: Univ of California 
Press. 
Clifford, James, and George E. Marcus. 1986. Writing culture: the poetics and politics of 
ethnography: a School of American Research advanced seminar: Univ of California Press. 
Collier, Paul. 1999. “Doing Well out of War: Paper prepared for Conference on 
Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, London, April 26-27, 1999.” 
   
 
263 | P a g e  
 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTKNOWLEDGEFORCHANGE/Resourc
es/491519-1199818447826/28137.pdf. 
Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 1998. “On economic causes of civil war.” Oxford 
Economic Papers 50 (4): 563–73. doi:10.1093/oep/50.4.563. 
———. 2004. “Greed and grievance in civil war.” Oxford Economic Papers 56 (4): 
563–95. doi:10.1093/oep/gpf064. 
Connor, Walker. 1994. Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding. New York: 
Princeton University Press. 
Core, Paul. 2009. “Burma/Myanmar: Challenges of a Ceasefire Accord in Karen 
State.” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 28 (3): 95–105. 
Cramer, Christopher. 2002. “Homo Economicus Goes to War: Methodological 
Individualism, Rational Choice and the Political Economy of War.” World 
Development 30 (11): 1845–64. 
Cramer, Christopher J. 2006. Civil War Is Not a Stupid Thing: Accounting for Violence in 
Developing Countries. London: Hurst & Co. 
Cunningham, David E., Kristian S. Gleditsch, and Idean Salehyan. 2009. “It takes 
two: A dyadic analysis of civil war duration and outcome.” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution. 
Cunningham, Kathleen G., Kristin M. Bakke, and Lee J. M. Seymour. 2012. “Shirts 
Today, Skins Tomorrow Dual Contests and the Effects of Fragmentation in Self-
Determination Disputes.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 56 (1): 67–93. 
Dapice, David. 2012. “China and Yunnan Economic Relations with Myanmar and 
the Kachin State: Powering the Peace Process.” Harvard Ash Center. Accessed 
April 30, 2016 
http://www.ash.harvard.edu/extension/ash/docs/chinayunnan.pdf. 
Dean, Karin. 2005. “Spaces and territorialities on the Sino–Burmese boundary: 
China, Burma and the Kachin.” Political Geography 24 (7): 808–30. 
———. 2012. “Struggle over Space in Myanmar: Expanding State Territoriality after 
the Kachin Ceasefire.” In Autonomy and armed separatism in South and Southeast 
Asia, edited by Michelle A. Miller, 113–35: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
Deignan, Herbert G. 1943. Burma: Gateway to China. War Background Studies 17. 
Washington D.C.: The Smithsonian institution. 
   
 
264 | P a g e  
 
Driscoll, Jesse. 2012. “Commitment Problems or Bidding Wars? Rebel 
Fragmentation as Peace Building.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 56 (1): 118–49. 
Duffield, Mark. 2002. “War as a network enterprise: the new security terrain and its 
implications.” Cultural Values 6 (1-2): 153–65. 
Duffield, Mark R. 2001. Global Governance and the New Wars: The merging of 
development and security. London: Zed books. 
Duncan, Christopher R., ed. 2008. Civilizing the margins: Southeast Asian government 
policies for the development of minorities. Singapore: NUS Press. 
———. 2008. “Legislating Modernity among the Marginalized.” In Duncan 2008, 
1–23. 
Egreteau, Renaud. 2006. “Instability at the Gate: India’s troubled Northeast and its 
external connections.” CSH India Occasional Papers. Accessed April 30, 2016. 
http://egreteau.com/images/Documents%20PDF/CSH%20OP%20-
%20n%B016.pdf. 
Eh, Na. 2013. “KNU Gen. Baw Kyaw Heh Exposes How Ceasefire Agenda has 
Shifted to Business.” Karen News, May 9. http://karennews.org/2013/09/knu-
gen-baw-kyaw-heh-exposes-how-ceasefire-agenda-has-shifted-to-business.html/. 
Elias, Norbert. 1978. What is Sociology? New York: Columbia University Press. 
———. 1983. The Court Society. Oxford: Blackwell. 
———. 1994. The Civilizing Process. New ed. Edited by Edmund Jephcott. Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
Ellemers, Naomi, Russell Spears, and Bertjan Doosje, eds. 1999. Social identity: 
Context, commitment, content. Malden, MA: Malden, MA : Blackwell Publishers. 
Emirbayer, Mustafa. 1997. “Manifesto for a Relational Sociology.” American Journal 
of Sociology 103 (2): 281–317. 
Farrelly, Nicholas. 2012. “Ceasing Ceasefire? Kachin Politics Beyond the 
Stalemate.” In Myanmar's Transition: Openings, Obstacles and Opportunities, edited by 
Nick Cheesman, Monique Skidmore, and Trevor Wilson, 52–71. Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
Findley, Mike, Alejandro Ponce de Leon, and Mike Denly. 2016. “Spoiler Alert: 
Combatant Fragmentation and the Colombian Peace Process.” Political Violence @ 
a Glance, September 5. Accessed September 08, 2016. 
   
 
265 | P a g e  
 
https://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2016/05/09/spoiler-alert-combatant-
fragmentation-and-the-colombian-peace-process/. 
Formoso, Bernard. 2010. “Zomians or zombies? What future exists for the peoples of 
the Southeast Asian Massif?” Journal of Global History 5 (02): 313–32. 
Geertz, Clifford. 1974. “" From the Native's Point of View": On the Nature of 
Anthropological Understanding.” Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and 
Sciences, 26–45. 
Gerring, John. 2007. Case Study Research: Principles and practices: Cambridge: 
University Press Cambridge. 
Global Witness. 2003. “A Conflict of Interest: The Uncertain Future of Burma's 
Forests.” Accessed January 22, 2016. https://www.globalwitness.org/en-
gb/archive/conflict-interest-english/. 
———. 2005. “A Choice for China: Ending the destruction of Burma's northern 
frontier forests.” Accessed January 22, 2016. 
https://www.globalwitness.org/documents/11694/a_choice_for_china_low_res.p
df. 
———. 2009. “A Disharmonious Trade: China and the continued destruction of 
Burma's northern frontier forests.” A Review by Global Witness 2006-2009. 
Accessed September 30, 2014. 
http://www.globalwitness.org/library/disharmonious-trade-china-and-continued-
destruction-burmas-northern-frontier-forests. 
———. 2014. “What Future for Rubber Production in Myanmar?” Accessed 
January 19, 2016. 
https://www.globalwitness.org/documents/10527/what_future_english_version_
april_2014_0.pdf. 
———. 2015. “Jade: Myanmar's "Big State Secret".” Accessed January 22, 2016. 
https://www.globalwitness.org/documents/18153/Jade_full_report_online_hi_re
s_xDRGxt7.pdf. 
Goodhand, Jonathan. 2000. “Research in Conflict Zones: Ethics and 
Accountability.” Forced Migration Review 8 (4): 12–16. 
———. 2005. “Frontiers and Wars: The Opium Economy in Afghanistan.” Journal 
of Agrarian Change 5 (2): 191–216. 
———. 2008. “War, peace and the places in between: Why borderlands are central.” 
In Whose peace? Critical perspectives on the political economy of peacebuilding, edited by 
Michael Pugh, Neil Cooper, and Mandy Turner, 225–44: Springer. 
   
 
266 | P a g e  
 
———. 2013. “Stabilising a Victor’s Peace.” In Stabilization operations, security and 
development: States of fragility, edited by Robert Muggah, 215–43: Routledge. 
Gravers, Mikael. 1999. Nationalism as political paranoia in Burma: An essay on the 
historical practice of power. 2nd. Richmond: Curzon. 
———. 2016. “The Karen and the Ceasefire Negotiations: Mistrust, Internal 
Segmentation, and Clinging to Arms.” In Sadan 2016b. 
Guevara, Ernesto. 2002. Guerrilla Warfare. London: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers. 
Guha, Ranajit. 1988. “The Prose of Counter-Insurgency.” In Selected Subaltern 
Studies, edited by Ranajit Guha and Gayatri C. Spivak, 45–88. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Gustafsson, Karl. 2015. “Recognising recognition through thick and thin: Insights 
from Sino-Japanese relations.” Cooperation and Conflict, 0010836715610594. 
Haacke, Jürgen. 2005. “The Frankfurt School and International Relations' on the 
centrality of recognition.” Review of International Studies 31 (01): 181–94. 
Haacke, Jürgen. 2006. “Myanmar's foreign policy towards China and India.” Adelphi 
Paper 46 (381): 25–39. 
Haacke, Jürgen. 2010. “China's role in the pursuit of security by Myanmar's State 
Peace and Development Council: boon and bane?” The Pacific Review 23 (1): 113–
37. 
Hagmann, Tobias, and Didier Péclard. 2010. “Negotiating statehood: dynamics of 
power and domination in Africa.” Development and Change 41 (4): 539–62. 
Hedström, Jenny. 2016. “'Before I joined the armey I was like a child': Militarism 
and Women's Rights in Kachinlandsaa.” In Sadan 2016b. 
Honneth, Axel. 1996. The struggle for recognition: The moral grammar of social conflicts: 
MIT Press. 
Horowitz, Donald L. 1985. Ethnic groups in conflict. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
Human Rights Watch. 2002. “My Gun Was As Tall As Me: Child Soldiers in 
Burma.” Accessed January 19, 2016. 
https://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/burma/Burma0902.pdf. 
   
 
267 | P a g e  
 
———. 2005. “They Came and Destroyed Our Village Again': The Plight of 
Internally Displaced Persons in Karen State.” Accessed January 19, 2016. 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/burma0605/burma0605.pdf. 
International Crisis Group. 2003. “Myanmar Backgrounder: Ethnic Minority 
Politics.” Accessed January 10, 2014. 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/burma-
myanmar/052%20Myanmar%20Backgrounder%20Ethnic%20Minority%20Politic
s.pdf. 
———. 2004. “Myanmar: Aid to the Border Areas.”. 
———. 2011. “Myanmar: A New Peace Iniative.” Accessed July 21, 2014. 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/burma-
myanmar/214%20Myanmar%20-%20A%20New%20Peace%20Initiative.pdf. 
———. 2012. “A Tentative Peace in Myanmar’s Kachin Conflict.” Accessed 
September 30, 2014. http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-
asia/burma-myanmar/b140-a-tentative-peace-in-myanmars-kachin-conflict.pdf. 
———. 2014. “Myanmar's Military: Back to the Barracks.” Accessed October 14, 
2015. http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/burma-
myanmar/b143-myanmar-s-military-back-to-the-barracks.pdf. 
Jones, Lee. 2014a. “Explaining Myanmar's regime transition: the periphery is 
central.” Democratization 21 (5): 780–802. 
———. 2014b. “The political economy of Myanmar’s transition.” Journal of 
Contemporary Asia 44 (1): 144–70. 
———. 2016. “Understanding Myanmar's Ceasefires: Geopolitics, Political 
Economy and State-Building.” In Sadan 2016b. 
Jost, John T., and Brenda Major. 2001. “Emerging Perspectives on the Psychology 
of Legitimacy.” In Jost and Major 2001, 3–32. 
———, eds. 2001. The Psychology of Legitimacy: Emerging perspectives on ideology, justice, 
and intergroup relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Jourde, Cédric. 2009. “The Ethnographic Sensibility: Overlooked Authoritarian 
Dynamics and Islamic Ambivalences in West Africa.” In Schatz 2009, 201–16. 
Justino, Patricia, Tilman Brück, and Philip Verwimp. 2013. A micro-level perspective on 
the dynamics of conflict, violence, and development. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
   
 
268 | P a g e  
 
Kachin Development Networking Group. 2007. “Valley of Darkness: Gold Mining 
and Militarization in Burma's Hugawng Valley.” Accessed February 10, 2014. 
http://www.burmacampaign.org.uk/reports/ValleyofDarkness.pdf. 
———. 2012. “Sham Tiger Reserve in Burma: A lesson on American aid in 
Myanmar.” Accessed January 10, 2014. http://www.kdng.org/publication/286-
sham-tiger-reserve-in-burma-a-lesson-on-american-aid-in-myanmar-.html. 
Kachin News Group. 2011. “KIO appeals to China to stop Myitsone dam 
construction.” Kachin News Group, November 24. Accessed February 10, 2014. 
http://www.kachinnews.com/news/1916-kio-appeals-to-china-to-stop-myitsone-
dam-construction.html. 
Kachinland News. 2013. “No ceasefire agreement without reaching the stage for 
political discussions, said Kachin public.” Kachinland News, May 29. Accessed 
January 22, 2016. http://kachinlandnews.com/?p=23286. 
Kaiser, Tania. 2013. “Researching Social Life in Protracted Exile: Experiences with 
Sudanese Refugees in Uganda 1996-2008.” In Mazurana, Jacobsen, and Gale 
2013, 106–28. 
Kaldor, Mary. 1999. New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era. Cambridge: 
Polity Press. 
Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2003. “The ontology of “political violence”: action and identity 
in civil wars.” Perspective on Politics 1 (03): 475–94. 
———. 2006. The Logic of violence in civil war. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
———. 2010. “Foreword: Internal Conflict and Political Violence: New 
Developments in Research.” In Chenoweth and Lawrence 2010, xi–xiii. 
Karen Human Rights Group. 2014. “Truce or Transition? Trends in human rights 
abuse and local response in southeast Myanmar since the 2012 ceasefire.” 
Accessed October 14, 2015. http://khrg.org/sites/default/files/khrg_-
_truce_or_transition_-_english.pdf. 
———. 2015. “‘With only our voices, what can we do?’: Land confiscation and local 
response in southeast Myanmar.” Accessed August 30, 2015. 
http://www.khrg.org/2015/06/with-only-our-voices-what-can-we-do-land-
confiscation-and-local-response. 
Karen News. 2013. “KNU leader - Govt’s Labels Nationwide Ceasefire 
‘untimely’…: Interview with Padoh Naw Ziporah Sein.” July 10. Accessed 
   
 
269 | P a g e  
 
January 19, 2016. http://karennews.org/2013/10/knu-leader-govts-labels-
nationwide-ceasefire-untimely.html/. 
———. 2014. “KNU Decision to Withdraw from UNFC Undemocratic Claims 
Karen Women’s Organisation.” Karen News, March 10. Accessed January 19, 
2016. http://karennews.org/2014/10/knu-decision-to-withdraw-from-unfc-
undemocratic-claims-karen-womens-organisation.html/. 
———. 2014. “Karen Army General explains rational behind reformation of ethnic 
alliance and recent conflict with govt troops.” Karen News, October 21. Accessed 
October 21, 2014. http://karennews.org/2014/10/karen-army-general-explains-
rational-behind-reformation-of-ethnic-alliance-and-recent-conflict-with-govt-
troops.html/. 
Keen, David. 2005. Conflict and collusion in Sierra Leone: James Currey/Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
———. 2012. “Greed and grievance in civil war.” International Affairs 88 (4): 757–77. 
doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2012.01100.x. 
Keyes, Charles F. 2004. “Afterword: The politics of 'Karen-ness' in Thailand.” In 
Living at the edge of Thai society: The Karen in the highlands of northern Thailand, edited 
by Claudio Delang, 210–18. London: RoutledgeCurzon. 
King, Gary, Keohane O. Robert, and Sidney Verba. 1994. Designing Social Inquiry: 
Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton N.J: Princeton University Press. 
Kolås, Åshild. 2007. “Burma in the Balance: The Geopolitics of Gas*.” Strategic 
Analysis 31 (4): 625–43. 
Korf, Benedikt. 2011. “Resources, violence and the telluric geographies of small 
wars.” Progress in Human Geography, 0309132510394120. 
Korf, Benedikt, and Timothy Raeymaekers. 2013. Violence on the margins: States, 
conflict, and borderlands. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Kramer, Tom. 2009. “Neither War Nor Peace: The Future Of The Cease-Fire 
Agreements In Burma.” Accessed January 22, 2013. 
http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/ceasefire.pdf. 
Krause, Keith, and Jennifer Milliken. 2009. “Introduction: the challenge of non-state 
armed groups.” Contemporary Security Policy 30 (2): 202–20. 
Kudo, Toshihiro. 2013. “Border Development in Myanmar: The Case of the 
Myawaddy-Mae Sot Border.” In Border Economies in the Greater Mekong Sub-region, 
edited by Masami Ishida, 186–206. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
   
 
270 | P a g e  
 
Kydd, Andrew H., and Barbara F. Walter. 2006. “The strategies of terrorism.” 
International Security 31 (1): 49–80. 
Lambrecht, Curtis W. 2000. “Destruction and violation: Burma's border 
development policies.”. 
———. 2008. “Oxymoronic Development: The Military as Benefactor in the Border 
Regions of Burma.” In Duncan 2008, 150–81. 
Le Billon, Philippe, and Eric Nicholls. 2007. “Ending ‘Resource Wars’: Revenue 
Sharing, Economic Sanction or Military Intervention?” International Peacekeeping 
14 (5): 613–32. doi:10.1080/13533310701753941. 
Leach, Edmund. 1954. Political systems of highland Burma: A study of Kachin social 
structure. Harvard: Harvard University Press. 
Leach, Edmund R. 1960. “The frontiers of “Burma”.” Comparative Studies in Society 
and History 3 (01): 49–68. 
Lian Hmung Sakhong. 2003. In Search of Chin Identity: A study in religion, politics and 
ethnic identity in Burma. Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies. 
Lieberman, Victor. 2010. “A zone of refuge in Southeast Asia? Reconceptualizing 
interior spaces.” Journal of Global History 5 (02): 333–46. 
Lindemann, Thomas, and Erik Ringmar, eds. 2015. International politics of recognition: 
Routledge. 
Lintner, Bertil. 2013. “Rain for Myanmar's peace parade.” Asia Times Online, June 
25. Accessed April 10, 2014. 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/SEA-01-250613.html. 
———. 2015. Great Game East: India, China, and the Struggle for Asia's Most Volatile 
Frontier. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
———. 2015. “The core issues not addressed.” The Irrawaddy, May 5. Accessed 
August 30, 2015. http://www.irrawaddy.org/magazine/the-core-issues-not-
addressed.html. 
Lintner, Bertil, and Hseng N. Lintner. 1990. Land of Jade: A journey through insurgent 
Burma. Edinburgh: Kiscadale. 
Lwin, Ei Ei Toe. 2014. “Will Karen National Union stay in UNFC?” Myanmar 
Times, August 9. Accessed January 19, 2016. 
http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/in-depth/11574-will-karen-national-union-
stay-in-unfc.html. 
   
 
271 | P a g e  
 
———. 2014. “KNU to meet amid split fears.” October 17. Accessed January 19, 
2016. http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/11982-knu-calls-
urgent-meeting-for-reunification.html. 
MacGinty, Roger, and Oliver Richmond. 2013. The liberal peace and post-war 
reconstruction: myth or reality? London: Routledge. 
Malešević, Siniša. 2008. “The Sociology of New Wars? Assessing the causes and 
objectives of contemporary violent conflicts.” International Political Sociology 2 (2): 
97–112. 
Mamdani, Mahmood. 1996. Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the legacy of 
late colonialism. N.Y.: Princeton University Press. 
Mampilly, Zachariah C. 2011. Rebel rulers: Insurgent governance and civilian life during 
war. Ithaca, N.Y. Ithaca, N.Y. : Cornell University Press. 
Marcus, George E. 1995. “Ethnography in/of the world system: The emergence of 
multi-sited ethnography.” Annual review of anthropology, 95–117. 
Marx, Karl, Friedrich Engels, and Robert C. Tucker, eds. 1978. The Marx-Engels 
reader. 2nd ed. New York, London: W.W. Norton. 
Maton, Karl. 2014. “Habitus.” In Pierre Bourdieu: Key Concepts, edited by Michael J. 
Grenfell, 48–64. London: Routledge. 
Mazurana, Dyan, Lacey Gale, and Karen Jacobsen. 2013. “A View from Below: 
Conducting Research in Conflict Zones.” In Mazurana, Jacobsen, and Gale 2013, 
3–26. 
Mazurana, Dyan, Karen Jacobsen, and Lacey Gale, eds. 2013. Research methods in 
conflict settings: A view from below. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
McCargo, Duncan. 2008. Tearing apart the land: Islam and legitimacy in Southern 
Thailand. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
McCoy, Alfred W. 1972. The politics of heroin in Southeast Asia. New York: Harper & 
Row. 
Meehan, Patrick. 2011. “Drugs, insurgency and state-building in Burma: Why the 
drugs trade is central to Burma's changing political order.” Journal of Southeast 
Asian Studies 42 (03): 376–404. 
———. 2015. “Fortifying or Fragmenting the State? The Political Economy of the 
Opium/Heroin Trade in Shan State, Myanmar, 1988–2013.” Critical Asian Studies 
47 (2): 253–82. 
   
 
272 | P a g e  
 
Menkhaus, Ken. 2007. “Governance without government in Somalia: Spoilers, state 
building, and the politics of coping.”. 
Michaud, Jean. 2010. “Editorial–Zomia and beyond.” Journal of Global History 5 (02): 
187–214. 
Millen, Raymond A., and Steven Metz. 2004. Insurgency and counterinsurgency in the 
21st century: reconceptualizing threat and response: Strategies Studies Institute. 
Moore, Barrington. 1978. Injustice: The social bases of obedience and revolt. London: 
Macmillan. 
Muckian, Martin J. 2006. “Structural vulnerabilities of networked insurgencies: 
Adapting to the new adversary.” Parameters 36 (4): 14. 
Mutu Say Poe. 2015. “KNU Chairman Speech At The Nationwide Ceasefire 
Agreement Signing Ceremony.” News release. October 15. Accessed July 05, 
2016. http://www.knuhq.org/knu-chairman-speech-at-the-nationwide-ceasefire-
agreement-signing-ceremony/. 
Myanmar Peace Monitor. n.d. “DKBA-5: Democratic Karen Benevolent Army.” 
Accessed October 01, 2016. 
http://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/background/ethnic-grievances/159-dkba-5. 
Mydans, Seth. 2012. “Burmese Government and Ethnic Rebel Group Sign Cease-
Fire.” The New York Times, December 2. Accessed July 05, 2016. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/13/world/asia/myanmar-signs-truce-with-
ethnic-rebel-group.html?_r=0. 
Myers, Steven L., and Seth Mydans. 2012. “U.S. Restores Full Ties to Myanmar 
After Rapid Reforms.” The New York Times, January 13. Accessed May 07, 2016. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/14/world/asia/united-states-resumes-
diplomatic-relations-with-myanmar.html. 
Myoe, Maung A. 2009. Building the Tatmadaw: Myanmar armed forces since 1948. 
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
Nair, Deepak. 2015. “Saving the States' Face: An Ethnography of the 
ASEAN Secretariat and Diplomatic Field in Jakarta.” PhD thesis, London School 
of Economics and Political Science. 
Neumann, Cecilie B., and Iver B. Neumann. 2015. “Uses of the self: two ways of 
thinking about scholarly situatedness and method.” Millennium-Journal of 
International Studies 43 (3): 798–819. 
   
 
273 | P a g e  
 
Neumann, Iver B. 2012. At home with the diplomats: inside a European foreign ministry. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Nyein Nyein. 2016. “Burma Army Offensive Continues in Kachin State: KIA 
Spokesman.” The Irrawaddy, September 23. Accessed September 26, 2016. 
http://www.irrawaddy.com/burma/burma-army-offensive-continues-in-kachin-
state-kia-spokesman.html. 
Obama, Barack. 2012. “Statement by the President on the Release of Burmese 
Political Prisoners.” News release. January 13. Accessed May 07, 2016. 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/13/statement-president-
release-burmese-political-prisoners. 
Pachirat, Timothy. 2009. “The Political in Political Ethnography: Dispatches from 
the Kill Floor.” In Schatz 2009, 143–62. 
Paulle, Bowen, Bart van Heerikhuizen, and Mustafa Emirbayer. 2012. “Elias and 
Bourdieu *.” Journal of Classical Sociology 12 (1): 69–93. 
doi:10.1177/1468795X11433708. 
Peace Donor Support Group. 2013. “Myanmar Joint Peacebuilding Needs 
Assessment.” Accessed September 26, 2016. 
http://www.themimu.info/sites/themimu.info/files/documents/Ref_Doc_Deskt
op_Review_of_Needs_and_Gaps_in_Conflict-Affected_Parts_PDSG_Jul2013.pdf. 
Pearlman, Wendy. 2009. “Spoiling inside and out: internal political contestation and 
the Middle East peace process.” International Security 33 (3): 79–109. 
———. 2010. “A Composite-Actor Approach to Conflict Behavior.” In Chenoweth 
and Lawrence 2010, 212–35. 
Perkoski, Evan. 2015. “Militant Proliferation and the Consequences of 
Fragmentation.” Political Violence @ a Glance, July 30. Accessed September 08, 
2016. https://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2015/07/30/militant-proliferation-
and-the-consequences-of-fragmentation/. 
Petraeus, David. 2006. “Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering 
in Iraq.” 
http://www.army.mil/professionalWriting/volumes/volume4/april_2006/4_06_
2.html. 
Phan, Zoya. 2013. “Listen to us: Stop ignoring our concerns.” Karen News, 
December 10. Accessed April 28, 2014. http://karennews.org/2013/10/listen-to-
us-stop-ignoring-our-concerns.html/. 
   
 
274 | P a g e  
 
Rabinow, Paul. 2007. Reflections on fieldwork in Morocco. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
Radio Free Asia. 2012. “Three Karen Officials Removed.” Radio Free Asia, April 10. 
Accessed January 19, 2016. http://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/karen-
10042012152054.html. 
Rampton, Dave. 2016. “Social Orders, State Formation and Conflict: Buddhist 
Nationalism in Sri Lanka and Myanmar.” Working Paper. 
Ranger, Terence O. 1983. “The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa.” In The 
invention of tradition, edited by Terence O. Ranger and Eric J. Hobsbawm. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Reno, William. 2009. “Explaining Patterns of Violence in Collapsed States.” 
Contemporary Security Policy 30 (2): 356–74. 
Richmond, Oliver. 2012. A post-liberal peace. London: Routledge. 
Richmond, Oliver P., Stefanie Kappler, and Annika Björkdahl. 2015. “The ‘Field’in 
the Age of Intervention: Power, Legitimacy, and Authority Versus the ‘Local’.” 
Millennium-Journal of International Studies, 0305829815594871. 
S' PhanShaung. 2013. “KNU 7th Brigade – open for business.” Karen News, 
September 7. Accessed January 19, 2016. http://karennews.org/2013/07/knu-
7th-brigade-open-for-business.html/. 
Sadan, Hkpankha T. 2016. “Kachin Student Life at Yangon University in the Mid-
1990s.” In Sadan 2016b. 
Sadan, Mandy. 2007. “Constructing and Contesting the Category “Kachin” in the 
Colonial and Post-Colonial Burmese State.” In Exploring Ethnic Diversity in Burma, 
edited by Mikael Gravers, 34–73. Copenhagen: NIAS Press. 
———. 2013. Being and Becoming Kachin: Histories Beyond the State in the Borderworlds 
of Burma. Oxford: British Academy and Oxford University Press. 
———. 2016a. “Introduction.” In Sadan 2016b. 
———, ed. 2016b. War and Peace in the Borderlands of Myanmar: The Kachin Ceasefire 
1994-2011. Copenhagen: NIAS Press. 
Sai Wansai. 2015. “Panghsang Summit Meeting, Joint Monitoring Committee and 
Military Offensives.” November 4. Accessed July 05, 2016. 
http://english.panglong.org/?p=13087. 
   
 
275 | P a g e  
 
San Juan, Epifanio. 2006. “Ethnic Identity and Popular Sovereignty Notes on the 
Moro Struggle in the Philippines.” Ethnicities 6 (3): 391–422. 
Schatz, Edward. 2009. “Introduction: Ethnographic Immersion and the Study of 
Politics.” In Schatz 2009, 1–22. 
———, ed. 2009. Political ethnography: What immersion contributes to the study of power: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Schlichte, Klaus. 2009a. In the Shadow of Violence: the politics of armed groups. 
Frankfurt: Campus Verlag. 
———. 2009b. “With the State against the State? The formation of armed groups.” 
Contemporary Security Policy 30 (2): 246–64. 
———. 2012. “The Limits of Armed Contestation: power and domination in armed 
groups.” Geoforum 43 (4): 716–24. 
Schlichte, Klaus, and Ulrich Schneckener. 2015. “Armed Groups and the Politics of 
Legitimacy.” Civil Wars 17 (4): 409–24. 
Scott, James C. 1979. “Revolution in the Revolution.” Theory and Society 7 (1-2): 97–
134. 
———. 1985. Weapons of the weak everyday forms of peasant resistance. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
———. 2009. The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast 
Asia. Yale agrarian studies. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Scott, James G. 1900. Gazetter of Upper Burma and the Shan States. 1 vol. Rangoon: 
Superintendent, Government Printing, Burma. Assissted by J.P. Hardiman. 
Shah, Alpa. 2013. “The intimacy of insurgency: beyond coercion, greed or grievance 
in Maoist India.” Economy and Society 42 (3): 480–506. 
doi:10.1080/03085147.2013.783662. 
Shaw, Rosalind. 2007. “Memory frictions: localizing the truth and reconciliation 
commission in Sierra Leone.” International Journal of Transitional Justice 1 (2): 183–
207. 
Sherman, Jake. 2003. “Burma: Lessons from the Ceasefires.” In The Political Economy 
of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance, edited by Karen Ballentine and Jake 
Sherman, 225–55. London: Boulder Co. Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
   
 
276 | P a g e  
 
Smith, Martin. 1999. Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity. 2nd ed. Dhaka: 
Dhaka University Press. 
———. 2007. State of Strife: The Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict in Burma. Policy Papers 36. 
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
———. 2016. “Reflections on the Kachin Ceasefire: A Cycle of Hope and 
Disappointment.” In Sadan 2016b. 
Smith, Nicholas H. 2012. “Introduction: A Recognition-Theoretic Research 
Programme for the Social Sciences.” In Recognition theory as social research: 
investigating the dynamics of social conflict, edited by Shane O'Neill and Nicholas H. 
Smith, 1–20. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Snyder, Richard. 2006. “Does lootable wealth breed disorder? A political economy 
of extraction framework.” Comparative Political Studies 39 (8): 943–68. 
South, Ashley. 2008. Ethnic Politics in Burma: States of Conflict. Routledge 
contemporary Southeast Asia series. Abingdon: Routledge. 
———. 2011. “Burma’s Longest War: Anatomy of the Karen Conflict.” Accessed 
January 22, 2013. Amsterdam: Transnational Institute. 
http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/Burma's%20Longest%20
War.pdf. 
———. 2013. Mon Nationalism and Civil War in Burma: the golden sheldrake: Routledge. 
Staniland, Paul. 2014. Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Stedman, Stephen J. 1997. “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes.” International 
Security 22 (2): 5–53. doi:10.2307/2539366. 
Steinberg, David I., and Hongwei Fan. 2012. “Modern China-Myanmar relations: 
dilemmas of mutual dependence.”. 
Stewart, Frances, and Valpy Fitzgerald. 2001. War and Underdevelopment. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Strömbom, Lisa. 2014. “Thick recognition: Advancing theory on identity change in 
intractable conflicts.” European Journal of International Relations 20 (1): 168–91. 
Tajfel, Henri E. 1978. Differentiation between social groups: Studies in the social psychology 
of intergroup relations. London: Academic Press. 
   
 
277 | P a g e  
 
Taw, David. 2005. “Strategic considerations for the Karen National Union.” In 
Choosing to engage: Armed groups and peace processes, edited by Robert Ricigliano, 40–
43. Accord 16. http://www.c-
r.org/downloads/Accord16_9Choosingtoengage_2005_ENG.pdf. Accessed 
October 01, 2015. 
Taylor, Robert H. 1982. “Perceptions of Ethnicity in the Politics of Burma.” 
Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science 10 (1): 7–22. 
———. 1987. The State in Burma. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 
———. 2006. “Colonial forces in British Burma: A national army postponed.” In 
Colonial Armies in Southeast Asia, edited by Karl Hack and Tobias Rettig, 185–200. 
London: Routledge. 
Thant Myint-U. 2011. Where China meets India: Burma and the new crossroads of Asia: 
Macmillan. 
The Border Consortium. 2012. “Changing Realities, Poverty and Displacement in 
South East Burma/Myanmar.” Accessed July 09, 2016. 
http://www.theborderconsortium.org/media/10374/report-2012-idp-en-1-.pdf.  
Tilly, Charles. 2003. The Politics of Collective Violence. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
———. 2008a. Contentious Performances. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
———. 2008b. Explaining Social Processes. Boulder CO: Paradigm Publishers. 
Transnational Institute. 2015. “Political Reform and Ethnic Peace in 
Burma/Myanmar: The Need for Clarity and Achievement.” Accessed October 14, 
2015. https://www.tni.org/files/download/bpb14-web-042015.pdf. 
Turner, John C. 1999. “Current issues in research on social identity and self-
categorization theories.” In Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje 1999, 6–34. 
Tyler, Tom R. 2001. “A Psychological Perspective on the Legitimacy of Institutions 
and Authorities.” In Jost and Major 2001, 416–36. 
U.S. Army. 2014. “Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies: FM 3-24/MCWP 3-
33.5, C1.” Accessed October 05, 2015. https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-
24.pdf. 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 2014. “Southeast Asia Opium Survey 
2014: Lao PDR, Myanmar.” Accessed October 14, 2014. 
   
 
278 | P a g e  
 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/sea/SE-ASIA-opium-
poppy-2014-web.pdf. 
Uphoff, Norman. 1989. “Distinguishing Power, Authority & Legitimacy: Taking 
Max Weber at His Word by Using Resources-Exchange Analysis.” Polity 22 (2): 
295–322. doi:10.2307/3234836. 
Van Maanen, and John. 1991. “Playing Back the Tape: Early Days in the Field.” In 
Experiencing fieldwork: An inside view of qualitative research, edited by William Shaffir 
and Robert A. Stebbins 124. London: Sage Publications. 
Van Schendel, Willem. 2002. “Geographies of knowing, geographies of ignorance: 
jumping scale in Southeast Asia.” Environment and planning D: society and space 20 
(6): 647–68. 
Vrasti, Wanda. 2008. “The Strange Case of Ethnography and International 
Relations.” Millennium-Journal of International Studies 37 (2): 279–301. 
Wallensteen, Peter, and Margareta Sollenberg. 1998. “Armed conflict and regional 
conflict complexes, 1989-97.” Journal of Peace Research 35 (5): 621–34. 
Walton, Matthew J. 2008. “Ethnicity, conflict, and history in Burma: The myths of 
Panglong.” Asian Survey 48 (6): 889–910. 
———. 2013. “The “Wages of Burman-ness:” Ethnicity and Burman privilege in 
contemporary Myanmar.” Journal of Contemporary Asia 43 (1): 1–27. 
———. 2016. “Reflections of Ceasefires Past, Present, and Future.” In Sadan 2016b. 
Weber, Max. 1947. The theory of economic and social organization. London: W. Hodge. 
Part I of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, translated from German by A. R. Henderson 
and Talcott Parsons. 
———. 1980. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie. 
Tübingen: Mohr. 
Wedeen, Lisa. 2009. “Ethnography as Interpretive Enterprise.” In Schatz 2009, 75–
94. 
Weinstein, Jeremy M. 2006. Inside Rebellion: The politics of insurgent violence. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Weng, Lawi. 2015. “Karen Leader: ‘If They Keep Attacking Us, There Will Be No 
Peace’: Interview with David Tharckabaw.” The Irrawaddy, May 11. Accessed July 
05, 2016. http://www.irrawaddy.com/burma/karen-leader-if-they-keep-attacking-
us-there-will-be-no-peace.html. 
   
 
279 | P a g e  
 
———. 2015. “Kachin Group Questions Govt Murder Probe, Forms Investigation 
Team.” The Irrawaddy, November 2. Accessed January 22, 2016. 
http://www.irrawaddy.com/burma/kachin-group-questions-govt-murder-probe-
forms-investigation-team.html. 
———. 2015. “A Taxing Trip in Karen State.” The Irrawaddy, December 6. Accessed 
January 19, 2016. http://www.irrawaddy.com/burma/a-taxing-trip-in-karen-
state.html. 
Wennmann, Achim. 2009. “Getting Armed Groups to the Table: Peace processes, 
the political economy of conflict and the mediated state.” Third World Quarterly 30 
(6): 1123–38. 
Wickham-Crowley, Timothy. 1987. “The rise (and sometimes fall) of guerrilla 
governments in Latin America.” Sociological Forum 2 (3): 473–99. 
doi:10.1007/BF01106622. 
Wimmer, Andreas. 1997. “Who Owns the State? Understanding Ethnic Conflict in 
Post‐Colonial Societies.” Nations and Nationalism 3 (4): 631–66. 
Wood, Elisabeth J. 2003. Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
———. 2006. “The ethical challenges of field research in conflict zones.” Qualitative 
Sociology 29 (3): 373–86. 
———. 2008. “The social processes of civil war: The wartime transformation of 
social networks.” Annual Review of Political Science 11: 539–61. 
———. 2009. “Ethnographic Research in the Shadow of Civil War.” In Schatz 2009, 
119–42. 
Woods, Kevin. 2011. “Ceasefire capitalism: military–private partnerships, resource 
concessions and military–state building in the Burma–China borderlands.” Journal 
of Peasant Studies 38 (4): 747–70. 
———. 2016. “The Commercialisation of Counterinsurgency: Battlefield Enemies, 
Business Bedfellows in Kachin State, Burma.” In Sadan 2016b. 
Yan, Naing. 2012. “KNU Bridges Internal Rift.” October 29. Accessed January 19, 
2016. http://www.irrawaddy.com/burma/knu-bridges-internal-rift.html. 
———. 2013. “Thousands Greet Convoy of Ethnic Leaders in Myitkyina.” The 
Irrawaddy, March 11. Accessed February 10, 2014. 
http://www.irrawaddy.org/kia/thousands-greet-convoy-ethnic-leaders-
myitkyina.html. 
   
 
280 | P a g e  
 
———. 2013. “Who’s Behind the Bombings in Burma?” The Irrawaddy, October 18. 
Accessed August 30, 2014. http://www.irrawaddy.org/news-analysis/whos-
behind-bombings-burma.html. 
———. 2014. “Is Naypyidaw Learning From Sri Lanka to End Civil War?” The 
Irrawaddy, January 29. Accessed January 19, 2016. 
http://www.irrawaddy.com/interview/naypyidaw-learning-sri-lanka-end-civil-
war.html. 
———. 2014. “The Growing Friendship Between Naypyidaw and the KNU.” The 
Irrawaddy, June 6. Accessed June 18, 2014. 
http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/multimedia-burma/growing-friendship-
naypyidaw-knu.html. 
———. 2014. “Karen Rebel Groups Plan Military Cooperation.” The Irrawaddy, 
October 14. Accessed January 10, 2015. 
http://www.irrawaddy.com/burma/karen-rebel-groups-plan-military-
cooperation.html. 
———. 2016. “More Than 3,000 Villagers Flee Escalating Conflict in Karen State.” 
The Irrawaddy, September 12. Accessed September 26, 2016. 
http://www.irrawaddy.com/burma/more-than-3000-villagers-flee-escalating-
conflict-in-karen-state.html. 
Yanow, Dvora. 2009. “Dear Author, Dear Reader: The Third Hermeneutic in 
Writing and Reviewing Ethnography.” In Schatz 2009. 
Zahar, Marie-Joelle. 2008. “Reframing the Spoiler Debate in Peace Processes.” In 
Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Peace Processes and Post-War Reconstruction, edited 
by Darby John and Roger Mac Ginty. 2nd ed., 159–77. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Zartman, I. W. 1989. Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa. Updated ed. 
Council on Foreign Relations books. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Zedong, Mao. 1961. On Guerrilla Warfare. Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 
Zelditch, Morris. 2001. “Theories of Legitimacy.” In Jost and Major 2001, 33–53. 
Zaw Oo and Win Min. 2007. Assessing Burma's ceasefire accords.  Washington: East-
West Center; Singapore: ISEAS.  
